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Abstract
This dissertation examines the development of armaments produc­
tion in Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia and the implications 
thereof regarding military import dependency, arms exports, and 
defence production cooperation among developing arms producers.
The dissertation concentrates on strategic and political 
issues of Third world arms production and does not deal with 
questions of arms industries and development.
The dissertation makes three broad arguments:
First, that truly indigenous arms production hardly exists 
in the three case study countries. I illustrate this by showing 
the heavy dependence of Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia on 
foreign technology, licences, foreign components and foreign 
capital for all major —  and many minor —  weapons manufacturing 
projects undertaken since the 1960s.
Second, that despite billions of dollars invested in build­
ing up respective defence industry sectors, all three states (or 
successor states in the case of Yugoslavia) remained dependent on 
imports of most of the same major weapons systems at the end of 
the Cold War as they were 30 years earlier. Embargo^ of systems 
such as fighter aircraft, ships and tanks by the old arms suppli­
er oligopoly was the key reason for the initiation of arms pro­
duction in all three countries. But the cancellation or failure 
of key arms manufacturing projects in all three countries, such 
as the Israeli Lavi fighter, means that far from achieving weap­
ons supply independence, this dependency is set to continue into 
the next century
Third, that despite the above two points, Israel, South 
Africa, Yugoslavia and other Third World arms producers have 
played an expanding and important role the world arms trade and 
proliferation of military technology since the 1970s. This 
seeming paradox will be illustrated by contrasting Israel's 
growing dependency on the United States for advanced weapons, 
capital and technology from 1970 to 1990, with the Israeli role 
as the single most important UN arms sanctions buster to South 
Africa from 1977 to the early 1990s; as an arms supplier to 
Argentina during the 1982 Falklands / Malvinas War, to Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq War and to Guatemala after the 1977 U.S. 
arms cut-off.
The dissertation concludes that while some arms production 
is bound to continue in all three states (or successor states), 
major weapons manufacturing projects are a thing of the past and 
will be initiated —  if at all —  with the cooperation of arms 
industries from the very industrialised powers which Israel, 
South Africa and Yugoslavia sought total independence from 
through indigenous arms production during the Cold War.
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Part One —  Introduction
Introduction
This dissertation examines the development of armaments produc­
tion in Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia and the implications 
thereof regarding military import dependency, arms exports, and 
weapons production co-operation among developing arms producers.
As long as the threat and use of force remains an element of 
world affairs, the significance of defence industries to the 
study of international relations remains considerable, insofar as 
such industries contribute in allowing states to deter attack and 
use force.1 The rapid growth of arms production in the develop­
ing countries in the past two decades makes these states increas­
ingly important subjects in the field of strategic studies.
During the 1980s, Third World arms manufacturers produced 
between 5 and 10 percent of all arms sold to developing countries 
—  up from a tiny fraction of this figure in the 1960s.  ^ Coun­
tries like Israel and Brazil are listed among the top ten or 
fifteen arms exporters in the world, with respective annual 
military sales worth over $1 billion. As a result, the oligopoly 
of Northern states —  the former Soviet Union, the United States 
and Europe —  which dominated world weapons production and sales 
for much of this century, has been seriously eroded.
But Third world arms producers still represent new, and 
somewhat neglected actors in the proliferation of conventional 
and even nuclear weapons. The number of academic works on arms
production in the developing countries is growing, but still 
small in comparison with other areas of strategic studies. As 
Brzoska and Ohlson have noted:
In the public image of Western media, arms 
production in the Third World is given about 
the same coverage as stories about arms 
transfers were given 20 years ago: the reporting,
which is irregular and spectacular, assumes that 
the reader is unfamiliar with the existence of 
such production.3
There are two broad areas of issues investigated by academic 
research on Third World arms production. The first is mainly 
concerned with strategic and political issues such as the diffu­
sion of world power and the relationship between arms suppliers 
and recipients. A key area of focus is whether independence of 
military action can be achieved through domestic production of 
arms. The second area stresses the effects of arms production on 
economic development, with the literature roughly split into two 
camps of those who believe arms production benefits the economy 
and those who regard it as harmful to development.*
This dissertation concentrates on the first area of strate­
gic and political issues and does not deal with questions of arms 
industries and development. I am of course aware that there is
some overlap of these areas, but development economics lies 
beyond the scope of this work.
Selection of the case study countries
The three states chosen as historical case studies for this 
dissertation may appear an unlikely grouping in that each was a 
strikingly unique entity within the world community during the 
Cold War:
Israel remained an unaccepted creation by most of the sur­
rounding Arab and Islamic world and received massive infusions of 
capital, technology and arms from the United States, which on a 
per capita basis, dwarfed Washington's post Second World War Mar­
shall Plan aid to Europe.
South Africa was, without question, the world's number one 
pariah state and faced an internationally coordinated arms and 
military technology embargo during the 1970s and 80s.
Former Yugoslavia, a founding member of the Nonaligned 
Movement, withdrew from the Soviet Union's zone of influence in 
1948 and built up its arms industries to give the nonaligned 
concept teeth. Wedged between the frozen wasteland of the Cold 
War's East-West military blocs, Yugoslavia nevertheless attempted 
to retain links to both superpowers, which Belgrade tried to play
off against one-another to obtain arms and economic assistance.
Differences mask similarities
Nevertheless, despite the unique standing of each of these three 
countries in the international community, Israel, South Africa 
and Yugoslavia share a series of striking similarities.
-First, all three have either had limitations on their relation­
ships with other countries forced upon them from the outside —  
as with Israel and South Africa —  or else they have undertaken 
restrictions voluntarily, as with Yugoslavia in its role as a 
leader of the Nonaligned Movement. This makes all three coun­
tries members of the group of developing countries which took the 
initial decision to establish a domestic arms sector in response 
to strategic/political imperatives, as opposed to economic imper­
atives (as in the case of, say, Brazil).^
-Second, the governments of Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia 
directed the main thrust of respective military-security policy 
at perceived external threats to the state from the 1950s to the 
late 1980s. But by the 1980s a more potent threat was found to 
exist within respective heavily guarded frontiers of each of the 
three states. In Israel and the Occupied Territories, the rapid­
ly growing Palestinian population launched the Intifada with 
stones and knives. In post-apartheid South Africa, the long- 
repressed black majority has launched a serious challenge for 
leadership of the country. In former Yugoslavia the ethnic and 
national groups -*• the problems of which Tito claimed to have 
solved with the new socialist Yugoslav man of the 1950s —  have 
dismantled the old federation in a bloody civil war.
-Third, is the fact that all three countries have been subjected 
to arms embargoes. Israel in the years immediately following 
statehood in 1948, and during and after the Six Day War; South 
Africa from the time of the voluntary United Nations' arms embar­
go in 1963 and the mandatory arms embargo from 1977; and, Yugo­
slavia following its break with the Cominform in 1948. In addi­
tion, all three countries have been subject to repeated less 
comprehensive arms cutoffs, which are outlined in Chapters Two 
through Four.
-A fourth similarity i$ structural. There clearly exist minimum 
levels of economic, technical and infrastructural development 
necessary before a state can begin manufacturing advanced weapons 
systems. But of greater interest is the fact that structural 
problems of the three case study countries illustrate the limits 
of technoloav and finance regarding indigenous arms production.
This is particularly marked with regard to indigenous fighter 
aircraft development, which will be examined in detail below.
Some initial questions
In researching and writing this dissertation I posed a series of 
questions which the following chapters attempt to answer. These 
include:
1) Why did the governments of Israel, South Africa and Yugosla­
via initiate large-scale military industries?
2) What is the structure of each case study country's military 
industries and what weapons are produced?
3) How successful have the three case study countries been in 
producing truly indigenous arms with reduced foreign input of 
components and technology?
4) How successful have the case studies' domestic arms industries 
been in reducing dependency on imports of major weapons systems, 
military components, technology and capital?
5) What is the level of military exports from Israel, South 
Africa and Yugoslavia? To what extent do these exports contrib­
ute to the proliferation of arms and military technology?
The argument
This dissertation makes a triad of arguments concerning the 
historical success and future implications of Third World arms 
production based on Cold War arms industry development in the 
three case study countries.
The first argument is that truly indigenous weapons produc­
tion hardly exists in Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia. I 
will show that the case study countries have been heavily depend­
ent on varying combinations of foreign technology/licences, 
foreign components, and foreign capital for all major —  and many 
minor —  weapons manufacturing projects undertaken from the 1960s 
to the early 1990s.
This point is made with full acceptance of the argument that 
'indigenisation' has lost much of its meaning since the 1960s. 
Only the United States and the Soviet Union have truly been 
successful in producing advanced weapons with near hundred per­
cent domestic content: Even countries like Germany, Japan and
Sweden manufacture aircraft with imported engines. The key point
is the yardstick used to measure foreign content and thus the 
success or failure of an arms project from the standpoint of 
indigenisation.G Given that past arms embargoes and the fear of 
future arms cutoffs were the prime reason for the establishment 
of all three countries' respective defence manufacturing sectors, 
I have chosen a relatively high level of indigenisation as a 
yardstick for assessing the success or failure of an arms manu­
facturing project. In the case of other Third World arms produc­
ers like Brazil, which developed its defence industry sector 
primarily for economic reasons, a high level of indigenisation 
would be far less important.
Second, in the foreseeable future, all three states (or 
successor states in the case of Yugoslavia) will remain dependent 
on foreign suppliers for major weapons systems, such as fighter 
aircraft, helicopters and naval vessels, despite ambitious endea­
vours to break import dependency precisely in these areas stem­
ming from the 1970s and 80s. Financial and technological re­
straints mean that no new projects like Israel's ill-fated Lavi 
fighter will be initiated in the next years. Instead, of the go- 
it-alone bravado of the 1970s and 80s, Israel, South Africa and 
whatever remains of Yugoslavia, will accept continued long-term 
dependency on foreign sources for major weapons systems. This 
trend was illustrated in the late 1980s with Yugoslavia's pur­
chase of Soviet MiG-29 fighters, Israel's continued reliance on 
the U.S. F-16 fighter (in lieu of the Lavi) and American-built
naval vessels and German submarines, and South Africa's failure 
to build —  let alone develop —  a single major weapon system 
during the Cold War.
Third, that despite the above two points. Third World arms 
suppliers have been playing an expanding and important role in 
the world arms trade and the proliferation of military industrial 
technology since the 1970s. This proposition may appear a con­
tradiction but its validity will be illustrated through the 
contrast of growing Israeli dependency on the United States for 
advanced weapons, technology and capital (Chapters Two and 
Seven), with Israel's role as the key UN arms sanctions breaker 
regarding exports to South Africa from 1977 through the early 
1990s and as an arms supplier to Argentina during the 1982 Falk- 
lands/Malvinas War, Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and Guatemala 
after the 1977 American arms cut-off (Chapters Five and Six).
Thesis outline
The military-sociological background of Israel, South Africa and 
Yugoslavia in Chapter One, serves as an important introduction to 
this dissertation. Answering the 'Why?' regarding attempts to 
develop indigenous arms industries is only one part of this work, 
but examination of respective civil-military relation structures
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serves to throw the case studies into greater relief and high­
lights similarities and differences. The development of domestic 
arms manufacturing capability (and security doctrines) parallels 
international and domestic political pressures —  or perceptions 
thereof —  by respective political, military and economic lead­
ers. The incidence of military industrial complex, examined in 
Chapter One, combined with the introduction in Chapters Two, 
Three and Four on foreign relations, political history and eth­
nic/national compositions of the case study countries, help place 
the development of domestic arms industries in a broader context.
Chapters Two, Three and Four are case studies of defence 
industries in Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia. Each chapter 
begins with a survey of the systemic and circumstantial factors 
which are common to all three case studies. This is followed by 
an examination of the weapons produced by each country's arms 
sector. These chapters show the armaments sector industries of 
Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia remained highly dependent on 
imports of key components, technology, manufacturing licences and 
capital throughout the Cold War.
Chapter Five is devoted to the far-reaching military- 
industrial relationship which developed between Israel and South 
Africa beginning in the mid-1970s. This chapter shows that 
despite a high continued level of military import dependency, 
countries like Israel are able to play a key role in the world 
arms market: Chapter Five concludes that Israel served as South
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Africa's single most important military supplier following the 
1977 United Nations mandatory arms embargo.
Chapter Six, which is devoted to defence exports from the 
three case study countries, serves as a broader extension to 
Chapter Five. This chapter documents Israeli, South African and 
Yugoslav arms exports and examines the economic and diplomatic- 
security grounds for military exports.
Chapter Seven is a study of the continued heavy dependence 
of Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia on advanced 'off the 
shelf' weapon systems, such as fighter aircraft, from the indus­
trialised countries. In conjunction with the arguments raised in 
Chapters Two, Three and Four, this chapter conclusively completes 
the argument that indigenous weapons production in the case study 
countries has done little to reduce long-term dependency key 
foreign arms systems.
Sources
As noted above, the body of academic work on arms production in 
the Third World is relatively small in comparison with that in 
other endeavours in the field of strategic studies. This disser­
tation draws on a number of academic studies. In particular
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yearbooks and publications from the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) have proven especially useful sources 
in my research.
But much of the information on which this work is based has 
been drawn from newspaper reports, weapons handbooks, military 
trade journals. Non-academic sources can present problems re­
garding accuracy of information. Press reports have provided key 
elements of this dissertation, and I have tried rely only on 
internationally recognised publications. More problematic are 
weapons handbooks, which are often based purely on claims made by 
manufacturers, and military trade journals which tend to play the 
uncritical tunes composed by those who supply advertising revenue 
—  namely the arms industries. Unfortunately, it is impossible 
to desist from using these sources, given the paucity of informa­
tion on the subject of Third World arms production.
Academics and journalists who worked in or with the case 
study countries also provided information both of direct rele­
vance to this dissertation and of a more general nature. I did 
not conduct field work in the three countries because of restric­
tions due to the subject nature. The defence industry sector was 
not a subject open to public discussion in South Africa or Yugo­
slavia during the late 1980s and early 90s; aside from self- 
congratulatory state propaganda. The case of Israel is far less 
extreme, but as a journalist, I adhered to a warning in the
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introduction to Seymour Hersh's book The Samson Potion. Israel.
America and the Bomb. Hersh writes:
I chose not to go to Israel while doing research 
for this book. For one thing, those Israelis who 
were willing to talk to me were far more accessible 
open when interviewed in Washington, New York, or 
some cases, Europe. Furthermore, Israel subjects 
all journalists, domestic and foreign, to 
censorship. Under Israeli rules, all material 
produced by journalists in Israel must be submitted 
to military censors, who have the right to make 
changes and deletions if they perceive a threat 
Israeli national security. I could not, for obvious 
reasons, submit to Israeli censorship.^
It must be stressed that due to the nature of the subject, 
information in this thesis cannot claim to be absolutely correct, 
and, as will be shown, many sources are contradictory.
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Conventions
The terms defence industry, defence sector, military industry and 
arms industry are used synonymously for the sake of variation. 
As Signe Landgren has noted, in reality there is no "defence 
industry" as such; instead there are a number of different indus­
tries producing various military equipment such as aircraft, 
ships, vehicles, small arms, electronics, etc. Despite the fact 
that most of these industries also produce civilian goods, the 
entire industrial structure is nevertheless called "a defence 
industry".®
I use the rather dated term "Third World" to refer to Is­
rael, South Africa, and Yugoslavia in acceptance of Strategic 
Studies convention. While none of the case studies really fits 
into what one might call the "Third World", the term is used to 
distinguish the post-1945 arms producers from the Soviet Union, 
the United States and Europe.^
"Jerusalem" is referred to as Israel"s capital in the text. 
This is meant âê facto and not âê iure.
One billion = one-thousand million
$ = U.S. dollars
15
IISS = International Institute for Strategic Studies
SIPRI = Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
IDF = Israeli Defence Forces
SADF = South African Defence Forces
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Chapter One
Civil-Military Relations and the military-industrial complex in 
Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia
The purpose of this introductory chapter is throw the case study 
countries into greater relief and to illustrate the differing 
role played by the military and by civilian interests in security 
policy and defence industry decision-making.
In this chapter I will examine Cold War civil-military 
relations in Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia in order to 
determine the role played by a convergence of military, political 
and economic interests (in what social scientists have termed 
the military-industrial complex) in the creation and expansion of 
arms industries in the three countries.
An examination of civil-military relations and in particular 
the incidence of military-industrial complex serves as a founda­
tion for the following chapters, especially for the examination 
of the causation question in the development of indigenous arms 
industries in the case study countries. As Samuel Huntington has 
pointed out, civil-military relations comprise an important 
aspect in answering the 'Why?' in the development of indigenous 
arms industries. Huntington argues:
18
military policy can only be understood as
the responses of the government to conflicting
pressures from its foreign and domestic environments.
Military policy is not the result of deductions 
from a clear statement of national objective. It 
is the product of the competition of purposes 
within individuals and groups and among individuals 
and groups. It is the result of politics not 
logic....1
With these points in mind, I will attempt to outline some of the 
domestic political competitions and civilian social structures 
which were instrumental in the formation of military and arms 
production policy in Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia during 
the Cold War period. The external influences on arms production 
will be primarily dealt with in the respective case studies 
(Chapters Two, Three and Four) . I will examine the way in which 
the high profile of the military and security issues in the case 
study countries impact on defence production decisions and will 
attempt to distinguish between the differing influences of mili­
tary, economic and political interests regarding security and 
arms production programmes in the case study countries.
My basic argument underpinning this chapter is that a vary­
ing convergence of military, political and economic interests —
19
largely shielded from normal political decision-making processes 
—  was able to influence or make decisions for the expansion of 
military industries in all three countries during the Cold War. 
This convergence of interests, which subverted the regular deci­
sion-making structures naturally differed greatly in Israel, 
South Africa and Yugoslavia, but all three cases broadly conform 
with elements from the theory of a military-industrial complex.
In the case of Israel, I will show that civilian leaders of 
the country's military industrial sector played a key role in 
pushing Israel's Cold War defence industrialisation policy. 
Members of respective Israeli cabinets who have adopted a more 
traditional 'hawkish' position on security Issues were often 
those who lacked any military experience whatsoever.^ a  striking 
case of this phenomenon may be found in Israel's Lavi fighter 
project, discussed in Chapter Two. The Lavi found its main 
backers in the various Israeli governments from 1974-89 and in 
the Israeli defence sector: The Israeli Air Force was less en­
thusiastic, preferring instead the tested technology of U.S. F-16 
and F-15 fighters.
South Africa contrasts strikingly with Israel in that the 
military establishment amassed considerable political power 
during the Cold War, which allowed it to effectively set the 
agenda for defence industry development through promulgation of 
the 'total strategy' policy to meet the largely imaginary front­
20
line state military forces bent on what was called * total on­
slaught ' .
In the case of former Yugoslavia it is difficult to disen­
tangle the Communist Party, the government and the military 
during the Cold War years. One may argue the military leadership 
was shot through with Communist Party members or vice versa 
during this period. The key role played by the Yugoslav Commu­
nist armed forces in the country's liberation from Nazi occupa­
tion during the Second World War insured the army a special 
position of influence in the post-War Yugoslav political system. 
As was the case in South Africa, the military, along with mili­
tary-oriented political leaders, amassed considerable power 
during the final two decades of the Cold War and appear to have 
played a decisive role in the defence industry policy decision­
making, secluded from the normal national political decision­
making process.
A problem of sources
It must be emphasised that only under conditions of the widest 
intellectual freedom is it possible to pursue military 
s o c i o l o g y . 3 While conditions vary radically between Israel, 
Yugoslavia and South Africa, none can be said to be fully open
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societies on a Western model. It should therefore be stressed 
from the onset that relatively little research has been conducted 
on civil-military relations in the case study countries: The
limited body of information is richer in the case of Israel than 
for South Africa, and almost no works exist on military industri­
al complex in Yugoslavia. Given this paucity of information, 
discussions with Israeli, South African and Yugoslav scholars and 
journalists on socio-political-military relations in their coun­
tries were especially helpful in writing this chapter.
The chapter will first survey the theoretical and historical 
background of the concepts of military-industrial complex. It 
will then examine each of the three case study countries regard­
ing civil-military relations and arms industry development deci­
sions.
The military-industrial complex: a theoretical and historical 
review
The study of elites has been a standard part of political and 
sociological discourse, but the concept of a military-industrial 
complex (MIC), tied to an elite collusion theory, only gained 
academic prominence in the 1950s.^
According to Alex Mintz, the military-industrial complex is
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defined in American political science literature as ”a coalition 
of powerful groups and bodies that share economic, institutional, 
or political interests in intensifying defense expenditure.
There is general agreement among academics that C. Wright 
Mills' The Power Elite is a key starting point for any examina­
tion of the MIC phenomenon. A distillation of major sociological 
traditions. Mills' 'power elite' consist of the pinnacles of 
corporate, political and military bureaucracies. The 'power 
elite' have similar interests in maintaining themselves in power 
and similar public policy values. Mills is explicit that the 
'power elite' is not a ruling class based on ownership of proper­
ty: its rule is not the rule of an economic class.^
The 'power elite' model draws heavily on two non-Marxist 
schools in classical sociology. The first is the Machiavellian 
tradition of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. This substitutes 
an elite/mass cleavage for class conflict. The ruling elites are 
viewed primarily as governmental/political leaders and not as 
landed/business elites. The second is that advanced by Max 
Weber. A central concern of Weber was the nature of authority in 
complex social organisations. Weber argued that power arose not 
only from capital ownership but also from occupancy of top posi­
tions in governmental bureaucracies. Both theories view the 
elite bureaucrat, and not the capitalist, as the power figure in 
our time.7
Mills observes that during the eighteenth century a remarka­
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ble trend in the division of power at the top of modern society 
can be observed. "Civilians, coming into authority, were able to 
control men of military violence, whose power, being hedged in 
and neutralized, declined."® According to Mills, this trend, 
which reached its climax in the nineteenth century and lasted 
until World War I, was remarkable in that never before had it 
happened on such a scale or seemed so firmly grounded.
Mills goes on to argue, however, that "In the twentieth 
century, among the industrialised nations of the world, the 
great, brief, precarious fact of civilian dominance began to 
falter...(and) the old march of world history once more asserts 
itself.
Of particular relevance to the case study countries of this 
dissertation. Mills argues that "in any serious disturbance of 
human affairs, real or imagined, societies do tend to revert to 
military rule. Even nowadays, we tend to overlook these more or 
less common facts of world history because we inherit certain 
values which, during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, have 
flourished under a regime of civilian authority."1®
Here, Mills is pointing out the argument raised by Thucy­
dides on the causes of the Peloponnesian War: The Spartans
became martial through viewing their society threatened from 
within and without. "What made war inevitable was the growth of 
Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.
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Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia have clearly viewed 
themselves as under threat from outside forces and by revolt from 
within since 1948; and this point cannot be overemphasised in an 
examination of the militarisation of their respective societies 
during the Cold War.
In assessing the nature and ascendancy of the 'military 
power elite' Mills concentrates on the example of the United 
States. He argues that the military comprise a group superbly 
trained in coordinating economic, political and military affairs 
and that the politisation of the high military occurs as the 
professional military develop a vested personal, institutional 
and ideological interests in the enlargement of all things mili­
tary.
Party political leaders —  who in any case increasingly 
accept military definitions of political and economic reality —  
view the military as a useful means to legitimate policies. The 
military is often able to lift policy above politics and "Politi­
cians thus default upon their proper job of debating policy, 
hiding behind a supposed military expertise; and political admin­
istrators default upon their proper job of creating a real civil­
ian career service.
More important than straightforward political roles or 
advice is a more complex type of military influence: The mili­
tary have come to be accepted by the political and economic elite 
and broad sectors of the public "as authorities on issues that go
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well beyond what has historically been considered the proper 
domain of the military." Mills argues that no area of deci­
sion-making has been more influenced by "the warlords and their 
military metaphysics" than that of foreign policy and interna­
tional relations.
Mills' MIC theory has provoked considerable academic debate, 
not so much about the existence of the MIC, but rather to what 
degree it is an autonomous entity and its direction of purpose. 
Academic positions vary from those who see the MIC as one of many 
institutional linkages in society, engendered primarily by exter­
nal threats and those who see it as a self-generating structure 
and source of repression at home and abroad.1^
Charles Wolf notes the many different views of the MIC, but 
criticises what he terms the 'primitive monolithic' view which 
regards the MIC as an outgrowth of national purpose, welding 
together elitist elements with a stake in militarism —  the armed 
forces, politicians, industrialists, government officials, la­
bour, and some academics —  into a military-industrial complex. 
Wolf argues that in reality the MIC consists of many different 
'turfs' which actually have conflicting interests, indicators, 
perceptions and managers. As an example, he cites the U.S. armed 
forces in which the different military services seek not only to 
raise the military share of the budget but to raise their share 
of that budget relative to the other services.
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Barry Buzan takes a more critical view of the MIC. Buzan 
argues that study of the MIC "generated a mostly polemical liter­
ature in the early 1970s" and that the term "still has a somewhat 
ill-defined common currency." Although Buzan says that the MIC's 
implication of a conspiracy to militarise the national interest 
was never convincingly proven, he accepts that the concept is
useful in that it points to the domestic structural inputs into
the arms i n d u s t r y . B u z a n  makes the point that study of the 
MIC:
drew attention to the fact that the process 
of arms acquisition had a logic of its own.
The logic did not always clearly serve the 
national interest, and it was both strong enough
and independent enough to be an important part
of the problem defined as arms racing.^®
The following chapters will show that Cold War arms industry 
development decisions in Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia 
often appeared to follow a logic of their own and that these 
decisions did not always serve the national interest: A point
clearly linked to Huntington's view that military policy is not 
the result of deductions from a clear statement of national 
objective, but rather the result of a competition of political 
purposes.
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Israel; military-industrial complex and intertwined civil- 
militarv relations
Much of the academic work on the phenomenon of the military- 
industrial complex has been done in the United States and exam­
ines the U.S. as a example of a modern MIC. Nevertheless, as 
Alex Mintz shows, the military industrial complex in Israel 
straddles a far more extensive industrial economy relative to 
national budget, population and GNP than the United States (see 
Appendix 13). Some 25 percent of Israeli labour is employed in 
the defence sector compared with just over 5 percent in the U.S.; 
Cold War per capita defence spending reached 28 per cent in 
Israel compared with 6.5 per cent for the U.S.; and, the Israeli 
proportion of defence exports in overall industrial exports is 25 
per cent compared with a figure of 3-4 per cent for the U.S.^^
Three points distinguish the Israeli military industrial 
sphere from that of the United States. First, the fact that 
private ownership of defence industries plays a lesser —  albeit 
growing role —  in guiding industrial production.
Second, the centrality of the security sphere in Israel which 
vastly exceeds that existing in any other Western country. Most
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of the population is actively involved in the Israeli military 
and there is considerable military overflow into civilian spheres 
such as education, settlement, and social welfare.
Third, under the Israel political system, votes are cast for 
party lists rather than individuals. Thus, there is far less 
chance that politicians will represent a specific region and seek 
to protect and stimulate its defence industries.^® On the other 
hand, there is far more government direction of economic affairs 
in Israel than in the United States.
Mintz stresses that while few can deny the existence of a 
military-industrial complex in Israel, the question is to what 
extent —  if any —  there exists a:
convergence of ideological, economic, and 
institutional interests among its components (which) 
leads to cooperative, coordinated, and uncontrolled 
activity that transcends the national interests 
of Israel.
Mintz concludes that the MIC in Israel should be viewed as a 
"very powerful interest group, enjoying significant autonomy in 
its activities...and lacking in significant control and supervi­
sion."2%
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This view is shared by Peri and Neubach who find that the 
basic characteristics of a MIC are present in Israel. These 
include:
1) A convergence of interests of the military-industrial estab­
lishment with the political bureaucratic establishment;
2) The evolution of a sector in Israel, headed by a cohesive 
elite with similar social characteristics, whose decisions and 
actions have a significant effect on the country's economy, 
foreign/defence policy and on its social and value systems.
3) A closed system of decision-making, shielded from public 
supervision, which undergoes less scrutiny than any other area in 
Israeli society.^3
The convergence of military-industrial and the political- 
bureaucratic establishments and the closed system of decision­
making can be illustrated through a number of examples.
The managing director of Israeli Aircraft Industry (lAI) 
from 1954-77, A1 Schwimmer, was a close personal friend of Shimon 
Peres, who during the 1950s was director general of the Israeli 
Defence Ministry and served on Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's
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personal staff. Schwimmer's close personal relations with high 
ranking defence ministry and other bureaucratic personnel al­
lowed him to launch military projects for which the economic and 
business justification was "highly q u e s t i o n a b l e " .^4
Peri and Neubach cite the Arava transport aircraft and the 
Westwind executive jet projects as examples of such decisions. 
They argue that the decision to develop the Arava transport was a 
*make-work' project designed to alleviate the work shortage at 
lAI aeronautics division in the mid-1960s. "The Arava project 
never paid for itself: the (Israeli) air force refused to buy
the aircraft, and to date sales have not even covered current 
costs." Needless to say, lAI has ceased manufacturing the
Arava.
The Westwind jet project was undertaken without a comprehen­
sive market study and the authors state: "We may safely say that 
politics had more to do with the decision-making process in these 
cases than did economic or business considerations."^^
Peri and Neubach conclude that the combination of lAI's 
desire to grow and the defence establishment's determination to 
expand, led to decisions which were never scrutinised by bodies 
outside the military-industrial e s t a b l i s h m e n t .^7
It is interesting to note that it was not the Israeli Air 
Force but rather the political leadership of the military and the 
defence industries which fought for projects like the Arava 
transport in the 1960s. This pattern was repeated in the 1970s
31
with the decision to build the Lavi fighter aircraft (a detailed 
examination of the Lavi fighter is included in Chapter Two). 
The Lavi project was initiated on completion of Israel's Kfir 
fighter project in the mid-1970s at the behest of the defence 
industries and the political and military leadership of the 
country. A number of views prevailed in the Israeli Air Force as 
the project evolved from its original conception an inexpensive 
workhorse to state-of-the-art fighter, but in general it appears 
the Air Force preference was for importing U.S. manufactured 
aircraft.
The Lavi was built up in public as an example of Israeli 
proficiency with the most advanced defence technologies and as an 
answer to potential future arms embargoes. The cancellation of 
the Lavi project, in the face of soaring projected costs, was a 
shattering emotional reverse for the Israeli public which had 
come to believe the 'can do' bravado of the country's arms mak­
ers. According to opinion polls in May 1987, shortly before can­
cellation, some 80 per cent of all Israelis supported the Lavi.
Nevertheless, the Lavi decision-making process was criti­
cised by the Israeli State Comptroller (ombudsman) as having been 
"made with information that was without basis, inadequate, ten­
dentious and lacking proper cost estimates."^® Among other 
failures was the fact that decision-makers were not informed 
until 1985 —  five years after the full project was launched —
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that the Lavi would cost $2-2.5 billion more than purchasing the 
U.S. F -16 fighter, or double the total original cost e s t i m a t e . ^9 
The Lavi decision-making process has subsequently come under 
harsh criticism in Israel and Peri and Neubach find that pres­
sures from economic interests and the security lobby were con­
spicuously present throughout the step-by-step decision to build 
the Lavi and that pains were taken **to push decisions through in 
the absence of any rigorous examination.”^®
Ze'ev Schiff, one of Israel's leading defence commentators, 
described the Israeli defence industries' disregard for the 
limits of power as that of an economic 'Frankenstein' that had 
"turned against its creator" and become "a defence power in and 
of itself, with its own interests that are sometimes liable to 
conflict with those of the Israel Defence Force or of the defence 
establishment, and even those of Israel itself."®^
Israel's top-secret nuclear weapons programme (examined in 
Chapters Two and Seven) also appears to have developed through 
decisions made largely within what could be termed the country's 
military-industrial complex and away from the normal political, 
let alone public, scrutiny. As Frank Barnaby has written:
So far, crucial nuclear-weapon decisions in 
Israel have been made by a very small number 
of political leaders without even a full 
cabinet discussion. In the absence of any
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public debate, the authorities can do more or 
less as they please. SL consequence.
Israel * s nuclear weapons developments a_re 
possibly out of political control■ (emphasis added)
Barnaby goes on to argue that although the initial decision to 
produce nuclear weapons was probably taken on security grounds, 
"there are reasons for believing that recent nuclear-weapon 
developments in Israel are the result of the technological momen­
tum of the nuclear programme rather than of deliberate political 
decisions".
He concludes that the size and quality of Israel's nuclear 
weapons force has less to do with strategic necessity and more to 
do with "technological momentum".
Why, then, has Israel opted for a relatively 
large and sophisticated nuclear force? The most 
likely explanation seems to be that the 
technological momentum of the nuclear-weapon 
programme has taken over and become unstoppable.
Israel has had to form a team of nuclear 
scientists and technologists to operate its 
nuclear reactors and its reprocessing plant, and 
to design, develop and produce nuclear weapons.
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These professionals will want to design and 
produce increasingly sophisticated nuclear 
weapons just to convince themselves that they 
can do so and for the sheer satisfaction of it.^4
A military-political-industrial elite
A further symptom of Israel's MIC is the existence of a cohesive 
military-political-industrial elite with similar social charac­
teristics, whose decisions and actions have a significant effect 
on the country's economy, foreign/defence policy and on its 
social and value systems. According to Neubach and Peri a common 
social basis for the ranking echelons of these three establish­
ments in Israel "exists in striking form.
During the period from 1948-77 the Labour Party ruled Israel 
and long-term relationships developed between defence sector 
managers and the government/bureaucracy. The case of A1 Schwim­
mer, cited above, is one such example. A further example can be 
seen in that of Zvi Dar, managing director of Israel Military 
Industries (IMI) from 1948-67, who was close to both David Ben- 
Gurion and to the Mapai wing of the Labour Party.
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Dar's personal connections with 
the political establishment enabled 
him not only to maintain the special 
standing of IMI within the defense 
establishment and to survive the transition 
from David Ben-Gurion to Levi Eshkol as defense 
minister, but also facilitated his access 
to the centers of political decision-making 
and enabled him to develop highly effective 
lobbying channels to the senior levels of the 
defense establishment.^®
From the mid-1960s a second pattern began to emerge in the 
Israeli MIC's social network. Under the early retirement pro­
gramme, established in the 1950s (in which officers retire before 
reaching the age of 50), members of the officer corps came to be 
expected to find a second career after leaving active military 
service.
Neubach and Peri have found this contributed to increasing 
numbers of former officers entering key positions in the Israeli 
defence industries while other officers, who initially entered 
civilian industries, later shifted to the defence sector. Former 
officers found jobs in various branches of defence manufacturing.
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as arms exporters, as representatives for foreign arms manufac­
turers, or as employees of the Israeli Defence Ministry.
An example of such an Israeli military/defence sector career 
pattern can be seen in Mordechai Hod, a former commander of the 
Israeli Air Force who subsequently came to represent the US 
defence contractor Northrop in Israel. In 1981-82 he recommended 
Israel purchase the Northrop F-18 aircraft and that Israel cancel 
the Lavi fighter project and instead jointly develop a fighter 
with Northrop.
Retired Israeli officers retain the professional self-image 
of a 'citizen in uniform', and a broad feature of Israeli society 
is that military status tends to be transformed into civilian 
status. This appears to be due to the fact that the military has 
enjoyed a central role in Israeli society from the pre-state 
period through to the present: "The contribution of the status-
generating equality of military performance to social integration 
in Israel... facilitates the convergence of the military and 
civilian subsystems."^®
As a result, an Israeli upper social class has been created, 
which, among other shared characteristics, holds similar views on 
Israeli security problems which were developed either during 
underground military activity in the pre-statehood period or 
while serving in the Israel Defence Forces. With regard to 
development of domestic arms industries during the Cold War, 
upper class securocrats appear to have held a common view: "One
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outgrowth of their worldview was their adoption of a positive ap­
proach to the fostering of the military industry.
Arms exports and the MIC
Israeli arms export patterns provide evidence indicating the 
presence of a military-industrial complex. Peri and Neubach cite 
three aspects of Israeli arms export policy to illustrate this 
view:
1) Although arms exports are said to be based on need to make 
Israel economically independent, Israeli arms exports are depend­
ent on American approval (due to key American components). Thus, 
far from promoting independence, Israel's arms sales actually 
subject the country to additional restrictions from Washington. 
The politico-economic question is whether the export of civilian 
industrial goods would not bring Israel as much foreign currency 
as weapons exports, but without the increasing dependence on the 
United States (see Chapter Six for further examination of this 
problem).
2) As an international political commodity, levels of arms
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export are subject to rapid fluctuations. Conventional wisdom is 
that arms exports should never exceed 25 per cent of a country's 
total exports -- a level which Israel could well approach. 
Political changes have caused sudden huge declines in orders for 
Israeli weapons, such as with the fall of the Shah of Iran in 
1979 and a series of politically motivated arms order cancella­
tions in 1983 whereby Israel reportedly lost $300 million in 
export sales. The impact of such lost exports is felt throughout 
the entire Israeli economy.
3) The fact that the Israeli Foreign Ministry's limited influ­
ence is completely out of scale with that of the arms export 
lobby. This has been summed up in the oft-repeated Israeli 
dictum: "foreign policy should serve defence policy." The
authors argue that Israeli foreign policy is potentially being 
damaged by less import interests merely because of the strength 
of one lobby and the weakness of another. As an example they 
cite the military aid that Israel provided to the former Nicara­
guan dictator Anastasio Somoza. This led the subsequent Sandin- 
ista government to adopt an anti-Israeli posture and it harmed 
relations with Costa Rica —  Israel's closest friend in Latin 
America. A further example is the damage done to Israel's rela­
tions with the UK during the Falklands War by continued arms 
sales to Argentina.40
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Decisions regarding the expansion -- though not the initial 
creation —  of Israel's arms industry have clearly been influ­
enced by forces which can be attributed to the broadly defined 
phenomenon of the military-industrial complex. Neubach and Peri 
conclude that the emergence of Israel's arms industry and arms 
exports came not as a result of strategic decisions but rather as 
the result of influences generated from the country's military 
industrial complex. It was "an incremental, creeping, virtually 
self-fertilizing p r o c e s s . M i n t z  concludes that the Israeli 
MIC is "a very powerful interest group comprising bodies respon­
sible for Israel's security, pressing for vast-scale defense 
production."42 He concludes that this group enjoys significant 
autonomy in its activities and lacks insufficient external con­
trol and supervision.43
Civil-military relations in South Africa
During the 1970s and 80s the role of the military in South Afri­
can society grew considerably. Involvement in the Angolan civil 
war and in Namibia during the 1970s and South Africa's growing 
international isolation following the 1977 United Nations manda-
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tory arms embargo contributed to the bringing the military to the 
forefront of society.
With the election of P.W. Botha as prime minister (and 
subsequently president) in 1978, South Africa gained a head of 
state who had served for the previous 12 years as minister of 
defence. Botha, who one South African academic described as a 
military man "albeit in a non-career c a p a c i t y , s t r e n g t h e n e d  
the office of prime minister and subsequently that of president. 
He expanded the roll of the National Security Management system 
under which a network of military, police and intelligence offi­
cers effectively ruled the black townships and centralised na­
tional decision-making by radically increasing the powers of the 
country's State Security Council.
The election of F.W. de Klerk as South Africa's president in 
September 1989 resulted in the apparent diminution of the powers 
accumulated by the military (and police) during initial post-Cold 
War period. In early 1990 de Klerk had dismantled both the State 
Security Council and the National Security Management System in a 
move which the Financial Times said was to "neutralise the right- 
wing threat from the security forces.
De Klerk reportedly told a meeting of 500 senior police 
officers in January 1990, that the police force would no longer 
be used to fight the government's political battles and that he 
wanted to keep them out of the political arena.
South African military involvement in the country's future
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political system remains a topic for future researchers. In this 
section I will survey the development of political involvement of 
the South African military and the incidence of military-indus­
trial complex through the end of 1990.
Praetorians in Pretoria?
One of the few works to treat the subject of civil-military 
relations in South Africa is Philip Frankel's Pretoria's Praeto­
rians . Frankel argues that while South Africa has never been 
under direct military rule, "the country's military leaders have 
played a direct or ancillary role in shaping the South African 
society we know today" and that the South African Defence 
Force (SADF) was not simply an instrument for policy implementa­
tion but rather an active participant in policy-making in the 
military, economic, homelands and foreign policy sectors.^®
The South African military's claims of having held a non­
political status in South Africa "are essentially specious", 
Frankel argues. Such claims are based on the legal notion that 
the military in South Africa is a non-political agent of state 
power. These views stem from British law and the Defence Act of 
1912 (with subsequent amendments) which forbade officers from 
joining a political party, and from an SADF regulation which
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forbids members of the services from participating in any politi­
cal party meeting or demonstration in uniform. Such a * liberal' 
format for conduct of civil-military relations must be recognised 
as being "over-heroic and idealistic in its understanding of what 
military institutions actually do —  as opposed to what they 
should do —  in society...(and) is sociologically naive.
South Africa shifted in an authoritarian direction during 
the Cold War in that national security was redefined to encompass 
many issues beyond the purely strategic. The liberal conception 
of civil-military relations foundered on the acute race and class 
distinctions in Cold War apartheid South Africa: The SADF was 
tied to the defence of the special interests of the whites which 
generates "a fusion of roles and functions in relation to which 
the polite theoretical distinctions between civil and military 
have little practical meaning."^0
Military involvement in South African politics has a lengthy 
history stretching back to the old Kommando system developed from 
the 1600s. Under the Kommando system, all soldier-members were 
technically equal and entitled to offer advice in councils of 
war. Thus each Buraher-soldier was theoretically a general who 
obeyed orders voluntarily and often acted in accord with his own 
initiative in b a t t l e . T h e  Afrikaner Kommando system was, in 
spirit, a nation in arms involved in a sort of people's war in 
defence of community and homeland.
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But there is particular, possibly anti-liberal legacy of the 
Kommando system:
Under such psychological conditions the dividing line 
between political and military authority could never 
be as sharply articulated as that demanded by the 
'liberal' model of civil-military s o c i e t y .^2
The Kommando system, which emphasises the free flow of influences 
across the civil-military boundary, obfuscates the military-civil 
boundary. The Liberal model, on the other hand, stresses sol­
diering as a "discrete, permanent and professional activity of 
autonomous status."^3
Both traditions have markedly different views on the 
military's role in social development. The Liberal model re­
serves the task of building the community for the civil sector 
under the protective umbrella of a military which is concerned 
exclusively with the strategic task of protecting the state. 
Under the Kommando system the nation in arms and the soldier are 
responsible for "the dissemination of soldier ideologies, for 
building the economy and protecting its cultural and moral inter­
ests apart from its purely strategic foundations."^4
The whole importance of the old Kommando pattern is that 
many of these traditions were echoed in South Africa's Cold War
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military-political power network. Imported British traditions 
were simply modified to fit the South African whites* interests; 
Westminster model government without universal franchise and 
civil-military relations with a diluted 'Liberal* element as a 
concessions to indigenous Afrikaner Kommando traditions. Indeed, 
the contemporary militarisation of South Africa must be consid­
ered in light of the National Party's coming to power in 1948. 
The subsequent period —  until the de Klerk reforms of the 1990s 
witnessed the codification of the apartheid doctrine. The 
resulting centralised power structures, which denied popular 
aspirations, helped support military i n f l u e n c e . ^5
In the four decades following 1948, the majority of the 
South African elite came to accept increasingly crude official 
propaganda which depicted South Africa as a garrison state pos­
sessing no option other than the use of force to protect the 
vital interests of the white minority. However, it would be 
wrong to view the SADF as straining for direct political power. 
The officer corps moved cautiously in the political ring for fear 
of having its actions labeled as illegitimate.^6
The enhanced role for the military was triggered by a series 
of events in the 1970s which gravely shook Afrikaner confidence: 
The 1974 Portuguese revolution and the liquidation of the Portu­
guese role in Angola and Mozambique and the subsequent arrival of 
Cuban forces in Angola; the cancellation by Britain's Labour 
government of the Simonstown naval agreement in 1974; and, the
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1977 mandatory United Nations arms embargo on South Africa.
These external developments contributed to the growing 
militarisation of South African society. As perceived threats to 
status QUO appeared to grow, the opinions of military elites came 
to be more readily accepted —  a situation which corresponds with 
the Huntington proposition, noted at the beginning of this chap­
ter, that perceived national security threats induce a fusion of 
military and political decision-making with soldiers becoming the 
dominant element in the making of security policy. But as will 
be shown below, the SADF turned the Clausewitzian idea of the 
military serving the political aims of the government on its head 
in the South Africa of the 1970s and 80s.
'Total Onslaught' met with 'Total Strategy'
The growth of military influence over policy-making in Pretoria 
was marked and furthered by the adoption of two dramatic-sounding 
concepts to the repertoire of South African strategic thinking: 
'total onslaught' and 'total strategy'.
The concept of 'total onslaught' —  prevalent in Pretoria 
from 1975 onwards —  was largely a response to the Portuguese 
collapse in Angola and Mozambique and the 197 6 Soweto riots. 
'Total onslaught' postulated a coordinated assault on South
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Africa by Marxists directed from Moscow, the Afro-Asian 'bloc' 
and an anti-South African fifth column. The policy conceived to 
combat this 'total onslaught' was, logically, called 'total 
strategy'.
'Total strategy' was formally introduced in the Defence 
White Paper of 1977. The Paper broadly stated:
National security demands coordination of political 
action, military/paramilitary action, economic action 
psychological action, scientific and technical action, 
religious-cultural action, manpower services, 
intelligence services, security services, national 
supplies, resources and production services, 
transport and distribution services, community 
services and telecommunications s e r v i c e s .5?
In short, practically all elements of South African society were 
to be drawn under the influence of a military-directed Cold War 
security doctrine by the late 1970s. Frankel concludes that 
total strategy "mystifies and obscures reality" and writes off 
internal problems in South Africa as external manipulation. What 
emerges, he says, is:
a climate perfectly commensurate with the way the 
government and its military allies legitimate virtually
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any claims to civilian power....Total strategy 
legitimizes this development, it engenders the 
psychological and institutional atmosphere conducive 
to the growth of garrison state...
With the accession of the militarily well-connected P.W. 
Botha first as prime minister then as president, the multi­
dimensional approach to security envisaged by total strategy 
became government p o l i c y . W h i l e  it cannot be demonstrated that 
the executive-military alliance was a calculated plan forged 
during Botha's long tenure as defence minister "there is little 
doubt that the Defence Force was an important chip in the bar­
gaining surrounding the eventual emergence of Botha as prime 
minister."^0
Total strategy led to military involvement in a wide variety 
of state activities including teaching and healthcare (particu­
larly in Namibia) , tax inspection and natural disaster rescue 
o p e r a t i o n s . At the political level, total strategy prescribed 
the constitutional reforms put into effect in 1984 which extended 
political rights to members of the coloured and Indian communi­
ties —  but not to blacks. With regard to the armed forces, the 
efficient use of manpower was given priority and aid was given 
for the development of black homeland armies, although the empha-
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sis in their training was on coping with internal unrest.
During the 1980s, increasingly less emphasis was given to 
the external threat to white South Africa. The continued civil 
war in Angola, the virtual decomposition of Mozambique, along 
with the dependency or weakness of Pretoria's other neighbors 
made the enunciation of an external threat even more incredible 
than it was in the late 1970s. With the growing unrest in the 
townships the threat to white rule was obviously much closer to 
home.
Nevertheless, the most fundamental elements of total strategy 
and total onslaught endured within the realm of mainstream Cold 
War strategic thinking in Pretoria and also in what can perhaps 
be termed the South African national psyche. Of key importance 
was the apparently increased acceptance of the relevance of 
nearly all elements of South African society to security policy. 
Basically, by the late 1970s social policy, economics and all 
politics had come to be relevant security policy c o n c e r n s . ^3
Writing in the early 1980s Frankel said that future military 
intervention in South Africa would not necessarily imply a coup. 
He argued instead that the country could fall victim to a 'creep­
ing coup' —  "a growing but gradual and low key penetration of 
the military into key public decision-making bodies . . . social 
institutions and collective psychologies of the whole body poli­
tic.
In the post-Cold War period the De Klerk reforms seem to have
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succeeded in reducing the military's role. Total strategy was 
formally downgraded in the 1982 Defence White Paper and referred 
to as 'revolutionary onslaught' or merely 'the onslaught' in the 
1986 Defence White Paper. Nevertheless, a separate military and 
police agenda may have been the main legacy of 'total strategy' 
and the uncovering of illegal death squads run by the police in 
the spring of 1990 provided evidence for supporters of the 'cree­
ping coup' hypothesis.65
The rise of the State Security Council
During the 197 0s and early 80s South Africa's State Security 
Council (SSC) evolved from relative unimportance to become the 
most important decision-making body in the country. South Af­
rica's military was influential in transforming the State Securi­
ty Council and its related committees from a loose advisory 
branch to a highly centralised body which resided "at the apogee 
of public decision-making." 66
The SSC was made a cabinet committee in 1972 —  the only 
cabinet committee created by law in South Africa. Its standing 
members included the prime minister, the ministers of defence, 
foreign affairs, justice, and law and order (police), the senior 
cabinet minister (if not included in the above portfolios), the
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secretary for security intelligence, the head of the South Afri­
can Defence Forces, the secretary for foreign affairs, the secre­
tary for justice and the commissioner of police. The SSC was the 
only cabinet committee to be chaired by the head of g o v e r n m e n t . ^7 
The law creating the State Security Council gave it the 
responsibility of advising the government on the formulation and 
implementation "of national policy and strategy in relation to 
the security of the R e p u b l i c . A s  Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie 
Kotze point out, this is an assignment which can be interpreted 
to cover virtually every area of government at home and a b r o a d . ^9 
Three above-mentioned factors during the 1970s led to the 
SSC being given a far greater role in decision-making in South 
Africa. First, the South African military's involvement in the 
failed intervention during the Angolan civil war, which, accord­
ing to minister of defence Gen. Magnus Malan "focused attention 
on the urgent necessity for the State Security Council to play a 
much fuller role in the national security of the Republic than 
hitherto."^0
Second, the growing concern over security for South Africa 
during the 1970s which spawned a concepts like 'total onslaught' 
required a body to manage the response of 'total strategy'. The 
SSC was the organisation chosen to head the national security 
management system.?!
Third, was the centralisation of political power following 
the election of P.W. Botha as prime minister in 1978. Among
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Botha's earliest priorities was the overhaul of official machin­
ery for making and implementing government decisions —  a key 
aspect of total strategy. Beginning in 1980, Botha initiated a 
three-phase government 'rationalisation* programme which began by 
increasing the power of the prime minister; replaced the 20 
cabinet committees which had hitherto existed with five; consoli­
dated the existing 39 government departments into 22;?2 and, 
ultimately created himself a more powerful presidency to replace 
the position of prime minister.
A key point to note is the weakness of the South African 
parliament and foreign ministry in decision-making. The weakness 
of South Africa's parliament stems in part from the fact that the 
country has no deep-rooted praetorian culture and the very idea 
of a COUP d 'etat was foreign to South African culture. With 
regard to South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs and Infor­
mation, Frankel said that during the 1970s and 80s the institu­
tion:
continues to implement policy and fill out «the details 
of policy decisions (but) the principles of foreign 
policy are today largely determined in the context 
of the State Security Council in which the minister 
of foreign affairs is directly exposed to 'external' 
military influence.
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Thus, South Africa's destabilisation policy of the 1980s can 
accurately be described as "a direct and natural result of mili­
tary penetration into the foreign policy area."?*
Armscor and SSC: A military-industrial complex in South Africa?
Symptoms of the military-industrial complex, as identified by C. 
Wright Mills, are evident in Cold War South Africa.
The growing international isolation of Pretoria over the 
past three decades and the pressure to build up indigenous mili­
tary industries led to a tight group of political, military and 
economic leaders setting the pace and direction for the local 
economy.
there is no perfect alignment in relations between 
the South African military and businessmen.... 
Nonetheless, it is an undeniable and clearly visible 
fact that the tentative organisation of the South 
African economy on a permanent war footing has today 
stimulated a greater degree of political mingling 
between the economic, military (and government) elites 
than at any point in South African history.?^.
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One effect of the international arms embargo was that South 
African political and military leaders gave priority to domestic 
sources of arms supply and all sectors of private industry were 
increasingly geared to supplying the SADF with military goods. 
Although the South African state arms producer, Armscor, was 
successful in developing indigenous arms production, it also 
succeeded "in locking together the military, government and 
economic into a tight tripartite network" which supported Cold 
War government policy.
Indeed, Frankel credits Armscor, with a central policy­
making role in the very planning of armaments production in South 
Africa:
Armscor is at the node of communication between 
the military, private enterprise and government 
regarding the conception, planning and implementation 
of armaments policy.
Armscor*s board of directors is comprised of South African gov­
ernment bureaucrats, business and scientific elites as well as a 
representative of the director general of finance and the chief 
of the SADF. Some 5,600 businesses in South Africa are linked to 
Armscor as subsidiaries, contractors or sub-contractors.
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The basic fact of the matter is that virtually all 
of South Africa's leading corporations (and many 
subsidiaries of well-known international firms) 
form part of the estimated network of roughly 
fifty main companies who are primary contributors 
to Armscor production of hard or soft military 
equipment, who assist the corporation in marketing 
its manufactures, or who provide the specialized 
personnel or managerial skills to the Corporation.^®
The existence of Armscor and the former State Security 
Council accurately fit with Mintz's definition of a military 
industrial complex cited at the beginning of this chapter: "a 
coalition of powerful groups and bodies that share economic, 
institutional, or political interests in intensifying defense 
expenditure.
Armscor and the SSC clearly formed a coalition of powerful 
groups with shared economic, institutional or political interests 
in raising defence expenditures during the final two decades of 
the Cold War.
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Cold War civil-military relations in Yugoslavia; The armv as a 
seventh federal republic?
Unlike other formerly state socialist East European countries, 
the Communist Party in Yugoslavia grew out of the army and the 
partisan resistance against Nazi German occupation of the coun­
try.®^ This provided the basis for the special role that the Army 
enjoyed in Yugoslav politics and is a key difference between 
Yugoslavia and the two other case study countries of this disser­
tation.
As Adam Roberts has pointed out:
The army was so involved in the resistance and 
revolution that it could scarcely regard its role 
as being confined to the defence of the frontiers 
and ignore the question of defence of the political 
system.®^
The Yugoslav Peoples Army viewed itself as the guarantor of 
Yugoslav unity and —  despite the fact that nearly 70 per cent of 
its officers were Serbs —  was probably the only true pan-Yugo- 
slav institution which functioned with some degree of success
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amidst the patchwork of the 6 republics and 2 autonomous regions 
which comprised the former Yugoslav state.
The political role of the military
It is considerably more difficult to disentangle the political 
from the military in the case of Yugoslavia than in Israel and 
South Africa. It may be argued that the Yugoslav officer corps 
was shot through with Communist party members, or, vice-versa: 
By the late 1970s some 98 percent of all commanding officers were 
party members
A further measure of the military's role in politics can be 
seen in the proportion of Central Committee members who were 
military officers. The proportion of officers increased from 3 
per cent (in 1948) to some 14 percent (in 1978) of the 165- 
member Central Committee.^4
Paradoxically, during the first two decades after the Second 
World War, the Yugoslav Army appears to have become a more con­
ventional military establishment. It was an "exclusivist, pro­
fessional, supranational 'Yugoslav' institution that was almost 
hermetically sealed off from the rest of Yugoslav s o c i e t y . "^5
Although the army remained the key national force for so­
cialisation of the values of the Yugoslav Communist system and 
carefully cultivated its heritage as the founding instrument of
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the system, until thé 1960s it remained outside the mainstream 
of party-political life.®^
But in the mid-1960s, Yugoslav Communist Party reformers 
came to fear that the isolation of the army could create a poten­
tial military threat to the broad political and economic reforms 
being introduced to Yugoslavia at the time. The reformers sought 
to dilute the exclusiveness of the military and following 1966 
this was termed an * opening to society * :
Military matters, once a public taboo, began to 
be discussed in the media....The Federal Assembly 
began to debate, not just rubber stamp, the defense
b u d g e t . 87
Communist Party structures in the Yugoslav Army were reorganised 
in an effort to limit authority of the command echelons of the 
military which had dominated Party branches in the military since 
the abolition of political commissars in 1953. Under pressure 
from the republics, the Army implemented a policy of proportional 
representation in its officer corps which had traditionally been 
dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins. But despite any dilution of 
the military's powers during the late 1960s, it remained the 
country's strongest and most reliable all-Yugoslav political
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institution.88
This was dramatically illustrated during the period of 
Croation unrest in the early 1970s. During the Croat crisis of 
1971 the Army not only played a key military role, but also 
helped direct the Party's decision to take a hard line on the 
nationalist movement in the Croatian republic. The military and 
the powerful Veterans' Union (comprised of both officers who had 
served in the war of liberation and pensioned post-war officers) 
repeatedly made high-level approaches to Tito to express dissat­
isfaction over the events in Croatia. Adam Roberts concludes 
that military and veterans were "in the name of ideological 
orthodoxy... to some extent challenging the notion of the primacy 
of the Party."89
During the 1970s Tito repeatedly emphasised that the Yugo­
slav Army had a domestic political purpose. In 1971 he said: 
"our army is also called upon to defend the achievements of our 
revolution within the country should that become necessary." And 
in 1974 he went further, saying: "It is no longer sufficient for
our army to be familiar with military affairs. It must also be 
familiar with political affairs and developments. It must par­
ticipate in ( t h e m ) . " ^ 8  Thus the army did not simply inject 
itself into Yugoslav politics, but rather was called upon to play 
an active role.
Army involvement in political affairs slowly increased 
during the 1970s with the emergence of a small group of political
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generals for the first time since the late 1940s. Most of these 
soldier-politicians occupied security-related posts such as 
public prosecutor and head of civil a v i a t i o n .
The army's political position was codified at the Tenth 
Party Congress in 1974. In apparent recognition of the 
military's enhanced role the army was formally allocated the 
military 15 seats on the Central Committee (party organisations 
from the republics received 20 seats). This pushed the total 
military representation on the Central Committee to 17 seats or 
10 percent of membership.
Johnson contends that in the early 1970s the army re-estab­
lished itself as a servant of the Party, ready to protect the 
Communist system from domestic as well as external challenges. 
He concludes that the army became a sort of ninth component in
the federal system, after the six republics and two autonomous
92regions.
During the last two decades of the Cold War the Yugoslav 
Peoples Army became far more outspoken on the country's problems 
and steadily gained influence during the country's slow slide 
into ethnic strife and civil war, prior to break-up.
In January 1986 the deputy defence minister. General Milan 
Daljevic, publicly criticised the ruling Communist Party, saying 
the Party had to remain more faithful to its ideology and to 
maintaining the political unity of the country. He said the
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Party should develop the Leninist principle of democratic cen­
tralism and that it should do this on a federalist level. There 
was no room in the Party for new federalist ideas or factions, he 
said, adding that nationalists and 'foreign ideologies' must be 
dealt with severely. His recommendation for resolving the 
Yugoslav crisis was; "More work, more order, and more u n i t y . "^3 
Daljevic's sternest warnings were for potential domestic opposi­
tion forces, in particular liberal writers and intellectuals in 
Belgrade. "We support broadening the freedom for artistic 
achievement," Daljevic said, "but we are not for the freedom of 
propagation for unacceptable, counter-revolutionary i d e a s . "^4
In June 1986 Yugoslavia's defence minister. Admiral Branko 
Mamula, took the highly unusual step of publicly denying charges 
that the military aspired to seize power in Yugoslavia. The 
statement was a response to growing protest from youth groups and 
peace movements in the republic of Slovenia against the military. 
Mamula warned the peace movements against acting on behalf of 
what he called "the interests of foreign and internal forces that 
wish to threaten Yugoslav security and independence."^^
Mamula gave an even less delphic warning in the autumn of 
1987. In a televised speech he said that the Party, which was 
responsible for the preservation and further development of the 
society, had failed precisely in carrying out these tasks. 
"Friends of the country had warned that Yugoslavia was slipping 
out of the control of the (Party) leadership," he said. The
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crisis had reached a point, he said, in which the "integrity of 
Yugoslavia and the preservation of the existing social system is 
in danger."96
This was regarded by observers as a clear warning of rest­
lessness in the military. It should, however, be pointed out that 
this military threat appears to have been fully legal under the 
Yugoslav constitution; Under Article 240 of the constitution, 
the army is empowered not only to defend the independence, sover­
eignty, and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, but also the 
"constitutionally established order of society."
The further erosion of the Party and central government's 
power during 1989 created a power vacuum which was partly filled 
by the growing aspirations of reform-minded republics like Slove­
nia and partly by the military, anxious to prevent any decentral­
isation of power in the country. With a weakening of old politi­
cal forces, the Army came to view itself as the last guarantee 
for the integrity of the Yugoslav state. A report in the Frank­
furter Allaemeine Zeituna in 1989 said:
The Army sees ever more room for its activities 
and is attempting to put forward its own political 
programme. The Programme is based on Serbian Party 
leadership. It rejects a majority-rule party system 
and will at most allow a pluralist system without
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political parties.97
In October 1989, the Yugoslav Chief of Staff Mirkovic, a 
Serb, warned that the Army did not need professors to explain the 
constitution and that the officer corps recognised only the 
Yugoslav federal constitution. The Yugoslav Army strongly op­
posed changes in the Slovenian constitution which place armed 
forces under the control of the r e p u b l i c . 9®
In conclusion, during Yugoslavia's final two decades, the 
army steadily expanded its influence over society and policy­
making. But the precise ways in which the military (and econom­
ic) interests influenced or made arms production decisions is 
less well documented.
A military-industrial complex in Yugoslavia?
Little work has been done on the civilian-military decision­
making process leading up to Yugoslavia's decision to expand its 
defence industries. Yugoslavia's shunning of the Cold War blocs 
through its leadership of the Nonaligned movement logically led 
to the political decision not rely on either military bloc for 
weapons and demanded domestic development of arms production 
c a p a b i l i t i e s 9 9
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Yugoslav military and industrial interests played a key role 
in securing approval of the Novi Avion fighter project in the 
1980s. The ability of these interests to obtain approval for the 
estimated $2 billion project , despite Yugoslavia's deepening 
economic crisis during the period, is evidence of the potency of 
the country's military-industrial lobby.
Apportioning precise military, political or economic influence 
over these decisions is as difficult as disentangling 
Yugoslavia's intertwined military and civilian influences. While 
decisions were made by the party leadership, determining the 
level of military or economic interests' influence over these 
decisions is problematic given currently available information.
Nevertheless, the expansion of Yugoslav military influence 
over national during the 1970s and 80s, as described above, 
appears to have included authority over domestic arms production 
decisions which remained highly centralised through the break-up 
of the Yugoslav federation.
Conclusion
This chapter on civil-military relations and the military indus­
trial complex has been intended as an introduction to arms pro­
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auction in the three case study countries examined in this dis­
sertation.
The preceding survey of civil-military relations and mili­
tary industrial complex illustrate the varying political, econom­
ic and military inputs into the making of security and arms 
production policies in Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia, but 
also illustrates the role played by MIC forces in sustaining and 
expanding the defence production sectors in the case study coun­
tries following the initial defence industries start-up. The 
initial decision to manufacture arms will be examined in greater 
detail in Chapters Two, Three and Four.
Israel exhibits characteristics indicating the presence of a 
military-industrial complex and the country's long-term security 
concerns have propelled the military to the forefront of society. 
In Israel, civilian military-industrial interests appear to have 
played an important role in fostering the expansion of the coun­
try's domestic arms industries. The defence sector build-up was 
a key policy priority for Israeli political leaders such as David 
Ben-Gurion and Shimon Peres. Managers of nascent defence indus­
tries, such as Israel Aircraft Industries, sought rapid expansion 
through projects such as the Arava transport —  a loss-making 
project embarked upon with no targeted market —  and the Lavi 
fighter which was subsequently canceled due to financial grounds. 
Military leaders appear to have been more cautious about the 
country's rapid defence industrial build-up, the Israeli Air
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Force's ambivalence about the Lavi being a case in point.
The South African military acquired considerable influence 
in the setting of the country's security agenda during the 1970s 
and 8 0s. The state arms producer, Armscor, brought together 
military, government and economic interests into a tight network 
during the Cold War which supported government policy and a mili­
tary industrial complex composed of these interests clearly 
gained power during this period. The South African MIC helped 
create an atmosphere conducive to arms industry expansion through 
creation of a largely imaginary threat from frontline African 
states under the guise of what was termed 'total onslaught'.
The Yugoslav military played a key role in the creation of 
post-1945 Yugoslavia and has repeatedly affirmed its dedication 
to the defend both state socialism and to protect the country 
from breakup. Little work has been done on the arms industry 
decision-making process in Yugoslavia. The initiative to for the 
creation and expansion of the defence industrial sector appears 
to have come from the party/government leadership as a key aspect 
of the Nonalignment policy. But the military's ever-expanding 
role in national policy-making during the 1970s and 80s appears 
to have further blurred distinctions between military and 
party/political decision-making with regard to arms production 
decisions. The huge influence of the military and aircraft 
manufacturing lobby in the 1980s is evidenced by the granting of
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approval for the $2 billion Novi Avion fighter aircraft project, 
despite the Yugoslav economic crisis.
Although elements of the military-industrial complex de­
scribed above appear to have played an important role in the 
expansion of the defence industries in Israel, South Africa and 
Yugoslavia, a key point of similarity among all three countries 
is that the initial decision to develop arms industries came as a 
response to the Cold War.
From 1955 to 1989 Israel was confronted with massive Soviet 
arms exports to the Arab world which served as part of Moscow's 
Cold War bid to gain influence in its Middle Eastern backyard. 
The fear that Jerusalem might be subject to further arms embar­
goes while the Arab frontline states received arms from their 
military patron in Moscow was a key reason that the initial rapid 
military industrial build-up in Israel achieved support.
During South Africa's period of growing international os- 
tracisation, Pretoria's elite were determined to prove that the 
Afrikaner state could make a valuable contribution to the West in 
the Cold War conflict with the Soviet bloc. The build-up of NATO 
compatible forces —  of questionable utility for African condi­
tions —  and development of an independent South African military 
capable of launching attacks on perceived Soviet client states in 
southern Africa was one means of proving this worth to the West. 
Much of South Africa's defence sector development during the 
1970s and 80s can be explained in that its purpose was to serve
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this Cold War goal.
Yugoslavia, trapped in the frozen Cold War wasteland between 
both blocs, made a conscious decision to opt out of the Cold War 
and developed defence industries and military strategies to 
achieve this end. During the height of the Cold War in the 
1950s and 1960s, Nonalignment stipulated not only that Yugoslavia 
be militarily self-sufficient but also that Belgrade should 
supply arms to like-minded Third World states.
The following three chapters examine the similar initial 
reasons for the arms industry start-up in the case study coun­
tries and the differing respective defence manufacturing sectors 
they developed during the final three decades of the Cold War.
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Part Two —  Case Studies
Chapter Two
Israeli armaments production: a case study 
Introduction
Israel is clearly the most successful arms producer and arms 
exporter of the three countries examined in this dissertation. 
Indeed, Israel is one of the Third World's leading arms produc­
ers, along with countries such as Brazil.^ As will be shown 
below, Israel is one of the few Third World producers with a 
truly broad based defence manufacturing sector. Israel's volume 
of arms and technology exports are variously ranked placing 
Israel between being the eighth and the fifteenth largest arms 
exporting country in the world.^
It is important to point out that Israel alone could never 
have financed such a large defence industry sector. During the 
1980s and 90s, the United States provided Israel with almost $4 
billion in annual military and economic aid. In addition, Ameri­
can Jews made $1 billion worth of tax deductible donations to 
Israel each year. The Israeli government raised another $500 
million a year through the sale of Israel bonds and American 
commercial banks loaned Israel some $1 billion annually. All 
this adds up to over $6 billion a year.^
But while Israel is an arms producer with a unique status, 
it nevertheless shares the host of circumstantial and systemic
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similarities with South Africa and Yugoslavia, which were out­
lined in the introduction. Before turning to the more substan­
tive themes of this chapter it will be useful to review these 
four case study similarities as they apply to Israel.
1) Limitations on relations with other countries; Israel re­
mains an unaccepted creation by most of its neighbors and indeed 
nearly the entire Arab world. Israel has been at war with all 
neighbor states since 1948 and through the late 1970s could claim 
to be entirely surrounded by hostile countries posing a threat to 
its security. Although the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 
removed the largest and most important of Israel's potential 
adversaries, relations between the two countries are far from 
warm.
The increased influence of the Arab bloc following the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War proved disastrous for Israel's carefully nur­
tured relations with the Third World. Twenty-nine out of the 32 
African states with which Israel had diplomatic ties severed all 
relations during or after the War.* This mirrored the 1967 Arab- 
Israeli War during and after which all Warsaw Pact countries, 
except Romania, broke diplomatic relations with Israel ^
A more fundamental limitation regarding Israel's relations 
with other states has been the fact that until Israel's formal 
designation by the United States as 'major non-NATO ally' in 
1987, Israel lacked a reliable long-term supplier of advanced
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military materiel. The military relationship with Czechoslovakia 
faded between 1948 and 1951. The Franco-Israeli military con­
nection lasted from 1955-1967/69 before ending abruptly and in 
acrimony. West Germany secretly supplied Israel with a variety 
of major systems from 1957-65.® The U.S.-Israeli military rela­
tionship began in earnest under President Johnson but remained 
subject to policy shifts in Washington and was largely unregulat­
ed by any bilateral agreement until the Reagan administration 
approved a series of military and technology transfer agreements 
which culminated in the 'near NATO status' and the U.S.-Israel 
Free Trade Agreement.
Thus, until the mid-1980s Israel lacked a truly reliable 
military relationship with a major power. Although the Israeli 
arms industry has been developed and sustained for a number of 
reasons which will be discussed below, it is this lack of a 
reliable foreign arms supplier and, indeed, the unwillingness of 
the Israeli leadership to become overly reliant on any foreign 
power which has served as a cornerstone in the decision to devel­
op and expand the Israeli defence industrial sector.
2) External threat more widelv perceived than internal threat. 
vet internal threat probablv of more fundamental danger to the 
state: Israeli security thinking has tended to be concentrate on
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external threats. Soldiers of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
are "trained to cope with the combined force of the Arab 
a r m i e s " . 7 Israeli forces have fought six major wars since Israel 
was created: the 1948-49 War, the 1956 War, Six Day War of 1967, 
the War of Attrition from 1969-70, the 1973 War, and the 1982 
invasion of Lebanon. Given this history a preoccupation regarding 
external threats is not difficult to understand.
Concentration on external threats may have been appropriate 
for the period from 1948-67, however, the occupation of Arab 
territories during the 1967 War and the incorporation of 700,000 
(today over one million) Palestinians under Israeli rule, in 
addition to the 400,000 Arabs who already lived in pre-1967 
Israel, created the potential for an entirely different sort of 
conflict. For 22 years following the 1967 occupation of Arab 
territories the Israeli military and police were able to maintain 
control over the occasionally restive Arab populations without 
resorting to any particularly sophisticated tactics.
Tactics employed by the Palestinian intifada, which began in 
December 1987, took the Israeli military by surprise. An article 
in the official Israeli Defence Forces Journal entitled 'Logis­
tics in the Stone Age', begins: "In the past forty years, the
IDF has learned how to fight several Arab armies concurrently. 
What it never had to deal with was rioting on the part of thou­
sands of residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza". Illustrating 
the depth of the IDF's unpreparedness for such a conflict the
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article goes on to quote an Israeli colonel in the Logistics 
Branch who admits that "...the acquisition of means for dispers­
ing crowds was under consideration for some time," and that with 
the outbreak of disturbances at the end of 1987 procurement 
priorities were immediately changed.® Clearly, the internal 
threat of a Palestinian uprising had been given low priority on 
the list of possible combat scenarios for the 1980s.
Today, Israel's external threats have been radically altered 
through diplomacy, circumstance or technology. The peace treaty 
between Israel and Egypt has held for more than a decade. Jordan 
can safely be discounted as a combatant against Israel in any 
future war, in part because of the long-running, secret dialogue 
which has gone on between Amman and Jerusalem and in part because 
King Hussein has given up Jordan's claims on the West Bank. 
Palestine Liberation Organisation forces have been expelled from 
Lebanon and the Lebanese state cannot be taken to be a threat to 
anything but itself. Iraq's military capacity was smashed by the 
Allied forces in the 1991 Gulf War. Of the front-line states 
this leaves Syria, long a leader of the rejectionist Arab 
states. Syria remains a danger to Israel less in terms of its 
army, air force, navy, or its population of some 11.3 million, 
but more through its possession of SS-21 surface-to-surface 
missiles which have the capability of reaching all targets in
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Israel north of Tel Aviv.
The Gulf War showed that the greatest external danger to 
Israel is in the form of missiles. Missile threats also emanate 
from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Prior to the Gulf War Iraq was 
involved with Egypt and Argentina in the Condor 2 or Badr-2000 
medium range surface-to-surface missile project. The missile, 
which was reported to have a range of 500 miles, was being de­
veloped with the assistance of several West European aerospace 
concerns. Iraq was also engaged in a programme to build nuclear 
warheads to the arm the missile.^ Whether UN sanctions and 
international sanctions will be able to hinder the long-term 
completion of these projects remains open to some doubt. The 
Saudi government recently bought Chinese DF-3 missiles which have 
a range of some 2,200 kilometres.
Other than missiles, which could be armed with nuclear, 
chemical or biological warheads, there appear to be few serious 
external threats to Israel in the short-term. The spread of 
rocket technology, then, is probably the one major external 
danger for Israel in the 1990s. Although it should be noted this 
threat is countered by Israel's own nuclear-armed missiles.
The second key danger to Israel is quite simply the Pales­
tinians in the Occupied Territories. The Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip pose at least four acute problems for 
the Jewish state which Israeli military and political leaders 
appear unable to resolve.
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First, and most basic, are the demographic projections which 
show that by the year 2010 an Israel, encompassing the Occupied 
Territories could have a population with an Arab majority, given 
the higher Palestinian birth-rate and declining Jewish immigra­
tion to Israel. (Prior to the failed coup against Gorbachev, 
Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel had sharply declined in part 
due to unemployment and housing shortages in Israel.^®)
Second, is the radicalisation of the Palestinians involved 
in the intifada. Israel proved itself adept at hermetically 
sealing the country's borders against attacks launched by Arab 
groups operating from outside of Israel or the Occupied Territo­
ries. Yet this considerable achievement may well count for naught 
if the Palestinian population in the territories is sufficiently 
radicalised by the policing operations of the Israeli military 
and settlers or comes under a more radical leadership. The human 
cost of such a development is incalculable and the economic cost 
of an intensified intifada or, more seriously, a campaign of 
economic sabotage would seriously hinder government attempts to 
restore Israel's economic fortunes. Indeed, the Palestinian 
uprising in its present form has already credited with having 
played a significant role in stopping the Israeli economic recov­
ery and with widening the Israeli government budget deficit in 
the late 1980s.
A third, and less easily quantifiable problem of the intifa­
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da is the role it plays in demoralising the Israeli military. 
The problem of demoralisation in the IDF first manifested itself 
at serious levels during the 1982 war in Lebanon. The Israeli 
Defence Forces have been more accustomed to conventional force 
engagements, high-technology equipment, and the consensus that 
every war was a war about the survival of Israel. However, the 
shooting and beating of unarmed Palestinian stone-throwers during 
the course of the intifada marks a more advanced chapter in the 
'dirty wa r ' that Israel began in Lebanon. Israel has valued 
above all the will of its soldiers to fight from the time of 
David Ben-Gurion who stated:
Seven hundred thousand vanquished 30 million, 
and this occurred because under the given 
conditions the 700,000 Jews possessed greater 
will power than the 30 million Arabs...and 
therefore they won.
Through to the current IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Shomron, 
who has emphasised:
The greatest danger facing our nation is the 
erosion in the consensus regarding what we call 
a war of survival...Armies generally collapse not
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because they are weak, but because they have lost 
the will to fight...
Thus, despite press reports that the intifada is running out of 
steam, the continuation of violent protest in the Occupied Terri­
tories must be a deeply worrying prospect. Indeed, the danger to 
morale of the Israeli military in the type of conflict which has 
developed in the Occupied Territories, is, if anything, greater 
in the intifada than it was in the war in Lebanon: at least in
the latter conflict the IDF was involved in a conventional land, 
air and sea war. A further danger is that soldiers not trained 
in crowd control tactics appear prone to over-reaction when 
confronted with a civilian uprising. The intifada's balance thus 
far is that on the one hand, hundreds of investigations have been 
launched against soldiers for violent behaviour in suppressing 
the uprising, while on the other hand, a small movement has begun 
among reservists who refuse to serve in the Occupied 
Territories.
The fourth danger brought by the intifada is that it has led 
to Israel's first major reversal since 1948 in the propaganda war 
designed to maintain Western financial, military and political 
support for the Jewish state. As the IISS's Strategic Survev 
points out: "The Palestinians successfully restricted their 
struggle to means that the world would applaud and that the IDF
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would be hard put to counter by conventional means..." This
produced a reserve of world sympathy for the Palestinians, par­
ticularly in the United States where the Reagan administration 
officially opened a dialogue with FLO in December 1988 —  some 13 
years after Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pledged the U.S. 
would not speak with the FLO until it recoginised Israel's right 
to exist. This capturing of the moral high ground by the Pales­
tinians places Israel in an entirely new and difficult context of 
Western opinion.
Israel has long enjoyed a unique and forgiving relationship 
with a West burdened by memories of the Holocaust. In the wake 
of the intifada, however, Jerusalem increasingly was seen through 
the Pariah perspective more common among some Third World coun­
tries which approved a UN resolution in 1975 equating Zionism 
with racism. The danger of worsening relations with the West is 
that this is occurring precisely at the time that Israel, as this 
chapter will argue, has become more heavily dependent on the 
United States for its entire military programme in terms of 
advanced weapons imports, military technology, and financial aid.
3) Victim of arms embargoes and arms control restrictions;
Israel (and the pre-state Zionist movement) has been a repeated 
victim of arms embargoes, arms control restrictions, and technol­
ogy transfer restriction since well before the establishment of 
the Jewish state in 1948. The earliest embargo was the historic
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British prohibition on arms exports to Palestine. In 1929, 
during anti-Jewish riots Jews were not allowed to receive weap­
ons, while Arabs in Palestine were able to obtain weapons from a 
number of regional s o u r c e s . A r m s  exports from the USA to Zion­
ists in Palestine rose considerably during the 1945-49 period. 
However, all these exports were illegal under the American Neu­
trality Act, the Export Controls Act and presidential proclama­
tions 2549 (1942) and 2776 (1948). Zionists operating in the 
United States were 'vigorously prosecuted* by law enforcement
agencies who **... were especially tough on the export of arms..."
17
The first arms embargo against the state of Israel was the 
United Nations embargo passed by the Security Council as part of 
the cease-fire resolution of 29 May 1948 which stipulated that no 
'war materiel* should be exported to the warring sides. The 
embargo's objective was to prevent either the Arabs or the Israe­
lis from using the cease-fire period to alter the balance of 
power, however, it proved largely ineffective.^®
The second major arms embargo involved the slow cut-off of 
Soviet arms from Czechoslovakia from 1948 through the early 
1950s. The Communist government installed in February 1948 in 
Prague sent World War II fighter aircraft and an average of two 
transport plane loads of arms to Israel a day during 1948 and 
beyond. Although official Israeli histories have tried to con­
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ceal the fact that Czechoslovakian arms deliveries continued 
after 1948, declassified archives of the Israeli foreign ministry 
show that in 1950 alone, one quarter of Israel's arms imports 
still came from Czechoslovakia.^^ But during the Korean War, 
Israel's East Bloc arms imports were finally terminated by Mos­
cow.
The third major arms embargo was included in the Tripartite 
Declaration of 25 May 1950, in which the United States, France 
and the United Kingdom undertook to regulate arms exports to the 
Middle East, which they still monopolised. As Aaron Klieman has 
pointed out, this policy clearly worked against Israel, given the 
UK's special military relationship with Egypt, Jordan and Iraq 
and with U.S. military blandishments directed at drawing Iraq 
into the anti-Soviet 'northern tier' security s y s t e m . ^0 For all 
practical purposes it can be said that the Tripartite Declaration 
was finally recognised as a dead letter following Egypt's 1955 
arms deal with Czechoslovakia (i.e.. the USSR) which conclusively 
broke the old Western oligopoly of arms venders to the region. A 
second UN arms embargo for the region, adopted in November 1956 
by the General Assembly, proved as ineffective as the 1948 Secu­
rity Council embargo.
Between 1955 and 1967 France came to be Israel's major arms 
supplier. The nature of French-Israeli relations, however, 
changed fundamentally in 1962 with the Evian accords which ended 
the Algerian War. Prior to resolving the Algerian conflict
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France had supplied arms to Israel partly because Paris saw 
Israel as an ally against the Arab Mediterranean states. (Al­
though Egyptian aid to the Algerian liberation movement has 
subsequently been shown to have been m i n i m a l . ^ 1 )  Following 1962, 
French interests evolved toward improving relations with the Arab 
world. The partial arms embargo announced by France on 2 June 
1967 —  the eve of the Six Day War —  was theoretically aimed at 
all combatants in the conflict. In practice, however, it was an 
attempt to restrain Israel from using French arms against the 
Arabs. This embargo covered only so-called offensive weapons, 
namely 50 Mirage 5s. Other French arms were not affected by the 
embargo including 25 Fouga-Magister aircraft, seven Super Frelon 
helicopters and seven out of 12 missile patrol boats on order as 
well as ammunition and spare parts. Israel, however, ignored the 
French demand that the weapons not be used for offensive purposes 
and in December 1968 launched a raid on Beirut airport. On 3 
January 1969 Paris announced a full arms embargo against 
I s r a e l . 2 2  in addition to the French embargo, the Israeli leader­
ship received a follow-up shock when the British government 
refused to sell Israel the Chieftain tank.
In the aftermath of the Six Day War the United States came 
to be Israel's single most important foreign arms supplier and 
has remained so through the present. However, Washington has 
repeatedly withheld particular weapons systems and military
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industry technology or postponed deliveries to indicate displeas­
ure over Israeli actions. The following are some examples of 
such temporary embargoes;
-Upon the outbreak of the 1967 War the Johnson administration 
announced that it would stop all arms exports to the Middle East. 
For Israel this meant the postponement of delivery of Skyhawk 
fighters which the U.S. had agreed to sell in 1966. The regional 
embargo lasted until 24 October 1967.
-During the 1969-70 War of Attrition, the Nixon administration 
withheld approval for the sale of F-4 and F-5 aircraft in order 
to pressure Israel politically.
-During the 1973 War, the U.S. airlift of weapons was linked to 
Israeli willingness to accept a cease-fire.
-The Ford administration initiated a 'reassessment* of U.S. 
Middle East policy from March through September 1975 and refused 
to enter into negotiations on new arms deals during this period.
-The Carter administration simply included Israel in its broader 
efforts to limit arms sales to the region and reduced Israel's 
priority in the list of states receiving U.S. military supplies.
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-The Reagan administration delayed arms deliveries on at least 
four occasions: after the Israeli destruction of Iraq's nuclear
reactor in June 1981; in response to the Israeli bombing or the 
PLO headquarters in Beirut in July 1981; in response to the 
Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981; and, 
during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.^3
-The Bush administration upheld the U.S. Department of Defence's 
refusal to grant export licences for supercomputers to Israel. 
In April 1989 Technion-Israel of Technology in Haifa canceled an 
order for a Control Data supercomputer after waiting six months 
while the company sought in vain to obtain U.S. government ap­
proval for export of the system. In light of Technion's experi­
ence, Tel Aviv University also dropped plans to buy a similar 
computer from the United States. The Weizmann Institute of 
Science in Rehovot has been waiting since the end of 1988 for its 
US suppliers to receive approval for the export of two vector 
processors which would upgrade existing systems to the level of a 
supercomputer.24 in the second half of 1990, the Bush adminis­
tration reportedly delayed delivery of F-15 aircraft, helicopters 
and ammunition to Israel.25
Despite the above examples, Washington has met most of Israel's
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requests for arms and substantial military aid. The major area 
where the U.S. has placed a more serious permanent 'embargo' on 
Israel has been on American financing of Israeli military indus­
trial projects like the Lavi fighter. In the case of the Lavi, 
which will be examined in more detail below, U.S. opposition 
effectively forced cancellation of the project. This leads to 
the fourth point of case study similarity;
4) Structural requirements and the limits of technoloav and 
finance
The structural requirements for the production of advanced weap­
ons systems are multiple and complex. This theme will be dis­
cussed in more detail in the following section on the Israeli 
armaments industries. Of greater interest here are the limita­
tions on growth imposed on indigenous Third World arms industries 
by technology and finance.
In Israel the initial impetus to establish an arms sector 
stemmed largely from external strategic / political imperatives, 
namely the unreliability of foreign arms suppliers and the re­
peated multilateral attempts to foist an arms embargo over all 
combatants in the Arab-Israeli conflict. While other related 
economic, technical and institutional factors supported the 
development of Israeli arms industries, it may be asserted that 
during the period from 1948-1973 Israeli concern over foreign 
military suppliers in light of repeated arms embargoes was the
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dominant justification for the development of the arms sector.
From 1973, while the perceived threat of arms embargoes did 
not wane, these other economic, technological and institutional 
influences increasingly began to serve as forces supporting 
expansion of the arms industry. The 1973 oil crisis had a seri­
ous impact on Israel's economy and its ability to sustain a high 
level of defence expenditures and arms imports.
The oil price shocks affected Israel in two 
ways. On the one hand, the additional economic 
burden of more expensive imported fuel worsened 
Israel's already severe balance of payments deficit.
On the other hand, Israel had to compete in the 
Middle East arms race against the OPEC Arab states 
who benefited greatly from the higher oil prices 
and were able to purchase vast quantities of 
sophisticated weapons systems.  ^^
To resolve these economic and military imbalances, the Israeli 
government began a policy aimed at further indigenisation of the 
state's arms industries and sought to raise the level of arms 
exports. In theory, increasing local production of arms would 
allow for import substitution which would lead to an improved 
balance of payments situation. (But as will be shown below and in
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Chapter Seven the military import substitution has been unsuc­
cessful in the Israeli situation.) Economic considerations came 
to play an increasingly important role in the Israeli defence 
sector. The decision to build the Merkava tank and even the 
early decision for a more modest Lavi fighter project were under­
taken after cursory studies by the Israeli finance and defence 
ministries calculated that design and production would cost less 
than importing foreign systems.
A related rationale for increased indigenisation of the 
Israeli arms industry was the desire to provide an industrial 
infrastructure for Israel which would produce technological 
spinn-offs. The argument raised was that modern military indus­
tries would stimulate the growth of other technology oriented 
enterprises through the acquisition and dissemination of modern 
technology and provide training for future scientists and engi­
neers. More recently, however, Israeli military economists
have criticised the military R&D spending as bringing far less 
profit than civilian R&D spending. In an article published in 
the Israeli Economist. Avriel Halperin, a military economist at 
the Hebrew University, calculated that every dollar invested 
military R&D brought in $2-3 in exports whereas every dollar 
invested in civilian R&D brought in $15. This conforms with
the view of reverse spinn-offs which holds that broad advanced 
technological spinn-offs from a healthy civilian goods industry 
are a necessary prerequisite to building advanced, indigenous
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arms.30
In Israel, after nearly two decades of hectic growth for the 
defence sector the cancellation of the much hailed Lavi fighter 
project in 1987 was a major symptom of domestic arms production 
limits. The cancellation came as a shock to the nation and 
sharply divided the military establishment into pro- and anti- 
Lavi camps. As will be illustrated below, the decision to build 
the Lavi was made in disjointed fashion, with arguments in favour 
of the project being accepted with little criticism and the onus 
of proof being placed on those opposing the project. Ultimately, 
however, three key Israeli limitations coalesced together to sink 
the Lavi.
First, and foremost, was finance. The project was non­
starter without U.S. capital, and despite protests from American 
defence aerospace concerns, Washington spent more than $1.5 
billion on the Lavi. However, the rising projected costs of the 
project combined with the domestic criticism over American money 
going to fund a fighter which would later compete with US air­
craft in the exports market led the Reagan administration to 
'convince* Israel to cancel the project over financial grounds.
The second Israeli limitation was technology. The idea of 
producing a truly indigenous fighter rapidly ran into barriers. 
Ultimately, the 'indigenous' Lavi was to have an American engine, 
American wings, an American tail assembly and substantial Ameri­
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can avionics. This effectively neutralised two of the important 
reasons for having an indigenous fighter project in the first 
place: independence and exports. With such key components under 
American control, unhindered production of the aircraft could not 
be assured should the United States place embargoes on the above 
assemblies and components. In addition, the American components 
would give Washington the right to veto all export sales of the 
fighter —  a right which was used to block sales of the Israeli 
Kfir fighter.
The third problem —  the calculus of national security —  is 
less easy to quantify but relates directly to the finance and 
technology problems above. Most simply put, one could have asked 
of the Lavi: 'What if it doesn't work?'^^ The development of new 
fighter aircraft is a risky business not just in the Third World 
but also in the West as witnessed by the recent difficulties 
which have beset Sweden's JAS-39 Gripen —  the prototype for this 
$6.5 billion fighter project crashed —  and continued French 
doubts over building the Rafale fighter without other European 
partners. If the Lavi would have run into development difficul­
ties it remains highly questionable as to whether Israel's tech­
nological and financial base would have provided the means to 
cope. Furthermore, for a country which since the Six Day War has 
come to depend on air-superiority for its defence, any weaknesses 
in Lavi performance, or delivery delays, would have carried a 
particular danger for Israel.
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with the cancellation of the Lavi structural realities 
finally forced Israeli leaders to abandon the long-cherished goal 
of military self-sufficiency at the end of the 1980s. Ze'ev 
Bonen, former head of RAFAEL, Israel's military research and 
development authority, publicly stated that Israel's military 
sector had reached the point where it could no longer set self- 
sufficiency as a goal and that attempts to produce all types of 
systems were bound to hit an economic impasse. Bonen's solution 
is for Israel to adopt a policy of seeking joint ventures with 
the West: "The natural solution to the economic problem may be
found in the integration of Israel in the defence community of 
the West."32
Israel's arms industries
The Zionist leadership in Palestine began supporting development 
of indigenous arms industries well before the creation of the 
state of Israel. Primitive grenades were manufactured on an ad 
hoc basis as early as 1917 by the Jewish underground which fought 
against the Ottoman Turks prior to the victory of British and 
Arab forces in the First World War.
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Following the anti-Jewish Arab riots of 1929, in which 
several hundred Jewish settlers were killed, the Haaanah (the 
Jewish underground militia) embarked on a programme to manufac­
ture basic small arms as a means to evade the British prohibition 
on the import of arms into Palestine. By 1933 the first regular 
factory of the Ta'as. the forerunner of Israel Military Indus­
tries, had been established. The main initial manufacture was a 
grenade which could be fired from the barrel of a rifle.
In 1945 some 800 crates of surplus war plant machinery were 
purchased from the United States and clandestinely shipped to 
Israel disguised as ‘textile machinery*. According to an article 
in the official Israeli Defence Forces Journal. following the 
assembly of this weapons plant machinery “sophisticated mass- 
production machinery (was) available...and with increased finan­
cial backing from the Haaanah production soared”. A visiting
U.S. military attaché who inspected Jewish arms manufacturing 
facilities in Tel Aviv and the Galilee in 1948 reported that 
British officers thought the Sten guns and the mortars made by 
the Jews in Palestine were superior to those made in the United 
K i n g d o m . 34 At the time of Israel's independence in 1948 some
1,000 workers were employed in Israel's arms and related chemi­
cals industries.
Despite the Israeli military victories of 1948-49, the 
subsequent armistice failed to generate genuine peace. Most 
Israeli policy-makers came to regard a 'second round' with the
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Arabs as virtually inevitable. A strong military was deemed 
essential for Israel, given the country's geo-strategic position, 
demographic situation and infrastructure. The underlying premise 
developed at this time —  and still adhered to —  was that Israel 
must not base its security policy on the supposition that outside 
forces would save the country in a worst-case scenario. The 
logical extension of this policy was the ability to supply the 
country's military with indigenously produced arms.
The experience with arms embargoes, beginning in the 1920s 
through the 1948-49 war, made David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first 
prime minister and defence minister, anxious to reduce reliance 
on arms imports. Thus, in its earliest stages, the development 
of the Israeli military sector was driven by the determination to 
reduce dependence on foreign arms sources. In 1949 it was decided 
to convert the scattered arms factories from the Haaanah into a 
more unified arms industry. The 1950 Tripartite Declaration 
served as a further factor to speed development of more advanced 
arms manufacturing capabilities and in 1951 the development an 
Israeli aircraft company commenced.
The development of Israeli military production, 1950-1990
The post-1950 development of Israel's defence sectors can be
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broken into four distinct periods: 1950-56, 1956-67, 1967-87,
and, 1987-present.
1) The initial period from 1950-56 was a time of expansion in 
basic assembly work and upgrading and retrofit of existing sys­
tems. Most important, however, key foundations for future growth 
of the arms sector were laid, including the establishment of the 
Bedeck Aviation Company in 1953 (the forerunner of Israel Air­
craft Industries) . By 1956 Bedeck was upgrading aircraft of the 
Israeli Air Force and servicing and repairing jet engines which 
had previously been sent to France for such work. During this 
period, Israel Military Industries developed its capabilities in 
the production of bombs, artillery, shells, and light ammunition 
with the assistance of French and Belgian arms manufacturers. 
Considerable progress was made in fitting modern cannons on aging 
tanks and adapting aircraft and motorised vehicles for desert 
warfare. The Uzi sub-machine gun, designed in 1952, entered 
production in 1954.
2) The second period, from 1956-67, marked the shift from basic 
assembly work to licensed production. Bedeck Aviation manufac­
tured the first French Fouaa Maaister jet trainers under license 
in 1960. Israel began producing guns under license from the 
Belgian concern FN Herstal; aircraft engines under license from 
Turboméca of France; and mortars under licence from Tampella of
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Finland. In addition, further foundations for the Israeli arms 
industry were laid in the form of the conversion of the old 
Science Corps, founded during the Israeli War of Independence, to 
the Israeli Combat Means Authority (known by its Hebrew acronym, 
RAFAEL) and the establishment of the nuclear research centres at 
Dimona and Nahal Sorek.^?
3) The 20 years, from 1967-87, marked a period of hectic growth 
for the defence sector in Israel. In particular the years 1969- 
72 were a time of heavy investment in the Israeli military sector 
with defence expenditures increasing from 11.8 per cent to 17.4 
per cent. The French arms embargo which followed the 1967 Six
Day War and the subsequent refusal of the United Kingdom to sell 
Israel the Chieftain tank led Israeli policy-makers to undertake 
a fundamental re-evaluation of weapons procurement policy. The 
fact that Israel had been denied key weapons systems during this 
crucial period encouraged the trend toward increasing indigenous 
design and production of arms. The Nesher and Kfir fighters —  
both of which were derived from the French Mirage —  were un­
veiled in 1969 and 1973 respectively.
Following completion of the Kfir fighter project, a debate 
over indigenous arms production, which had gone on for some years 
among Israeli leaders, came to a head over the question of wheth­
er to build a successor fighter aircraft to the Kfir. The group
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opposed to any post-Kfir project, led by former prime minister, 
defence minister and chief of staff Yitzak Rabin, argued that 
Israel could not support the burden of both designing and produc­
ing major weapons systems. The Rabin group called for the pur­
chase of stripped down weapons platforms for tanks and aircraft, 
and the add-on of locally designed and manufactured electronics 
and other components. However, it was the proponents of full 
indigenous design and production, led by Shimon Peres and Moshe 
Arens who finally prevailed, in part because Israel could, at 
this time, not even count on importing the relevant p l a t f o r m s . ^ 9  
During the late 1970s and early 80s, the decision was made 
to proceed with the Lavi fighter and to build the Merkava tank. 
The Gabriel ship-to-ship missile project came to fruition in the 
early 1970s and was used in the 1973 War. Among other important 
projects from this period are the pilotless drones developed by 
two different Israeli concerns which were used extensively in the 
1982 war; the Reshef fast patrol boat which was based on the West 
German designs for the Saar fast patrol boat and the Aliya class 
missile boat with a helicopter landing pad. The above is merely 
an overview of the major defence sector projects of this period. 
These and others will be discussed in considerably more detail 
below.
4) The year 1987 represents the high-water mark for the Israeli 
production of major weapons systems. This is the year in which
99
the Lavi fighter prototype made its first successful test flight 
only to be subsequently canceled when it became clear that the 
United States would not cover the costs for a project which 
Israel alone never could have funded. It is still too early to 
infer that the old Peres/Arens doctrine of autonomous production 
and design has been replaced by the Rabin policy of high- 
technology component production. Nevertheless, since the cancel­
lation of the Lavi, there has been marked attention given to the 
costs of acquiring new advanced weapons systems. Three examples 
will suffice here. First, Israel's new generation of corvettes, 
the Sa'ar 5, will be built in the United States. The reasons for 
this are partly the tied nature of U.S. military assistance for 
the project and partly the fact that Israel Shipyards —  one of 
the country's most important shipbuilders -- recently went 
bankrupt. Second, Israel's new Dolphin class submarines will be 
built in Germany instead of in Israel as previously p l a n n e d . * 0  
Third, is the fact that although the Lavi project has been can­
celed, the aircraft's avionics are still under production. All 
three Lavi prototypes will be built to serve as avionics testbeds 
for later production of avionics and electronic warfare systems. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed below, Israel Aircraft Indus­
tries, has re-organised divisions to emphasise upgrading, subcon­
tracting, engineering services and unmanned aircraft*^
100
and de-emphasized actual aircraft manufacture.
Structure of Israel's military industries
Steinberg estimates that Israel spends over $1 billion annually 
on domestic arms production.The annual Israeli military budget is 
some $5 billion out of a total operating budget of some $15 
billion. (It should be noted, however, that an additional third 
of the total budget is reguired for debt service of previous 
military debt.) The military sector in Israel employs some
60,000 people or 20 per cent of the industrial w o r k - f o r c e . * ^
Defence production in Israel is overwhelmingly state-owned. 
The four major concerns in the Israeli defence sector are par­
tially or totally owned by the state. Three of these, Israel 
Aircraft Industries (lAI), Israeli Ordnance Corporation, and 
RAFAEL were founded at the behest of the government. Israel 
Military Industries (IMI) was brought under control of the minis­
try of defence following the Israeli War of Independence. A 
further holder of major defence concerns in Israel is the Hista- 
drut. the national labour union.
A second category of defence firms are those which are 
jointly owned by Israeli and foreign concerns. Such joint ven­
tures have been important as the foreign shareholders provide 
much-needed capital and technology for the Israeli defence sec­
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tor, as well as providing international links useful for export 
sales. Examples here include General Telephone and Electric and 
Control Data Corporation, of the United States, which have major 
holdings in Tadiran Electronics and Elbit Computers respectively, 
and Motorola which has formed an Israeli subsidiary.
The third category of defence firms are the smaller and more 
specialised contractors and subcontractors. Unlike the statist 
mold of the major firms in the Israeli defence sector these firms 
tend to be p r i v a t e . ^3 As Steinberg has observed:
In this sense, the Israeli military industry 
can be said to be moving from the French model 
(highly concentrated among a relatively small 
number of large and vertically integrated firms 
or industrial groups) to the US model of a small 
number of major contractors complemented by a 
large number of highly specialized sub-contractors.
Military research and development in Israel is directed and 
controlled by the Ministry of Defence's Directorate of Armament 
Research and Production Administration —  known by its acronym 
MAFAT. MAFAT has a broad range of functions, which, according to 
the Israeli Ministry for Science and Development include:
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1) Assessing the technological situation in the 
world and its relevance to defense R&D in Israel;
2) Preparation of study papers for Headquarters 
dealing with defense R&D policies in Israel;
3) Preparation of budgets, choosing research personnel 
needed for the implementation of work programs, and 
allocation of research subjects among different 
R&D institutes;
4) Annual preparation of long-term programmes for R&D;
5) Overseeing the implementation of R&D projects and 
conducting a follow-up of operations;
6) Preparation of the necessary technological
infrastructure and facilities for implementing 
defense R&D programs;
7) Preparation of means to ensure the availability
of academic, engineering and professional manpower 
for the heeded R&D programs.
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MAFAT is broken into specialised professional/technical depart­
ments and the research areas in Israel which come under its 
responsibility include electronics and computer science, aeronau­
tics, optronics, technology of infantry and armaments, materials 
and processes science, aerodynamic and hydrodynamic science, 
military chemistry, human engineering and military medicine.
Weapons Production in Israel's Defence Sector
Despite the fact that Israel continues to import most of its 
major weapons systems, local arms industries produce systems 
ranging from small arms to rockets. The following section will 
examine Israeli arms production on a sector-by-sector and compa- 
ny-by-company basis.
Aircraft
The forerunner of Israel Aircraft Industries was Bedeck Aviation, 
established in 1953 (the name was changed to the present lAI in
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1967). lÀI is government owned and controlled by the ministry of 
defence. Among the aircraft which have been produced by lAI are 
the French Fouga Magister trainer (built under license); the 
Arava STOL (short take off and landing) transport; the Nesher, a 
version of the Mirage 3; and the Kfir, an upgraded version of the 
Mirage 3 and 5. In addition lAI produces the Westwind and Astra 
executive jets which are also available in military configura­
tions.
The Kfir project has been Israel's most important domesti­
cally mass-produced fighter aircraft to date. Work commenced on 
the Kfir project in 1969, following the total French arms embargo 
on Israel. lAI initiated a study to investigate the possibility 
of fitting the J-79 engine, used in the American F-4E, into a 
Mirage to boost performance. After lengthy experimentation, a 
Mirage powered by a J-79 engine made its first test flight in 
September 1970. In 1969 lAI illegally acquired manufacturing 
plans for the Mirage 3, the Mirage 5, and for the Atar 9C engine, 
a slightly more advanced engine than the 9B used in the Mirage 3 
which France had delivered to Israel prior to the embargo. Given 
the continued difficulties in adapting the J-79 to the Mirage 3, 
it was decided to commence manufacture of the Atar C-powered 
Mirage which was named Nesher and the first Nesher unit in the 
Israeli Air Force was formed in 1972.
The Nesher, however, was a temporary solution to Israel's 
need for advanced fighter aircraft. Through the use of the
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Mirage 5 plans, the American J-79 engine and a series of other 
technical modifications, the Kfir Cl entered production in 1974 
with the first two aircraft delivered to the air force in 1975. 
A series of improvements have led to the Kfir-C2 and the Kfir 
TC2, a two-seat version of the aircraft. Despite the extensive 
reverse engineering that has produced the Kfir, the aircraft 
cannot be classified as an indigenous Israeli aircraft. Aside 
from the use of the French Mirage plans, the use of key American 
components in the Kfir —  the J-79 engine and other American 
avionics —  make export of the aircraft subject to approval from 
Washington. The General Electric J-79 engine is manufactured
under U.S. licence in Israel and 40 percent of it parts are 
imported from the United States.^®
Although in popular opinion the Kfir is held to be a great 
Israeli success story, its efficacy is questioned by some:
The domestic military products developed by 
the Israeli defense industry have enjoyed a 
high reputation, which is not necessarily 
deserved. For example, since the J-79 was 
more powerful than the original French engine 
in the Mirage, this should have resulted in 
a "hotter" fighter. Tellingly, this was not 
happened. U.S. Navy pilots who later flew
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the Kfir reported that they found it "sluggish" 
compared to the Mirage, and although it could 
make one very fast turn, useful in combat, it 
then "lost energy" and had to dive out of the fight.
It seems that Israel Aircraft Industries had 
managed to botch the simple task of mating an 
existing airframe design to an existing engine, 
an interesting reflection on the capabilities 
of Israel's best-funded industry.
Nevertheless, the Kfir continues to be upgraded. Israeli author­
ities announced the latest version of the Kfir —  designated 
Tiger —  in April 1991. The Tiger reportedly incorporates the 
Mirage airframe with avionics and weapons designed for the can­
celed Lavi fighter.50
An important area of Israeli aerospace production is in the 
area of unmanned drones. lAI manufactures the Scout remotely 
piloted vehicle (RPV) which is able to carry a variety of pay­
loads such as telephoto lens television cameras. RPVs were 
extensively used in the 1982 war in Lebanon for target identifi­
cation and missile site reconnaissance. lAI is in the process 
of organising a joint venture with the Israeli Tadiran concern 
which produces a similar RPV called M a s t i f f . 51 A remotely pilot­
ed helicopter built by lAI was unveiled in 1990. The helicopter 
will be used by the navy aboard the Sa'ar 4 and 5 missile boats
107
for observation and r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . ^2 As with most Israeli high- 
tech military projects, development and procurement of remotely 
piloted drones is extensively supported by U.S. military finan­
cial aid. In 1990 Washington approved $12 million in aid for 
Israel's reconnaissance drones project in addition to the regular 
annual $3 billion appropriation for J e r u s a l e m . ^ 3
lAI manufactures two civilian aircraft which have optional 
military reconnaissance configurations: the Westwind and the 
Astra. The Westwind has its origins in the Jet Commander de­
signed by Rockwell Standard in the United States which was first 
flown in 1963. Production rights were transferred to lAI in 1968 
and the aircraft has since appeared in a number of versions 
including a Sea Scan maritime patrol variant which can be fitted 
with the Gabriel 3 anti-ship missile. The Astra, which first flew 
in 1982, is actually the latest variant of the Westwind. Among 
the changes are more use of composite materials, new avionics and 
wings which are mounted lower on the fuselage. The Astra is 
available in a special version adapted for the training of fight­
er pilots. Therefore, as with the military aircraft programme, 
lAI's civil airliners are tested imports from the West from which 
a family of progressively upgraded planes is produced.
This, then, was the extent of lAI's aircraft manufacturing 
programme through to 1987.
In the wake of the September 1987 cancellation of the Lavi
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fighter project, and the subsequent forced reduction in its 
workforce from 22,500 to 16,000 employees,^5 lAI is slowly ad­
justing to the fact that it will in all likelihood not produce a 
new fighter aircraft within this century other than further 
upgrades of the Kfir fighter.^6 This is reflected in the com­
plete reorganisation of lAI's aircraft manufacturing and engi­
neering organisational structure into five new divisions which 
significantly omit any fighter aircraft plant. The five new 
divisions include an Unmanned Aircraft Plant; a Military Aircraft 
Upgrading Plant; a Manufacturing Subcontracting Plant; an Engi­
neering Services Plant; and, a Civil Aircraft Plant.^7 After a 
lengthy history involving work on the manufacture of complete 
military aircraft from the Fouaa Maaister in 1960 to the test- 
flights of the Lavi prototypes in 1987, this new corporate struc­
ture marks a radical new direction for lAI which appears to take 
more into account the financial and technological limitations 
discussed above.
An indication of Israel having lost out in its bid to pro­
duce top echelon weapons systems, relative to international 
standards, can be seen in the sharp drop of lAI's percentage of 
the demanding domestic market. According to lAI president Moshe 
Keret: "Ten years ago half of our business was for the local
market. Then our local business decreased to one-third of our 
total. Today, only about 20 percent of our orders are for the
local market."58
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There remains a further potential major change on the hori­
zon for Israel's leading aviation concern. Recent reports indi­
cate that parts of the state-owned Israel Aircraft Industries may 
be privatised under the government's big privatisation pro­
g r a m m e . ^9 Should this occur, it could mean even more radical 
changes in the lAI product line as more vestiges of the statist 
import substitution methods are discarded in favour of economic 
and technical viability.
Despite these recent changes there remains considerable 
continuity and expansion in many of lAI's areas of specialisa­
tion. The trend toward supplying packages to upgrade military 
aircraft appears to be expanding. lAI offers such packages for 
the French Mirage, the U.S. McDonnel Douglas A-4, F-4, F-5 and F- 
15, and the General Dynamics F-IS.^O in 1987, lAI delivered the 
last of 90 upgraded Fouga Magister trainers to the Israeli Air 
Force. The new Fouga Magister, designated Amit, reportedly 
retains only the basic airframe with complete rewiring and up­
graded avionics. Two retrofit packages are currently available 
through lAI for the US F-4E Phantom: the Super Phantom and the 
Phantom 2000. Of these the Super Phantom is the more ambitious 
in that it re-engineers the F-4E to be fitted with the Pratt and 
Whitney 1120 engines which were developed to power the Lavi. The 
Israeli Air Force, however, scrapped plans to upgrade the 
country's entire stock of Phantoms with the Super Phantom pack­
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age. Citing cost, the Air Force opted for the cheaper Phantom 
2000 programme which includes avionics, radar, weapons and cock­
pit upgrades plus complete rewiring. The first Phantom 2 000s 
were delivered to the Israeli Air Force in 1989.^^ Herewith is a 
further example of the recent Israeli policy of eschewing more 
expensive and prestigious projects in the military sector.
A related sector of endeavour is the production of high- 
technology components for military aircraft. As stated above, 
the cancellation of the Lavi has not meant cancellation of the 
avionics and on-board electronic warfare systems under develop­
ment for the Lavi. Indeed, the Financial Times has reported that 
"the ghost of the Lavi lives on in the drive to export technolo­
g y " . ^2 lAI's president Moshe Keret has noted that one of the 
concerns fastest growing markets is for technology transfers to 
Asian countries. "They have money. What they are looking for is 
technology t r a n s f e r s . "^3 This is a military sector of rapidly 
growing importance to the Israeli arms exports drive and will be 
examined in greater detail in the exports section of this chapter 
and in Chapter Five on Israeli-South African military relations.
Israel Aircraft Industries has a number of subsidiaries 
which are involved in the development and manufacture of aero­
space technology and components. These include Elta Electronics 
which designs, develops and manufactures military electronic 
systems and equipment including radar, EW and Sigint systems.^4; 
RAMTA Structures and Systems which develops and manufactures
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booms for aircraft and missile launchers, anti-aircraft turrets, 
composite material aerospace components, and airborne gun 
p o d s . 6 5 ;  and, Mata Helicopters of Jerusalem which overhauls and 
upgrades helicopters and installs weapons and other specialised 
systems. Mata provides approved service for Bell, Hughes, and 
FAA helicopters and has an agreement with Sikorsky which allows 
it to draw on the US concern's blade repair technology. Israel 
also produces components for the F-16 fighter under licence from 
General Dynamics and the 1120 turbojet engine under licence from 
Pratt and Whitney. 66
Rocket, Missile and Satellite development
It may be argued that in the harsher post-Lavi world, the single 
area where Israel is currently developing advanced military 
systems vis-a-vis the industrialised countries iç in missile and 
rocket technology. "Israel has the most advanced ballistic 
missile force outside of the five major nuclear powers," notes 
Aaron Karp in a SIPRI s t u d y . 6 ?
Nevertheless, the pattern of development is similar to other 
Israeli advanced military systems; Acquisition of foreign tech­
nology followed by progressive upgrading with much of the re­
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search and development funding coming from the United States. As 
Karp points out: "Experience shows that all Third World ballistic 
missiles rely on key foreign technologies".
RAFAEL, the Israeli Armament Development Authority, plays 
the leading role in rocket and missile development and produc­
tion. RAFAEL is divided into four main divisions: guidance 
control, aeromechanics, electronics, and engineering support. In 
both guided and unguided weaponry it specialises in detectors, 
propulsion, telemetry, and w a r h e a d s . I s r a e l  Military Indus­
tries (IMI) also plays an important role in and missile produc­
tion through its rocket division which produces missiles and 
components
The earliest research in missile technologies began in 
Israel in the late 1940s. During the late 1950s Israeli scien­
tists participated as observers in French rocket tests in the 
Sahara. The first Israeli systems, however, were not successful 
and were never deployed. These included the Luz surface-to- 
surface missile with a range of some 25 kilometres and the Sha- 
frir 1. The Shavit 2 and 3 rockets were tested respectively in 
July and October 1961.^0 Following intelligence reports in July 
1962 that Egypt was developing a rival missile designated Zaphar 
a programme to develop longer-range missiles was i n i t i a t e d .
The sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 by an 
Egyptian (Soviet-made) Styx ship-to-ship missile prompted the 
acceleration of the Israeli programme to develop a similar mis­
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sile with the assistance of several French defence concerns 
The result was the Gabriel 1 ship-to-ship missile with a range of 
22 kilometres. An upgraded Gabriel 2 has a range of 40 km and 
the Gabriel 3 which has more sophisticated targeting abilities is 
also available in an air-launched version. Despite these develop­
ments it appears that the Gabriel did not meet the standards set 
by the Israeli Defence Forces: According to Neubach and Peri the 
Israeli Navy opted to equip it ships with the U.S. manufactured 
Harpoon missile which had twice the range of the Gabriel. (The 
Israeli navy is presently armed with both the Harpoon and the 
Gabriel missile.) This, they report, brought further development 
of the Gabriel missile to a c l o s e .
The Shafrir air-to-air missile, manufactured in Israel since 
1969, has been the subject of some controversy with Raytheon, the 
American manufacturer of the U.S. Sidewinder air-to-air missile's 
infrared guidance system. Raytheon claims that the Shafrir's 
guidance system is based on the system it developed for the 
S i d e w i n d e r . 74 a more advanced model of the Shafrir has been pro­
duced in Israel with funding from U.S. Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) credits.75
The Israeli Python 3, according to military trade journals, 
is "a simplified version of the famous U.S. AIM-9L S i d e w i n d e r . "76 
It was reportedly used with success in the 1982 Lebanon War.
The Barak 1 is a point defence missile system originally
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designed for naval use but a ground-launched version is being 
developed which will be capable of hitting tactical missiles at 
close r a n g e . T h e  Barak naval system, which entered production 
in 1986, was designed with a special emphasis on destroying 
incoming sea-skimmer missiles.^®
Israel's latest missile project is the Popeye air-to-ground 
missile which is being developed by Rafael. The Popeye has 
received an initial development grant of $8 million from the 
United States and a further $24.7 million was approved by the 
U.S. Congress for Israeli development and acquisition of the 
system in addition to Washington's annual $3 billion appropria­
tion for Israel.
Israel's Jericho 1 rocket was largely developed by Avions 
Marcel Dassault of France beginning in 1963. Dassault was build­
ing the MD 620 and 660 ballistic missiles at this time and the 
Jericho 1 was a derivative from these systems. The Jericho 1 has 
a range of 450 kilometres. It has reportedly been manufactured 
in Israel since the 1967 French arms embargo.
Following the 1973 War, Israel requested Pershing lA mis­
siles from the U.S. which had greater mobility, range and accura­
cy than the Jericho 1. The United States refused and instead 
supplied 160 short-range Lance missiles. Israel subsequently 
began development of a new long-range m i s s i l e . I n  1987 Israel 
test-fired the first upgraded Jericho 2 missile to a range of 820 
kilometres. The maximum range of Jericho 2 is reportedly 1,450
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kilometres. A second test of the Jericho 2 was made in 1988.
The Jericho II is said to be a solid-fuel rocket and some reports 
claim it was developed with illegally obtained fuel compounds, 
inertial guidance system components and rocket shells from the 
United States.83
The Jericho II programme appears to have figured prominently 
in the Israeli relationship with pre-revolutionary Iran. Under 
the code name of Operation Flower, Israel and Iran agreed to 
collaborate on the development of an improved model of the Jeri­
cho. The nature of the co-operation was similar to that which 
exists between Jerusalem and Pretoria: Israel supplied the
technology and Iran supplied the capital in the form of oil. 
However, the Iranian revolution cut short the agreement and only 
the initial Iranian payment for Operation Flower of $260 million 
(of a planned $1 billion) worth of oil was transferred to Israel 
in 1978.84
Israel's most recent development in the field of rocketry 
and military reconnaissance was the September 1988 launch of the 
Ofeq (Horizon) 1 satellite. An upgraded version of the Jericho 
2, designated the Shavit, was used to launch the 75 kilogram 
Ofeq-1 satellite into low-earth orbit. This made Israel the 
seventh world space power, but more importantly it demonstrated 
the advanced nature of Israeli nuclear delivery s y s t e m s . 8  5  &
study carried out by Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, based on an
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analysis of the launching of the Ofeq 1, posits that with a 
similar delivery system Israel should be able to launch a 1,100 
kg. warhead over a 4,500 km range and a 500 kg. warhead over a 
7,500 km. r a n g e . 86 Given these delivery systems, it is interest­
ing to note that during the Gulf War, Israeli Chief of Staff, 
Gen. Dan Shomron, changed the standard official Israeli formula 
"Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons" to 
"Israel will not be the first to use nuclear w e a p o n s . "8?
Following the successful launch of the Ofeg-1 experimental 
satellite, Israel launched a more advanced Ofeq-2 reconnaissance 
satellite into low earth orbit in March 1991. Future planned 
launches include an additional reconnaissance as well as a commu­
nications satellite. The communications satellite, designated 
Amos, which will be in a geosynchronous orbit over east Africa, 
will be launched by a European Ariane rocket in 1993. It will be 
near an Arab Satellite Communications Organisation Arabsat commu­
nications satellite, thus enabling Israel to pick up signals 
between Arabsat and its ground stations. The Ofeq satellite 
reportedly required vital, classified U.S. technological data 
which was obtained by Jonathan Jay Pollard, an Israeli spy, who 
worked for American Naval Intelligence in Washington until his 
arrest in 1985.8®
The Arrow defensive missile, Israel's most recently an­
nounced missile project is, characteristically, 80 per cent 
funded by the United States and will be jointly developed with
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American defence concerns. In June 1988 the U.S. and Israel 
signed an agreement under which Israel will develop the Arrow 
rocket designed to shoot down ballistic missiles in flight. The 
project will be funded by the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organisation which is providing $125 million and organising a 30- 
month joint technology demonstration to evaluate the Arrow. (It 
should also be noted that by the end of 1988 Israel had emerged 
as the largest single foreign recipient of Strategic Defense 
Initiative Contracts totaling $165 million.®^) In addition the 
Israeli government has requested $200-400 million in funding for 
a radar system for the Arrow missile from Germany.^0 The Arrow 
project's mix of foreign technology and foreign funding is 
consistent with the long line of indigenously built Israeli 
military systems dating back to the Fouga Magister aircraft in 
1960. The first two test of the Arrow in 1990 and 1991 were 
reportedly failures and the test rockets were shot down by Israe­
li naval vessels in the Mediterranean.
Armoured vehicles and general equipment
Israel Military Industries (IMI) is both the leading producer and 
research and development body in the field of general arms and 
armour. With 38 factories and operational units employing some
118
14,000 workers, including 1,200 scientists and engineers, IMI has 
a yearly turnover of $500-600 million. Among IMI*s areas of 
production are light weapons, ammunition, artillery, aircraft 
armament, smart munitions, anti-tank missiles, composite materi­
als, laser communication equipment and c h e m i c a l s . ^2 IMI has 
participated in several joint ventures with the U.S. BMY concern, 
a manufacturer of armoured vehicles. Projects have included a 
heavy assault bridge for use with the Ml tank and the Counter­
obstacle vehicle, designed to clear m i n e f i e l d s . ^3
The Merkava main battle tank project is the single most 
important Israeli development in this category. In 1966 Israel 
and the United Kingdom agreed to jointly design and co-produce 
the Chieftain tank. Under the agreement, Israel would have 
purchased hundreds of obsolete Centurian tanks —  the British 
needed additional funding for the project —  and would have been 
allowed to participate in the final development of the Chieftain. 
The most attractive aspect of the deal was that the Chieftain 
would also be produced in I s r a e l . ^4 Israeli engineers took part 
in the design of the Chieftain and lessons from Israeli combat 
experience were incorporated into the two development models 
which were actually tested in Israel. But in 1969 the British 
government unilaterally canceled the agreement while maintaining 
commitments to supply Arab clients with front-line t a n k s . ^5
In response to the British move a lobby for an indigenous 
Israeli tank project grew under the leadership of Major-General
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Israel Tal. The research and development for the Merkava project 
began after considerable study following the 1973 War.
A number of reportedly unique features have been incorporat­
ed into the Merkava including a low silhouette and engine loca­
tion in the front, with special armour for enhanced crew protec­
tion. An important unanswered question is the degree to which 
the tank's designers used knowledge gained from developing the 
Chieftain to produce the Merkava. Despite its unic[ue design, the 
Merkava, like the Kfir, cannot really be considered a pure in­
digenous system as it is powered by a U.S. Teledyne Continental 
engine, uses a U.S. General Motors Allison transmission (although 
the Merkava 2 uses an Israeli transmission) and contains other 
foreign components such as an American Cadillac Gage stabilisa­
tion system and Belgian MAG machine guns.^G Like most other 
major Israeli arms projects the Merkava was dependent on foreign 
capital: the U.S. government paid $100 million for the tank's
development and p r o d u c t i o n . 9? in May 1989 a Mark 3  version of 
the Merkava was unveiled. Like its predecessors^ it still relies 
on an American Teledyne engine and its 105mm gun is a version 
of the British L7, components of which are produced under licence 
in Israel. The Israeli Defence Ministry announced in 1991 that 
development of upgraded Merkava "for the twenty-first century" 
was under way.^9
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Israel manufactures a range of tank components including a 
12 0mm smooth bore tank gun which uses special chrome plating 
technology illegally acquired from the United States in 1981. 
Israel also manufactures components for the U.S. M48 and M60 
tanks under licence from Chrysler. RAFAEL has developed and
produced an active tank armour, designated Blazer, which can be 
retrofitted on tanks which lack the heavy passive armour of the 
Merkava. Such active armour, which consists of individual units 
which can be configured to fit most t a n k s , ^01 explodes outwards 
when hit by incoming anti-tank rounds but is not activated by 
small arms fire.
A further example of a major Israeli armoured system which 
requires key U.S. components is the Shoet Mark-2 armoured person­
nel carrier which is equipped with a U.S. engine and transmis­
sion.
A wide variety of other military hardware and basic small 
arms are manufactured in Israel. Included are the Uzi sub-ma­
chine gun (derived from the Czech ZK-476), the Galil assault 
rifle (derived from the Soviet AK-47),^®^ artillery rockets, 
anti-tank weapons, mortars, grenades, mines, and a variety of 
large and small calibre ammunition (see Appendix 8). Some exam­
ples of the most recently developed equipment include the Negev 
light machine gun built by IMI which weighs less than 7 kilos; 
the pyramid tv-guided bomb, developed by RAFAEL for use against 
ships, SAM sites and buildings ; and, with the intifada in
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mind, a new gravel launcher system "designed to clear barriers 
and disperse demonstrations" is available mounted on a vehicle 
with "a stand for three Galil assault rifles, a shovel that 
clears road barriers (and) tyres made of material not easily 
punctured".
Naval vessels
Naval shipbuilding in Israel began after the 1969 total French 
arms embargo. Two concerns in Israel have been involved in the 
manufacture of naval vessels, the RAMTA division of Israeli 
Aircraft Industries and Israel Shipyards Ltd. of Haifa. The 
latter company, however, went bankrupt in the late 1980s after 
years of financial difficulties and is presently only carrying 
out minor repair and overhaul work. In 1973 the first Reshef 
fast patrol boats —  derived from the French Cherbourgh class, 
which was based on a West German design by Luerssen —  were 
delivered to the Israeli navy. Although produced in Israel,
the Reshef, like the Kfir fighter and the Merkava tank, requires 
a foreign-manufactured engine, the German Maybach diesel and 
reportedly uses electronic warfare equipment supplied by Italy's 
Elettronica. The Reshef thus fits the pattern of indigenous
Israeli production of advanced systems whereby key components
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must be imported. Israel Shipyards also built the larger Aliya 
class missile boat of which two were delivered to the Israeli 
navy.
Israel Aircraft Industries' RAMTA manufactures the Dabur 
patrol boat and a larger version thereof, designated the Dvora. 
The Dabur is based on a U.S. design and was originally manufac­
tured in the United States for use as a river patrol boat in the 
Viet Nam War.
Interestingly, the Israeli Navy has had its, more minor, 
version of a Lavi cancellation due to financial constraints. The 
navy had planned to acquire a fleet of hydrofoils and in a joint 
venture with the U.S. concern Grumman built two attack craft 
based on the Flagstaff design. However, the project ended up 
costing much more than expected and planned construction of eight 
additional hydrofoils has been s u s p e n d e d .
With the bankruptcy of Israel Shipyards Ltd., and the limit­
ed capacities of RAMTA's desert shipyards, it would appear that 
Israel is pulling out of major naval shipbuilding projects at 
least through the turn of century; a development which mirrors 
the state of affairs at Israel Aircraft Industries. The two 
major acquisitions of the Israeli Navy in the 1990s will be built 
abroad: The largely American designed Sa'ar 5 missile boat
will be built in the United States, albeit using some Israeli 
components, and the navy's replacement Dolphin submarines will be 
built in Germany.
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Military industry suppliers: electronics, sub-assemblies and 
components
Military electronics concerns and suppliers of components and 
sub-assemblies comprise the fastest growing, most diverse and 
advanced manufacturers of the Israeli defence sector. Not sur­
prisingly, they comprise the sector of Israel's defence indus­
tries most thoroughly penetrated by foreign companies and capi­
tal. However, given the secrecy that surrounds Israel's military 
and military applicable industries it is often impossible to 
determine the precise shareholding by foreign concerns. The 
following pages survey some of the most important companies in 
this sector.
The largest holder of Israeli military and electronics 
component suppliers is the financially troubled Koor Industries, 
owned by the Histadrut (Israel's labour federation). With some
34,000 employees Koor has holdings in over 100 small and middle 
sized concerns in Israel which manufacture such things as tele­
communications systems, data link systems, military and airborne 
power systems, chemicals and metals. Koor had losses of $293 
million in 1989 and over $100 million in 1987 and 1988. These
124
losses were partly due to sharp reductions in local Israeli 
defence orders and greater competition for export sales.
Tadiran Israeli Electronics Industries, was 50 per cent 
owned by GTE Sylvania of the U.S. and 50 per cent by Koor through 
1983 when GTE reduced its holding to 22 per cent. Tadiran em­
ployed 12,000 workers at its peak and is active in both the 
civilian and military sectors. But in recent years the company 
has lost hundreds of millions of dollars and has been forced to 
dismiss large numbers of employees as part of a restructuring 
programme. Tadiran produces among other things tactical communi­
cations equipment, intelligence gathering and electronic warfare 
equipment, night-sensing devices, tank range-finders, field 
telephones, computerised command and control systems for air, sea 
and ground forces, and weapons systems simulators. Exports 
comprise some 45 per cent of Tadiran's business and of these 
some 80 per cent are in the security or military field. Thus, 
the company has been badly hit by the world down-turn in military 
p r o c u r e m e n t a n d  Koor is reportedly considering selling off its 
share in the company.
Koor has a 75 percent holding in Soltam, a manufacturer of 
mortars, artillery cannons, ammunition and sights. The remaining 
25 per cent is reportedly held by Tampella of F i n l a n d . T h e  
Iranian revolution led to a major decline in Soltam*s annual 
exports (which total $50-60 million) and the company remains
in financial difficulties. Soltam*s labour force was reduced
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from 2,400 in 1985 to 590 in 1990.116
The second major Israeli conglomerate involved in the de­
fence sector is Clal Industries Ltd. Employing 11,000, Clal had 
a major share in the nOw bankrupt Israel Shipyards. Its subsidi­
ary, Urdan Industries Ltd., operates Israel's largest foundry and 
was established to support the Merkava tank project. Urdan 
manufactures parts for the Merkava*s hull, turret, suspension 
system, and a mine-clearing roller. H ?
Elta Electronics Industries is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Israel Aircraft Industries. Elta manufactures early warning 
systems, radar, signals intelligence, and communications intelli­
gence.
Elbit Computers Ltd. was founded in the 1960s and has spe­
cialised in radio and communications equipment for the Israel 
Defence Forces as well as coding systems, simulators, airborne 
displays, weapon delivery systems, fire control systems, naviga­
tion, positioning systems, and most recently, chemical agents 
sensors. Elbit is 50 per cent owned by ^ Control Data of the 
United States and 50 per cent by Elron, an Israeli concern which 
was established with U.S. c a p i t a l . E l b i t ' s  relationship with 
Control Data appears to have been especially close. From 1974- 
1980, Robert Chinn, senior vice-president of Control Data, served 
as chairman of the board of Elbit. This corporate relationship 
appears to have facilitated the transfer of technology from
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Control Data to Elbit. The relationship may have contributed
to Elbit's development of the highly successful fire-control 
system for the Merkava tank; a project which the military trade 
journal Defence Update cryptically reports "was undertaken with a 
low profile, almost by clandestine m e a n s . .."^^l control Data 
also owns 67 per cent of Eltek Ltd. and 100 per cent of Eljim, a 
computer concern. 1^2
Motorola Israel Ltd. is a 100 per cent subsidiary of Motoro­
la USA, specialising in command, control and communications 
equipment.
Ormat Turbines Ltd., a manufacturer of turbogenerators, is a 
subsidiary of Turbomeca of France, however, the percentage of 
Ormat shares held by Turbomeca is not k n o w n . ^23 ormat is in­
volved in research and development and production of turbines, 
generators, turbo-generators and engine generators.^24
The troubled Bet Shemesh Engines Ltd., manufacturer of jet 
engines and aviation spares, was founded in the late 1960s as a 
partnership between the Israeli government and I. Shidlovsky, the 
owner of a French firm involved in the manufacture of jet en­
g i n e s . Bet Shemesh went on to become Israel's centre for 
planning, development, manufacture, overhauling and repairing 
turbojet e n g i n e s . Following severe management problems. Bet 
Shemesh's ownership was transferred from the Israeli government 
to Israel Aircraft Industries which continued in partnership with 
Shidlovsky*s French concern. In 1980 lAI's shares reverted back
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to the government which also bought the Shidlovsky
s h a r e h o l d i n g . 127 1984 Pratt and Whitney, a subsidiary of the
U.S. United Technologies Inc., bought some 44 per cent Bet 
Shemesh*s shares from the Israeli government. In 1986 the nearly 
bankrupt Bet Shemesh became the subject of debate between the 
Israeli government, which had a 56 per cent holding in the compa­
ny, and Pratt and Whitney. Pratt and Whitney, which had invested 
some $10 million in Bet Shemesh threatened to pull out of the 
company unless the Israeli government agreed to sell its holding
to a private c o n c e r n . 128
Elisra Electronic Systems Ltd., formerly AEL Israel, is an 
important supplier of early warning equipment for air and naval 
forces, chaff dispensers, high power jammers, Elint and Comint 
systems and communications e q u i p m e n t . 129 Formerly 37 per cent 
owned by the U.S. Electronics Labs, 37 per cent by Siemens of 
Germany and 2 6 per cent by Tadiran, the U.S. AEL Industries now 
owns 58 per cent of E l i s r a . T h e  company manufactured goods 
for Germany's Siemens but this relationship was ended in the 
1980s. In 1985 Elisra was reported to be seeking a foreign firm 
from which to acquire technical assistance in digital switch­
boards. 121
Electro-Optics Industries Ltd. (El-Op), is a leading Israeli 
manufacturer of computer technology and electronic warfare de­
vices including cameras, laser range finders, gun sights, avionic
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instrumentation and night vision devices. It is owned 50 per 
cent by Tadiran and 50 per cent by the Federmann Group, an Israe­
li conglomerate. El-Op recently established a joint venture with 
the U.S. Varo concern to produce and market military electro- 
optical equipment. The joint venture is called Varo Electro- 
Optics and cements a relationship between Varo and El-Op which 
began some 20 years ago when Varo sold El-Op image intensifica­
tion technology. During the 1980s, El-Op was involved in the 
theft of plans from its then partner, Recon-Optical in the United 
States. Recon is the world's leading manufacturer of aerial 
camera reconnaissance systems for the military. Israel officials 
at the plant were caught trying to take away ten boxes of de­
tailed drawings and thousands of pages of notes in Hebrew on 
trade secrets of Recon's cameras.
Orlite Engineering Ltd. manufactures composite components 
for the aerospace industry including nose radomes, air intakes, 
and fairings. It is owned by an unidentified U.S. company and 
Israel's Bank Hapoalim.1^3
Turbochrome Ltd. manufactures engine turbines and is owned 
by the U.S. concern ChromaIloy America.
Iscar Blades Ltd. is a manufacturer of gas turbine compres­
sors and precision forged parts such airfoils and turbine blades. 
Iscar is owned by the TRW concern of the United States, which 
holds and undisclosed percentage of the firm's share capital and 
by Israeli Discount Bank Investments.
129
Astronautics CA, Ltd. manufactures avionics, cockpit dis­
plays, digital air data computers, fire control systems for 
tanks, . It is 100 per cent owned by the U.S. concern Astronau­
tics Co. of America.
Kemp Israel, is a subsidiary of Kemp Industries of the U.S. 
and develops hydraulic and mechanical systems and components for 
armoured vehicles.
Nimda Ltd., a manufacturer of vehicle power trains and 
retrofit packages for tanks, trucks and armoured personnel carri­
ers is partially owned by GM-Detroit Diesel Allison. The precise 
percentage of shares held by Allison has not been publicly dis­
closed. 138
Beta Engineering and Development, a manufacturer of mine 
detectors and vibration-detection surveillance devices is 35 per 
cent owned by Gerber Scientific Inc. of the United States.139
Intel Israel Ltd., a manufacturer of microcomputers for 
missiles and airplanes, is a 100 per cent subsidiary of the U.S. 
Intel Corporation.
The list of small Israeli high technology firms in the 
defence sector which are either foreign owned or have foreign 
shareholders is a lengthy one and more details are provided in 
Appendix 10. While there are many Israeli concerns in this 
sector which do not have foreign shareholders these appear to 
play a less important role in Israeli military production.1^®
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Given the degree of foreign penetration in the defence electron­
ics and components sector —  linked to the limited roll of the 
traditional state-owned arms producers in Israel —  the true 
level of independence of the Israeli defence sector would appear 
to remain open to question. This issue will be further investi­
gated in Chapter Seven on Israel's continued dependency on off- 
the-shelf arms imports.
Two points, regarding the growing foreign involvement in the 
Israeli military sector should be re-emphasised in concluding 
this section. The first is technological. As Harkavy and Neuman 
point out, despite the impressive performance of Israeli military 
research and development of the past decades, we must not ignore 
the parallel increasing sophistication of state-of-the art mili­
tary technology produced by the major industrial powers. "As 
technological invention moves ahead at a dizzying pace, smaller 
nations such as Israel must also deal with the irony of their 
growing dependence in spite of their greater military production 
capabilities". This partially explains the high level of 
foreign penetration in the areas of computer technology and 
electronic warfare devices which Aaron Klieman refers to as 
Israel's "leading growth area within the military industries 
complex...
The second point is financial. Israel has attempted to 
build a broad local defence sector based on an economy that is 
both far smaller and far weaker than not only those of other
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industrialised arms producers, but also those other Third World 
arms producers like South Africa, Brazil, and Taiwan. Even for 
projects less ambitious than the Lavi, the imported or indigenous 
technological means may be available but the financing simply is 
not.
An Israeli defence sector case study: The Lavi fighter programme
from genesis to termination
"The Lavi may fly but if it does, the rest of the army will be 
grounded."
(Israeli general commenting on the high cost of 
Israel's subsequently canceled Lavi fighter project.
The fighter project which ultimately spawned the Lavi was con­
ceived at the behest of Israel Aircraft Industries (lAI) and not 
the Israeli Air Force. With the completion of the Kfir fighter 
project in 1974, lAI required a follow-on project so as to pro­
vide work for the large team of engineers which otherwise would 
have been unemployed. According to Neubach and Peri, l A I 's 
'professional political lobby' was able to convince then Defence 
Minister Shimon Peres that a new fighter project was vital and
132
Peres duly allocated funds for initial studies of the project. 
Negotiations were conducted to produce the aircraft with a for­
eign partner, but were not successful. The Israeli Air Force 
remained *cool* on the project, but in 1978, under pressure from 
lAI, Defence Minister Weizman approved the employment of 200 lAI 
engineers to study alternative designs for the aircraft. Even at 
this stage the project was not formally listed in the Israeli 
defence budget nor did it have approval of the Cabinet or the 
relevant Knesset committees.
The proposed twin-engine fighter project was presented to 
U.S. Secretary of Defence Harold Brown by Israeli Defence Minis­
ter Ezer Weizman in September 1978. Development costs were 
estimated by lAI to be $700 million; a figure which the U.S. 
delegation countered was one-third the cost of developing such 
and aircraft in the United States. The Americans subsequently 
raised a series of objections to the plan, based mainly on Israe­
li cost estimates. Since U.S. financial support was vital to 
the project, Weizman ordered that the project be scaled down to a 
single engine fighter with a smaller engine —  a decision which 
the defence minister took on his own initiative without approval 
from the Cabinet. In February 1980 the Israeli Cabinet approved 
this less ambitious project without any comprehensive cost-bene- 
fit study. The lAI management, although disappointed that
the project had been scaled back, was pleased that a concrete 
decision had at last been taken at the Cabinet level. As one
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official said: "We knew that once we were inside we could alter 
the design again.
The Israeli Air Force had been one of the critics of the 
scaled back Lavi project and in 1981 the commander of the air 
force. Maj.-Gen. David Ivri told Prime Minister Menachem Begin 
that if the Lavi was to be of any use to the air force in the 
1990s it would have to be a larger aircraft with a more powerful 
engine. Begin accepted Ivri's argument on that basis that "The 
air force commander is the expert, and if he says a larger plane 
is needed we have to abide by his d e c i s i o n . B e g i n ' s  decision 
added billions of dollars to the projected cost of the Lavi and 
changed the entire nature of the project. Instead of being the 
low cost, low technology, ground support aircraft to replace 
Israel's Kfirs and A-4 fighters, it evolved to become an advanced 
technology, ground attack/ multi-purpose fighter which would 
compete with state-of-the-art fighters like the U.S. F-16.^^® 
This reversion to the more advanced Lavi project marked the 
victory of the approach advocated by Shimon Peres and Moshe Arens 
in their long-standing intra-governmental dispute with Yitzhak 
Rabin. Peres and Arens were committed to Israel's developing 
the means to manufacture advanced weapon platforms in Israel. 
Rabin, on the other hand, argued that Israel could not afford to 
design and produce major weapons.
The Lavi fighter aircraft, developed during the 1980s, was
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heavily influenced by the Israel Air Force's experience in the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War. During the course of the War Israel lost 
102 aircraft, or 20 per cent of its entire air force, almost 
exclusively to surface-to-air missiles. These aircraft were for 
the most part lost while providing close ground support for the 
Israeli army. (While a longstanding Israeli military doctrine 
has been the maintenance of air superiority, this doctrine must 
translate into effective ground support for Israel's army which 
is small in comparison to those of potential confrontation 
states.) The Lavi was therefore the first Western fighter de­
veloped in recent years which was not an air superiority fighter 
but rather a ground attack fighter with high penetration and high 
survival factors.
Yet it was partly this very specialisation of the Lavi which 
added to the controversy surrounding the aircraft. As the Lavi 
became increasingly geared to meet the precise needs of the 
Israeli Air Force, the already limited chances for exporting the 
aircraft were even further reduced. In order to produce the Lavi 
at anything near a competitive price, the production run called 
for a minimum order of 240-300 aircraft by the Israeli Air Force. 
But senior Israeli defence officials quoted in the Financial 
Times privately doubted whether Israel needed or could afford to 
fly so many Lavi fighters and instead argued that as Israel's 
strategy would remain based on air-superiority Israel would 
remain reliant on air-superiority fighters.
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The Lavi thus came to be held between the pincers of pro­
jected unit costs and the defence budget cuts facing the Israeli 
military: On the one hand plans to produce a limited number of
Lavis, more in line with Israeli Air Force requirements, were 
scrapped after lAI reported that a decision to produce only 75 
aircraft would mean that the cost per plane would be an astronom­
ical $107 million. While on the other hand, the case for
continuing the high levels of expenditure on the project, let 
alone the thought that the Israeli Air Force could afford to fly 
300 Lavis, was devastated by then Defence Minister, Yitzak 
Rabin's argument (made on the eve of the project's cancellation 
in August 1987) that the 45 per cent of Air Force's Kfirs were 
grounded due to lack of funds and that the budget cuts had led to 
the discharge of 20 per cent of the service's fighter pilots. 
Rabin stressed that Israel could not continue to allocate such of 
high proportion of defence spending to the Lavi project without 
further affecting the size of existing forces.
The specialised nature of the Lavi as a ground attack 
aircraft added to the project's controversy given the rapid 
changes in the nature of air combat in a battlefield environment. 
The trade journal Flight International questioned the effective­
ness of the aircraft in an article entitled 'Lavi - lion or 
albatross?' Regarding the planned Lavi the article said:
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The 40km zone back from the front line is 
becoming increasingly hostile for fixed-wing 
fighters. The accuracy and sophistication of 
modern surface-to-air missiles and radar-controlled 
anti-aircraft guns means that survivability is 
becoming ever more difficult to achieve. Indeed, 
it can be argued that in this forward area the 
rapidly developing capability of remotely piloted 
vehicles and advanced helicopters might be better 
deployed.
The Lavi ground attack aircraft, conceived in the early 1980s as 
an answer to the lessons of the 1973 War was therefore already 
being overtaken by the rapid evolution of missile and radar 
technology and the subsequent revisions of military doctrine well 
before the first prototype made its maiden flight on 31 December
1986.
Indigenous production of the Lavi was meant, among other 
things, to reduce Israeli dependence on foreign sources for 
advanced fighter aircraft. But as the project evolved to be more 
technically demanding and expensive, Israel became far more 
dependent on the United States —  both financially and technolog­
ically —  than it ever was during the Kfir project. Simply put, 
Israel not only lacked the capital to finance the Lavi but also 
the necessary technical infrastructure. Hence, nearly all of the
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$1.5 billion spent on the project up to its cancellation came 
from the United States and more than 50 per cent of the Lavi 
was actually to be built in the United States including the 
PW1120 engine by Pratt & Whitney, the wings and vertical tails by 
Grumman, and the flight control hardware and software by Lear 
Siegler.
By 1987 the host of financial, technological and strategic 
problems surrounding the Lavi led to coalition of forces opposing 
the project both in Israel and the United States. The Israeli 
Army and Navy both opposed the Lavi partly on the ground that the 
high development and manufacturing costs of the aircraft would 
force their respective services to make do with a smaller propor­
tion of the defence budget. The air force appears to have 
always had mixed feelings over the project. Despite the fact 
that the head of the air force advised Begin to opt for produc­
tion of an upgraded aircraft, there were many in the air force 
who would have preferred to remain faithful to the tested F-16 
fighter. Ultimately the air force formally advised against 
continuation of the Lavi project.
A series of influential financial administrators came to be 
highly critical of the Lavi project. The governor of the Bank of 
Israel, Michael Bruno, publicly stated that ”0n the basis of 
economic analysis, there is no justification whatsoever for 
continuing the p r o j e c t . T h e  Israeli State Comptroller
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(ombudsman), Ya'acov Maltz, issued a highly critical 40 page 
supplement on the Lavi project in his annual report (issued in 
June 1987). In the report Maltz Criticised the decision-making 
process which allowed the project to grow from being a simple 
successor to the Kfir into a multi-billion dollar undertaking. 
Maltz argued that the Finance Ministry, the Ministerial Defence 
Committee and parts of the defence establishment were not given 
adequate information at points when crucial decisions were made 
on the project and that alternatives such as the U.S. F-16 were 
never seriously explored. The report also emphasised that the 
Lavi's much-praised avionics would not be available until after 
1992 and that any development difficulties in this area would 
mean that Israel would be left with outdated aircraft or too few 
aircraft and might even be forced to buy American fighters to 
cover the a delayed of the Lavi. At a press conference following 
release of the report Maltz concluded:
A great many of the significant and essential 
decisions (about the Lavi) were made with 
information that was without basis, inadequate, 
tendentious and lacking proper cost estimates.
The United States government which had been critical of the 
Lavi under both the Carter and Reagan administrations also raised
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fundamental objections to the project in late 1986 and 1987. A 
report published on 21 December 1986 by Dov Zakheim, Under Secre­
tary of State of Defense for Planning and Resources at the Penta­
gon, entitled 'The Lavi Aircraft: An Assessment of Alternative 
Programs* argued strongly against continuation of the Lavi 
project and outlined a series of alternative o p t i o n s . Publi­
cation of the report failed to bring about any change in the 
project and in August 1987 the U.S. government, despite earlier 
claims that a decision on the Lavi was a purely internal Israeli 
affair, openly called on Israel to terminate the project **in the 
best interest of both Israel and the US.**
Despite the broad body of opinion ranged against the Lavi 
fighter, the Israeli public remained broadly supportive of the 
project. In an opinion poll conducted in May 1987 some 80 per 
cent of those questioned supported the project, with 15 per cent 
opposed and 5 per cent not r e s p o n d i n g . B y  August of that year 
the level supporting the project had dropped to 43.5 per cent in 
the p o l l s . A c c o r d i n g  to the New York Times. however, this 
figure was still high enough to instill caution in leading poli­
ticians of the fragile Likud-Labour coalition:
.. Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir recognize that
the Israeli public has come to be sentimentally,
if somewhat irrationally, attached to the plane.
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and neither man wants to be blamed for dashing the 
public's dreams....The Lavi is to Israel what the 
Mercury space program was to America - a national 
project that justifies itself more in terms of pride 
and innovation than in pure economics.
Financially and technologically the Lavi was dependent on 
Washington and the opposition of the United States to the project 
left Israel with no alternative but to cancel the manufacture of 
the aircraft. On 31 August 1987 the coalition government voted 
by the narrowest of margins —  12 to 11 —  to cancel the project. 
Shimon Peres, a member of the old guard of Lavi supporters, 
ultimately voted against the Lavi, while Moshe Arens resigned 
both his seat in the cabinet and inner cabinet to protest the 
Lavi's demise. The United States rewarded Israel for the cancel­
lation with a $300 million grant to compensate workers no longer 
needed for the fighter project and to cover retooling costs for 
other high technology defence projects.
The Lavi: A stunning success through cancellation?
In retrospect it may well be fair to characterise the Lavi
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project as a success. Israel received 90 per cent of the total 
$1.75 billion research and development costs and 50 per cent of 
the project's technology and components from the United States 
government at the same time that the American aerospace concern 
Northrop struggled to pay $1.2 billion development costs of its 
F-20 Tigershark fighter p r o g r a m m e . Both projects were ulti­
mately canceled but while Northrop was merely left to write off 
the F-20's losses, the Israeli defence sector, at minimal cost to 
Jerusalem, gained valuable technology packages, R & D experience 
and the ability to produce and export a host of important new 
aerospace technology packages and components. And as Aaron Klie- 
man has argued, such data packages and know-how are the 'highly 
promising' fourth wave of Israeli arms exports following the 
earlier export programmes of second-hand equipment, military 
training and major s y s t e m s . T h e  evidence is not yet in, but 
the Lavi's technology may well sell far better than the Kfir 
fighter. The U.S. government had little trouble blocking the 
sale of the Kfir, however, the blocking exports of technology 
packages and data transfer will prove difficult at the very 
least.
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Conclusion
Israel was subjected to a series of arms embargoes beginning in 
1948 with the creation of the Jewish state. Domestic weapons 
production began in the 1950s, but the French embargo imposed 
during and after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War appears to have been 
the reason for the rapid expansion of arms production in the 
1970s and 80s.
But this radically expanded domestic arms production pro­
gramme failed to produce major indigenous Israeli weapons systems 
without reliance on key foreign components by the close of the 
Cold War. The Lavi fighter is a prime example of Israel's fail­
ure to break away from the industrialised arms producers even in 
the Cold War's twilight. Despite the fact that Israel is far 
more scientifically advanced than possibly any other Third World 
arms producer, some 50 percent of the Lavi would have been manu­
factured in the United States or under U.S. licence.
Despite billions of dollars spent on developing an indige­
nous arms manufacturing sector over the past 3 0 years, in the 
1990s Israel will rely on U.S. fighter aircraft, and helicopters, 
American-built naval vessels, and German-built submarines. 
Despite the success of the Merkava tank project only a small 
proportion of Israel's tank forces are comprised of Merkavas.
Israel's particular relevance to this dissertation is its 
role as a caveat for other Third World arms producers. Despite a
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series of key Israeli advantages over other developing arms 
producers including some $6 billion annually in American grants 
and cheap loans; access to U.S. military technology unparalleled 
in modern history; and a highly educated and motivated popula­
tion, by the end of the Cold War Israel clearly failed to create 
a weapons manufacturing sector which was independent of the major 
industrialised countries.
The irony of Israeli arms production in the post-Lavi period 
is that the defence sector is coming to emphasise the production 
of high technology components with military applications —  an 
area of domestic military production singularly dependent on 
foreign actors. Thus despite the shift away from major weapons 
systems, the continuing demands for indigenous arms industries to 
preserve Israeli independence continue to fall to the dictates of 
limited finance, lack of technology, and the comparative advan­
tage of the industrialised countries.
Sophisticated weapons systems can be developed in Israel, 
but the domestic manufacture of such systems demands the import 
of even greater amounts of advanced technology and components and 
hence greater foreign dependency. Dependency will also be finan­
cial. New financial arrangements with the United States will be 
required and these will further increase dependence on Washing-
ton.168
Regarding the heavy Israeli dependency on the U.S., Yehoshua
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Liebowitz of the Hebrew University and editor-in-chief of the 
Encyclopedia Herbraica has said:
For two thousand years the Jewish people survived 
without any help from the goyim. Now the Jewish 
people are held captive in the velvet fist of the
A m e r i c a n s .169
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Chapter Three
South African armaments production: a case study 
Introduction
According to the white minority government. South Africa's de­
fence industries thrived under the United Nations arms embargoes 
during the Cold War. New weapons systems, which it was claimed 
were indigenously developed, were regularly unveiled in state 
ceremonies during the 1980s.
The reality of South African arms production, however, was 
quite different. By the end of the 1980s the South African arms 
industry had still failed to reach the level where actual indige­
nous research and development was carried out. "What had been 
achieved was rather a capacity to retrofit, redesign or upgrade 
weapon systems based on one or several different foreign arms."^ 
What has been achieved is "a degree of self-sufficiency, which 
varies greatly from one weapon category to the other, depending 
on the complexity of the technology i n v o l v e d . But it must be 
stressed that little would have been achieved without foreign 
technology.^
South Africa is unique among the three case study countries 
in this dissertation partly because of the mandatory UN arms 
embargoes it has faced and also because the state which was being 
defended by the domestic arms industries was one in which four-
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fifths of the population remain effectively cut off from politi­
cal influence and economic activity.
Nevertheless, South Africa shares a series of circumstantial 
and systemic similarities with the case studies examined in this 
dissertation. Before turning to the more substantive themes of 
this chapter it will be useful to review these four case study 
similarities as they apply to South Africa.
1) Limitations o n  relations with other countries;
South Africa was perhaps the number one pariah state in the world 
due to the racial system of Apartheid, which was institutiona­
lised from 1948. A series of United Nations resolutions restrict 
trade and other links with South Africa and many countries have 
their own legislation regulating links with Pretoria. Few 
countries wished to be seen associating with Pretoria and numer­
ous multinational corporations have withdrawn from the country 
after initiation of an international campaign calling for divest­
ment from South Africa.
This wholesale international rejection was a bitter disap­
pointment for the white South African ruling class which, since 
the early 1950s, had strenuously attempted to force acceptance of 
South Africa as a member of the West.
South Africa's rejection by the Western powers marked a 
failure of two key security policy goals of the Malan and Strij-
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dom governments: 1) That South Africa should join some sort of
formal Western defence alliance; and, 2) That the Western powers 
should commit themselves to the defence of South Africa/*
South Africa agitated for inclusion as at least an auxiliary 
to NATO during the early 1950s. Pretoria wanted NATO's area of 
operations to be extended further south than the French African 
dependencies north of the Tropic of Cancer, but NATO members 
remained unconvinced of the efficacy of such a move. The best 
Pretoria was able to get was the 1955 Sea Routes (Simonstown) 
Agreement. Under the terms of this accord the British naval base 
at Simonstown was given to the South African navy with the stipu­
lation that the British Navy and the navies of its allies would 
have access to its facilities. Britain and South Africa also 
agreed to contribute forces for the defence of southern Africa 
against external aggression. Pretoria had hopes for the expan­
sion of military co-operation under the agreement, but Britain 
remained unwilling to truly commit itself to the defence of the 
region. Despite joint British-South African naval exercises, 
London's reservations meant that Simonstown was never cemented as 
a true military a l l i a n c e . ^
The early 1960s were a period of shifting threat perceptions 
in South Africa as world opinion increasingly focused on apart­
heid. Black protest against the Pass Laws led to the Sharpe- 
ville massacre in March 1960 in which 67 people were killed and 
many more were wounded when police opened fire on a demonstra­
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tion. The government immediately banned the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and arrested 
the leaders of both groups. In 1961, South Africa was denied 
continued membership in British Commonwealth.
Despite setbacks in international stature. South Africa 
continued to try to develop its military forces on Western lines 
so as to have something to offer to ease entry to military al­
liances or agreements. Indeed, Pretoria's goal of being accepted 
by the West and its aspiration to join the institutional frame­
work of Western security organisations explains a surprising 
proportion of conventional defence build-up during the 1960s and 
70s. South African elites tried to project the image of a 
country that was white, capitalist, and above all Western. Hence 
in developing the air force and navy. South Africa merely bought 
weapons systems from Western suppliers and organised the respec­
tive branches of these forces in a similar style to NATO struc­
tures. The rationale being that this would make South Africa a 
more valuable addition to NATO. Only the country's army was 
allowed to develop as a truly African military organisation.
Yet as Robert Jaster has pointed out, the idea of South 
Africa endeavouring to come under the protective umbrella of a 
rejectionist West coexisted uneasily with the theme —  oft re­
peated by South African leaders —  that the West was 'abandon­
ing* South Africa and that the country would have to fight
161
isolated and alone against hostile forces.^
Pretoria, therefore, tried to take into account both the 
potential interests of the West and the actual security concerns 
of the South African military and police as decisions were made 
in improve the South African Defence Forces (SADF) during the 
1960s. On the one hand, millions of dollars were spent enlarging 
and modernising naval communications, docking and repair facili­
ties with and eye to West.  ^ But on other hand, the number of new 
soldiers trained annually rose from 2,000 in 1960 to 26,400 in 
1970 ® with the army increasingly instructing its men in counter­
insurgency warfare so that by 1973 all it forces received such 
training.
But despite Western European aid in establishing South 
Africa's silvermine radar network which monitors sea traffic from 
India to the South Atlantic —  25,000 ships pass the Cape of Good 
Hope annually —  Western threat perceptions regarding the Cape 
route waned after the 1950s and 60s.^
In 1967, after the June Arab-Israeli War caused the closure 
of the Suez Canal, world attention focussed on the shipping route 
around the Cape of Good Hope, particularly for the transport of 
Middle Eastern oil to the West. This buoyed Pretoria's hopes of 
greater Western involvement in the region and possible expansion 
of the limited ties with Britain. But ultimately the West chose 
not to involve itself further in the region. The Americans were 
going through the trauma of Vietnam and were not interested in
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increased foreign commitments. The British had just elected a 
Labour government and were also reducing overseas commitments. 
In any case, the Cape no longer dominated naval thinking as it 
once had, partly because there was no Soviet naval presence in 
the area.
Rebuffed by NATO, South Africa proposed setting up a similar 
organisation for the Southern Hemisphere: SATO, the South Atlan­
tic Treaty Organisation. Prospective members were to include 
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. SATO was dis­
cussed as late as 1984 but again Pretoria met with no serious 
response.
Further South African estrangement from the West was evident 
with cancellation of the Simonstown Agreement by the British 
Labour government in November 1974. The British decision to 
break with Pretoria was aided by the controversy over joint 
British-South African naval exercises which had taken place in 
October of that year. South African leaders and British Conser­
vatives bitterly opposed cancellation, but as one* observer point­
ed out, if the Soviet threat was as great as claimed, then not 
even joint British-South African naval forces would prevent the 
ultimate domination of the Indian Ocean by the Red navy. Only a 
NATO force could have performed such a task, but the NATO allies 
saw no such threat and had no interest in creating such a 
force.1^
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The 1977 mandatory United Nations arms embargo on exports 
to South Africa meant the end of South Africa's imports of major 
weapons systems from France and left Pretoria without a supplier 
of weapons such as fighter aircraft, helicopters and naval ves­
sels.
From the early 1960s through to the mandatory embargo South 
Africa saw its overt military links with major world powers 
atrophy and finally vanish. Pretoria developed its indigenous 
arms industries for a variety of reasons, but the growing 
strength of the arms and military technology embargoes aimed 
against South Africa were the key reason for the development of 
the country's arms industries.
2) External threats more widelv perceived than internal threats 
vet internal threat probablv of more fundamental danger to the 
state ;
South African security policy has long emphasised external issues 
and underplayed the domestic threat to the white minority-ruled 
state. The earliest concrete South African worries over external 
threats appear to have been generated in the wake of the 1956 
Suez War. The retreat of Britain and France illustrated the 
limits the old imperial powers had available to protect their 
perceived interests —  a clear hint of the decolonisation to
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come. Suez also foreshadowed Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence and showed the European power most linked to the 
region lacked the strength and the will to involve itself mili­
tarily in southern African affairs.
The South African Defence Ministry's initial concern was 
internal security and this was echoed in the legislation intro­
duced to parliament by South Africa's minister of defence, 
Fouche. Yet at the same time the Defence Ministry was already 
approaching South African security in greatly expanded terms. In 
addition to preserving internal security, Fouche set forth three 
other objectives for the SADF in 1961:
- Within its limits, to be able to cope with any invasion from 
outside;
To have something to offer when South Africa wanted to enter 
agreements or military alliances with other countries;
To act as a deterrent, "so that no insignificant little state 
can believe it can invade South Africa". .
Precisely where an invasion force, indicated in the first 
point, would come from is completely unclear, as is the identity
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of the * little state* in point three. In 1961, decolonisation 
had not yet begun in southern Africa (Zambia, the first country 
in the region to achieve independence, did so in 1964.) There­
fore, barring a joint Afro-Asian invasion force —  a highly 
unrealistic proposition —  or a force sent by one of the super­
powers, which South Africa would have been unable to resist 
anyway, there seems to have been little substance to the Defence 
Ministry's scenarios for a landward invasion of the country at 
this time.
Subsequent decolonisation in the region fueled Pretoria's 
concern over external threats. The country's buffer zone of 
colonial or white-ruled states finally evaporated during the late 
1960s and 70s. The three British High Commission Territories of 
Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland 
achieved independence in 1966, 1966 and 1968 respectively.
Pretoria had expected to absorb these territories into a 'Greater 
South Africa' but eventually accepted that they could probably be 
controlled economically —  a policy which would be perfected in 
the late 1970s and early 80s through the destabilization cam­
paign. Rhodesia made its Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) in 1965, but during the 1970s the guerrilla war waged by 
black forces from ZANU and ZAPU eventually wore down the white 
regime. Salisbury required increasing amounts of aid from South 
Africa and ultimately Pretoria sanctioned the Lancaster House 
Agreement of 1979 which led to the creation of Zimbabwe. Angola
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and Mozambique began their troubled independence in 1975. Only 
South African-ruled Namibia remained as a 'buffer* and Pretoria 
was subjected to increasing Western pressure during the 1970s to 
concede control over this League of Nations mandate.
The tumultuous dissolution of the Portuguese Empire in the 
mid-1970s led Pretoria to further magnify what were perceived as 
external threats to South Africa. The main goals of security 
policy during this period can be summarised as follows : 1)
South African control over any decolonisation in Namibia; 2) The 
bringing of neighboring states under South African economic 
influence; 3) Dissuading the frontline states from assisting any 
of the Namibian or South African liberation movements ; and 4) 
Forcing Cuba and the USSR out of the region.
The 1974 Portuguese revolution and the subsequent liquida­
tion of the Portuguese role in Angola and Mozambique profoundly 
shook South African strategic thinking. The initial fear in 
Pretoria was that Angola and Mozambique would provide bases for 
infiltrating guerrillas into Namibia or South Africa itself. As 
disorder spread throughout Angola during the spring and summer of 
1975 —  with rival groups seeking to gain control of territory 
before the agreed 11 November Angolan independence day —  South 
African officials became increasingly concerned about the con­
stellation of post-independence Angola. South African forces 
occupied parts of southern Angola in August and by October, as
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Cuban reinforcements for the MPLA arrived, an SADF-led force of 
South African, FNLA and UNITA troops advanced 400 miles in the 
western part of the country, defeating Cuban and MPLA forces. 
Another SADF-UNITA column advanced 500 miles north toward Luanda. 
But by mid-autumn, increasing numbers of Cuban troops and Soviet 
weapons turned the tide of war against South Africa.
Of crucial importance was the fact that international polit­
ical and materiel support for Pretoria was not forthcoming. The 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) condemned South Africa, and 
even conservative member states like Zaire which had sent forces 
into Angola to fight the MPLA in July, called for a ceasefire and 
the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Regarding armaments, the 
United States Senate approved an amendment on 19 December 1975 
which prohibited aid to any Angolan faction without Congressional 
approval. Given the tanks and 122mm cluster-mounted rockets 
received by the MPLA and the eventual build-up of some 20,000 
Cuban troops, lack of Western materiel appears to have been an 
important cause of the South African withdrawal in Angola. On 22 
January 1976, South African forces withdrew to a maximum depth of 
50 km inside Angola.
The outcome of South Africa's Angolan invasion, viewed by 
some analysts as a debacle for the South African military and by 
others as merely a reversal, had a heavy influence on South 
African military planning for the remainder of the 1970s. This 
was the SADF's first experience in regional conventional warfare
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and the losses sustained from the Soviet 122mm rockets spurred 
the government to order the state arms producer, Armscor, to 
begin work on the long-range G-5 and G-6 h o w i t z e r . T h e  posi­
tioning of some 20,000 Cuban and East German soldiers of the 
border with Namibia was a physical manifestation of the ever- 
discussed 'communist threat' to the Afrikaner state. These 
forces served as the external threat which justified further 
expansion of South African military doctrine to counter what 
officially was termed the 'Total Onslaught' against white South 
Africa. As noted above, the military doctrine to counter this 
supposed threat was, logically, called 'Total Strategy'.
The emphasis on external threats led South Africa to re­
define the security politics of the entire region. Pretoria 
sought to create a cordon sanitaire of frontline countries in 
which the ANC and SWAPO were denied logistical or military sup­
port and where South Africa could develop and maintain critical 
leverage over the local governments. South African military 
planners viewed the ultimate threat to the country as a conven­
tional assault from across the border. Therefore, the highest 
long-term goal of the destabilisation policy was the consolida­
tion of economic and military influence over the frontline 
states.
The concept of security concerns being met by improving 
conditions within South Africa for the non-white communities
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received little emphasis during the 1960s 70s and 80s. This was 
partly because such things as bringing black educational stand­
ards up to those of whites would be enormously expensive given 
the size of the black population and the very great discrepancy 
that existed in terms of money spent per student. In any case, 
improving the political and economic status of Black Africans 
would have contradicted precisely the Apartheid system that the 
white ruling-class sought to defend during this period. Indeed, 
it was natural to concentrate on outside threats to society: 
Placing greater emphasis on internal threats to the country would 
only too quickly have exposed the inherent contradictions in 
South African society.
Pretoria's assault on external 'threats*
A legacy of the increased emphasis on external threats to South 
Africa was the muscular military response outside the South 
African and Namibian borders during the period 1980-87. The 
offensive posture appears to have been initiated for a number of 
reasons: it was partly designed to appease the Afrikaner right
wing who threatened to block the ruling National Party's limited 
reform programme; partly as an act of defiance to show the world 
that South Africa would not go soft in the face of growing inter-
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national sanctions; partly to convince the frontline states to 
enter into 'security agreements' with Pretoria; and partly be­
cause domestic armaments production levels during this period 
made it easy and, indeed, expedient to run down some of the 
military's growing stocks of weapons and munitions.
During the 1980-87 period, SADF forces conducted a series of 
major operations in Angola and launched attacks of varying inten­
sity on Mozambique, Lesotho and Botswana. The stated South 
African targets in these raids were said to be ANC or SWAPO bases 
and personnel, but the level of fighting between the South Afri­
can armed forces and regular Angolan forces led the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies to describe the South African 
presence in Angola as "a state of undeclared war against 
Angola".
Conventional weapons for conventional wars
The priority given to external threats in the 1960s 70s and 80s 
can be illustrated by examining the various components of the 
South African armed forces. For years Pretoria sanctioned the 
development of forces and military installations to, on the one 
hand, show that the country was a member of the Western community
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of nations, and, on the other hand, to counter what was always a 
highly improbable scenario: Namely that the Soviet Union would
back or lead an attack on South Africa launched from the front­
line states. It is difficult to comprehend South African state­
ments from this time Which talk about deterring a landward 
threat, simply because no conventional landward threat existed to 
deter during the 1960s and 70s.
South Africa imported tanks, cargo vehicles, anti-tank guns 
and Mirage III fighters, all of which were directed at landward 
threats which might develop in the future. The efficacy of 
many of these weapon systems remains highly questionable for a 
number of reasons. First, there is the problem African condi­
tions. Systems designed for the North German Plain or the Baltic 
Sea may be far less useful in Namibian or South Indian Ocean 
conditions. Secondly, one can ask what was the purpose of such 
systems. A military trained for irregular warfare —  probably 
the only serious threat to South Africa —  was perhaps the 
single most important element of defence forces needed by the 
white South African state. Would re-conditioned tanks be of any 
use to counter-insurgency forces? It is possible that such 
weapons systems were procured due to lack of alternative avail­
able armaments on the world market or the relatively backward 
state of South strategic thinking. However the most likely 
reason adoption seems to have been Pretoria's above-mentioned 
attempts to prove that it was indeed a Western country. The
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similar military hardware and the anti-communist rhetoric created 
a material and 'intellectual* facade in common with other Western 
armed forces. A South Africa with compatible equipment and 
doctrine to NATO might provide an incentive to Western states to 
form a military alliance with South Africa.
Pretoria, it appears, built up an armed forces of a not very 
appropriate nature —  from a strictly military sense —  aimed at 
an exaggerated external threat to serve as a diplomatic tool 
beginning in the 1960s. As a consequence of this policy, the 
South African navy was run down, most air force bases were sta­
tioned 400 miles inland, and emphasis was given to improving 
tank forces and strategic thinking stressed forces capable of 
striking outwards. Most significantly, the South African Navy 
became the poor cousin to the army and air force due to the 
emphasis on landward threat of conventional forces to South 
Africa.
Shifts in threat perception forced the navy through the most 
fundamental changes of any of the South African Defence Force 
branches. In the 1960s, when Pretoria sought an alliance with 
the West, a larger. Western-type navy was developed so that South 
Africa could, in concert with the West 'protect* the Cape route. 
This posture was essentially reversed in the late 1970s. With 
the emphasis on landward defence, navy was scaled down and small­
er coastal patrol forces comprised of fast patrol boats and in­
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shore minesweepers were given priority. The rationale seems to 
have been that as the West would not involve itself with the 
SADF, the navy stood no chance of fending off a major power. The 
navy was therefore forced to bear the brunt of budgetary con­
straints imposed on what was then seen to be the least vital of 
the armed services.
But the idea that an African navy did not need Western-type 
capabilities lost favour in Pretoria during the 1980s. South 
Africa curiously ignored the threat of even a limited Western 
naval blockade of the country, although the potential harm a 
blockade could inflict would have been considerable: 91 per cent
of South Africa's trade with the world is conveyed by s e a . I n  
the mid-1980s South African strategists awoke to this potential 
danger, and initiated policies to rebuild the navy into a force 
capable of at least deterring a naval blockade. The submarine 
yards, closed in 1981, were reopened to enable replacements to be 
built for the navy's three Daphne-class submarines, which will 
reportedly be obsolete by the mid-1990s. Two frigates have been 
brought out of mothballs and there are plans to purchase more 
corvettes from Israel. Finally, a commercial tanker is being 
modified to carry helicopters to serve in an offshore early warn­
ing capability.
By the end of the Cold War there was far less emphasis on the 
external threat. The continued civil war in Angola and the 
virtual decomposition of Mozambique, along with the dependency or
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weakness of South Africa's other neighbors made the enunciation 
of an external threat even more incredible than it was in the 
late 1970s. The withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, Namibian 
independence, and the rise of unrest in the townships clearly 
showed that the real threat to Pretoria was obviously much closer 
to home.
Nevertheless, for nearly two generations, the South African 
government has concentrated security policy concerns on external 
forces while ignoring or underplaying the domestic security risks 
inherent in a society where four-fifths of the population are 
effectively cut off from political and economic participation. 
The initiation of reforms under the de Klerk administration are a 
final admission of Pretoria's misdirected security policies of 
the past.
3) Victim of arms embargoes and arms control restricTtions;
South Africa has been the victim of more international arms 
embargo legislation that any other country in modern history.
The first embargo in 1963, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 181 of 7 August, called for the voluntary cessation 
of all sales of arms and military equipment to South Africa. 
Security Council Resolution 182 of 4 December 1963 broadened the
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embargo to Include equipment and materials for arms production.
The 1963 voluntary resolutions were replaced by a mandatory 
arms embargo of Resolution 418 from 4 November 1977.
An embargo on arms imports from South Africa was established 
by the non-mandatory Security Council Resolution 558 of 13 Decem­
ber 1984.
The only other country that has been the victim of a manda­
tory United Nations arms embargo has been Rhodesia.
Although the UN embargoes have not been nearly as thorough
or tough as the U.S.-led COCOM strategic embargo against the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, South Africa has been the 
"single most embargoed nation in the w o r l d . "2% (For the text of 
UN Resolutions 181, 182 and 418 see Appendix 14.)
4) Structural requirements and the limits af technology and 
finance;
South Africa was able to finance both the growth of its armed 
forces and the development of Armscor, the state armaments manu­
facturer, through the dynamic economic growth of the 1960s and 
70s. But the stagnation of country's economy in the 1980s, along 
with the increased success of the international arms sanctions 
movement and the general decline of confidence in South Africa in 
corporate circles created a more difficult situation in the 
1980s. From the financial perspective it appears doubtful that
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Pretoria could have afforded the development and production costs 
for ships, submarines, or fighter aircraft —  even if the tech­
nology had been available.
The question in the 1980s was whether Armscor could afford 
—  in security terms —  to build second-rate systems, given the 
twin facts that the white South Africans were vastly outnumbered 
in southern Africa and that potential enemies were able to import 
advanced weapons from the industrialised countries and other 
Third World suppliers. As will be shown below, Armscor failed in 
its bid to build major weapons systems rec[uired by the SADF and 
this leads to one of the main points that I will make in this 
chapter. Namely that South Africa has found it impossible to 
develop both advanced and indigenous arms industries.
Furthermore, there are questions as to whether Armscor was 
even able to maintain existing arms production lines. The eco­
nomic crunch began to hit Pretoria's military acquisitions in the 
early 1980s and indigenous overproduction of military equipment 
for the domestic market being put at up to 50* p e r c e n t . T h e  
decline in South African arms production began in 1982 and led 
to sharp reduction in arms industry personnel as projects such as 
the Impala aircraft assembly line have been closed down. Armscor 
ended the 1980s with its most active production in the areas of 
armoured vehicles, small arms and ammunition. Production at a 
number of factories had reportedly been halted and some facili­
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ties have been mothballed.
South Africa is far less advanced in terms of military 
technology than Israel and has been almost totally reliant on 
imported military know-how, components, and production licences. 
As will be shown below, without the benefit of foreign assistance 
few of South Africa's military production projects would have 
been realised in the past two decades.
South Africa's military industries
Armaments production capabilities in South Africa grew enormously 
during the period from 1965 to 1990. Pretoria's ruling elites 
were forced to shift to 'indigenous' production of weapons and 
military supplies largely due to international ostracism of the 
country's apartheid system expressed through the mandatory United 
Nations embargo on the sales of arms and arms production equip­
ment to South Africa.
The beginnings of South Africa's present day arms manufac­
turing capacity were created during the Second World War. South 
Africa, fighting with other Commonwealth and colonial forces on 
the side of the United Kingdom was cut off from its normal mili­
tary suppliers in Britain. As a result, light aircraft, armoured 
vehicles, howitzers, mortars and ammunition were assembled in
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South Africa during the war Most of these industries reduced
or terminated production with the end of hostilities in 1945. At 
least three reasons can be given for this seemingly precipitous 
move. First, such production was not cost effective in South 
Africa and no economies of scale existed. Second, there existed 
no compelling external factors to maintain a domestic arms 
industry: South Africa had served loyally in the War and scarce­
ly expected to have its Western allies embargo the sale of arms 
and technology. In any case, nearly all of Africa remained under 
the domination of the colonial powers. Third, the vast quanti­
ties of surplus weapons left around the world after the Second 
World War could be bought easily and cheaply. In the immediate 
post-War period South Africa only produced munitions until the 
establishment of the first rifle factory in 1953.
The development and structure of South Africa's military indus­
tries
In the wake of the 1961 Sharpeville Massacre, South Africa was 
forced to leave the Commonwealth. This date marks the beginning 
of efforts to diversify the country's indigenous arms industry 
and to create better economies of scale by exporting to the 
United States. In December 1963 the United Nations Security
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Council voted to impose a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa. 
Britain and France supported the embargo but only with regard to 
weapons for internal use and it appeared both countries would 
continue selling arms to South Africa as long as they were not 
overtly designed for police use. But in 1964, in a move that has 
characterised the vacillation of British arms sales policy to 
South Africa, the newly elected Labour government announced that 
no further arms of any type would be sold to Pretoria.
The South African government under Prime Minister Hendrick 
Verwoerd responded by rushing a bill through parliament which 
created an Armaments Production Board (APB) which was given 
authority to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire all weap­
ons or munitions that might be necessary for the South African 
Defence Force (SADF). According to South African sources, rapid 
progress was made despite the UN arms embargo. In 1965 Defence 
Minister P.W. Botha announced that South Africa had negotiated 
127 arms production licences from foreign producers The APB
did not seek to create a major state-owned arms industry, but 
rather to integrate state and private industry . Indeed, the 
fact that today some 70 per cent of South Africa's present mili­
tary production remains within the realm of private industry 
is a matter of considerable pride for South Africa's conservative 
white elite. (One note on methodology is necessary: 'Produ­
ction ' of weapons and military supplies by Armscor is taken to 
mean production at plants owned by Armscor, at private plants or
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at the plants of subcontractors. Armscor co-ordinates the mate­
rial needs of the SADF and provides the private suppliers with 
technical aid, guidance and export markets.)
Work had begun on the development of advanced weapons sys­
tems even before the creation of the APB. In 1963, for example, 
the National Rocket Institute was established by the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research and was ordered to develop an 
air-to-air missile system. The first locally assembled missile 
system was reportedly tested in 1968.
The APB was converted into a state corporation and renamed 
the Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation (Armscor) 
in 1968. Armscor*s management is directly responsible to the 
South African Ministry of Defence, the old state arsenal system 
was dismantled and replaced with an arrangement somewhat similar 
to that which exists in France: close co-operation between
private industry and government albeit under state guidance. 
Members drawn from private industry sit on the Defence Planning 
Committee which advises the Ministry of Defence on decisions 
regarding Armscor, and the private sector has naturally main­
tained pressure on Armscor to procure as much as possible from 
commercial sources.
At the time of its creation Armscor was directed "to meet, 
as effectively and economically as possible, the armaments re­
quirements of the Republic", and was empowered to achieve this
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through; development, manufacture, standardisation, maintenance, 
acquisition, and "by collaborating with, or assisting or render­
ing services to, or utilizing the services of, any person, body 
or institution or any department of state". Aided by the
existing steel and mining explosives industries, by an abundant 
supply of coal for energy, and by the buoyant economy of the 
1960s and 1970s, Armscor was able to overcome many of the techno­
logical and economic barriers it faced in such an undertaking. 
Armscor was successful in supplying an active South African 
military with many of its basic needs, but serious technological 
limitations remained and recent developments with regard to 
fighter aircraft and submarines show that South Africa will 
remain dependent on outside sources for its next generations of 
these and other advanced weapons systems.
It needs to be stressed that reliable information on 
Armscor*s activities remains difficult to obtain. The state 
apparatus for secrecy has grown steadily since 1948 and the most 
recent addition to the protective shell of legislation that 
encases Armscor is the 1980 amendment to the Armaments Develop­
ment and Protection Act which:
prohibits the disclosure of any information 
in relation to the acquisition, supply, marketing 
importation, export, development, manufacture, 
maintenance, or repair of, or research in connection
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with armaments by, for, on behalf of, or for the 
benefit of the Armaments Corporation or a subsidiary 
company. ^0
Weapons production does not, therefore, constitute a subject 
which can be easily discussed in South Africa, even among academ­
ics. The effect of this censorship is evident in some South 
African literature on the country * s domestic arms industries and 
the military. The reader is often left with the sense that the 
authors know far more about the subject than they are willing to 
commit to paper, and that what is written is sometimes purposely 
lacking in detail.
Arms production in South Africa
Armaments manufactured in South Africa are, as the South African 
authorities never tire of emphasising, custom-designed to meet 
the geographic, climatic, and strategic demands placed upon them 
by African conditions, and the tactical demands of the SADF. 
Indeed, this has meant that in some cases the emphasis has been 
on fairly low-level technology.
With regard to military vehicle systems, high mobility is 
considered important and because of the long distances covered
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over rough country, wheels are preferred to tracks. Tracked 
vehicles also tend to break down far more freqpiently than wheeled 
vehicles. Due to SADF fears of being outnumbered in combat (due 
in part to the limited white conscription base) force multiplying 
weapons and military systems which can easily be modernised are 
favoured. In addition, SADF tactics place emphasis on night- 
fighting and Armscor supplies night-fighting equipment. Standar­
disation is given high priority both at the level of sub- 
assemblies and components. Examples of such standardisation can 
be found in tyres, gearboxes, engines and communications equip­
ment. South African-produced weapons systems tend to conform 
with other standard Western systems. The Kukri, for instance, 
which is an export version of the V3B IR guided missile has 
mechanical and electrical interfaces that conform to both the 
U.S. Sidewinder Aero 3B and the French M550 Magic launchers.
Generally speaking. South African armaments manufactures are 
characterised by the production of a narrow range of svstems 
which are advanced relative to sub-Saharan African standards. 
Pretoria, for example, claims total self-sufficiency with regard 
to the production of small arms and ammunition, yet it appears 
that even in this relatively unadvanced area of arms manufacture 
Armscor prefers to import certain equipment due to concerns over 
quality or cost. The South African government has itself admit­
ted in the 1977 Defence White Paper that "locally manufactured 
arms will necessarily have a cost premium".
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Aircraft
Limited domestic production of military aircraft in South Africa 
first began in 1930. However, the project reportedly suffered 
from lack of funds and with the outbreak of the Second World War 
in 1939 the South African Air Force was equipped with aircraft 
ill-suited for combat tasks.
South Africa re-embarked on domestic production of military 
aircraft in the 1960s and in the past three decades Armscor's 
Atlas aircraft factory has produced a variety of medium technolo­
gy planes for South Africa's air force. However, it should be 
stressed that Atlas has not been involved in the design of in­
digenous aircraft.
As Signe Landgren has noted "French, British, and Israeli 
participation and technology created the South African aircraft 
industry....To date. Atlas has not presented one single aircraft 
which could be called i n d i g e n o u s . W h a t  Armscor and the South 
African government have claimed are indigenous airplane and 
helicopter designs are actually re-designs and that the main 
tasks of the country's aircraft industry have been refitting, 
modification and upgrading work.^^
The Atlas Aircraft Corporation was set up in 1964 as a 
private company (it was taken over by the state in 1969) and
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construction of Atlas's factory was completed in 1967 with plans 
and assistance from France's S u d - A v i a t i o n . T h e  factory was 
specifically designed for the licenced manufacture of the Italian 
Aermachi M.B. 326M jet trainer/light attack plane, which Armscor 
has renamed the Impala. In 1973, South Africa made an agreement 
with Italy to produce the more advanced M.B 326K light-strike 
version of the aircraft which armscor has designated the Impala 
II. From 1978 a more advanced Impala III was reportedly manufac­
tured . South Africa received considerable foreign assistance in 
setting up the Impala production line —  more than 1,000 British 
and Italian engineers and technicians worked on the project and 
special team from Rolls Royce set up the Impala's engine assembly 
line.38
The Impala incorporates U.S. designed avionics and the 
British Rolls Royce 540 Viper jet engine, licenced by Britain to 
the Italian Piaggio concern, which sub-licences it to South 
Africa. The more advanced Viper 632 Turbojet which powers the 
Impala II was jointly developed by Rolls Royce and Fiat. South 
Africa was one of the first countries to receive the engine from 
Italy. No information is available on the local content of the 
Viper 540 still being assembled in South Africa. 39
By the late 1980s Armscor had manufactured as many Impalas 
as were required by the South African Air Force and the produc­
tion line at Atlas was closed down. South Africa reportedly has 
some 239 Impala aircraft of which 200 were assembled or
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partially manufactured domestically.
The most important element of South Africa's Air Force are 
its Mirage fighters. South Africa began receiving Mirage Ill's 
in 1963. The Mirage FI was acquired under a deal made in June 
1971 between Armscor and Marcel Dassault/Breguet Aviation and 
Société Nationale d 'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs 
d'Aviation (SNECMA) of France. The agreement provided for li­
cenced production of the entire FI fighter/interceptor including 
engines and electrical equipment. However, despite the fact
that a number of academic studies report that South Africa has 
manufactured the Mirage, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Atlas ever did more than assemble knocked-down FI's which arrived 
from France. ^ ^ . Indeed, this seems to be borne out in 
Pretoria's 1986 White Paper on Defence and Armaments S u p p I v  which 
states that: "By way of the construction of Impala aircraft and 
the repair and modification of SA Air Force naval combat aircraft 
and helicopters, the aviation industry has already reached a 
satisfactory capability". No mention whatsoever is made of
manufacturing Mirages during the late 1970s and it would appear 
that the Ministry of Defence finally gave up the pretense that 
the aircraft was ever manufactured by Atlas.
The initial FI order was for 48 planes of which 16 were the 
Fl-CZ interceptor version (assembled at Atlas from 1976-77) and 
32 were the Fl-AZ ground-attack version (assembled from 1973-76).
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The gradual shift to licenced production of the FI at Atlas was 
planned, but the entire project was canceled in 1977 when the 
French government decided to include licenced production of the 
Mirage under provisions of the Mandatory UN arms embargo. There­
fore, the advanced stages of indigenous Mirage manufacture were 
never reached and Atlas assembled only 48 of the aircraft.
In July 1986, South Africa announced the development of what 
it claimed was a 'mid-life update' of the Mirage 3 in which 50 
percent of the of the aircraft was reconstructed. According to 
Jane's Defence Weekly, the unveiling ceremony, headed by South 
African President P.W. Botha, was more on a scale usually for the 
roll-out of a new fighter prototype. Official South African 
reports have said the Cheetah, as the new aircraft is called, is 
the result of years of top-secret research and development. But 
privately, foreign ministry officials have admitted the Cheetah 
is, indeed, an Israeli Kfir with an admixture of avionics from 
French and British sources.
In appearance the Cheetah is very similar to the Kfir. This 
was reported by a number of correspondents who attended the 
unveiling ceremony. Nevertheless, Jane's Defence Weeklv also
reported that while the
...small fixed foreplanes, dog-tooth wing 
leading edges and drooped radar nose correspond 
to the lAI (Israel Aircraft Industries) Kfir-TC2....
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The lack of an airscoop at the base of the fin, 
as fitted to the Kfir, confirms the absence of 
the General Electric J79 engine.
The Kfir uses a U.S. General Electric J79 engine which due to the 
arms embargo is —  in theory —  unobtainable for Pretoria. Some 
sources say the Cheetah is powered by a French SNECMA Atar 9 
engine which the Financial Times reported is made under an 
"Israeli-South African military co-operation pact" but others 
say that Israel has subsequently sold licence-produced U.S. J79 
engines to South Africa for the Cheetah.^®
Landgren describes the Cheetah as follows:
In sum, about 50 percent of the old Mirage 3 
is reconstructed and brought up to the same 
standard as the Israeli Kfir-2....Thus, the 
aircraft presented as proof of *home-grown 
achievement of development*, is a 50 per cent 
reconstruction of the 24-year-old Mirage 3 
and draws heavily on Israeli and French know-how.
The Mirage 3 redesign will not add any new planes to the South 
African Air Force —  contrary to claims by Defence Minister
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Magnus Malan at the Cheetah unveiling. Instead, the existing 
Mirage fleet will be modified to Cheetah standard.^0
Atlas Aircraft continues to manufacture the dual civil- 
military C-4M Kudo, which is based on the AM-3CM light spotter 
plane built by Aeronautica Macchi of Italy. (The Am-3CM is 
itself based on the American Lockheed 60.) The six or seven seat 
Kudo is used for cargo, general utility and spotting. It is 
powered by a U.S. Avco Lycoming G50-480 engine, manufactured 
under licence in Italy.
A smaller general purpose plane, the Italian AM.3C, desig­
nated Bosbok, is assembled under licence by Atlas. The Bosbok is 
used by the air force for reconnaissance, forward air controlling 
and transport.
The Durban-based National Dynamics Company (a privately 
owned concern) produces a remotely piloted drone called the 
Eyrie. National Dynamics claims to have designed the drone but 
some sources have noted a similarity with both the American 
Lockheed Acguila and the German Dernier Minidrohne. According to 
Jane * s Weapon Svstems the Eyrie is not similar to the Israeli 
Scout and Mastiff d r o n e s .
During the 1970s and 80s South African leaders debated the 
building of an indigenous helicopter to replace the country's 
aging Alouette 3s, Pumas and Super Frelons. In March 1986 a new 
light attack helicopter, the Alpha XH-1 was unveiled at the Latin 
American Aerospace Trade Fair held in Chile. Although the Alpha
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was apparently derived from the Alouette 3, it was never put into 
full scale production. Armscor's chairman, Fred Bell, has admit­
ted the XH-1 is powered by a foreign engine, produced under 
licence from an unidentified country and Jane * s World Combat 
Aircraft notes that the XH-1 uses a French engine, tail rotor and 
transmission. No armament or threat assessment went into the
Alpha's design and according to official sources it served merely 
as a flying test-bed for the more recently unveiled XPT-1 attack 
and transport helicopter. The XPT-1 is not an operational proto­
type, but rather a slightly modified Puma helicopter from the air 
force's existing fleet. The XPT-1 carries a 20mm helmet sighted 
gun and four outboard pods firing 68mm air-to-ground unguided
rockets.53
Missiles
South Africa has produced a limited number of missile systems 
which have been highly dependent on foreign inputs including 
technology form France, Israel, Germany and the United States.
The state-run rocket research Institute (RRI) was estab­
lished in 1963 with West German co-operation. The RRI —  set up 
under the auspices of the University of Pretoria -- drew on
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expertise from Germany's Max Planck Institute of Aeronomy and the 
Institute for Stratospheric Physics at Lindau. West Germany's 
Herman Oberth Gesellschaft in Bremen and the Waffen und Luftrues- 
tung, an umbrella organisation for some 30 West German firms 
involved in the rocket industry (including BMW, Siemens, Robert 
Bosch and Liebherr-Africa), aided South Africa in early rocket 
development work.
South Africa's first missile project was reportedly canceled 
after what were claimed to be successful tests of a prototype 
designated Whiplash in 1968.
The RRI was involved in setting up the joint French-South 
African Cactus/Crotale surface-to-air (SAM) missile programme in 
the 1960s. Under the agreement. South Africa supplied the fi­
nancing and France built the missile. It does not appear that 
the Crotale —  designated Cactus by Pretoria —  was ever assem­
bled in South A f r i c a .55 it is also reported that South Africa 
financed France's Milan anti-tank missile, the Matra R-530 and 
the R-550 Magic air-to-air m i s s i l e . 5 6
South Africa's Kukri air-to-air missile project appears to 
have been a continuation of the Whiplash programme from the 
1960s. The Kukri's forerunner, designated V 3 , was reportedly 
completed in the mid-1970s. The V3 is based on a fusion of 
technology from the French Magic R-550, the U.S. Sidewinder and 
other French missile technology. French missile assistance came 
to an end in 1977 and the Kukri is one of the few South African-
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produced weapons that Western analysts consider to exhibit traits 
indigenous development. (But it too is derived from the French 
Magic and resembles the Israeli Shafrir.) The system is unique 
in that it utilises a helmet-mounted sight system which allows 
the pilot to 'look and shoot'(The missile sighting system is 
connected to the movements of the pilot's right e y e . ) ^ ?
Pretoria claims the Skerpioen ship-to-ship missile, manufac­
tured in South Africa, is an indigenous system. However, observ­
ers say it is the Israeli Gabriel-2 produced under licence, or 
possibly an upgraded version of the Gabriel.^®
In 1982 Armscor announced that work had commenced on an 
anti-ship missile system, similar to the French Exocet and a 
prototype was tested the same year. During the 1980s it was 
reported that Armscor had managed to obtain technical information 
on France's MM-38 Exocet missile through sympathetic high-ranking 
French officials —  but not the French government itself. In 
1983, U.S. intelligence reported that Pretoria was actually co­
producing Aerospatiale's Exocet m i s s i l e . ^ 9
Key American missile technology has also been shipped to 
South Africa. According to a Financial Times ABC News Niaht- 
line report, U.S. ballistic missile technology and military 
equipment was illegally shipped to South Africa between 1984 and 
1988 with full knowledge of the American Central Intelligence 
Agency. The exports from the Pennsylvania-based International
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signal and Control included telemetry tracking antennae, which 
follow missiles in flight and pick up data such as fuel consump­
tion, velocity and gravitational forces; gyroscopic equipment for 
the guidance systems of the ballistic missiles; and, photo-imag­
ing film readers, used to determine the performance of missiles. 
"The antennae and film reader, used together, would form the 
backbone of a system to develop medium-range missiles," said an 
unnamed former high-ranking U.S. intelligence official cited in
the report.GO
A further important South African system is the Walkiri is 
multi-barrelled rocket-launcher. Based on the Soviet Stalin 
Organ system, the Walkiri a truck-mobile system, capable of 
firing up to 24 unguided missiles as a ripple, with a range of 22 
km. Landgren says it is likely South Africa received assistance 
from Israel or Taiwan for the Walkiri project.G1
Armoured vehicles, howitzers and tanks
One of South Africa's few high technology military achievements 
is the G5 155mm field gun and the G6, a self-propelled version of 
the G5. Both guns are regarded by some analysts to be the most 
advanced systems of their type in the world. The G5 and G6 use 
what are known as 'base bleed' projectiles. Such munitions
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generate gas at the rear of the shell which has been fired so as 
to destroy the partial vacuum that reduces the range of the 
projectile. This helps give the G5/6 system its extended range 
—  37.5 km. as opposed to 30 km. with standard projectiles.
Base bleed ammunition is difficult to produce and few de­
veloping arms producers possess the necessary technology for its 
manufacture. Unsurprisingly, the system is not an example of 
indigenous South African weapons development, as claimed by 
Armscor. Most of the technology for the gun and ammunition was 
supplied by the American Space Research Corporation and is based 
on technology obtained from Sweden's Bofors and Belgium's Bouder­
ies Reunis de Belgique. Armscor was able to buy an entire plant 
for the manufacture of G5/G6 ammunition from West Germany's 
Rheinmetall via a clandestine shipment through Paraguay and 
Brazil.
South Africa's armoured vehicle industry has drawn heavily 
on foreign technology and components. It has been relatively 
easy to import vehicles, engines and electronic components as 
'civilian goods' thus evading both the voluntary and mandatory UN 
embargoes. It is interesting to note that in 1980, prior to the 
commencement multinational corporate divestment in South Africa, 
eight foreign auto manufacturers had branches in the country. 
These included: Chrysler, Ford and General Motors (USA); Toyota,
Datsun-Nissan (Japan); British Leyland (UK); Volkswagen (West
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Germany); and Alfa Romeo (Italy).^3
After importing French Panhard AML armoured cars in 1961, 
South Africa obtained agreement for licenced production of the 
AML in 1963 and production began in 1966. The vehicle was pro­
duced under the designation Eland by Sandock-Austral and a series 
of upgrades have led to the Eland Mark 7. According to the 
military trade magazine Defense and Armament the Eland's engine 
originated in the U.S. Production of the Eland ceased in 1983 
and was succeeded with the Ratel armoured vehicle.^4
The Ratel is a 6 x 6 wheeled vehicle manufactured in South 
Africa, but based on prototype designed by the West German compa­
ny Buessing, which was later incorporated into the Maschinen 
Fabrik Augsburg-Nuernberg (MAN). The bullet and napalm proof 
tyres are produced under licence from the Austrian Polyair compa- 
ny.65
Despite official claims. South Africa has never produced an 
indigenous tank of any sort. The Olifant main battle tank is a 
modernised version of the British Centurian 5 tank, in service in 
South Africa since 1955. Pretoria has been able to escape the 
arms embargo by importing used Centurians from Jordan and scrap 
Centurians from India for subsequent refurbishment and upgrading. 
The Olifant is reportedly powered by a Canadian engine and has 
armour, fire control systems and other modifications based on 
Israeli improvements to the Centurian. Armscor has re-equipped 
the Olifant with a 105mm gun of unknown origin.
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Armscor*s Truckmaker•s division produces the Samil range of 
vehicles based on designs and components from Magirus-Deutz and 
Unimog in Germany. These include more than 70 variants of troop 
carriers, ambulances, gun tractors and recovery trucks. A Samil 
line vehicle in widespread active use by the South African Army 
is the Buffel mine-proofed armoured personnel carrier.
Following the 1977 Mandatory UN arms embargo. South Africa 
was compelled to begin production of diesel engines for military 
vehicles. Armscor obtained production licences and equipment 
from West Germany * s Daimler-Benz and Canada's Massey-Ferguson 
for the establishment of the Atlantis Diesel Engine Works. 
Atlantis produces 21 different types of engines and has a capaci­
ty of 50,000 units per year. In a related development. South 
Africa obtained technology for the manufacture of gearboxes from 
West Germany's Zahnradfabriken and a gearbox plant was estab­
lished by General Mining.^®
Naval vessels
Armscor has faced considerable difficulty meeting the require­
ments of South Africa's navy. Although the British naval base at 
Simonstown was established in 1808 and became the most modern
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dockyard in the southern hemisphere, modern South Africa did not 
begin producing naval vessels until 1978. Pretoria has two major 
dockyards: the naval dockyards at Simonstown and at Durban.
Both naval yards have been expanded during the 1980s in line with 
South Africa's emphasis on upgrading existing ships.
The Minister Class fast patrol boats, built by Sandock- 
Austral in Durban, are not of indigenous design but rather li­
cence-produced Israeli Reshef Class fast patrol boats (which are 
themselves based on the West German Saar 4 Class built by Luers- 
sen). The Minister Class boats are armed with Skerpioen missiles 
and Italian and Swiss-designed guns.^®
There have been numerous reports of a South African subma­
rine project since the cancellation by Paris of Pretoria's order 
for two French Agosta Class submarines in 1977. The navy's three 
French-built Daphne Class submarines, commissioned in the early 
1970s, are reaching the end of their normal service life (life 
expectancy of a submarine is 20-25 years). Official concern in 
the 1980s over the impact of a naval embargo —  particularly with 
regard to oil imports —  and the role played by submarines in 
landing troops along the African coast, appear to have contribut­
ed to the decision to replace the Daphne submarines.
Blueprints for the U-209 submarine, manufactured by the 
Howaldswerke-Deutsche Werft and the Ingenieurkontor Luebeck of 
West Germany were obtained with the assistance of top members of 
Germany's ruling Christian Democrats in the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s . A
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lengthy parliamentary investigation into the affair —  repeatedly 
blocked by the German government —  has shown that other German 
companies have shipped submarine components and a 1:5 scale model 
of the submarine to South Africa. State prosecutors in Berlin 
began an investigation in the summer of 1991 of charges that 
additional West German submarine components were shipped to South 
Africa via Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski's East German trading 
empire. Pretoria would require further technological assistance 
in a bid to build a submarine and there have been repeated ru­
mours that Israel is assisting in the project —  the Israeli navy 
has operated German U-209s since the 1 9 7 0 s.
Other South African naval programmes have included the 
conversion of the replenishment tanker Tafelsberg to an armed 
helicopter carrier in 1983-84. In 1986 the navy's new supply 
ship, the Drakensberg, was launched. West Germany's Howaldswerke 
Deutsche Werft and the Ingenieurkontor Luebeck were subsequently 
identified as suppliers to the Drakensberg p r o j e c t . S o u t h  
Africa is also rumoured to have initiated a Corvette project, 
possibly in co-operation with Israel.
Light weapons and small arms
The small arms industry is the oldest, most successful branch of 
South African military production/*, but as in the country's
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other defence industry sectors, most of what Armscor and other 
private manufacturers produce is not of indigenous design.
South Africa has manufactured the Belgian Fabrique National 
(FN) FN FAL 7.62mm rile, designate R1 since 1961. During the 
1970s, South Africa began manufacturing the Israeli Galil (which 
itself is based on the Soviet AK-47), designated the R4. The R5 
is a shortened version of the R4 for use by troops in armoured 
personnel carriers.
The army's standard machine guns are licence produced. Both 
the Belgian FN MAG 7.62mm and the British Browning M1919A4 
(designated M-G4) have been produced in South Africa since 1960. 
South Africa also manufactures the Israeli Uzi under a licence 
obtained from Belgium. The licence was reportedly revoked in 
1963, but South Africa continued manufacturing the Uzi until at 
least the 1980s. The Uzi's replacement appears to be the SS-77, 
designed by Armcsor, reportedly with inputs from the Belgian FN 
MAG and the Soviet Goryunov SG4 3 . ? 6
South Africa has been slow to develop indigenous p'roduction 
of pistols. Despite the UN arms embargo, European and American 
pistols were widely available. Beginning in the 1980s, however, 
the country experienced a shortage of handguns and prices jumped 
dramatically. For example, the price of an American Colt .45 
pistol increased by 328 percent between 1983 and 1986.^7 A 
number of South African arms makers began producing pistols
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during the 1980s but market forces acted against the new indus­
tries. The high prices attracted a flood of pistol imports from 
Eastern European Countries —  via West European dealers —  which 
were sold on the South African market in what the country's army 
newspaper called "a surreptitious dumping operation of the East­
ern bloc".78
Military electronics and communications equipment
South Africa's military electronics and communications sectors 
have been developed since the 197 0s with considerable foreign 
input. As Landgren has noted;
Access to US, British, French, West German and 
Israeli know-how remains indispensable, and 
access is facilitated by the fact that electronic 
components are practically impossible to define as 
as either military or civilian.79
The pullout of U.S. electronics concerns from South Africa 
began only in the early 1980s. But the takeover of foreign 
subsidiaries by South African concerns did not mean a cut-off
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from the former parent company. European and Japanese firms have 
for the most part remained in South Africa. Among the leading 
foreign concerns involved in the South African defence sector are 
Plessy, Racal Electronics, General Electric Corporation, Marconi, 
Decca and EMI Electronics (all from the UK) ; International Tele­
phone and Telegraph, Sperry-Rand and IBM (USA); and Siemens and 
AEG-Telefunken (Germany).®® (
South Africa's first military electronics concern was Allied 
Technologies (Altech), established with British and French as­
sistance.
Grinaker Electronics (Grinel) was created after South Africa 
bought the UK-owned Racal subsidiary in 1978. Grinel, which has 
close links with France's Silec DSI, produces tank and portable 
radios.
Tactel, one of South Africa's leading communications systems 
manufacturers, produces the French Thomson-CSF TRC-300 radio and 
Danish designed VHF (very high frequency) equipment.
Barlow electronics, owned by the South Africhn Barlow Rand 
concern took a 50 percent holding in Britain's Marconi subsidiary 
in 1977, and in the same year bought the French-owned Fuchs 
Electronics. Eloptro is an Armscor subsidiary responsible for 
manufacture of optical equipment such as weapon night-sight 
systems. Production began in 1977 either under licence from 
Israel or based on ITT technology obtained through the U.S.
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concern's South African subsidiary.®^
Conclusion: Indigenous arms production in South Africa: The
Grand Illusion?
South Africa has been the world's most embargoed country in terms 
of arms since the 1960s. Pretoria built a domestic arms manu­
facturing sector to counter the UN voluntary and the subsequent 
mandatory arms embargo.
But although South Africa manufactures some arms used by the 
country's army, the state-led arms producers were unable to 
produce any to the major weapons systems required to replace 
those cut-off by the UN-ordered embargo during the Cold War. The 
repeated up-grading of the country's outdated fighter, transport 
and reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, naval vessels and 
submarines is proof of this failure.
South Africa's weapons manufacturing projects were heavily 
based on foreign technology. 'New' weapons systems unveiled 
during the 1980s, such as the Cheetah fighter and various heli­
copter prototypes, are examples of such foreign technology-based 
upgrades.
As one observer has noted: "...the South African arms
industry owes its development to foreign input..."®^ Armscor's
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d a i m s  of 'indigenous* development and production of arms simply 
do not correspond to reality. Based on the data presented in 
this chapter and in Chapter Seven on arms and technology imports, 
it will be evident that the vast majority of South African mili­
tary manufactures are in reality copies of Western systems; 
domestic systems reliant on key foreign components; or, outright 
imports disguised with a 'Made in South Africa' label.
An aspect of South African arms production of particular 
interest to the this dissertation is the impact of the interna­
tional arms embargo. On the one hand. South Africa was able to 
evade the UN arms embargo and import large quantities of arms and 
military technology (as will be shown in Chapters Five and 
Seven), but the embargo appears to have staunched the sale of 
major systems such as aircraft and naval vessels to Pretoria. 
South Africa failed in its bid to manufacture such major systems 
and herein lies the limited success of the UN arms embargo on 
Pretoria. The embargo was able to block the sale of fighter 
aircraft and naval vessels which apartheid South Africa was 
unable to manufacture domestically and the state was forced to 
waste considerable resources trying to break out of this key 
functioning element of the United Nations' embargo during the 
final decades of the Cold War.
On closer examination, Armscor's 'self-sufficiency' appears 
to be something of a cleverly designed facade. Why, one might
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ask, would Pretoria go through the motions to create such a 
deception? There would appear to be at least two possible rea­
sons. First, Armscor's formideÜDle indigenous weapons systems —  
as depicted in the South African press and by government spokes­
men —  did much to assure white South Africans in the 1980s that 
the state would provide the means for defence of the white-ruled 
society. Despite government statements about the usefulness of 
the Alpha XH-1 helicopter as a test platform, there is some 
speculation that the project went ahead more as a public rela­
tions gesture. If Pretoria had begun canceling important long­
term military procurement programmes, white South Africans might 
have concluded they faced an insecure future, thus fueling white 
emigration pressures. Instead, with the frequent unveilings of 
'new' indigenous military systems, uncritical Western military 
trade journals and the media reported one South African arms 
production triumph after another. The message in the 1980s was 
simple: Armscor produces a formidable array of weapons with
which South Africa can protect itself regardless of the arms 
embargo supported by a misguided West.
Second, it is possible that the facade of Armscor's self- 
sufficiency was created to provide cover for countries which 
agree to ignore the UN embargo and export advanced weapon sys­
tems, components of technology to South Africa. As was the case 
with the Mirage FI fighter, a system could be shipped unassembled 
to be 'indigenously manufactured' by Armscor. It is possible
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that this facade was especially groomed during the 1980s to 
prepare for the launch of the 'indigenous' Cheetah/Kfir and other 
soon-to-be unveiled systems such as submarines or frigates.
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Chapter Four
Yugoslavian armaments production: a case study
Introduction
An important aspect of Yugoslavia's Cold War policy of nonalign­
ment was the development of a broad-based military industrial 
sector. Belgrade repeatedly suffered from arms cutoffs and 
embargoes from unreliable suppliers, the first of which was in 
1938 after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia which had been 
Yugoslavia's main inter-war arms supplier.
The perceived importance of indigenous arms production 
capacity grew with the Yugoslav government's enunciation of the 
doctrine of Total National Defence (territorial defence) in the 
late 1960s. Total National Defence called for the entire Yugo­
slav population to defend the country against an invader. A key 
element of this policy was a widely dispersed domestic arms 
industry which was supposed to continue producing in times of 
war.
Although Yugoslavia differed in many ways from the other two 
case studies in this dissertation, it nevertheless shared a 
series of circumstantial and systemic similarities with Israel 
and South Africa. Before turning to the more substantive themes 
of this chapter, it is useful to review the four case study
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similarities —  set forth in the Introduction —  as they apply 
to Yugoslavia.
1) Limitations on relations with other countries;
Unlike Israel and South Africa, the limitations on Yugoslavia's 
relations with other countries have partly been self-imposed. As 
a leading member of the Nonaligned Movement, Belgrade sought to 
distance itself from the Superpowers and their respective blocs 
during the Cold War.
Even before the end of the Second World War, Yugoslavia's 
Communist Party under Josip Broz Tito sought to shift the country 
away from USSR. The Red Army reached the eastern boundaries of 
Serbia in September 1944 and on 21 September, Tito flew to Moscow 
to conclude an agreement for joint Soviet-Yugoslav action on 
Yugoslav territory. Tito sought to guard against making it 
appear that the Soviet Union had installed him in power and had 
Yugoslav Communist partisans set up their own administration in 
liberated territory and were the first to enter Belgrade. Soviet 
troops remained in the country only as long as was necessary to 
complete the offensive against retreating German forces in Aus­
tria and Hungary.
After the war, Stalin tried to force Yugoslavia to form a 
federation with Bulgaria. The directive was regarded by the 
Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party as a thinly
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veiled attempt to dilute the Yugoslav leadership and weaken the 
Yugoslav path to communism. Belgrade distanced itself from 
Moscow and Stalin's directive was ignored.
In March 1948, Stalin formally accused the Yugoslav Commu­
nist Party of 'revisionism' and in June the Yugoslav Party was 
expelled from the Cominform. Beginning in the summer of that 
year, the Cominform countries and the USSR successively denounced 
their respective treaties of friendship and mutual assistance 
with Yugoslavia. Soviet forces carried out manoeuvres on the 
Hungarian and Romanian borders with Yugoslavia and the possibili­
ty of invasion "seemed by no means remote".^
At the time of this forced break with the Soviet Union and 
the East Bloc, Tito's relations with the West had, paradoxically, 
reached their lowest levels since the end of the Second World 
War. Despite the Yugoslav contribution to the allied war effort, 
leaders of the Western powers, and in particular the United 
States, regarded Tito's postwar backing for the Soviet Union, his 
militant anti-Americanism, and his support for the Greek Commu­
nists as proof that Yugoslavia was the number one Soviet satel­
lite.^
Nevertheless, with the onset of the Cold War, any weakening 
or break-up of what was widely regarded in the West as the ' Sov­
iet Bloc' was a high priority for U.S. leaders. Even before the 
Yugoslav Communist Party formally modified if previous foreign 
policy, Washington had already taken the first steps to support
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what it regarded as a more independent Yugoslav stance. In 
autumn 1948, the U.S. released the Yugoslav Royalist treasury of 
some $47 million, and in early 1949 eased restrictions on exports 
to Yugoslavia. In September 1949 the first American loan to 
Belgrade of $20 million was approved —  the political value of 
the gesture was far greater than the sum involved. In October, 
over Soviet objection, the U.S. supported Yugoslavia's admission 
to the UN Security Council. Finally, in December 1949, Washing­
ton gave a public guarantee of support for Yugoslavia in the 
event of a Cominform attack.^
For Tito, turning to the West for financial and military aid 
remained a political heresy, and as late as 1951 he publicly 
stated that Yugoslavia would never seek Western arms  ^ —  even 
though the United States became Belgrade's single most important 
arms supplier from 1951-57.
The first Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation, in 1955, began 
with a visit by Khruschev and Bulganin in which they publicly 
apologised for post-1948 Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia on their 
arrival in Belgrade. But this first reconciliation lasted until 
1957 when in foundered on, among other things, Chinese hostility 
to Yugoslav 'revisionism' at a time when Moscow was making every 
effort to maintain the USSR's deteriorating relations with China.
The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, coming as it did 
during the thaw with Moscow, placed the Yugoslav leadership in a
215
highly awkward situation. The intervention was accepted by Tito 
as a 'lesser evil' and as a response to a situation which should 
never have been allowed to develop. This, however, satisfied 
none of the parties concerned with Belgrade's stance on the 
issue: Many Yugoslavs were alarmed about the endorsement of any
Soviet intervention, and about the surrender of Hungarian leader 
Imre Nagy from asylum in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest to his 
subsequent execution. Western leaders were angered over what 
they viewed as Tito's double standard given his criticisms of the 
1956 Suez War. (Military sales from the United States were 
halted in 1957.) Soviet leaders were angered over what they 
perceived as ambivalence in Belgrade and the reaffirmation that 
of the idea that Yugoslavia should serve as an international 
model for socialism. Thus, Belgrade's insistence on taking an 
independent position served to severely damage relations with 
both East and West. But as Duncan Wilson has noted: "The essen­
tial moral of November 1956 was however that in the last resort 
Tito supported the existence of a 'socialist camp' even if he 
could not join it".^
The apparent impossibility of rebuilding a lasting relation­
ship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (given Tito's 
determination to adhere to a Yugoslav socialist path) and the 
ideological aversion to the West, left Belgrade with few choices 
for foreign friends other than the growing number of Third World 
countries. During the late 1950s Tito came to play an important
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role in the build-up of the Nonaligned Movement. Following 
extensive travel in Africa an Asia, Tito organised a major world 
conference of non-aligned states in Belgrade in September 1961.
During the final two decades of Tito's rule, relations with 
both the Soviet Union and the United States warmed and cooled 
repeatedly. Links with Moscow improved in the early 1960s, but 
in spring 1968 Tito warned the Soviet leadership that any attempt 
to use force against the Dubcek government in Czechoslovakia 
would end in catastrophe. There was considerable Yugoslav en­
thusiasm for the 'Prague Spring* and Tito perhaps saw the govern­
ments of Eastern Europe looking to Belgrade for guidance.^.
The August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact 
forces came as an enormous shock to the Yugoslav leadership. The 
fact that Moscow could 'discipline* a socialist state without any 
serious reaction from the West added to the alarm of Yugoslavia's 
ruling Communists. Many in Belgrade believed that Romania and 
then Yugoslavia itself could become the victim's of Warsaw Pact 
'disciplinary* forces.
The crushing of the Prague Spring movement marked a water­
shed in Yugoslav defence doctrine. Warsaw Pact forces were once 
again transformed into Belgrade's main military threat. A new 
territorial defence policy —  which viewed guerrilla warfare as a 
means to combat a superior invading force —  became official 
policy in February 1969. The landmark National Defence Law of
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that year changed the very character of Yugoslav defence policy. 
Tito also met with Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausecu, and both men 
declared their determination to resist foreign aggression.
Relations with the U.S. warmed again during the 1970s, but 
in the final years of Tito's rule it appears that yet a further 
attempt at rapprochement with the USSR was attempted. Tito 
visited Moscow in 1979 and military co-operation with the Soviet 
Union was increased slightly. Nevertheless, Soviet use of Yugo­
slav naval facilities on the Adriatic was curtailed in 1979, 
officially due to a series of major earthquakes.?
In conclusion, Yugoslavia's relations with both Superpowers 
(and their respective blocs) were complicated and limited from 
1945 through the end of the Cold War due to Belgrade's determina­
tion to maintain ideological purity and to lead in development of 
an international model for state socialism. Relations with 
Moscow ran a turbulent hot-cold during this period, while ties to 
Washington were always limited due to the leading role of the 
Communist Party in the Yugoslav political system.
Tito's desire to follow a nonaligned policy on the then 
East-West geopolitical faultline forced self-imposed limitations 
on the country's relations with the major powers in the post-war 
world. The implication of such a policy, linked to Belgrade's 
desire to play leadership role in non-industrialized Nonaligned 
Movement, was the establishment of an indigenous arms manufactur­
ing capacity not least to break the world arms sales oligopoly
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still controlled by a few industrialized powers during the 1950s 
and 60s.
2) External threats more widely perceived than internal threats 
vet internal threat probably of more fundamental danger to the 
state;
From 1945 the Yugoslav leadership largely perceived external 
threats as posing the greatest danger to the state.® Only in the 
initial post-Second World War period and again in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s did the central government view the major threat 
to the Yugoslav federation as coming from the country's mosaic of 
national, ethnic and religious groups. Defence planning from the 
late 194 0s to the mid-1980s concentrated on external threats to 
the country.
But as the 1991 Yugoslav civil war and the subsequent break­
up of the state showed, secessionist aspirations of the republics 
and autonomous regions remained an at least an equal danger to 
the Yugoslav federation.
Given the recent dissolution of Yugoslavia due to internal 
forces, it is useful to briefly review the national, ethnic and 
religious composition before turning to Belgrade's post-1945
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defence policy and its concentration on external threats.
Unresolved nationality questions
•'If anybody attacks us, we shall be united as one."
(Ranking Yugoslav official visiting a 'friendly' 
country in 1971.)
"But what will happen if nobody attacks you?"
(Ranking official from the 'friendly' c o u n t r y .
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established on 1 
December 1918 as one of the successor states of First World War. 
It comprised the former Austro-Hungarian provinces of Croatia- 
Slovenia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina; the former independ­
ent kingdoms of Serbia (including present day Macedonia) and 
Montenegro; and small territories annexed from Austria and Hun­
gary. The kingdom was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929, when internal 
borders were redrawn in an effort to break apart the various 
national and ethnic groups.
Despite a long history of efforts by the central authorities 
to develop a distinctive Yugoslav nationality, the old national 
questions and animosities remained and proved to be the most
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enduring threats to the existence of the federal state.
In this sense, Yugoslavia was similar to Israel and white 
South Africa. All three countries faced widely fluctuating 
levels of external threat (or perceptions thereof) in the post- 
1945 era and developed their respective security regimes accord­
ingly. However, for all three states a long-term threat to na­
tional existence appears to come from developments concerning the 
nationalities within their respective frontiers.
Yugoslavia was a multi-national federation comprised of six 
republics: Serbia (population, 1981 estimate, 9,313,000), Croa­
tia (4,601,000), Bosnia-Hercegovina (4,120,000), Macedonia 
(1,912,000), Slovenia (1,892,000), and Montenegro (580,000), and 
two autonomous provinces within Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo- 
Metohija. Only some 1.2 million out of a total population of 
22.4 million officially acquired the 'Yugoslav* nationality.^® 
(Despite this, Tito himself maintained as late as 1962 that the 
national question had been solved via the fostering of a compre­
hensive Yugoslav socialist consciousness during the 1950s.) The 
ethnic, national and religious composition of Yugoslavia ex­
pressed in percentages at the time of the 1981 census was as 
follows: Serbs, 36.2 percent; Croats, 19.7 percent; Slovenes,
7.8 percent; Bosnian Moslems (regarded as a separate ethnic 
group), 8.9 percent ; Macedonians, 6 percent ; Albanians, 7.7 
percent;, Montenegrins Serbs, 2.5 percent; Hungarians, 2 percent;
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and, Turks, 1 percent. In addition there were smaller groups 
including Slovaks, Romanians, Bulgarians, Czechs, and, Italians. 
Some 41 percent of the population was Serbian or Macedonian 
Orthodox, 31 percent was Roman Catholic, 12 percent was Moslem, 
and with Protestants and Jews each comprising less than 1 per­
cent.
The withdrawal of Slovenia and Croatia from the Yugoslav 
federation in 1991 makes it instructive to note an often over­
looked 'frontier* that existed within Yugoslavia: Namely the old
boundary between those regions which were formerly in the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire (roughly, Slovenia, Croatia and Dalmatia), and 
those which were in the Ottoman Empire (roughly Serbia, Bosnia, 
and Macedonia).
A number of nationality issues proved to be internal prob­
lems of recurring nature for Belgrade. These included Serb domi­
nation of the Yugoslav federation; the Albanian question; and, 
the Serbo-Croation conflict.
The domination of Yugoslavia by the formerly independent 
state of Serbia began in 1918 with the establishment of the 
Serbian Karadjordjevic dynasty as the new state's ruling family. 
In post-1945 Yugoslavia, the predominant role of Serbia appeared 
to be checked when Tito (a Croat) created the two autonomous 
provinces of Kosovo and Vojodina in 1974, which were 'broken o f f  
from Serbia and given the same rights as the other six republics. 
But by the late 1980s, Serbia again asserted a dominant role
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under its populist, orthodox Communist leader Slobodan Milosevic. 
In October 1988, mobs loyal to Milosevic indirectly toppled the 
Communist Party leadership in Vojvodina and Montenegro and also 
prompted a purge in Kosovo. In March 1989, Serbia asserted full 
control over Kosovo and Vojvodina through a constitutional change 
which brought both autonomous regions back under full Serbian 
sovereignty.
Milosevic owed part of his enhanced role during the late 
1980s to the recurring tensions between Serbs and Albanians. The 
largely Albanian Kosovo and its Pec region are regarded as the 
very cradle of Serbian civilization. Defeated by the Ottoman 
Turks in 1389, when the Serbs recaptured Kosovo in 1912-13, it 
was considered something of an entry to Jerusalem. But the 
subsequent massacres of ethnic Albanians in the region appear to 
have begun the contemporary poisoning of Serbo-Albanian rela­
tions. The region was colonised by Serbs with the goal of re­
establishing Serbian dominance. Cyclical violence continued 
after 1945, and under Aleksander Rankovic, the head of Yugoslav 
state security during the early 1960s, the Serb population in 
Kosovo was given considerable liberty to maltreat the Albanians.
The Serbo-Albanian conflict became so violent that Tito's 
own position appeared under threat and Rankovic was expelled from 
the Communist Part in 1966. Greater autonomy and expanded cul­
tural rights were granted to the ethnic Albanians in 1968, and in
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1974 the autonomous province of Kosovo was created. Violent 
riots by Albanian nationalists, which resulted in several deaths, 
took place in 1981. In 1989 more than 20 died during clashes 
with the Yugoslav federal army in what The Economist called an 
"Intifada in the B a l k a n s " . K o s o v o ' s  Serbian population in­
creasingly viewed itself as abandoned and under threat during the 
1980s and it was alleged that ethnic Albanians, who comprise 90 
percent of the population in Kosovo, were engaged in acts of 
intimidation so as to force the Serb population to leave. Serbo- 
Albanian antipathy ran so deep by the late 1980s, that newspaper 
articles in Serbia equated the Albanians with the Turks who 
vanquished Serbia in fourteenth century.
A final Yugoslav nationalities conflict is that between the 
Serbs and Croats. The fighting between Serbian and Creation 
forces during the summer of 1991 was only the latest outburst in 
the violent relationship between Serbs and Croats since 
Yugoslavia's creation. Creation resentment of Serb domination 
between 1918 and 1941 was manifested in the massacres of report­
edly hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs living in Croatia 
during the short-lived Croatian state created by the Nazis during 
the Second World War.^^ In 1971, following Creation demands 
concerning control of the armed forces, education, and language, 
an originally sympathetic Tito ultimately sent the federal army 
to crush the nationalists, purge the Creation Communist Party, 
and restore central authority.
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Defence policy directed at external threats
But despite these internal conflicts the Yugoslav People's Army 
has been "preoccupied" with external security since 1948.^^ 
Yugoslav military forces were designed to defend the country 
against all external threats with a purely conventional army for 
nearly 25 years after the Second World War. Although post-War 
Yugoslav defence planning always included some elements of guer­
rilla warfare, the idea of territorial defence, based on mass 
popular involvement, was not formally enunciated as a new doc­
trine until 1969.
The decision to emphasise a standard conventional force 
immediately after the Second World War was influenced by a number 
of factors. First, Soviet models were highly regarded during 
this period and it was natural that the Yugoslav army should take 
examples from the administrative and structural models of the Red 
Army. Second, in the initial post-War period the main military 
problem for Belgrade was internal: the central government needed 
large forces in order to reassert control over a fragmented 
country. Third, Yugoslavia viewed itself as a member of the 
victorious allies club and planned to acquire territories from 
Italy and Austria and expand the Yugoslav federation to include
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much of the Balkans. Thus, in the initial post-War period "All 
these factors, coupled with the lack of a major external threat, 
pointed to the need for a strong centralized army able to inter­
vene quickly in a local conflict."
But the crisis between Yugoslavia and the Cominform powers, 
which began in 1947, changed the entire Yugoslavian defence 
calculus. The expulsion of Belgrade from the Cominform in 1948 
and the crisis with the East Bloc —  which lasted until Stalin's 
death in 1953 —  marked a clear shift in the Yugoslav leadership 
toward emphasising external dangers to the state.
Following the first Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement in 1955 
Belgrade came to view the external threat as coming from the 
West. The Israeli seizure of Arab lands in the Six Day War; the 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic; the 
ousting of Sukarno in Indonesia, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Ben Bella 
in Algeria, and the c o u p  d * état in Greece, all served to enhance 
this perception.IB The August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by 
Warsaw Pact forces came as such a shock to the Yugoslav leader­
ship precisely because it so undermined what had become the 
conventional 1960s Weltanschauung.
In the aftermath of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czecho­
slovakia, Tito and other senior Communist leaders viewed Yugosla­
via as under potential threat of invasion from Warsaw Pact 
forces. During the initial crisis period the Yugoslav People's 
Army was placed on a state of alert and large numbers of reserves
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were called into active service. Forces were redeployed from 
the old areas of threat perception —  the Italian, Greek and 
Austrian borders —  and redeployed along the eastern and northern 
Yugoslav frontiers. This call-up and redeployment revealed 
considerable weaknesses in the mobilisation and logistics system 
of the army and thus highlighted the arguments which had been 
raised against over-dependence on conventional forces to defend 
the country.
A detailed new 'Law of Total National Defence' (which had 
been under preparation prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia) 
was rushed through the Federal Assembly and ratified early in 
1969. Under the National Defence Law it was emphasised that any 
invader would face both the regular army and also the popular 
militia, comprised of all Yugoslavs from 18 to 65 years of age 
armed with cheap defensive types of weapons. The hope was to 
make the Yugoslav federal state appear as tough as the Americans 
had found the North Vietnamese.^®
Under the National Defence Law it was established that the 
Yugoslav armed forces consisted of both the Yugoslav People's 
Army and the Territorial Defence forces. The former encompasses 
the army, air force and the navy as a unitary force. The latter 
includes the Territorial Defence units. This was a radical 
change from the past where the Yugoslav People's Army was the 
sole armed force for the country's defence: The 1969 law made
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both army and territorial defence forces co-equals, at least in 
theory.
In the years following the 1969 National Defence Law, pres­
sures grew for a de-centralisation of the armed forces. In June 
1971 the Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted the 36th Amendment to 
the constitution of 1963 which empowered the constituent repub­
lics and autonomous provinces of the federation to organise and 
direct their respective territorial and civil defence units. But 
following the subsequent 1971 unrest in Croatia, Tito and the 
Yugoslav army pushed through a new National Defence Law in 1974 
replacing that of 1969. The significant change in the 1974 Law 
is that it emphasises the central character of the Yugoslav de­
fence system.
This move to re-centralise the armed forces into one of 
Yugoslavia's few institutions not divided into its republican 
parts remained deeply unpopular. During the early 1990s, as the 
Yugoslav federation began its break-up, one of the most conten­
tious issues were attempts by the federal army to disarm the 
republican defence forces.
In and ironic historical twist, the republican armed forces 
—  built up to defend the Yugoslav federal state against the 
external Warsaw Pact threat —  came to comprise a key element of 
the long underestimated centrifugal forces tearing the country 
apart. The territorial units of republics like Slovenia partly 
proved that Tito's old goal of creating defence forces modeled on
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the North Vietnam had been met: Slovenian forces defended their
home territory against the * foreign' Yugoslav federal forces with 
far more tenacity than most observers —  including the central 
government in Belgrade —  had expected.
3) Victim of arms embargoes and arms control restrictions:
Yugoslavia has been the victim of a series of arms cutoffs and 
embargoes which predate the Second World War. In the first of 
these in 1938, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia meant that 
Belgrade's primary inter-War arms supplier ceased to exist.
From 1945-48, Yugoslavia received arms from the Soviet 
Union, but already by 1947 disagreements between Tito and Stalin 
over foreign policy began to taint the arms sales relationship 
between Moscow and its client. In 1948 after the Yugoslav mili­
tary delegation in Moscow was unable to arrange for the supply of 
any further weapons and equipment for the country's nascent 
shipyards and defence production sector " (Tito) made no attempt 
to conceal the very serious consequences of the attitudes now 
adopted by the Soviet authorities for the Yugoslav armaments 
industry and Five Year P l a n s . "^2 This was a classic example of 
the historic Soviet unwillingness to share arms manufacturing
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technologies with allies.
During the entire Cold War, the Yugoslav leadership repeat­
edly attempted to play off one superpower against the other with 
regard to arms sales. At the first sign of a split between 
Moscow and Belgrade, the United States signaled willingness to 
supply financial credits and arms. The first shipment of Ameri­
can arms arrived in May 1951 and further U.S. arms exports were 
formalised through the Military Assistance Agreement between the 
U.S. and Yugoslavia in November of that year.
But in 1956 Washington temporarily withheld deliveries of 
military aircraft and other equipment. All American military 
assistance grants to Belgrade were terminated by 1958.^3
During the 1960s the Soviet Union again became Yugoslavia's 
main foreign arms supplier. Repeated attempts by Belgrade to 
diversify its sources of major weapons systems "were only slowly 
reciprocated by Western governments" which were hesitant to 
embrace the Communist-led state.
The USSR again used arms sales to exert pressure on Belgrade 
in 1970. Moscow attached conditions to the renewal of a five- 
year arms purchasing agreement on the verge of expiration, which 
included a demand that Yugoslavia co-operate more closely with 
Warsaw Pact forces.^5
The final example of a foreign arms cut-off to Yugoslavia 
was in July 1991. In response to federal army moves against 
Slovenia, the European Community approved a full arms embargo
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against Belgrade, as did countries like Sweden.
4) Structural requirements and the limits af technology and 
finance;
Yugoslavia has been highly reliant on foreign technology for the 
development of its defence sector industries. As will be shown 
below, most Yugoslav weapons are copies of foreign systems; li­
cence-produced systems; or else require key foreign components.
Yugoslavia's defence industries have also been indirectly 
reliant on foreign financing. During the period 1949-53, for 
instance, the West (especially the U.S.) underwrote all Yugoslav 
trade deficits and provided extra aid after the catastrophic 
drought of 1950. Total aid from the West during this period 
amounted to over $1.5 billion —  a considerable sum at this time 
—  and, according to Robert Byrnes: "This made dt possible for 
the Yugoslav government to proceed with plans for industrializa­
tion and building an armament industry".^6
During the 1980s, when such volumes of foreign aid were not 
forthcoming, Yugoslav defence industrial spending on projects 
such as a multi-billion dollar fighter aircraft programme, helped 
steer the country toward economic catastrophe. By the end of the
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1980s, Yugoslavia had slid into a political and economic crisis 
which was crowned by inflation rates of over 200 percent and a 
foreign debt of more than $20 billion.2? With the breakup of the 
Yugoslav federation in 1991, the United States and the European 
Community cut all foreign aid to Belgrade.
The Yugoslavian military industrial sector
The Yugoslav leadership fostered the development of a domestic 
defence industrial sector since the end of the Second World War 
—  far longer than the two other case studies in this disserta­
tion. As will be shown below, the resultant industrial infra­
structure is somewhat different than that of Israel and South 
Africa. This reflects, among other things, Yugoslavia's more 
limited financial means and a series of decisions in Belgrade 
regarding the maintenance of high levels of civil goods produc­
tion in defence factories and favouring production of more basic 
weapon systems over state-of-the-art technology.
It must be stressed that there has been very limited report­
ing or analysis of Yugoslavia's arms industry or arms exports in
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the country's press or in domestic academic publications. One 
of the first instances occurred in early 1988 when the Slovenian 
youth magazine Mladina criticised the Yugoslav military for 
delivering weapons to Ethiopia while other countries were sending 
food aid. In response, the state prosecutor brought charges 
against the magazine. Nevertheless, Mladina * s coverage stimulat­
ed similar, albeit less radical coverage of this and similar 
stories in papers such as the Slovenian Communist Party newspaper 
Pelo.28 The quantity and quality of independent reporting and 
study on the Yugoslav arms industry compares very badly with 
Israel and even poorly with South Africa.
The development rationale for Yugoslavia's military industries
The rationale for developing a domestic arms industry, as de­
scribed by Yugoslav security analysts, are similar to those of 
Israel and South Africa. These include:
1) The ending of technological and other forms of 
dependence on the leading producers of armaments and 
military equipment.
2) To speed development of the national economy and tech­
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nical development; and to create greater scope for 
employment.
3) To improve the balance of payments in dealing with 
other countries by reducing expenditures for military 
imports and to secure means of payment from arms e x p o r t s . 29
I will examine points one and three in this section. Point two 
lies beyond the scope of this dissertation.
The desire to reduce Yugoslav dependency on foreign sources 
of weapons and military materiel played the primary role in the 
decision to development a domestic arms industry. Three histori­
cal problems with arms supply and a key foreign policy shift 
combined to make development of a domestic arms industry a prior­
ity for post-1948 Yugoslavia.
Historical problem number one is Belgrade's experience on 
the unreliability of foreign arms suppliers, outlined above.
Historical problem number two stems from the difficulty of 
supplying a partisan army during a conflict, a serious problem 
for the Yugoslav Communists during the Second World War. As Col. 
Fabijian Trgo said in an essay published in a volume of Tito's 
Selected Militarv Works, "Obtaining weapons...was one of knotti­
est problems faced by the Partisans. The chief source of arms 
for the units were captured enemy w e a p o n s . ..."2® Yugoslav poli­
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cy, particularly after the 1969, placed emphasis on territorial 
defence and stressed development of arms industries which could 
continue to function during a war. It should be noted that the 
idea that arms industries could function during a war was regard­
ed with some skepticism by foreign observers.
Historical problem number three is the poor quality, high 
price and potential unsuitability of imported weapons. In 1950 
Tito described imported tanks from the Soviet Union as "worn 
out", guns which were "obsolete", field telephones that were 
"unworkable", and other military supplies that equally "worn, 
rusty and useless". Furthermore, Tito complained that the price 
for such imported equipment was far more than Yugoslavia could 
a f f o r d . T h e  cost of importing weapons remained a major concern 
of an increasingly indebted Yugoslavia. The unsuitability of 
imported weapons is a potential problem of more contemporary 
origin which centres on the post-1969 shift to a territorial 
defence doctrine. Weapons systems for Yugoslavia's armed forces 
were to be rugged, operational with the smallest of units, easily 
repairable, cheap, effective under Balkan conditions, and, com­
patible with Yugoslav territorial defence tactical doctrines.
Belgrade's foreign policy shift to a leader of the Non- 
Aligned movement is a further factor which positively influenced 
development of an indigenous arms industry. "Nonalignment called 
for nondependence on one or the other bloc for weapons, and
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logically demanded development of indigenous capacities."32 
Indigenous production of arms in Yugoslavia was a goal, not least 
so as to offer other aspiring members of the non-aligned world an 
alternative source of arms.
The initial push to develop indigenous arms manufacturing 
infrastructure in Yugoslavia came during the period 1948-53. 
Prior to 1948 the Soviet Union had not allowed Belgrade to build 
it own arms industries and this ultimately became one of the 
issues of contention between Tito and Stalin. The Soviet desire 
to prevent Belgrade from developing indigenous arms production 
capabilities was so extreme that despite the fact that Yugoslavia 
imported Soviet mortar systems, even an application to build a 
factory to manufacture shells was r e j e c t e d . ^ 3
The structure of the Yugoslav defence sector
The structure and production programme of Yugoslav defence indus­
tries was unique in a number of aspects. First, unlike most 
former East European state socialist countries, the majority of 
Yugoslavia's defence industries were not state-owned, but rather 
are operated under a worker self-management system. Second, 
probably none of Yugoslavia's defence industries were solely 
devoted military production. According to Yugoslav sources, only
236
30 percent of the capacity of arms manufacturers was devoted to 
weapons production.3* No official figures for defence sector 
employment are available but a SIPRI study estimates that some 
60-70,000 people worked the Yugoslav arms industry.
Nicol lists some 27 industries as having played a role in 
Yugoslav armaments production. Among these companies were
some of the largest industrial concerns in Yugoslavia. Zavodi 
Crevna Zastava, which ranked number ten in earnings, manufactured 
only arms until 1953, after which it began to manufacture Fiat 
automobiles and other light vehicles. The concern specializes in 
light weapons and anti-aircraft systems.
Soko Aircraft, in a joint-venture with Romania manufactures 
the Orao fighter aircraft. The Jastreb Airplane and Glider 
factory produces both the Caleb and the Jastreb reconnaissance, 
training and operational conversion aircraft.
Iskra Amalgamated Enterprise, established in 1946 as an 
electronics and precision-mechanics concern, was the most impor­
tant Yugoslav producer of hand-held and tank laser range-finders.
The Tovarna Automobilov in Motorjev —  known by its acronym 
TAM —  manufactures the TAM line of trucks and the M-7 0 light 
pontoon bridge.
Rade Koncar is one of former Yugoslavia's largest electrical 
concerns. It produces, among other things, tactical communica­
tions systems.
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Prva Petoljetka, based in Trstenik, specialises in hydraulic 
and pneumatic equipment seals and tools for military vehicles, 
submarines and aircraft, as well as pneumatic components for guns 
and missile launchers.^7
Interestingly, ten of the 27 concerns listed by Nicol are 
shipyards. In keeping with the policy of mixing civilian with 
military production, it appears the Yugoslav authorities have 
made a serious effort to distribute naval projects among the 
country's shipyards. The shipbuilding industry was Yugoslavia's 
third biggest export earner and although shipyards in nearly 
every country have been forced to close since the first oil 
crisis of 1973-74, even by the end of the 1980s not a single 
Yugoslav shipyard had been closed down.^®
Legal aspects of Yugoslav arms production
As most Yugoslav arms producers were not state-owned, the country 
had a host of laws governing manufacture and sale of weapons 
which changed considerably as the defence sector grew. The 1965 
Law on Enterprises Manufacturing Goods for Particular Military 
Purposes regulated government allocations and set standards 
required for Yugoslav defence materiel. New national defence 
laws were passed in 1969 and 1974, as were additional federal 
regulations for arms producers. In February 1975, delegates from
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Yugoslavia's arms producers met and ratified the establishment of 
the Industrial Association for the manufacture of Weapons and 
Military Equipment (INVOJ). The stated purpose of the organisa­
tion was to promote greater efficiency in the use of existing 
facilities, to co-ordinate defence production and research and to 
improve productivity. In addition, the INVOJ was to assist in 
developing economies of scale in production and procurement of 
raw materials. No list of member companies is available as 
membership in the INVOJ is considered a state secret. However, 
one Yugoslav source reported that in 1978 the association had 30 
members and that while no new weapons plants were being built, 
the number of industries involved in defence production continued
to grow.39
In 1978 further legislation concerning the arms industry was 
proposed in the Federal Assembly. The reason for the proposed 
laws was: 1) a fear that the arms industry was becoming out-of-
date in some sectors; 2) the realisation that existing laws did 
not take into account the growing number of sub-contractors for 
components and sub-assemblies; 3) the desire to control prices 
for weapons, components and raw materials used in arms produc­
tion; 4) the need to co-ordinate arms exports; 5) the desire to 
move production facilities and exports under a stricter security
control regime.40
The Federal Assembly subsequently ratified three new laws
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dealing with the arms industry in 1979. The first of these 
brought arms producers under tighter state control in that it 
required Yugoslav arms producers and the Federal Directorate for 
Sales and Reserves of Products for Special Purposes reconstitute 
the INVOJ association as a state body. The third law centralised 
control over arms production through the Federal Secretariat of 
National Defence (FSND) , which is empowered to decide which 
concerns were to function as arms producers. Yugoslav defence 
production was regulated by Belgrade under the terms of this 
third Law and was fixed at levels set by respective Five Year 
Plans. Nichol argues that the Laws of 1979 —  which gave the 
FSND greater control over the relatively de-centralised arms 
industries —  paralleled moves by the Yugoslav army to recentra­
lise control over territorial forces and represent an aspect of 
the growing role of the military in Yugoslav politics and society 
from the late 1970s.
Arms production in Yugoslavia
The Yugoslav arms industry advanced considerably since its diffi­
cult birth in the late 1940s, when German designs were among the 
main sources for light weapons p r o d u c t i o n . A t  the time of 
break-up in 1991, the country's defence sector produced every­
thing from small arms up to the Orao fighter aircraft. In
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making this point, however, it must be stressed that there was a 
major foreign content in all advanced Yugoslav weapon systems, 
and that even the most of the country's 'domestic' small arms are 
copies of foreign systems.
Nevertheless, the explicit acceptance by Yugoslav authori­
ties of high levels of foreign components and production under 
foreign licensing agreements made Yugoslavia different from 
Israel and South Africa. The Yugoslav leadership regarded li­
censing as an economical means of obtaining weapons, components 
and defence technology transfer. It was a broadly accepted 
Yugoslav defence procurement policy that to save R&D costs it was 
often preferable to manufacture arms under licence.*3 This did 
not mean that Yugoslav defence planners regarded licensed produc­
tion of arms as positive. The army monitored foreign licensing 
agreements for arms production and in 1982 reported that out of 
540 types of major weapons and military equipment systems pro­
duced in Yugoslavia, some 60 were tied to foreign licences.** 
This assertion ignores the fact Yugoslavia relied on foreign 
suppliers for its most sophisticated weapons systems —  as will 
be shown below.
Despite the considerable efforts to build up a credible 
defence industrial sector, Yugoslavia, similar to Israel and 
South Africa, appears to have fallen technologically ever further 
behind the major arms producers during the 1970s and 80s. Anton
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Bebler has noted that as military R&D and defence production 
accelerated in both the East the West blocs, Yugoslavia found it 
could not compete.
Economic, scientific, technical, political, 
and other barriers prohibit Yugoslavia 
from participating in these developments in 
a serious manner and (instead) Yugoslavia 
must rely on foreign assistance or else 
buy modern weapons in the international market.
Technology transfer via licensing and the copying of foreign 
systems was, therefore, the backbone of military research and 
development in Yugoslavia. This naturally meant that much of the 
country's military production was not anywhere near state-of-the- 
art. But since the 1960s, defence policy officials made some 
effort to model security policy on the country's structural and 
economic constraints. As Brzoska and Ohlson have observed: 
"Yugoslavia does not attempt to produce weapons at such a high 
level...but has a broad basis for the production of less advanced 
weapons.
The bulk of the Yugoslav Army's major weapons systems are 
either manufactured under licence or are bought 'off the shelf 
from foreign suppliers. (Belgrade's considerable dependency on
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outright arms imports will be examined in Chapter Seven.) Before 
examining Yugoslav defence production on a sector by sector 
basis, it is useful to review the major military systems manufac­
tured in Yugoslavia under foreign licence. These include:
-Soviet T-54/55, T-62, and T-72 tanks.
-The Soviet Shersben fast attack boat.
-The Aerospatiale-Westland Gazelle helicopter (designated Barti­
zan) , under French licence.
-The Viper MK 632-41 turbojet engine and afterburners for 
Yugoslavia's Orao fighters, under licence from the UK's Rolls- 
Royce. The Orao reportedly has navigation and fire control 
systems of UK, French and Swedish origin. The Yugoslav manufac­
tured Caleb fighter also is powered by Viper engines.
-Snapper and Sagger anti-tank guided missiles from the former 
Soviet Union.
-The 81mm M-68 and 120mm UBM-52 mortars are built under licence 
from Germany's Hotchkiss-Brandt.
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-The three-barrelled 20mm anti-aircraft M-55 and M-57 cannons are 
manufactured under licence from Hispano-Suiza, now part of the 
Oerlikon-Buhrle Group of Switzerland. A variant of the M-55 is 
built under licence from Galileo of Italy.
-The towing vehicle for the M-55 is the Fiat Campagnoia 1107 
built under licence from Fiat.
-The TAM 4 3 engine for the TAM 1500 truck is produced under 
licence from Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz of Germany; the TAM Pi 561 
and Pi 563 trucks under licence from Czechoslovakia; the TAM 
4500, 5000, 5500 and 6500 trucks under licence from Magirus-Deutz 
of Germany; the FAP 2220 BDS and FAP 2020 BS truck engines are 
produced under licence from Britain's BL; the FAP 4, 6, 10 13, 
15, and 18 trucks are built under licence from Saurer of Austria.
-The diesel engine for the M-60 armoured personnel carrier is 
produced under licence from Steyr of Austria.
-Diesel engines from Pielstick of France and Proteus gas turbines 
from Rolls Royce of the UK for fast attack craft.
-Diesel engines from General Motors for the M-117 class mines­
weeper.
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Sources: Nichol, •Yugoslavia*, in Katz, pp. 344-6, 362 fn. 36;
Mark Urban, 'Yugoslavia offered miliary technology*. The Inde­
pendent . 4 November 1986; Milan N. Vego, 'Yugoslav armed forces 
since 1968*, pp. 150-2; 'Orao - jugoslawisch-rumanisches Kamp- 
flugzeug,', Neue Züricher Zeituna. 19 December 1975; Richard 
Holmes, 'Yugoslavia', in John Keegan (ed.). World Armies 2nd ed. 
(London Macmillan, 1979), p. 674.
Yugoslav approaches to weapons design were similar to those 
in the former Soviet Union. Emphasis was on follow-on systems 
and off-the-shelf components. Foreign weapon systems were care­
fully analysed to glean new innovations. Under such a design 
regime, innovation took place in a highly conservative and incre­
mental manner. Nichol claims that such design practices did not 
stifled the creativity of Yugoslav weapons designers and that the 
overall level of the country's industrial and scientific develop­
ment allowed researchers to assimilate innovations and graft 
Western components and techniques to produce some unique Yugoslav 
systems. Yugoslav Laser range finders and anti-tank rockets are 
cited as particular examples, but the author is only able to cite 
official Yugoslav claims of their 'distinctive nature' and effec­
tiveness . ^  ^
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Aircraft
Yugoslavia had three important aircraft manufacturers prior to 
the Second World War; Ikarus, the First Serb Aircraft Factory 
and the Zmaj Airplane and Hydroplane Factory. All were de­
stroyed during the war and in 1946 the Ikarus plant was nationa­
lised and the remnants and technical staff of the three pre-War 
concerns were incorporated under I k a r u s . *8
Production of the Soviet Ilyushin IL-2, a trainer version of 
the IL-2 and the YAK-3 at the reconstructed Ikarus plant began 
before 1948. The first 'Yugoslav* aircraft produced after the 
war was the S-49 trainer which was based on the Soviet Yak-9. 
Ikarus produced Yugoslavia's first jet aircraft in the early 
1950s, including the 451 M trainer and the 452 reconnaissance 
aircraft.49
The Orao (eagle) fighter/ground attack aircraft project, 
undertaken jointly with Romania's CIAR aircraft factory (but with 
Yugoslavia's Soko Metal Industries in the senior position) is an 
example of the technical abilities which placed Yugoslavia among 
the more advanced arms producers of the industrialising coun­
tries. The Orao, which bears a marked similarity to the Anglo- 
French Jaguar and the Fiat G-91Y, made its first test flight in 
1974.50 Yugoslav Air Force had taken delivery of some 80
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Oraos by 1988.^^ Since 1982 the Orao had been manufactured in at 
least five versions including one with the more advanced Rolls- 
Royce 632 Viper engine.52
As is the case with major aircraft projects in Israel and 
South Africa, the Orao has such a high foreign component input 
that analysts must question whether it can really be considered 
indigenous. In addition to using Rolls-Royce engines manufac­
tured under licence, the Orao requires a variety of other foreign 
components. These include hydraulic landing gear based on de­
signs from Messier-Hispano-Bugatti; cockpit seats designed by the 
UK's Martin Baker; main electrical system supplied by Lucas; a 
GEC Avionics three-axis stability augmentation system; and, a 
Thomson-CSF head-up display for the aircraft's fire-control
system.53
An earlier Yugoslav aviation project was the Soko G2-A Galeb 
(seagull) trainer/light attack aircraft, first test flown in 
1961. Produced in two versions, the Galeb also requires key 
foreign components for its manufacture. These include Rolls- 
Royce Viper 11 MK 22-6 turbojet engines; a British Aerospace 
Folland cockpit; a Marconi radio compass; and, an Aereospatiale
radio transceiver.54
The Soko G-4 Super Galeb light strike and training aircraft 
is a completely redesigned plane, meant to replace the G-2 Galeb. 
First tested in 1978, the G-4 Super Galeb is powered by a Viper
247
mk 632 engine from the UK's Rolls-Royce. The 6-4 requires a 
number of other important foreign components for its construc­
tion. These include Dunlop tyres; a Martin-Baker cockpit; a 
radio compass from GEC; a Collins marker beacon receiver and 
radio altimeter; and, a Ferranti gyro gunsight.
The most ambitious Yugoslav aerospace project for the 1990s 
was the manufacture of a supersonic multi-role fighter, the Novi 
Avion, as a replacement for the air force's MiG-21s. Despite 
criticism over rising costs —  now projected at well over $2 
billion —  the project remained on t r a c k . ^5 Yugoslavia's influ­
ential military lobby regarded the Novi Avion of crucial impor­
tance, not merely for the air force, but also for technical 
spinoffs which it was claimed would narrow the gap separating 
Yugoslavia from most developed countries.
But foreign observers say Yugoslavia may have over-reached 
in the Novi Avion project and, if the project is not canceled due 
to the Yugoslav break-up, it will be 1995 at the earliest before 
production of the airframe can b e g i n . Y u g o s l a v  officials 
recognised that the Novi Avion would require a vast foreign input 
in order to get off the ground. Discussions regarding joint 
development of the airframe were held with U.S. and European 
companies including Boeing, Aerospatiale, Dassault-Breguet, and 
Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm. The Novi Avion's engine will also 
be an import. Rolls-Royce, Pratt & Whitney and General Electric 
have submitted proposals to Belgrade and Yugoslav officials were
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expected to choose from the Turbo-Union RB. 199, the Pratt & 
Whitney PW1120, and the General Electric F404.5?
Naval vessels
Yugoslavia's shipyards manufactured submarines and naval vessels 
up to the size of corvettes beginning in the 1950s. As with most 
areas of Yugoslav domestic arms production, naval shipbuilding 
requires considerable inputs of foreign technology and compo­
nents .
Yugoslavia * s submarine manufacturing programme began with 
launch of the first Sutjeska class patrol submarine in 1958. 
Built at the Uljanik Shipyards, the Sutjeska was subsequently 
modified with Soviet electronic equipment and weapons systems. A 
successor to the Sutjeska class was the Heroj class submarine, 
first launched in 1967. The Heroj class submarines were manufac­
tured with Soviet electronic equipment and weapons systems. 
Likewise, the 1970s generation of Yugoslav submarines, the Sava 
class, was also built with Soviet electronics and weapons sys­
tems. The first vessel from the 1980s generation of Yugoslav 
submarines, the Una class, was commissioned in 1985. Little is 
known of its construction or a r m a m e n t s . ^8
Yugoslavia also built a two-man submarine, the R-2 Mala
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class, which has been exported to a number of countries.
Yugoslavia's shipyards manufactured a variety of corvettes 
and smaller patrol boats. The Kobra class type 400 corvette, 
first launched in 1985, uses a German MTU 538 TB 92 diesel en­
gine. The Mornar class corvette, manufactured in the 1950s and 
60s, is powered by a SEMT-Pielstick diesel engine and is fitted 
with Soviet sonar equipment.
The Koncar class missile/fast patrol boat, designed by the 
Naval Shipping Institute in Zagreb, is based on Sweden's Spica- 
class fast patrol boat and uses Rolls-Royce gas turbines and 
German MTU diesel engines. The Koncar's fire control system is a 
Swedish PCS 9 LV 200 and the radar is a Dutch Philips TAB 
system.GO
The Mirna class fast attack/patrol boats, first commissioned 
in 1981 use SEMT Pielstick diesel engines.
Former Yugoslav shipyards produce a number of smaller patrol 
boats which appear to be mostly indigenous. These include the 
Kraljevica class types 131, 501, and 519 large patrol craft and 
the types 15, 16, 18, 20 and 80 coastal patrol craft.G1
Rockets
Yugoslavia has a limited rocket production programme. The M-77
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Oganj multiple rocket system, which fires a round of 32 128mm 
rockets was developed in the early 1970s and is reportedly simi­
lar —  but inferior —  to the Czechoslovakian RM-70. The range 
of the rockets is 20 km. The entire system is either mounted on 
a Yugoslav FAP 2220 BDS truck or produced in a towed version 
known as the M-63 which has a maximum range of just under 9 km.®^
Tanks, armoured vehicles and howitzers
Yugoslavia has manufactured the T-72/T-74 tank under licence 
since the early 1980s. The tank, designated M-84, is the 
country's main battle tank.
Yugoslavia's ISKARA concern and Sweden's L.M. Ericsson had a 
co-operation agreement since at least the 1970s for the develop­
ment of lase r s , some of which have been used to upgrade 
Yugoslavia's Soviet-manufactured T-54/T-55 tanks.
The BOV-3 triple 20mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun 
system was unveiled in 1984. Nothing is known about foreign 
input to the system other than that the engines powering the 
vehicle are German Deutz type F 6L 413 F diesels.®^
The M-980 mechanised infantry combat vehicle entered produc­
tion in the early 1970s. Although designed in Yugoslavia, it 
requires a number of key foreign components. These include a
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French engine, Soviet anti-tank weapons, and a 20mm cannon manu­
factured under Swiss licence.
The M-55 A2 anti-aircraft gun, manufactured since 1955, is 
basically an licence-produced weapon consisting of three Hispano- 
Suiza guns mounted on a towed carriage. The system is produced 
in a number of modified versions. The M-75 anti-aircraft gun is 
based on a Hispano-Suiza gun.^^
Yugoslavia’s M65 155mm howitzer is a copy of the U.S. M114A1 
howitzer. According to Jane’s Armour and Artillery; ’’The M65 is 
virtually identical to the American model and differs only in
detail."GG
Light weapons and small arms
Yugoslavia is not only reliant on foreign technology or licenced 
production for major weapons systems. A second area of dependen­
cy is in the area of small arms and light weapons systems which 
are actually copies of foreign systems. Given the limitations of 
sources it is impossible to compile a complete listing, but the 
following provides an illustration:
-Standard issue 7.62mm pistol is a copy of the Soviet Tokarev 
TT23
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-9mm M65 pistol is a copy of the Tokarev TT
-7.62mm sub-machine gun (SMG) is a copy of the PPSh 1
-7.62 M59/66 automatic rifle is a copy of the Soviet SKS
-7.62mm M70 assault rifle is a copy of the Soviet AK-47.
-7.62mm M65A/B is a copy of the Soviet Kalashnikov IMG
-7.62mm M53 SARAC UIG is a copy of the German MB42
-M-48 bolt action rifle is a copy of the German Mauser 98K
-the 50mm light mortar is similar to the British 2 inch light 
mortar; the 60mm M-57 has been developed from the U.S. 60mm M-2; 
the 81mm M-31 is a copy of the U.S. 81mm M-1
-the M-57 anti-tank grenade launcher is similar to the Czech p- 
27; the M-18 57mm recoilless gun is based on U.S. design.
Sources: 'Yugoslavia', in John Keegan (ed.). World Armies, 2nd
ed. (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 674; Milan Vego, 'Yugoslav
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armed forces since 1968*, in Defence Yearbook 1983 (Oxford: 
Brassey*s for RUSI, 1983), p. 152.
Conclusion
Yugoslavia was subjected to a rigorous arms embargo by the Soviet 
Union and its East Bloc allies beginning in 1948. This embargo 
sparked initial development of the country's arms manufacturing 
sector in the late 1940s and 50s. Arms production capabilities 
were further expanded after the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.
But from the preceding pages it is clear that Yugoslavia 
failed to achieve the desired independence of foreign arms sup­
pliers through the development of domestic weapons production. 
Belgrade remained highly dependent on the industrialised coun­
tries for technology and components for development of its arms 
industries throughout the Cold War and almost all domestically 
manufactured Yugoslav weapons required key foreign components or 
technology inputs.
As with Israel and South Africa, fighter aircraft illustrate 
the depth of Third World military industry dependency in the case 
of Yugoslavia. Belgrade's/^ fighter —  if built —  will
require a foreign engine, numerous other foreign components and
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probably the full-scale technical participation of an aerospace 
concern from one of the industrialised countries. The^ is a 
mirror for most of Yugoslavia's other 'indigenous' weapons sys­
tems which were licence-produced or merely copies of Soviet or 
Western systems.
The reliance of Yugoslav Army on indigenously manufactured 
copies of foreign weapons systems, licence-produced arms, or key 
weapons systems requiring foreign components was only part of the 
story concerning chronic Yugoslav dependence on outside sources 
for arms during the Cold War. Prior to its 1991 break-up, Bel­
grade still relied on Soviet weapons systems for all its front­
line defences. Important imports from the former Soviet Union in 
the 1980s included MiG-29 fighters, tanks and naval vessels. 
This aspect of the limited success of Yugoslavia's indigenous 
arms production sector is illustrated in Chapter Seven which out­
lines Belgrade's imports of 'off the shelf' weapons systems.
As an example of Third World arms production, Yugoslavia 
serves as middle point between the lavish military industry 
development aid enjoyed by Israel and severity of the UN arms 
embargo imposed on South Africa. Although Belgrade was able to 
produce an array of weapons systems during more than 40 years of 
Cold War production, the fact that the country never broke free 
of military dependency on the indstrialised states —  especially 
the former Soviet Union —  must serve as a warning to other
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aspiring Third World arms producers which, like former Yugosla­
via, lack a powerful economy or a wealthy patron.
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Part Three —  Arms export and imports
Chapter Five
Israel and South Africa: A Dual-Level Relationship Matures
The significance of the Israeli-South African military, nuclear 
and economic relationship for this dissertation is with regard to 
the importance of Israel as a major international arms supplier 
—  capable of evading mandatory United Nations sanctions with 
impunity for over a decade. Some defence analysts claim that 
Israel's arms exports to Argentina during the 1982 
Falklands/Malvinas War marked the first time that a Third World 
military supplier was able to play a major role in international 
relations. But as I will argue below, Israel truly began its 
role as a key international arms dealer —  albeit in terms of 
serving sensitive, internationally unpopular clients, and not by 
export volume —  in 1977 when it refused to abide by the mandato­
ry UN arms embargo on South Africa.
Study of the Israeli-South African relationship has been 
something of a growth industry in both the media and academia 
during recent years. The reasons for this increased attention 
are at least two-fold. First, it is a reflection of the maturing 
and deepening relationship between these two countries during the 
final two decades of the Cold War. The relationship matured in 
that both states came to recognise that Israel would have to 
remain on the record as dissociating itself from South Africa.
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At the same time technical and military trade between both coun­
tries continued, albeit with an even lower profile. ^ Klieman 
argues that Israel now has a two-tiered relationship with South 
Africa. On the one hand Israeli officials shun public contacts 
but on the other they have sought 'constructive engagement* to 
secure important strategic co-operation. Links have deepened in 
that Israeli military exports to South Africa have been increas­
ingly in the form of military technology and services while South 
Africa has apparently provided Israel with test sites for nuclear 
weapons and has directed investment toward the Jewish state.^
A second reason for the increased publicity given to Israe­
li-South African links —  although admittedly less salient for 
this dissertation —  is that the implications of the relationship 
have been deeply troubling for many. Traditional supporters of 
Israel regard the Jewish state as a Phoenix which arose from the 
horrors of the Second World War. Thus pictures of a former Nazi- 
sympathiser. South Africa Prime Minister John Vorster, laying a 
wreath on the Vad Yeshem Memorial to Holocaust victims during an 
official visit to Israel in 1976, came as a profound shock.^ 
Many non-Israelis, particularly in Western Europe and the United 
States have been equally troubled by the relationship. James 
Adams, defence correspondent for the Sundav Times reflects this 
sense of unease in the very title of his book on the subject: 
The Unnatural Alliance. Israel and South Africa.* Finally,
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-traditional anti-Zionists, both in the West and in the Third 
World, regard the Israeli-South African relationship as a vindi­
cation of their views on the true nature of Zionism.
This chapter will examine the Israel-South African relation­
ship beginning in 1973, but with emphasis on the 1980s. I will 
argue that links with Israel became one of South Africa's most 
important foreign policy endeavours during the 1980s and possibly 
beyond (although the de Klerk reforms may lead to a lifting of 
the United Nations arms embargo on Pretoria). This conclusion is 
drawn by illustrating varying elements of the relationship:
First, Israel has clearly been the most important supplier 
of arms and military technology to South Africa since the 1977 UN 
mandatory embargo.
Second, is Israel's nuclear relationship with South Africa. 
Although South Africa's nuclear capabilities have been developed 
with the assistance of a number of Western countries, the links 
with Israel have in recent years served as a conduit for advanced 
technology for which there were increasingly few other sources.
Third, overall economic relations, though not directly 
covered in this dissertation, are a further area of importance 
between Pretoria and Jerusalem. Officially, economic ties are 
rather limited, but if diamonds and arms are included, Israel's 
economic importance to South Africa grows considerably. Further­
more, the potential for Pretoria to use Israel as a conduit for 
South African exports to the United States (given the Israeli-
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American free trade agreement) and the European Community make 
the official trade figures and the unofficial trade a somewhat 
insufficient measure of the economic relationship.^
This chapter will address the following themes:
-Changes in Israeli-South African relations during the 1980s; 
i.e.. was the apparent down-grading of bilateral relations by 
Jerusalem reality or a public relations ploy?
-Direct Israeli exports of arms and military equipment to South 
Africa.
-An assessment of the level and nature of general technology 
transfer to South Africa and the nature of investment patterns 
between both countries.
-The nuclear question.
The Relationship Endures
Ties between Israel and South Africa actually predate the Israeli 
state. The long friendship between future South African Prime 
Minister Jan Smuts and Chaim Weizmann, then President of the
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British Zionist Federation, began in 1917 and the influential 
Smuts helped secure the Balfour Declaration (which committed 
Britain to the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine)• The 
history of early Zionist/Israeli-South African relations through 
the early 1970s has been competently presented in a number of 
works.G I shall not dwell upon it here and will instead move 
directly to the 1970s where the foundations for the present, 
heightened, relationship were laid.
The year 1973 was a turning point for Israeli-South African 
relations. Up until this time, Israel had been cultivating trade 
and military links with a great number of black African coun­
tries. ^ But during and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 29 out 
of 32 African states severed diplomatic ties with Israel (the 
exceptions were Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland). This diplomatic 
catastrophe, in concert with the initial military and intelli­
gence debacle of the War and the Arab oil embargo, which made 
relations with the West more problematic, all served to encourage 
consideration of new approaches to Israeli foreign policy.® It 
should also be noted that South Africa was not passive during the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War. Pretoria allowed more than $30 million to 
be sent by South African Jews to Israel and some 1,500 volunteers 
left South Africa to serve in Israel during the War.® There are 
even reports that an Israeli fighter with South African markings 
was shot down by Egyptian forces.
South African links with Israel grew rapidly after the War.
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In 1974 Israel re-established diplomatic representation in South 
Africa. (Diplomatic ties had been cut back in 1963 in a bid to 
develop links with black Africa.) In 1975 three events served to 
propel Israel further toward South Africa. First, U.S. Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger encouraged Israel to assist South 
Africa's involvement in the Angolan war, something which the U.S. 
Congress had forbidden the CIA to do. Second, President Gerald 
Ford's 're-assessment' of U.S. aid to all Middle East countries 
greatly concerned the Israeli leadership which had already come 
to be dependent on American aid. Thus South African capital 
gained potential new importance. Finally, in November 1975, the 
United Nations adopted a resolution which termed Zionism "a form 
of racism and racial discrimination." This was followed by the 
granting of UN general assembly observer status to a delegation 
from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).^^
In March 1976, Israeli Defence Minister Shimon Peres made a 
secret trip to South Africa and invited South African Prime 
Minister John Vorster to make an official visit to Israel. 
Vorster arrived in April and met with the entire Israeli leader­
ship: Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Foreign Minister Yigal
Allon, President Ephraim Katzir and many others. A series of 
agreements were concluded covering commercial, trade, fiscal and 
other arrangements. In addition, a series of secret agreements 
were also reportedly made covering arms sales and nuclear co­
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operation. On his departure, Vorster told reporters that all 
agreements would be overseen by a joint cabinet-level committee 
which would meet annually and that a special steering committee 
would co-ordinate the exchange of information and encourage 
scientific and industrial co-operation.^^
Increasingly formal links were thus established to accommo­
date the growth in South African relations with Israel. Menachem 
Begin*s victory in the 1977 election and the establishment of the 
Likud coalition meant Pretoria had a solid ally in Jerusalem: At 
the time Begin assumed the premiership he was chairman of the 
Israel-South African Friendship League.
U.S. pressure for compliance with the UN arms embargo
Criticism of South Africa and apartheid grew considerably in the 
United States during mid-1980s. Among the results of this criti­
cism was the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Bill of 1986. Of 
particular concern to Israeli officials, with regard to South 
African links, was an amendment drafted by Senators Charles Ma­
thias of Maryland and Dan Evans of Washington, both members of 
the Republican Party. This amendment appeared as Section 508 of 
the final bill and required President Reagan to conduct a study 
on the extent to which the international arms embargo on the sale 
and export of arms and military technology to South Africa had
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been violated. It further required that a report be submitted to 
Congress 180 days after the passage of the anti-apartheid legis­
lation, setting forth the findings of the study, "including an 
identification of the countries engaged in such sales and exports 
[to South Africa]." The Report was to be prepared by the State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
The potential difficulty for Israel, given the close links 
which had developed with Pretoria, was that the 1986 Anti-Apart­
heid Act recommended that President Reagan consider cutting off 
U.S. military aid to countries that had sold arms or military 
technology to South Africa. This would have meant a huge finan­
cial loss, as Israel received some $1.8 billion in military aid 
and a further $1.2 billion in economic aid from Washington in 
1986.
But as the report deadline of 1 April 1987 approached, it 
became clear that the U.S. Congress was less than enthusiastic 
about carrying out its obligations with regard to Section 508 of 
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Bill. During January and 
February, Israeli representatives worked to achieve an under­
standing with the Reagan administration over what it would take 
to satisfy Congress. On 19 March the Israeli government an­
nounced that it would sign no new military contracts with Preto­
ria and reduce its political and cultural ties with South Africa 
(nothing was said about terminating existing contracts which may
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have had many years to run). Interestingly, an article appearing 
in the Jerusalem Post three days later noted that South Africa 
seemed "unruffled** by the news that Israel intended to adopt 
limited sanctions against it, and that the normally truculent 
foreign minister, Pik Botha, had been "to say the least, muted" 
in his response to the Israeli announcement. Possibly this was 
because nine years earlier —  in 1978 —  the Israeli government 
also made a formal written pledge to the United Nations which 
flatly stated that Israel would not sell arms to South Africa in 
compliance with the UN arms embargo.
The report Compliance with the U.N. Arms Embargo was duly 
delivered to Congress and an unclassified version was distributed 
to the public. The report contained little that was not already 
known and many of its findings were open to serious question. 
For example, the report asserted that: "The United States has
strictly enforced the mandatory arms embargo, and no exceptions 
have been authorized with respect to any prohibited sale or 
export."17 In fact, under the Reagan administration's policy of 
constructive engagement this had clearly not been the case (see 
Chapter Seven) . Section Six of the report sets forth a slim set 
of findings: "We believe companies in France, Italy, and Israel
have continued to be involved in the maintenance and upgrade of 
major systems provided before the 1977 embargo."!® This is 
followed by an implicit acceptance of the Israeli government 
pledge to cut military links with Pretoria:
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Prior to the Israeli government's decision on 
March 18 (sic) not to sign new military contracts and 
to let existing contracts expire, Israel appears 
to have sold military systems, and sub-systems 
and provided technical assistance on a regular
basis.
And here, after concluding that "Companies in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have on occasion ex­
ported articles covered by the embargo..." ^®the study ends.
The report blatantly failed to address the question of South 
African arms imports in a vigorous manner. Indications are that 
Israeli officials made an agreement with the Reagan administra­
tion regarding measures designed to satisfy the U.S. Congress, 
and the report was then tailored to buttress the Israeli pledge 
of 19 March not to sign any new military contracts with South 
Africa. Even this was not demonstrated in a convincing way by 
the report in that it is implied that Israeli military sales to 
South Africa would be cut off fairly quickly if Israel honoured 
the pledge. However, this was far from certain: Nobody knew how
long the existing Israeli contracts with South Africa had to run, 
and they may, in any case, have automatic renewal clauses written 
into them.
270
More fundamentally, it seems improbable that the Israelis 
ever planned to abide by their 19 March pledge. By the admission 
of Israeli officials, far too much is at stake. Although the 
total value of annual Israeli arms sales to South Africa remains 
a state secret, it appears that earlier figures of $125 million 
annually were far too low. A variety of sources have put total 
annual arms sales at between $400 and $800 million and hun­
dreds if not thousands of jobs depend on these export sales. Few 
observers seriously believed that South Africa need fear an arms 
embargo from the Israelis. Indeed, this was precisely what some 
Israeli politicians, academics and journalists themselves said. 
A report in the Washington Post quoted Simcha Dinitz, former 
Israeli ambassador to the United States (1973-78) and Knesset 
member as saying he expected:
...a *deprofilization* of Israel's presence 
in South Africa. In other words, the special 
relationship between the two nations - 
particularly in what is called 'strategic 
affairs' - will continue, but in a much 
less visible manner and with less direct 
involvement of the military so as not to 
clash with the will of (the American) Congress.^2
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This, then, is the view of one relatively high-ranking Israeli 
politician. Unsurprisingly, a number of academics and journal­
ists with varying political inclinations have drawn similar 
conclusions regarding Israel's future relations with South Afri­
ca. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi of the University of Haifa, in his
book The Israeli Connection, Who Israel Arms and Why, has written
that regarding Israeli links with South Africa:
The solution is to follow the precedent
established in the 1977 arms embargo:
when pressed to do so, Israel's
representatives will deny any dealings
with South Africa....[the 19 March declaration]
was an obvious public-relations move
designed to counter the effect of the
report scheduled to be submitted to
to Congress on April 1. But in practice
nothing will change.remphasis added] 23
Beit-Hallamni argues that Israeli involvement in South Africa is 
of far greater importance to Israel than is widely recognised and 
that the Israelis will only leave when they are forced out as was 
the case in Iran, Algeria, Rhodesia "and other places".24
272
The publisher of Israeli Foreign Affairs. Jane Hunter, 
argues that Israeli officials have purposely leaked stories which 
intimate that Israel will phase-out existing military contracts 
with Pretoria and not enter into new ones. This, she contends, 
was all part of the programme to convince the U.S. Congress that 
it would adhere to the 19 March declaration. Hunter argues that 
Congress was weak in its enforcement of Section 508 of the Com­
prehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in part because of insufficient 
domestic political p r e s s u r e . ^5 Members of the U.S. Congress 
appear to have been wary of tangling with the powerful pro-Israel 
lobbies, particularly when many of their constituents were less 
than interested in the issues involved and others were taking 
Israeli promises at face value. Regarding future prospects. 
Hunter concludes: "At present it is very clear that Israel will 
not have to exert itself very hard to convince Congress that it
has stopped dealing with P r e t o r i a . .."^6
But in fact, Israel may not have had to convince many senior 
officials in Washington to allow military trade with South Africa 
to continue. Andrew and Leslie Cockburn report in their investi­
gative work Dangerous Liaison. The Inside Storv of the U.S. 
-Israeli Covert Relationship that Israel served as a Cold War 
proxy for U.S. arms sales to Pretoria. The authors say:
It would appear that tacit approval by a series 
of Democratic and Republican administrations for
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Israeli arms sales to South Africa has resembled 
the duplicitous policy of arms sales to Iran: 
public sanctions together with covert sales....
U.S. defense and intelligence agencies, as well 
as inhabitants in the Oval Office have at times 
had classified agendas which have undermined the 
good intentions of the guardians of sanctions. This 
was in part because Cold War strategic thinking 
placed South Africa firmly in the Western camp....2?
Interestingly, parts of the facade designed to shield 
Israel's links to South Africa may now be lifted. Following the 
initiation of the de Klerk reforms, Israel announced in November
1990 that it would "re-examine" is ties to South Africa. The 
world was presented with the curious spectacle of Israel 'aban­
doning' sanctions it never implemented in the first place in July
1991 when the Israeli cabinet announced the lifting,of all polit­
ical and economic sanctions (but not military sanctions) aimed at 
South Africa.29
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South African Imports of Israeli Arms and Military Materiel
There is little doubt that during the late 1970s and 1980s South 
Africa was Israel's biggest customer for arms and other military 
equipment. Even before this period Pretoria was a key Israeli 
customer: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) has estimated that between 1970 and 1979 South Africa 
received over 35 per cent of Israel's total arms exports. 
During the 1980s the trend was toward greater South African 
imports of Israeli services, military components and the upgrad­
ing of existing equipment as opposed to imports of complete 
Israeli weapon systems.
Accurate figures for the total value of Israeli arms exports 
to South Africa during the 1980s are impossible to obtain and the 
various figures available diverge widely. The Israeli Economist 
reported that sales to South Africa totaled some $100 million 
a n n u a l l y . A  United Nations report published in 1987 said 
Israel was South Africa's biggest arms supplier and that two-way 
arms sales between the countries was $500 million per year.^3 A 
series of reports in the Los Angeles Times put Israeli arms 
exports to South Africa at between $500-800 million annually.
It should be emphasised that these higher figures are theoreti­
cally possible. South African defence spending for 1989-90 was 
some $3.7 billion of which $2.4 billion was channeled through a
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special defence account not subject to public audit. The special 
defence account exists primarily for clandestine weapons acquisi­
tions from abroad.35
South Africa's arms imports from Israel during the 1970s 
have been documented in Chapters Three and Seven and in Appendix 
4.36 South Africa purchased three Reshef-class fast patrol 
boats in 1978 and subsequently manufactured another nine under 
license at the Sandock-Austral Shipyards in Durban. Dvora class 
patrol boats have also reportedly been manufactured in South 
Africa under Israeli license. At least 108 Gabriel-2 ship-to- 
ship missiles were ordered and Pretoria produces the missile 
under license, which it has renamed S c o r p i o n . 3? Israel has 
provided South Africa with its Scout and Mastiff remotely piloted 
vehicles, one of which was shot down over Mozambique in 1983. 
Armscor manufactures the Uzi submachine gun and the Galil assault 
rifle (designated R-4) under license. Other South African im­
ports from Israel have included small arms, night sights, micro­
wave protection and detection systems, electronic fences and 
anti-personnel mines.
Following the imposition of the UN mandatory arms embargo in 
1977, secrecy regarding South Africa's arms imports was nearly 
absolute and it was not until 1986-87 that a number of major arms 
deals with Israel were c o n f i r m e d .3® Recent official Israeli 
admissions as to the high value of arms exports to South Africa
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indicate that considerable trade took place over the period 
between 1977 and 1985. Few details have emerged as to the pre­
cise nature of South Africa's imports during this period but it 
seems probable that the bulk of the trade was in high technology 
components used in South Africa's numerous weapons refitting 
programmes and other less easily traced systems and equipment.
Aircraft —  The Cheetah project
"You don't have to be a genius to see our fingerprints all over 
it."
(Israeli cabinet minister commenting on South Africa's 
Cheetah fighter project.
In July 1986, South Africa's Atlas Aircraft Industries announced 
the development of what it claimed was a "mid-1 if e-update" of the 
Mirage 3 fighter, in which some 50 per cent of the aircraft had 
been reconstructed. Official South African reports stated that 
this 'new' aircraft, designated the Cheetah, was the result of 
years of top secret research and development. Privately, howev­
er, foreign ministry officials in Pretoria admitted that the 
Cheetah was mostly an Israeli Kfir with an admixture of British
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and French a v i o n i c s . *0 The Israeli Kfir is itself derived from 
the Mirage 3, with elements of Mirage 5 technology. It appears 
that Israel Aircraft Industries sold South Africa a modernisation 
package which had been used to convert the SAAF's Mirage 3s into 
the Kfir-TC2, one of the most recent upgrades of the Kfir, or the 
Kfir-TC7. According to the trade journal Flight International 
the Cheetah retains the original Snecma Atar 9K engine which is 
jointly produced by Israel and South Africa.*1 It is not known 
whether Israel has supplied South Africa with Miraae/Kfir air­
frames. Nevertheless, one report from Pretoria quoted military 
sources as saying it should now be possible to build the Cheetah 
from scratch if n e c e s s a r y . *2, what this possibly means is that 
observers should not be surprised if ‘indigenous* Cheetahs (read 
Kfirs) begin replacing the SAAF*s Mirage 3s some of which are now 
more than 25 years old.
The Cheetah, however, appeared to have been a temporary Cold 
War solution for Pretoria. Ultimately South Africa planned to 
build a more advanced fighter based on a combination of the 
original Mirage Ills, the Cheetah, and technology from Israel's 
canceled Lavi fighter project. The Financial Times correspondent 
in Tel Aviv reported that while Israel's Lavi fighter project may 
have been canceled
...its ghost lives on, in the shape of
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a burgeoning drive to export the home-grown 
technologies at the heart of the aircraft 
...[and that] Among the countries known to 
be seriously interested in using Israeli 
expertise in avionics and on-board electronic 
warfare systems designed for the Lavi are 
South Africa...
This is denied by South African officials but belied by 
Pretoria's vigorous efforts to recruit a specially targeted group 
of some 600 key members from the 3,000 strong Lavi production 
team who lost their jobs at Israel Aircraft Industries after the 
Lavi's cancellation.45 The South African government offered sal­
aries of US$5000-7000 a month and by December 1987 Jane's De­
fence Weekly reported that some 50 former Lavi engineers and 
technicians had accepted the offer and were already in South 
Africa. 46 In 1989 the U.S. television network NBC reported that 
at least 75 Israeli engineers from the Lavi project, had been 
transferred —  with the approval of the Israeli government —  to 
work on South African aviation projects.4?
Recent reports from South Africa say that while the first 
Cheetah squadron at the Louis Trichardt airbase in the northern 
Transvaal became operational in April 1988, Israeli technicians 
from the Lavi project were "already helping the South Africans to 
update the Cheetah".4®
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other Aircraft
A second recent major Israeli arms deal with South Africa was 
reported in early 1986. With the assistance of the Saudi Arabian 
arms dealer, Adnan Khasogghi, Israel was able to import 60 Ga­
zelle helicopters from Egypt (manufactured in Egypt under French 
license) armoured personnel carriers, cannons, mortars, 20,000 
semi-automatic rifles, and 12,000 machine guns. Fifty of the 
helicopters (and an unknown amount of the remaining equipment) 
were immediately shipped to South Africa. The helicopters
were clearly for Pretoria, but it is possible that some of the 
arms were destined for UNITA or the 'Mozambique National Resist­
ance' (RENAMO).
In October 1986 the South African Air Force confirmed the 
acquisition of a number of Boeing 707 aircraft from I s r a e l . ^0 
Initial reports maintained that the aircraft were in-flight 
refueling tankers, but an article in Jane's Defence Weekly^^ said 
that the aircraft were equipped with "sophisticated SIGNIT origi­
nating in Israel" (most likely the ELTA Electronics Industries' 
EL/L-8300 'strategic' s y s t e m ) .^2 This system provides an auto­
matic intercept, analysis and direction-finding capability
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against radar signals within specified bands. ELTA describes the 
system as being capable of handling up to 300 signals simultane­
ously, any three of which can be in the same frequency band. In 
addition, the system includes data fusion facilities and real 
time reportage of data to remote ground stations. Maximum detec­
tion range of 'hostile* signals is between 400 and 450 kilome­
tres. This system can be fitted to an aircraft such as the 707 
which is already equipped for in-flight r e f u e l i n g . ^3 The number 
of 707s South Africa bought from Israel remains unclear, esti­
mates range from two to six.^*
The Cold War implications of South Africa's acquisition of 
the 707 SIGINT platforms and in-flight refueling capability com­
bined with the Cheetah/Kfir fighter were considerable: South
Africa acquired the means to launch attacks against targets all 
over subequatorial Africa. Reports on the combat abilities of 
the Cheetah are few and mixed but with either a Cheetah —  or 
Mirage upgraded with Lavi components —  the SAAF would be able to 
attack targets at distances of up to 2,000 miles (3,200 km). The 
South African government was thus in a position to pursue a 
policy of economic destabilisation even more effectively should 
it have chosen to do so. The Beira Corridor, the Tazara Railway 
(Tanzania / Zambia Railway Authority) railway and other transport 
routes throughout southern Africa were potentially far more 
vulnerable. Pretoria was also in a position to maintain or 
increase the economic dependency of the southern African states
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and merely the existence of the enhanced air-strike abilities of 
the SAAF was a potential influence southern African leaders. 
Indeed, the South African government seemed anxious to publicise 
its enhanced strike abilities: South African radio reported at
length the initial story of the 707 sale which was broken by 
the Sunday Telegraph along with a re-confirmation by an SAAF 
spokesman that the aircraft had been delivered some months earli­
er. The spokesman did not question the Sunday Telegraph * s asser­
tions that Dar es Salaam, the Tazara Railway and Soviet radar 
installations in the frontline states might now be potential 
targets for the SAAF.^5
Israel also supplied South Africa with Astra aircraft which 
may be used as replacements for the SAAF's Shackleton maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft which were retired in 1984. The lack of 
replacements for the Shackletons forced the South Africa to end 
its marine reconnaissance in the region. In October 1987 
Israel's energy minister, Moshe Shahal, announced that Israel 
would pay part of its coal debt to South Africa with Astra air­
c r a f t . ^6 The Astra, which is derived from the Westwind executive 
jet, is available in a maritime Sea Scan version as well as an 
executive aircraft.
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Rockets
South Africa test-fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile 
in July 1989, which according to United States government 
sources, was an improved Israeli Jericho II missile. A report by 
the U.S. television network NBC —  citing American intelligence 
sources —  said that Israel was helping Pretoria build the mis­
sile in exchange for a regular supply of enriched uranium for its 
own nuclear weapons p r o g r a m m e . 5 ?
The test in which a long-range version of the Jericho II 
known as the Shavit (Comet) flew 900 miles appears to have been 
conducted jointly by Pretoria and Jerusalem. A second test of 
what South African officials described as a "booster rocket" was 
conducted at the country's Overberg test site in November 
1990.58 other reports have said that Israel is co-operating with 
South Africa in the development of a photo-reconnaissance satel­
lite and that a joint launch programme is planned which would 
provide South Africa with a satellite to monitor neighboring
countries.59
It remains unclear whether South Africa will actually manu­
facture the upgraded Jericho II missile. The 1989 NBC report 
remains the only the source to date which says Israel was aiding 
South Africa in construction of the missile.
Israel and South Africa were reportedly involved in the 1989 
Blowpipe scandal in which French police arrested five men trying
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to sell a model of a British Blowpipe missile stolen from an army 
base in Northern Ireland. Security sources in Whitehall said the 
Mossad had been involved in a long-running operation with South 
Africa's Armscor to acquire details of Britain's Starstreak high- 
velocity missile which is based on technology first developed for 
the Blowpipe:
The ultimate goal of the Paris operation 
is thought to have been for South Africa
and Israel to undertake joint development
of the a series of high-speed missiles for
use by both ground and air f o r c e s . ^0
The Blowpipe scandal is yet another example of both Israel and
South Africa's chronic reliance on foreign technology for which
they lack the expertise or financial means to develop indigenous­
ly.
Submarines
Submarines are a further area of possible present and future 
Israeli-South African co-operation. The navies of both countries 
urgently require new submarines: South Africa's three Daphne
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class submarines have long passed their half-life and Israel's 
three Type 206 submarines are something of an embarrassment given 
the high standards met by other major Israeli military systems.
It must be stressed that the evidence of Israeli-South Afri­
can co-operation in submarine manufacture is extremely limited. 
Nevertheless, enough information is available so as to allow 
speculation on recent developments.
Submarine technology is one area in which Israel is still 
notably deficient. The cancellation of the Lavi fighter project 
freed a considerable proportion of military funds and the Israeli 
Defence Ministry gave its approval in April 1988 for the purchase 
of three German dolphin class medium sized submarines. (German 
submarines were preferred as the United States no longer manufac­
tures the appropriate diesel motors). The project was subse­
quently canceled due to financial constraints, but during the 
1991 Gulf War Germany agreed to fund two submarines for the 
Israeli Navy.
Curiously, South Africa also sought to buy West German 
submarines. South African diplomats in Bonn paid at least DM 423 
million for the construction plans and components for the West 
German U-209 submarine.®^ South African officials reportedly 
liked the U-209 because of its ability to fire ship-to-ship 
missiles through its torpedo tubes. There has been speculation 
that Israel, which has been supplied with the U.S. Harpoon ship- 
to-ship missile, will supply South Africa with the relevant
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technology which will be converted into a submarine launched 
m i s s i l e . such a system would appear to fit with shifts in South 
African strategic doctrine during the 1980s which sought to 
strengthen the navy against what was perceived as the threat of a 
possible oil embargo.
Recent possible evidence of Israeli co-operation with South 
Africa's submarine programme has come to light in the course of 
government investigations in Germany following the scandal over 
the sale of the U-209 plans and components to Pretoria. An 
article in the German weekly. Per Soieael. reported the discovery 
of documents which show that Israel may have served as a conduit 
for shipments of West German submarine components to South Afri­
ca. 63 The case outlined in Per Soieael regards a 1:5 scale 
plastic model of a fully functioning submarine which is necessary 
to allow South African engineers interpret the plans and provide 
a demonstration of the craft's electrical systems. No evidence 
of direct shipment to South Africa of such a model has been 
discovered, but government investigators discovered customs 
declarations in a file marked 'South Africa' which record the 
shipment of a 1,804 kilogram container which was sent by the 
Kiel-based Howaldtswerft to Israel in Pecember 1986. State 
investigators in Kiel have said the shipment had nothing to do 
with the South African business but refused to say what was in 
the container. Per Soieael posed two questions. First, how did
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the documents for a sale to Israel get into the South Africa 
file? Second, if they really have nothing to do with the sale to 
South Africa, then why have officials left them in the file 
during the course of the investigation?
Are Israel and South Africa co-operating on a joint subma­
rine project? Pretoria obtained plans and components for the U- 
209 but would need considerable technical assistance if the 
project is to be realised. Israel will receive technical assist­
ance from Germany and the United States for its own submarines 
and could eventually be in a position to assist South Africa with 
the more demanding aspects of the project. A number of other 
countries may also work with Pretoria in this area. Chile was 
cited as an early partner for South African submarine production, 
although it now seems that Taiwan or Brazil, which recently 
announced a nuclear submarine project, are also possible candi­
dates .
It should be noted, however, that official South African 
sources continue to deny that a new submarine will be built. 
According to the South African Navy's Vice Admiral, Glen Synder- 
combe, the modernisation of the Navy's existing submarines is 
planned. This, it is claimed, will allow them to remain in 
service beyond the year 2000.
General technology transfer, investment and corporate relations
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The Israeli-South African relationship has, at its heart, tech­
nology transfer and investment. Israel, with its superior scien­
tific base and special links with the United States, is able to 
supply South Africa with advanced technology and components for 
the arms industry. In exchange, Pretoria has invested considera­
ble sums in Israel and allows the 110,000 strong South African 
Jewish community a special dispensation to remit funds to Israel. 
(South African Jews are noted for contributing the highest level 
of funds per capita to Israel of any Jewish community in the 
world.)
South Africa's industrial base stagnated during the 1980s 
both due to the emigration of skilled professionals and the 
international sanctions and divestment campaign which weaned 
away, among others, the computer c o m p a n i e s . ^6 Thus, the acquisi­
tion of microelectric, computer and military technology became an 
urgent priority for the South African government. Such transfers 
appear to have become the basis for Israeli exports to South 
Africa. Unlike major weapons systems such exports are exceeding­
ly difficult to trace. Enforcement of the UN mandatory arms 
embargo regarding such items is nearly impossible and only limit­
ed information on such trade is available.
A series of agreements governing co-operation in science and 
technology have been signed by South Africa and Israel since
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1976. Most of these, however, have been made in secret or else 
contain secret annexes and we can only surmise as to their scope. 
One agreement was signed in 1983, which according to a supplement 
published with the South African Financial Mail, extended exist­
ing collaboration in science through the creation of a framework 
of co-operation between South African and Israeli companies which 
was designed to develop and exploit technology with commercial 
a p p l i c a t i o n s . 6 7  The objective of the programme is to encourage 
technological co-operation between firms in both countries, 
although the programme manager. Brigadier Jan Willers, admitted 
that the larger part of the development projects are being car­
ried out in Israel "because of Israeli aptitude for high-tech". 
South Africa's aptitude he says, "lies in natural resources and 
the industries they f o s t e r " . 6® This very neatly illustrates the 
nature of the Israeli-South African technological relationship: 
Israel supplies the know-how and South Africa the finances and 
raw materials.
A further agreement on science and technology was signed 
early in 1985. The pact reportedly called for joint ventures and 
projects in high technology fields valued at the surprisingly low 
figure of $5 million.69
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the numer­
ous small or non-military projects that have been undertaken 
between South Africa and Israel. Instead I will briefly examine 
those endeavours —  at least those which are known —  with
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military significance for Pretoria,
One of the earlier examples of technical co-operation in the 
1970s was the establishment South Africa's ship-building industry 
with the aid of personnel sent from the Haifa shipyard to the 
Sandock-Austral yard in Durban. Prior to this. South Africa's 
ship-building industry was "virtually non-existent" and
Pretoria went on to manufacture the Israeli Reshef class fast 
patrol boat under license and then graduated up to the Drakens­
berg naval command and supply vessel. The largest ship manufac­
tured in South Africa to date, the Drakensberg, was built with 
the assistance of West German blueprints and electrical compo­
nents.
The Israeli electronics industry has merited consistent 
South African interest. The level of Israeli involvement in 
South Africa is reportedly high, but direct evidence for mili­
tary applications of Israeli investment is again limited. The 
major Israeli investor in South Africa in this field is Koor, the 
Histadrut labour federation's holding company. Its enterprises 
in South Africa include a substantial holding in Consolidated 
Power; a battery plant; an emergency lighting plant, and an 
agricultural chemical p l a n t . K o o r  also owns 51 percent of the 
share capital of South Africa's Iskoor Steel concern. Iskoor
has been involved in joint venture to overhaul and modernise 
South Africa's Centurion tanks and armoured cars . The Koor
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subsidiary Tadiran Electronics was listed in the 1987-88 Jo­
hannesburg telephone book, although Tadiran claims to have closed 
all operations in South African in 1982.^5 Koor borrowed some 
$80 million from four major South African banks during the late 
1980s in what the Jerusalem Post said was "an apparent effort to 
restructure and diversify its loan p o r t f o l i o . "^6 This again is a 
classic illustration of the Israeli-South African relationship in 
which Pretoria supplies the capital and Israel the know-how. In 
August 1987 the Histadrut instructed all its subsidiaries to 
break ties with South Africa once present contracts have expired.
Whether this policy was actually implemented is not known.
A further source of high technology transfers to South 
Africans may be Pretoria's own investments in Israel. South 
Africa's Africa-Israel Investments owns Kiryat Weizmann, one of 
Israel's major science oriented industrial parks. Scientific 
agreements between Israel and South Africa allow the discoveries 
of Kiryat Weizmann researchers to be passed on to South African 
universities.78 Construction of a second South African financed 
high technology park was begun at Rishon Lezion in March 1987; 
ironically just the time when Israel was assuring the United 
States that it was cutting back its ties with South Africa.79 
South Africa's giant Anglo American Corporation announced in 1990 
that it had established a fund in Israeli for investment in 
"technology-based" projects. Julian Ogilivie-Thompson, Anglo 
American's chairman, said: "South Africa has a limited base of
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technology. If we are to make significant strides in the indus­
trial sphere then we have to have access to foreign technology 
markets.
Technology imports have been important for South Africa and 
will become even more vital if the arms embargo against the 
country is maintained.
Israeli - South African Nuclear Relations
Before any assessment of the level of Israeli aid for South 
Africa's nuclear programme can be made two issues need to be 
noted. First, the rationale behind South Africa's acquisition of 
nuclear weapons and second, the nuclear facilities presently 
available in the country.
The military rationale seems to be based on a fairly 
straightforward point: Namely that after the liquidation of the
Portuguese Empire and the surrender of Rhodesia, South African 
leaders perceived increasing concentrations of hostile forces on 
or near the country's borders. As the UN mandatory arms embargo 
began to grow teeth Pretoria found itself in a conventional 
arms race in which the regional superiority of the SADF was 
eroded. Under the Cold War conditions of the 1980s it was clear
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that this was an arms race that South Africa could, in the long 
term, ultimately lose. As neighboring states such as Angola began 
to receive sophisticated radar, anti-aircraft systems and air­
craft such as the MiG-23, Pretoria pinned its hopes on the new 
Cheetah fighter. But as Christopher Coker pointed out in 1987:
... it can only be a matter of time before
the Angolans receive even more modern equipment.
If the South Africans engage in an arms race, 
they will never win. They will never be able 
to match system for system, plane for plane, 
only upgrade existing models that are already 
a generation or more old.®^
The belief that Armscor produces first echelon weapons systems 
and that these systems are indigenously manufactured was one fal­
lacy of South African arms production. But Armscor*s weaknesses 
were increasingly noticed and from the early 1980s the South 
African military "began to demand more sophisticated weapons and 
less of the weapons the South African industry can produce."®^ 
Before the end of the Cold War it appeared that South Africa 
would lose its conventional military superiority in the region. 
The one alternative —  other than launching a serious peace 
initiative —  was to rush development of nuclear forces; an area
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where Pretoria had a comparative advantage. A further incentive 
was the Soviet Union's historic reluctance to transfer nuclear 
weapons, let alone technology, to even its closest allies.
Manpower shortages were a further military reason for the 
development of South African nuclear weapons. South Africa had 
only 29,100 regular troops in 1986, the remaining 67,900 were 
conscripts.®^ In the 1980s the South African military was 20 per 
cent short of officers, and trained pilots were even further 
under strength. During the 1970s and 80s South Africa developed 
sophisticated border defences on the Israeli model, but the army 
simply lacked the necessary forces to permanently man such a 
defence perimeter.
The manner in which South African nuclear weapons would be 
deployed is open to debate. During the 1980s some observers 
thought such forces could be used as a deterrence, directed at 
neighboring states to prevent attacks from being launched on 
South Africa. Such a doctrine might have proved a cheaper and 
more feasible project than attempting to match the conventional 
forces of neighboring states. Whether it would have been effec­
tive, from a political standpoint is open to debate. Some ob­
servers argue that nuclear deterrence tends to break down when 
the opposing side(s) do not possess nuclear w e a p o n s . O t h e r s  
argue that given South Africa's history of brazen attacks on its 
neighbours and the comments by South African officials that 'no
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rules will apply in the defence of South Africa's right to ex­
ist ', the deterrence value of the Bomb would be very great and 
among other things it could block the imposition of sanctions on 
Pretoria.
The actual use of nuclear weapons against concentrated 
forces would have been possible given the low population levels
along much of the border region and in Namibia. There is also
the possibility that the South African government developed plans 
in the 1970s and 80s to use low-yield neutron-type bombs against 
the domestic black majority.
One final consideration on the use of nuclear weapons for 
Pretoria is slightly less horrific. This is their diplomatic 
value. The example of the Bomb as a diplomatic tool may come 
from Israel. Dr. Francis Perrin, who headed France's nuclear 
programme from 1951-1970, when Paris built Israel's Dimona reac­
tor, plutonium plant, and assisted in the construction of an 
Israeli atomic bomb has stated:
We thought the Israeli bomb was aimed
against the Americans, not to launch it
against America but to say 'if you don't
want to help us in a critical situation we 
will require you to help us, otherwise we 
will use our nuclear bombs.
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A similar policy for South Africa might have been viewed as a 
means to reverse the erosion of Pretoria's prized ties to the 
Western community of nations.
South Africa's nuclear infrastructure
According to Leonard Spector's The New Nuclear Nations. South 
Africa has two light-water/low-enriched uranium Power Reactors, 
Koeberg I and II which were supplied by Framatome of France; a 
Uranium Conversion plant probably supplied by the United Kingdom; 
a Reprocessing Plant of uncertain origin; an Enrichment plant 
supplied by a consortium of West German, Swiss, French and Ameri­
can firms; a Fuel Fabrication plant of unknown origin; and two 
research reactors. South Africa has reasonably assured reserves 
of uranium totaling some 313,000 metric tons.
This chapter is limited to the Israeli role in South 
Africa's nuclear programme but it is clear from the above that a 
host of Western countries —  in particular the U.S., France, 
Britain, and West Germany —  were involved in the build up of 
Pretoria's overall nuclear programme. As Abdul Minty has pointed 
out, these Western nations, in addition to Israel, bear collec­
tive responsibility for the development of South African nuclear 
weapons.®^
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Israeli nuclear assistance to South Africa
Precise information regarding Israeli technology or hardware 
transfers to South Africa is difficult to obtain. Details which 
have emerged seem to point toward collaboration more on the 
military aspects of nuclear technology and, equally important, 
the technology of nuclear weapon delivery systems. One of the 
first instances of Israeli assistance was during the mid-1970s 
when Israel, along with the CIA, the Pentagon and State Depart­
ment, helped organise a shipment to South Africa of technology to 
manufacture a 155mm Howitzer which not only could deliver a 
conventional shell 3 0 per cent further than any comparable sys­
tem, but which could also serve as a nuclear delivery s y s t e m . ^0 
In 1976, when then Prime Minister Vorster visited Israel, 
one of the important bargaining points he brought was an offer to 
allow Israel test missile delivery systems and nuclear devices in 
or near South African territory. Israel had participated in the 
testing of a French surface-to-surface missile in the Sahara in 
1964 but since then had not the opportunity to test the perform­
ance of its own weapons except through computer s i m u l a t i o n . I t  
would appear that negotiations were successful for in August 1977 
the Soviet Union informed the Carter administration that satel­
lite photographs indicated that preparations to detonate a nucle­
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ar device were being made in the Kalahari Desert. American, 
British, French and West German intelligence subsequently con­
firmed the Soviet d i s c o v e r y . ^2 Diplomatic pressure was applied 
on Pretoria by all of the above countries and the test was can­
celed with the site subsequently being dismantled. If there was 
indeed a test planned it was apparently an Israeli test, for 
South Africa reportedly did not possess sufficiently enriched 
uranium required for nuclear weapons production in 1977.^^
Despite this setback, it appears that Israel and South 
Africa successfully tested a small nuclear warhead in the South 
Indian Ocean on 22 September 1979. The test was observed by a 
United States government Vela satellite which was specifically 
designed to detect nuclear explosions. The validity of the 
satellite's finding was questioned by a number of officials in 
the Carter administration. However, subsequent study of docu­
ments released under the American Freedom of Information Act and 
a number of independent investigations by U.S. intelligence 
agencies and scientists corroborate the Vela observation.^^ It 
is likely that a second nuclear test was carried out in the same 
area late in 1980. In November of that year, the United States 
Geological Survey observed a phenomena resembling a strong earth­
quake in the same area where the 1979 nuclear device was believed 
to have been tested. In December satellite sensors registered 
radiation caused by a heat source in the same area.
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According to a book written by Amos Perlmutter, Michael 
Handel and Uri Bar-Joseph (the latter formerly in the Israeli Air 
Force), the 1979 test was a joint Israeli-South African experi­
ment of a nuclear shell fired from a 155mm H o w i t z e r . R o n a l d  
Walters has argued the 1979 and 1980 tests may have been of 
neutron bombs, given the paucity of radioactive fallout. He 
believes that the tests were a collaborative effort between 
Israel and South A f r i c a . T h e  American television network CBS 
reported in February 1980 that Israel, in co-operation with South 
Africa, had exploded a nuclear bomb near the coast of South 
Africa in September 1 9 7 9 .^7 James Adams reports that "very senior 
members" of Israel's intelligence community told him that the 
explosion was not an Israeli bomb but that there was indeed a 
nuclear explosion in the area on this date and that the Israel 
has helped South Africa with its nuclear programme.^®
Andrew and Leslie Cockburn cite a former senior CIA official 
who says the explosion on September 22 was much more than just a 
small atomic device.
...the CIA man revealed that the two countries had 
been testing the fission trigger known as "the pit" 
for a hydrogen bomb. The dramatic assessment that 
both Israel and South Africa were building H-Bombs 
was classified top secret....It was thus the official 
CIA view, which the White House conveniently
299
suppressed.
In 1990, reports made public by the American Central Intelligence 
Agency, confirmed that the 1979 test had indeed been a small 
atomic bomb.
From the above evidence it can be concluded that the 1979 
incident was a test of an as yet unidentified nuclear system. In 
keeping with the structure of the Israeli-South African relation­
ship it appears that Jerusalem supplied the nuclear system in 
exchange for Pretoria supplying the test site.
South Africa's President P.W. Botha came close to admitting 
that Pretoria possessed nuclear weapons in 1983 when he warned 
the world to think twice before contemplating military action 
against his country; "They might find we have military weapons 
they do not know about", Botha said.^^l
Further evidence concerning general South African acquisi­
tion of Israeli nuclear technology has grown in recent years. 
The most startling information was provided by Mordechai Vanunu, 
a former Israeli nuclear technician at Israel's Dimona nuclear 
facility, who gave a series of interviews which were published in 
the Sundav Times. In addition to describing in detail Israel's 
plutonium extraction techniques and processes for manufacturing
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nuclear weapons, Vanunu also said that South African scientists 
frequently worked at the Dimona facility. According to Robin 
Morgan who headed the Sundav Times investigative team which 
interviewed Vanunu:
... it was common knowledge at the plant
that South African metallurgists, technicians,
and scientists were there on exchange programs...
Vanunu said he had never met one of the South 
Africans. [But] It was one of his sterling 
traits that he never embellished any of the 
information he provided....Vanunu was aware 
of the South Africans' presence because his 
fellow workers would tell him.^OZ
In his book, Sy. Wav of Deception. Mossad defector Victor 
Ostrovsky also says that Israel assisted the South African nucle­
ar programme:
It was no secret...that we helped South Africa 
with its nuclear program. We supplied them 
with most of their military equipment. We trained 
their special units. We worked hand in hand with
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them for years. These are two countries that regard 
themselves as needing the doomsday machine and 
they were prepared to use it.^®^
Ostrovsky’s claims are partially backed by the above-mentioned 
CIA documents, released under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act 
in 1990. Regarding Israeli South African nuclear relations the 
documents state:
Israelis have not only participated in certain 
South African nuclear research activities over the 
past few years, but they have also offered and 
transferred various sorts of advanced nonnuclear 
weapons technology to South A f r i c a . 1^4
James Adams argues that as international pressure on South Africa 
mounted, and the flow of nuclear technology and personnel from 
the West began to dwindle, the gap was filled by Israel and 
Taiwan in return for a steady supply of uranium. Adams writes:
Specifically in the nuclear field, Israel
agreed to help South Africa in any way possible.
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including the development of nuclear power 
stations for peaceful purposes and helping 
the South African government develop a nuclear 
capability. According to officials in South 
Africa, there are 'several dozen' Israeli 
scientists working in South Africa at any 
one time.105
Adams marks the actual start of Israeli-South African nuclear 
cooperation as being in the mid-1960s, when Israel assisted in 
construction of South Africa's second research reactor. Safari 2.
The evidence outlined above appear to make it quite clear 
that Israeli has been assisting South Africa with its nuclear 
development for many years. But the question remains: Does
South Africa have the Bomb? There has been no admission from 
Pretoria, but evidence seems to indicate that South Africa has 
had nuclear weapons, or the capacity to rapidly assemble such 
weapons, since the early 1980s. In 1977, then French Prime 
Minister Raymond Barre told journalists, while defending the sale 
of nuclear power stations to Pretoria: "South Africa already has
nuclear capability." The point being that additional French 
sales would supposedly add nothing to South Africa's nuclear- 
military capability.^®® More recently, Leonard Spector, an 
associate at the Carnegie Endowment International Peace, testi­
fied to a U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that South
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Africa had the ability to enrich it domestically produced uranium 
to bomb-grade status and that Pretoria has probably had nuclear 
weapons manufacturing capability since 1980. This was confirmed 
by South Africa's foreign minister, Roelof Botha, who announced 
at a press conference held in Vienna in 1988, that his country 
was indeed capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Botha 
refused to answer questions as to whether South Africa already
possessed nuclear w e a p o n s . 1^7
To conclude this section on the South African nuclear ques­
tion, it should be re-emphasised that South Africa received 
nuclear assistance from a number of Western countries since the 
1950s. But it must be stressed that from the 1970s, as Western 
states appear to have begun reducing their nuclear links in light 
of Pretoria's growing international ostracism, links with the 
Israeli nuclear community appear to have been maintained and
possibly e x p a n d e d . 108
Potential nuclear delivery systems
Pretoria's ties to Israel are equally important with regard to 
potential delivery systems for nuclear weapons. These systems
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have been outlined above and in Chapters Two and Three and in­
clude the 155mm Howitzer, the technology for which Israeli agents 
helped smuggle to South Africa; the Kfir fighter technology which 
was used to upgrade South Africa's Mirage (Cheetah) fighter- 
bombers; and, the in-flight tankers and SIGINT systems which 
greatly increased the range of the South African Air Force. The 
Jericho II missile, which Israel has reportedly armed with nucle­
ar warheads, would be an important nuclear delivery system, if 
Pretoria has indeed taken delivery of the system or its technolo­
gy-
As South African sources of more advanced military equipment 
or technology were slowly cut-off from the late 1970s, Pretoria 
increasingly relied on Israel as a key supplier of weapons/tech­
nology which could be utilised in a nuclear delivery capacity. 
If it is accepted that South Africa indeed became capable of 
producing nuclear weapons in the early 1980s, then the provision 
of delivery systems became one of the most important military 
questions for the late 1980s and beyond. At present it is Israel 
which appears to remain Pretoria's single most reliable supplier 
of such systems and technology.
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Conclusion
During the 1970s and 80s, Israel became the single most important 
source for South Africa's arms and military technology imports. 
In defiance of the UN arms embargo, Israel supplied Pretoria with 
missiles, gun-boats, helicopters, fighter aircraft modernisation 
packages, reconnaissance aircraft and a variety of small arms and 
other equipment (see Appendix 4). In return Jerusalem received 
capital, raw materials and access to nuclear weapons testing 
sites from white-ruled South Africa during the Cold War.
The Israeli-South African relationship endured during the 
most concerted period of international sanctions activity against 
the white-ruled South Africa from the mid-1980s through to the 
initiation of the de Klerk reforms. The relationship now looks 
set to deepen as international pressures recede when confronted 
with a reformist South Africa.
Israel will remain a key ally for Pretoria given that the UN 
arms embargo is likely to remain in place until the end of white 
minority rule in South Africa. Thus, a deepening of links be­
tween the two countries will occur via a dual-level relationship 
in which Israeli rhetoric will always be quite different from 
Israeli actions. This will be a small inconvenience for the 
South African government which is long accustomed to accepting
306
overt invective with covert benefits. For Jerusalem the only 
relevant point beyond the collective Israeli conscience is what 
Washington thinks: As the recipient of some $4 billion in direst 
annual U.S. military and economic aid, it is fortunate for Jeru­
salem that the State Department and successive American govern­
ments have always been easily persuaded that Israeli links to 
South Africa are of a limited nature or else have used Israel as 
a proxy arms supplier as part of a secret Cold War political 
agenda.
Israel's broad military links to South Africa since the 
1970s have special significance because they represent the first 
example in which a non-Northern arms producer has successfully 
defied the old arms exporter oligopoly for an extended period in 
modern times. The paradox is that Israel's success in supplying 
South Africa with arms comes despite Jerusalem's rapidly growing 
financial, military and technological dependency on its American 
patron during this period.
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Chapter Six
Arms exports from Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia and some 
diplomatic and economic motivations
This chapter assesses the level of arms exports from Israel, 
South Africa and Yugoslavia and looks at some of the diplomatic 
and economic motivations for weapons export sales.
The case study countries for this dissertation have become 
Third World military exporters of varying significance during the 
past three decades. As I will show below, Israel, South Africa 
and Yugoslavia have engaged in arms exports for a variety of 
reasons, of which the economic and diplomatic rationales have 
been among the most important. This will be followed by an 
examination of the major buyer countries of arms from the three 
case study countries.
This chapter will attempt to answer the 'Why?' question with 
regard to Israeli, South African and Yugoslav arms exports and 
then assess in detail the level and nature of military exports 
from the case study countries.
The 'Why?* of Third World arms exports
States which export arms usually do so for a complex mixture of 
reasons. Andrew Ross argues that while the initiation of defence
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industrialisation in the Third World is usually prompted by 
political and military considerations the export drive is fueled 
by economic motivations.^ Although economic objectives have 
played a key role in the development of Third World arms exports, 
I have found that the political-security-diplomatic rationale has 
also been an important motivation for military exports.
As Edward Kolodziej has noted, there are at least four broad 
ways in which to explain, not simply arms transfers, but to pose 
the question, "of the whv of arms transfers." First, some 
studies portray arms transfers as a product of state objectives. 
Second, are works which focus on military factors such as mis­
sion requirements, environmental factors, and modernisation. A 
third approach is taken by studies that stress the internal or 
domestic governmental bureaucratic, and private industrial forces 
which push for arms transfers. (In Chapter One this approach was 
addressed by examining the role played by the military and secu­
rity interests in the respective case study societies.) Fourth, 
is the systemic approach which concentrates on such factors as 
bloc cohesion, ideological locus, and the impact of technological 
change. ^
In attempting to answer the 'Why' of arms exports in this 
chapter, I will look at arms transfers as primarily as a product 
of state objectives and private business interests.
Before turning to the respective case studies, it is useful 
to examine the concept of arms transfers through the three broad
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patterns of supply set forth in a Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute study. These are defined as; 1) hegemonic.
2) industrial and 3) restrictive.^
The hegemonic pattern of arms exports is —  obviously —  
where arms transfers are used by one country to dominate other. 
The clearest model of the hegemonic arms delivery relationship is 
one in which arms exports from the industrialised countries to 
developing countries are used to support particular groups in 
power or to prevent or support the emergence alternative groups. 
The post-1945 Cold War is replete with American and Soviet exam­
ples of such arms supply behaviour.^ Of greater relevance to 
this dissertation is the hegemonic pattern where lesser powers 
use arms exports for more limited ends, such as inducing or 
preventing certain actions by the recipient country. One example 
of such export policy from the Cold War period was West Germany's 
policy of only supplying arms or military assistance to countries 
which refused to grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany.
t\s will be evident in the survey below of military exports 
from Israeli, South Africa and Yugoslavia, all three countries 
have exported arms in pursuit of explicit political and diplomat­
ic gains. Israel used military exports as a means to break out 
of diplomatic isolation and as an inducement to convince other 
countries to recognise Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. South 
Africa, too, used arms exports as a diplomatic tool to escape its
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international pariah status. Yugoslav arms exports were aimed at 
supporting the Nonaligned Movement and reducing the dependency of 
developing countries on the industrialised powers.
The industrial pattern of arms supply occurs in situations 
where is it important for the supplier country to maintain in­
digenous arms industries: The supplier must export arms in order
to obtain necessary capital to maintain the domestic defence 
sector. (The SIPRI study does not include the military- 
industrial complex phenomenon under this definition.) Israel and 
South Africa clearly fall under this rubric; Yugoslavia does too, 
albeit to a lesser extent.
The restrictive pattern is where military exports are not 
supplied to countries where this may directly or indirectly 
involve the supplier in a local or international conflict. 
Israel is clearly in this position with its strictly limited 
military exports to the Arab world. Until the end of the Cold War 
in Europe, Jerusalem was in a similar position with regard to the 
former East Bloc due to American sensitivities. The South Afri­
can government was unwilling to sell arms to the frontline Afri­
can states. In the case of Yugoslavia there is little evidence 
of arms denials under the restrictive pattern.
As no country transfers arms for a single reason, the above 
three patterns are not mutually exclusive. Arms export policy is 
the result of decisions taken by possibly different government 
bodies, groups, corporations, and individuals. It may result
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from a compromise between competing pressure groups. ^ Never­
theless, in the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to show 
—  as far as possible —  which of the influences shaping respec­
tive arms export policy of Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia 
were predominant during the 1970s and 80s.
Israeli Arms Exports
The value and volume of annual Israeli arms, military technology 
and military services exports has dramatically increased during 
the past three decades. In the early 1960s Israel reportedly 
exported a mere $6.5 million worth of arms annually.® For the 
year 1988 the total value of military export orders was $2 bil­
lion, according to a report presented to the Israeli parliament 
by then Israeli Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin.? Although in 
overall volume Israel lagged far behind the major arms suppliers 
(USA, USSR, France, UK, and, China), during the 1980s Israel was 
variously ranked as being the world's seventh to the eighteenth 
largest exporter of conventional weapons.® A SIPRI study found 
that between 1978 and 1988, Israeli arms exports totaled $4.3 
billion, making Israel the thirteenth biggest arms dealer in the 
world for this period.®
Israel's overall ranking remains an issue of some debate but
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this is less important than the fact that Israel was the fifth or 
sixth largest pro-Western arms supplier and among the top three 
Third World suppliers during the 1 9 8 0 s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  weapons 
now comprise between one-fifth and one-third of total Israeli 
industrial exports and this accords Israel the distinction of 
having the most weapons-intensive export economy in the world. 
Between the earliest Israeli exports of surplus military equip­
ment and ammunition in the 1950s to the exports of the Kfir 
fighter in the 1980s Israel has reportedly exported military 
materiel to more than 60 countries, national liberation move­
ments, and insurgency groups.
The rapid growth of Israeli military export sales over the 
past three decades can be attributed to a series of domestic and 
international factors (in addition to the elements of military 
industrial complex discussed in Chapter One). On the domestic 
level these include: 1) government subsidies and overall low
costs for arms manufacturers; 2) the fact that Israeli weapons 
systems have been combat tested; 3) the relatively advanced 
technology of Israeli arms; 4) the fact that Israel is a reliable 
supplier and resupplier of arms; and, 5) a lax arms export deci­
sion-making process in J e r u s a l e m . L e t  us examine these points 
in more detail:
1) Through the mid-1980s the success of Israel military export 
sales owed a great deal to heavy government subsidies which
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greatly reduced the unit-cost for advanced systems. Direct 
subsidies for all Israeli exports in the early 1980s were approx­
imately 2 0 per cent of value added but in the industrial (and 
agricultural) sector benefits from a further set of subsidies 
pushed the effective subsidy rate as high as jîû ^ 2  5Û per cent. 
Furthermore, in order to prevent Israeli exports from being 
priced out of the market because of domestic cost increases, 
there were a series of devaluations of the Israeli Shekel. 
Israeli labour costs are, in any case, relatively low and 
Israel's large pool of skilled labour remains poorly paid in 
comparison with the West. Hence, for a variety of structural 
reasons Israel has been able to produce weapons systems which are 
often far more cost competitive than those of the West.
2) A second key advantage for Israeli arms exports is that many 
Israeli systems have been combat tested (or are sold as such) by 
an army which has captured popular imagination in international 
military circles. This fact remains an important reason for the 
popularity and international prestige of Israeli weapons and is 
stressed in Israeli defence sector marketing campaigns. An 
advertisement for the Reshef-class fast patrol boat has the 
caption; "Built in Israel. Bred in Battle. Respected 
Everywhere."
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3) A third factor contributing to the success of Israeli mili­
tary exports is the relatively high level of Israeli military 
research and development —  compared with other Third World arms 
producers —  and Israel's special connections used to obtain 
Western military technology. Israel has been able to produce 
weapons systems with qualitative standards which come close to or 
match those produced by the Western countries.
The Merkava tank is an example of a battle-tested and cheap 
system which incorporates key Western components and technology. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the price for a Merkava was some 
$900,000 compared with $1.4 million for the West German Leopard 2 
and $1.5 million for Chrysler Corporation's M-1. And neither the 
Leopard 2 or the M-1 underwent serious testing in active service 
during the 1970s and 80s.
4) A fourth factor contributing to the success of Israel's 
military export drive has been the reliability of supply and 
resupply. Israel appears to have deliberately cultivated this 
image to contrast with the stop-start arms supply policies fol­
lowed by, say, the United States under the Carter administration. 
Israel's resupply of Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas War 
may have damaged relations with the United Kingdom, but it une­
quivocally demonstrated that Israel was the arms dealer which 
would always deliver.
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5) Anns export decision-making process lax
Arms export decision-making authority is highly concentrated in 
Israel. Decisions are made at the sub-cabinet level and only 
very large or politically sensitive deals are supposed to reach 
the cabinet itself. However, there is a long history of the 
Israeli cabinet simply not being informed even of deals which 
fall under the sensitive rubrics. On a number of occasions the 
Cabinet has only discovered major arms deals through reports in 
the foreign media or by mere chance. Two particularly controver­
sial examples where the cabinet only learned after public disclo­
sure will suffice here: the sale of mortar shells by Soltam to
West Germany in 1959 and the disclosures in 1982 of arms sales to 
Iran and A r g e n t i n a . K l i e m a n  concludes that cases such as these 
illustrate how the cabinet tends to be forum for discussion of 
arms sales after, rather then before the fact. Although a 
Ministerial Committee on Weapons Transfers exists, it has steadi­
ly lost influence. Klieman argues that:
No known criteria have been established for 
assessing either the utility of arms transfers 
or, conversely, their irrelevance or counter­
productivity for national security. Arms export
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diplomacy is dealt with piecemeal and has not been 
subjected to comprehensive study in all of its 
dimensions at the highest levels of government.
This appears to fit with ex-Mossad agent Victor Ostrovsky's 
description of lax arms export sales approval given by the Kaisa- 
rut (liaison) division of the Mossad. Ostrovsky describes a 
situation where an Israeli arms-salesman came to the office 
wanting approval from the then prime minister, Shimon Peres, for 
the sale of 20-30 U.S.-made Skyhawk fighters to Indonesia.
American approval would also have been required for the re­
export of the aircraft but Ostrovsky writes: "I was quite sure
there was no way the Americans would approve the sale.”^®
Ostrovsky says that when he refused to grant immediate 
approval for the Skyhawk export the man demanded to see his 
superior, Amy Yaar.
About 20 minutes later the man left Yaar's 
office and walked by mine. Holding the contract 
under his chin for me to see, and grinning from 
ear to ear, he said, "Apparently Mr. Peres was 
in, after all."
Peres, in reality, was probably in Jerusalem, 
and would certainly have known nothing about his
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signature being put on these documents.
The key role played by the Mossad in arranging Israeli arms 
exports has been confirmed by Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman who 
wrote in the Washington Post;
Because these arms export deals usually have to 
be secret, the Israeli intelligence community 
has an active hand in the transactions. The 
Mossad...often instructs its spies to act as 
salesmen and shipping agents for defense exports.^0
Raviv and Melman conclude the Israeli arms exports drive "used 
to be much better controlled by government authorities than it is 
now" and that the arms sales middlemen "were now attempting to 
dictate Israeli foreign policy based on their own quest for 
financial gain."^^
Such arms sales libertarianism must be viewed as an impor­
tant part of the overall domestic environment in which Israeli 
military exports have flourished in the past two decades.
In sum, there are few controls on arms exports in Israel. 
Indeed, the internal bureaucratic pressures are for approving 
sales and "The presumption is that unless presented with solid
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political or diplomatic reasons to the contrary, requests for 
arms ought to be answered affirmatively.”^^
Systemic and circumstantial factors favouring Israeli arms ex­
ports
On the international level, a series of factors which have aided 
the growth of Israeli arms exports (and arms production) can be 
broadly divided into two categories: systemic and circumstantial. 
As svstemic inputs to the calculus for arms sales Aaron Klieman 
lists:
1) Israel's diplomatic isolation
2) Few sources of arms supply
3) Israeli dependence on the United States
4) Israeli competitiveness
5) No international safeguards
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6) 'Security dilemma' of all states
7) Conventional arms race
8) Third World rearmament
9) No international constraints
The first four of the above systemic inputs to the development of 
Israel's defence sector and arms export programme are examined 
above and in Chapter Two. Points five through nine comprise 
systemic inputs of a more general nature which lie beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.
Of far greater importance in analysing the growth of Israeli 
arms exports are the circumstantial inputs. Klieman lists some 
18 domestic and regional circumstantial inputs which influence 
the Israeli calculus for arms sales to varying degrees. In
the pages below I will examine four circumstantial inputs —  some 
drawn from Klieman's list and some not —  which are especially 
important in explaining the growth of Israel's arms exports. 
These include: 1) the economic rationale for arms exports; 2)
the political-security-diplomatic rationale for arms exports; 
and, 3) the imperatives created in the aftermath of the 1973
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Arab-Israeli War.
1) Arms exports: the economic rationale
The economic rationale has evolved to become the primary motiva­
tion for Israeli military exports. In the 1950s and 60s indige­
nously produced arms from Israel's then modest military indus­
tries, or surplus equipment, was exported mainly on security or 
political-diplomatic grounds. By the 1970s, with the expansion 
of Israel's military-industrial sector and the doctrine of great­
er military self-sufficiency, larger volumes of Israeli arms were 
exported increasingly on pure economic grounds.
The growth of the Israel's state-owned arms industries, 
along with the expansion of the Israeli military following the 
1967 War, increased Israel's already high defence expenditures 
from 11.77 per cent of GDP (1967) to 17.43 per cent ( 1 9 7 2 ) . As 
arms manufacture was one of the few areas where Israel was de­
veloping a comparative advantage, one goal of boosting arms 
exports seems to have been the raising of GDP so as to bring down 
overall defence spending to more acceptable levels. In more 
recent years, with the increase of smaller, private manufacturers 
of military materiel and greater emphasis on state concerns 
operating in the black with fewer government subsidies the argu­
ments advanced for exports are more straightforward: Namely that
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arms export sales mean profit and that they should be used to 
raise additional funds for technological and scientific research 
and development.^®
The emphasis on reaching greater self-sufficiency in arms 
production provides a series of compelling economic arguments for 
increasing arms exports. A key question is unit cost of a par­
ticular system. For a major weapon system with a projected 
development cost of, say, $1 billion, the number of units re­
quired by the Israeli Defence Forces will probably be too small 
to bring unit cost down to a competitive level. Thus, for a 
small country like Israel, the projected export volume of the 
system may decisive in determining whether the project receives 
approval. The same principle applies to smaller weapons systems 
and equipment. In order to achieve unit cost savings it is 
necessary to organise large-volume, long-term production. Ac­
cording to Neubach and Peri such export-led unit cost savings 
have been achieved particularly with regard to ammunition and 
communications equipment.
Economic considerations stemming from the Israeli policy of 
maintaining arms production surge capacity, i.e..the potential 
for a rapid increase in military output during times of crisis or 
war, further encourage arms exports. High volumes of exports 
allow for production lines to be kept open after the needs of the 
IDF have been met.^B Surge capacity remains an important element
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of Israeli military preparedness and is in itself an important 
reason for the massive investment in armaments industry infra­
structure .
Employment and prevention of brain-drain provide further 
compelling economic incentives for Israeli arms exports. The 
expansion of Israel's arms industries and subsequent military 
exports have provided thousands of new jobs during the past two 
decades. The government plays an important role in the economic 
system in Israel and the state is thus expected to provide em­
ployment opportunities : "...the military industries, which are 
subject to government control and influence in various ways, 
serve as one means to this end". The Israeli military sector 
employs a large proportion of the country's skilled professionals 
and scientists. The maintenance of these industries helps pre­
vent Israeli brain drain and provides an immigration incentive 
for persons with advanced technological and scientific skills.
A large proportion of the arms exported by Israel are refur­
bished systems which have been withdrawn from the IDF or captured 
during war. Israel's commitment to qualitative superiority and 
the continued willingness of the United States to supply Israel 
with its most advanced armaments since the 1970s has led to a 
rapid turnover rate for Israeli military hardware. Refurbished 
or obsolete weapons systems have a particularly high value-added 
component and the most important of these sales appear to have 
been made purely for economic gain. Examples of such exports can
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be seen in aircraft sales to Indonesia, Malaysia, El Salvador, 
and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 80s. According to
an estimate by The Israeli Economist, exports of obsolete equip­
ment were worth some $200 million in 1982 —  possibly a fifth of 
Israeli arms exports for that year.^^
A final economic ground for Israeli military sales is that 
arms may be used as a means for Jerusalem to acquire vital raw 
materials through barter. Iran, for example paid for some of the 
arms it received with oil and South Africa has paid for some of 
its imports with coal, steel and uranium.
2) Arms exports: the political - security - diplomatic rationale
Although economic imperatives have come to be the driving force 
for Israeli arms sales in the 1970s and 80s, Jerusalem also 
exports military materiel as a means to achieve a range of polit­
ical, security and diplomatic ends. Aaron Klieman points out 
that:
...current Israeli arms export diplomacy serves 
as an extension of the country's overall 
approach to external affairs. In fact, defenders 
of this present course maintain that given forced
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diplomatie isolation the sale of arms and 
technology is one of the few effective techniques 
remaining to further Israeli goals overseas.3*
Klieman stresses that all Israeli governments, irrespective of 
their ideological orientation, have shared a common set of objec­
tives in 'confronting the real world*. Among these has been the 
effort to offset Israel's isolation in the Middle East "by set­
ting up a worldwide network of mutually beneficial cultural, 
commercial, and diplomatic ties".
Klieman sets forth eight separate diplomatic goals which, he 
argues, figure prominently in Israel's pursuit of international 
defence relationships. These include: arms as influence; arms
as prestige; arms as military contacts ; arms as commerce, arms 
and the Jewish factor; arms as preemption; arms Western security 
and the United States; and, arms as independence.
-Arms as influence: While admitting that the leverage of a
smaller arms supplier remains more limited than that of a larger 
state, Klieman nevertheless asserts that the Israeli leadership 
subscribes to the commonly accepted view that friends can be won 
and states influenced by providing arms for their security needs. 
While the benefits of direct influence remain unclear and while 
Israel is in no position to threaten arms sanctions against its
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clients, Israeli military assistance appears to enhance bilateral 
political relationships which already exist and facilitates 
collaborative efforts in intelligence and anti-terrorism. Klie­
man posits that the influence of Israeli military exports, while 
transient, remain worthwhile in that arms sales serve as a better 
short-term instrument for maintaining and expanding influence in 
the Third World than economic aid and trade.
-Arms as prestige: Israeli arms exports impact on Israeli inter­
national prestige in two radically different ways. On the one 
hand military exports to South Africa and various dictatorships 
in Africa and Latin America have long been a cause of Israel's 
international condemnation. On the other hand, Israel's well 
known roll in conventional arms transfers offer certain symbolic 
benefits which serve to counter the country's isolation from a 
realDolitik standpoint. Klieman argues Israeli arms exports show 
that Israel has something more tangible to offer than mere moral 
support to governments prepared to deal with Jerusalem. Israel's 
military reputation and the range of Israeli weapons available 
for export appear to have helped revive Israel's relations with 
the Third World in the 1980s and Klieman attributes the resump­
tion of diplomatic relations with Zaire, Liberia, and Sri Lanka 
to the interest these countries had in obtaining military support 
from Israel. Klieman argues that power is a function of reputa-
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tlon and that arms exports are an important means to build 
Israel's reputation in this direction. "Success in this arms 
market.. .confirms not only that Israel is a reality.. .but that it 
is also a factor to be reckoned with world as well as regional 
politics.
-Arms as military contacts: Klieman views military exports as an
especially useful diplomatic tool when directed at Third World 
countries under a direct or indirect military government. In­
deed, Israeli attempts at gaining influence in Third World coun­
tries appear to be targeted far more at junior officers with 
ambitions for power than at the government or state. Hence, the 
early Israeli contacts with Idi Amin and Joseph Mobutu. Such 
contact are even more common in Latin America. According to 
Klieman "Israeli military transactions have established liaison 
with this most significant political elite in the maioritv of 
Central and South American countries." (emphasis a d d e d ) A s  
Neubach and Peri note, such ties based on arms exports can often 
serve as a substitute for overt diplomatic relations.
-Arms as commerce: Military exports serve as tools for Israel's
commercial diplomacy. As the Israeli economy industrialised over 
the past decades, Jerusalem's diplomatic thrusts have increasing­
ly been aimed at creating opportunities for trade. Military 
sales frequently provide the initial access point to a market
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from which civilian deals can be spun-off. This occurred in Iran 
during the 1970s, in Zaire during the 1 9 8 0 s , a n d  apparently 
also in Guatemala, South Africa and South Africa's Bantustans. 
Taking a slightly different angle, Neubach and Peri posit that 
such commercial relations via arms exports sometimes develop as 
the fourth stratum of a covert relationship. Citing the examples 
of Iran under the Shah and Morocco, they argue that the upper 
stratum of relations consists of personal relations between heads 
of state, the second stratum consists of training and guidance 
for the leader's personal guard and/or internal security serv­
ices, and a third stratum of a broader nature between the respec­
tive military establishments.*1 The fourth stratum of economic 
ties develops as military trade ties are transformed into civil­
ian economic relations, as happened in Israel's relationship 
with Amin's Uganda.
-Arms and the Jewish factor; An important aspect of Israeli 
diplomacy has been a commitment to the safety and welfare of the 
10 million Jews residing outside of Israel in some 80 different 
countries. Klieman notes that there is a significant correlation 
between the presence of Jews in a country and its being a recipi­
ent of Israeli military exports with particularly significant 
examples being Iran under the Shah, South Africa and Argentina. 
In these cases, arms and military sales appear, at least partly.
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to have been inspired with the goal of maintaining contact with 
the Jewish populations in these countries to facilitate their 
emigration to Israel A more extreme set of such examples
include countries such as Ethiopia, Morocco, and revolutionary 
I r a n , w h i c h  have in effect used their Jewish populations as 
hostages. In these cases arms transfers may have been the only 
diplomatic tool available to serve Israeli statecraft.
Klieman*s thesis on the 'Jewish factor* is contested by 
Neubach and Peri, who dismiss the justification of arms sales to 
Argentina and South Africa on the 'Jews as hostages' ground as a 
mere public relations ploy.**
The Jewish factor has in recent years also functioned in a 
different manner. Many countries have come to see improving ties 
with Israel as a means to improve their image in the United 
States. Israeli diplomats "are not above suggesting the purchase 
of its military goods as an acceptable and fair quid pro quo for 
using the near-legendary strength of the pro-Israel lobby in 
Congress...on behalf of the arms client..." *^ This argument is 
an especially strong selling point in the Third World and one 
such client appears to have been Zaire. However, other countries 
using Israel as a conduit to Washington, such as the former 
Comecon/Warsaw Pact states appear to have sought to improved 
relations with Jerusalem without buying Israeli arms.
-Arms as preemption: Military exports serve as an important tool
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through which Israeli diplomats seek to preempt Arab diplomatic 
gains which would further isolate and weaken Israel. Klieman 
argues that in the face of Arab efforts to boycott, blackmail or 
buy-off Third World countries into abstaining from contact with 
Israel, military exports are an important resource in Jerusalem's 
counter-offensive. Moving to a preemption in a broader sense, 
Israeli arms exports are used to exacerbate inter-Arab and inter­
regional conflicts and Israeli arms sales to royalist forces in 
Yemen, Morocco, Kurdish separatists, the Lebanese Phalange, and 
Iran can partly be classified under this rubric.
-Arms, Western security and the United States: Like South Afri­
ca, Israel has always conceived of itself as a member of the 
Western community of nations and regards itself as an important 
Middle Eastern element of the Western security system. However, 
Israel has been regarded by the West as being problematic, if not 
a downright liability in the regional and Arab-Israeli context. 
The Israel leadership is, therefore, placed in a position where 
it feels that it must take positive action to confirm the 
country's value to the West. In cases where a United States 
administration finds it politically impossible to supply arms to 
a given country —  either because of domestic political or legal 
obstacles or because of sensitivities in the recipient state in 
being seen to accept American arms —  Israel is available as a
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substitute supplier. This approach appears to have been espe­
cially favoured in Central America with the Iran-Contra scandal 
providing the starkest example of Israel serving as a U.S. proxy 
and also with regard to American arms sales to Iran, South Africa 
and the Angolan counter-revolutionary forces.
-Arms as independence: Klieman argues that if the notion of
sovereignty for all modern states is meaningless in absolute 
terms, a country like Israel which has such limited options, must 
exploit every possible advantage to gain some degree of political 
latitude. He regards the sale of weapons as offering this essen­
tial margin for a more independent foreign policy and concludes 
that as Israel clings to a tenuous independent role in world 
politics some of the success can be traced to Israeli military 
sales.
3) The imperatives created in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab- 
Israeli War
Through 1973 Israeli arms exports were based mainly on small 
anas, reselling surplus or captured military systems along with 
some service and repair work. In the aftermath of the 1973 War a 
series of circumstance helped bring about both a quantitative and
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qualitative rise in Israeli arms exports. Some of these factors 
have been discussed above but it is useful to restate them here 
to present a full picture of the post-1973 context. First, the 
Israeli defence production sector underwent considerable growth 
during the period from 1967-72, with overall defence expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP increasing to over 17 percent. Israel
was thus in a situation where it could produce an increased 
volume of military equipment of a more sophisticated nature not 
only for the domestic market but also for export.
Second, the OPEC oil price increase worsened Israel's bal­
ance of payments deficit through the burden of more expensive 
imported petroleum. At the same time Israel was forced to com­
pete in a regional arms race against the newly rich OPEC Arab 
states which were able to purchase vast quantities of advanced 
weapons in the post-1973 period. Among the Israeli responses to 
meet the expanded costs of defence in this new situation was a 
vigorous programme to increase the volume of arms exports.
Third, the response of the Israeli government- following the 
1973 War was to further increase subsidies and grants to defence 
sector industries which underwrote between 30 and 80 per cent of 
weapons development costs. In addition, repayments to the state 
from sales of military systems developed or produced with govern­
ment funding were r e d u c e d . ^0 What this appears to have meant in 
practice is that not only could Israeli arms be offered for
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export at lower prices but also that higher margins of profit 
could be made on sales: In sum an invitation for Israeli arms 
manufacturers to increase exports.
The fourth factor contributing to the rise in Israeli arms 
exports in the post-1973 period was the acceleration of U.S. arms 
exports to Israel which after the War. This allowed the release 
many older IDF weapons systems for export sales.
A fifth factor may be found in, what for lack of a better 
term, we may refer to as the ‘international climate' for arms 
sales in the 1970s. The Latin American countries —  taking out 
the massive loans which subsequently shackled many of their 
respective economies —  provided Israel with the single most 
important regional market. Iran under the Shah and South Africa 
following Prime Minister Vorster's Israel visit in 1976 also 
provided Israel with buoyant arms export markets during this 
period. Although it may be unwise to delimit history into strict 
tine-periods, it can be argued that a series of conflicts —  many 
of which have cooled or disappeared with the end of the Cold War 
—  had their genesis in the 1970s. These include the wars fol­
lowing the liquidation of Portugal's African empire, the Iran- 
Iraq War, and the series of revolutionary and counter-revolution­
ary insurgencies in Central America and Africa. In all of these 
conflicts Israel, as we will see below, proved both willing and 
able to supply combatants with military equipment ranging from 
small arms and military training to jet fighters.
341
A sixth and final factor assisting the growth of Israeli 
arms exports in the post-1973 era was the supportive nature of 
successive Israeli governments. In a similar, albeit reverse 
manner, as has occurred in France, the shift from a socialist to 
conservative government meant little fundamental change in arms 
export policy. Indeed, as Klieman points out, Shimon Peres, as 
defence minister from 1974 to 1977, used this period in office to 
stimulate or complete programmes which he himself had initiated 
some 20 years earlier as director-general of the defence minis­
try. The arrival of the Likud coalition served as ”...a rein­
forcement and acceleration of the previously existing pro-arms 
orientation than a fresh policy i n i t i a t i v e . . . " ^ 2
The Nature of Israeli Arms Exports
Israeli military exports can be divided into at least five 
(overlapping) categories: local manufactures, re-exports, serv­
ices, retrofit, and components/technology.
Local manufactures and the export limitations placed on 
major systems have been discussed above. Although a range of 
Israeli-built systems are offered for export, the fact is that
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few locally manufactured mai or systems haye been sold in large
numbers. Only two major systems —  the Gabriel ship-to-ship
missile and the Reshef fast patrol boat —  can be said to haye
succeeded in the international market. As one observer points
out: "Solely from the standpoint of marketability abroad, the
utility of such major systems is open to question....Their sheer
size and visibility can...deter politically sensitive clients who
are perfectly willing to buy less conspicuous arms or equipment." 
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Re-exports have provided Israel's main means of selling 
major weapons systems. The systems offered for sale are largely 
surplus French or U.S. equipment from the IDF or captured Soviet 
systems. Egypt, for example, reportedly lost some $1 billion 
worth of Soviet equipment in the Six Day War, much of which was 
simply captured by Israeli forces and later re-exported. ^5
Israeli military service exports include aircraft and heli­
copter servicing arrangements, the training of local personnel in 
the maintenance and operation of weapons systems, officer train­
ing and counter-insurgency training (both of which can be carried 
out either in Israel or in the recipient country).
As discussed in Chapter Two, Israel offers a series of 
retrofit packages which are used to modernise existing weapons 
systems of recipient countries. These became an increasingly 
important defence sector export to financially pressed Third 
World countries in the 1980s.
343
The export of military components and technologies has been 
a further growth area for Israel during the 1980s. Military 
components include computers, optics, communications and micro­
electronics . Military technologies exported can provide the 
recipient country with the technological means to produce indige­
nous weapons. As was shown in Chapter Five on the Israeli-South 
African military relationship, a broad range of military technol­
ogy is available from Israel for export.
Constraints on Israeli Arms Exports
While Israel has sought to achieve armaments independence —  both 
with regard to production and exports —  a series of conditions 
have served as a brake on the acceleration of military export 
sales.
Israel's overwhelming technical, financial and strategic 
dependence on the United States serves as a major constraint on 
freedom of maneuver in the arms export business. Washington has 
a powerful say over Israeli arms exports because the U.S. can 
forbid the export of Israeli military systems that contain key 
American components. The most striking example of Washington's
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use of its veto on Israeli arms exports has been with regard to 
the Kfir fighter. The export of the Kfir, which uses a General 
Electric J-79 engine, was repeatedly blocked after the first 
foreign order for the fighter from Ecuador was vetoed by the 
newly installed Carter administration 1977. Israeli negotiations 
for sales of the Kfir to Mexico, Columbia and Venezuela were 
blocked by Washington until 1980, and public disclosure of 
Washington’s approval for the delivery of up to 60 Kfirs to 
Taiwan caused such embarrassment in Taipei that the sale had to 
be canceled.56 As a military export the Kfir has been a fail­
ure, in part because of periodic U.S. moves to block its sale. 
The Kfir assembly line has now been closed down and current sales 
are from existing stock. U.S. control over the export of the 
Kfir has impacted against Israel both in terms of lost revenue 
from export sales and in terms of reducing Israel's international 
standing as an independent arms supplier. This latter point may 
well be the more crucial, as one of the key selling points of 
Israel arms has been that deliveries are meant to be reliable and 
confidential with few questions asked.
United States approval was subsequently granted for Kfir 
exports to Columbia, but the scandal surrounding the sale of 
Israeli weapons to Columbia's cocaine cartel was seen by some 
Israelis as a U.S.-inspired move to drive Israel from the Colum­
bian arms market. An unidentified Israeli army general, quoted 
in the Yedioth Ahronot newspaper said:
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The Americans would be glad if Israel would have 
gone out of Columbia, because Israeli security 
industries are succeeding to sell much military 
equipment to Columbia, in place of American 
military equipment. My feeling is that somebody 
there is blowing up all the affairs of the Israeli 
involvement in order to fuck Israel....They are 
most angry because we are selling Israeli planes 
in Columbia which it buys instead of American
planes.57
A second constraint on Israeli military sales has been Arab 
pressure on all countries —  in particular in the Third World —  
to eschew links to Israel. Arab influence over the emerging 
states of Africa waxed following the 1967 War when increasing 
amounts of cheap oil from the Gulf states was seen as a means to 
prime the ailing African economies. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War 
led 29 of 32 African states to sever diplomatic ties with Jerusa­
lem, with the Arab states promising to make up for any financial 
aid losses caused by the break.5® The rise of the Arab-dominat­
ed Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 
wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War meant the Arab world was better
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provided to buy-off and/or intimidate other countries from doing 
business from Jerusalem. However, Arab influence over the Afri­
can states waned during the 1980s. Arab aid never amounted to 
levels that were promised and the example of Egypt —  a leading 
Arab and African state —  establishing relations with Israel 
appears to have made the need for an African boycott seem less 
imperative. Nevertheless, the African boycott was applied just 
as Israeli arms exports were increasing in the 1970s and this 
meant that key a region of the Third World was largely closed to 
the initial Israeli military export drive.
A key problem which plagued Cold War expansion of Israeli 
military exports was that so many world regions and key groupings 
of states were closed to Israel. The Arab world, aside from 
limited sales to Morocco and Egypt, is for obvious reasons not a 
target for Israeli military exports. In the remainder of the 
Islamic world only Iran, and to a lesser degree Turkey and Indo­
nesia have bought arms from Israel. South-East Asia offers 
limited possibilities for Israeli arms exports. Although China 
has been an important customer, countries like Taiwan, Singapore 
and South Korea are more likely to become significant arms pro­
ducers themselves than customers of Israel. Eastern Europe, 
aside from rumours of some limited sales to Romania and former 
Yugoslavia remained off limits for Israeli military sales 
throughout the Cold War; not least due to U.S. sensitivities. 
Western Europe provides limited opportunities as most of the
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major countries prefer to buy military equipment from their own 
national arms and electronics producers. Western European mili­
tary imports tend to be in the areas of very advanced technology 
and the U.S. is usually the supplier. West Germany bought mili­
tary equipment from Israel on a fairly regular basis, but the 
sales have usually been of basic items such as ammunition. The 
U.S.-Israel free trade agreement made the United States Israel's 
great hope for expanding future arms sales. Nevertheless, by the 
end of the 1980s, Israeli sales to the U.S. had been only a 
limited success. (U.S.-Israeli relations are discussed below.)
Another area of some promise for arms exports during the end 
of the 1980s were the black African states which comprised some 
of Israel's most important arms customers beginning in the 1960s 
through to 1973. After a hiatus of nearly ten years, the black 
African states began slowly re-establishing links with Israel in 
the mid-1980s. Military sales followed but given the continent's 
economic troubles the prospects for major Israeli defence con­
tracts remain limited. The condition of the economy is also a 
reason for some pessimism regarding Israel's most important 
regional market for defence exports: Latin America.
The problem with African and Latin American markets does not 
appear to be selling arms but rather financing the sales and 
collecting the debts. Unlike its arms exporting competitors in 
the First, former Second, and sometimes even the Third World,
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Israel's economic malaise in the 1980s left Jerusalem with re­
duced means to offer financing arrangements for weapons exports. 
A striking example of this problem is illustrated by the sale of 
Kfir fighters to Honduras which was to be financed with Honduran 
military aid from Washington. The arrangement had been approved 
by both the State Department and the Pentagon but commercial 
interests in the United States raised strong opposition to Ameri­
can aid being used to finance the aircraft sales of a competitor. 
American financing was withdrawn and the deal was canceled, 
apparently because Israel was not able to offer any alternative 
means of financing the sale. The U.S. aerospace concern, Nor­
throp, subsequently sold Honduras refurbished F-5 fighters under 
a liberal financing arrangement.^9
Increasingly, the only way for Israel to 'finance' sales to 
countries in the Third World is through barter sales. In 1983 
Israel sold aircraft to Paraguay in exchange for meat and other 
products. More recently, Israel reached a $100 million barter 
agreement with Mexico for oil and a $350 million barter deal with 
Columbia for coal.^O Barter appears to have come into favour in 
part because of the high level of losses through non-repayment of 
debt by developing countries. Reports in the Financial Times 
indicate that Israel experienced severe difficulties in obtaining 
repayment for its military exports during the 1980s and that 
debts of at least some $300 million worth of arms exports are 
considered unrecoverable.
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In summing up the powerful competition faced by Israeli arms 
exports, a leader in the Jerusalem Post stated: "The major arms
producers... are able to more or less corner the market leaving
Israel little but the f r i n g e s .
Israeli Arms Exports to Central and South America
In Central America, more than in any other area of the world, 
Israel has come to be a key regional supplier of weapons ranging 
from First World War surplus rifles to jet fighters. Israeli 
arms have been so aggressively marketed in the region that the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has 
condemned the Israeli government for encouraging border conflicts 
in the region by playing on fears of rival governments in order 
make bigger sales.^3
Zionist relations with states like Nicaragua and Guatemala 
predate the creation of the Israeli state. Nicaragua's Luis 
Somoza supplied the Haganah (the forerunner of the IDF) with 
passports and false end-user certificates for arms purchase in
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Europe and Guatemala's ambassador to the United Nations, Jorg 
Garcia Granados, was an important advocate of the Zionist cause 
during the negotiations which led to the 1947 Partition Plan for 
P a l e s t i n e . D u r i n g  the 1950s and early 1960s, Latin America 
comprised the sole bloc of developing countries to support Israel 
in international forums such as the UN, and until 1980 as many as 
12 Latin American states recognised Jerusalem rather than Tel 
Aviv as the Israeli capital. For these reasons, Israeli leaders 
tend to regard Latin American countries as traditional supporters 
which to some extent have been 'lost' in recent years due to 
increased Arab financial status and the improved political status 
of the PL0.G5
The growth of Israeli arms sales to Latin America began in 
1967 when the United States Congress limited American military 
sales and credits to Latin America to $75 million (later raised 
to $150 million). European and Israeli arms dealers were thus 
able to move into a region which hitherto had largely been an 
American arms sales p r e s e r v e . B y  1977 Israel had become a key 
arms supplier to the Central American states of Guatemala, Hondu­
ras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, supplying fighter, transport and 
trainer aircraft, missiles, artillery and small arms.
During the period following 1977, Israeli arms sales to 
Latin A merica further expanded, despite the Carter 
administration's ban on Israeli sales of the Kfir fighter to the 
region. The Carter administration and the American Congress
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reduced U.S. arms sales to Latin America in general during the 
late 1970s. Somoza's Nicaragua, El Salvador and particularly 
Guatemala all suffered what, in effect, were military aid bans 
placed against them by Washington. Israel filled the military 
void left by the United States and supplied weapons, military 
technology and advisers to each of these countries. The Carter 
administration lifted its ban on Israeli sales of the Kfir to 
Latin America in October 1980, a move which boosted the reputa­
tion Israel had attempted to cultivate as a reliable arms suppli­
er —  capable of successfully applying pressure on Washington 
when the need arose and distant enough from the region's tensions 
and rivalries so as to simply ignore them and sell weapons to any 
government (or organisation) with available funds.^7
With the advent of the Reagan administration in 1981, Jeru­
salem also came to be increasingly used as a proxy for shipping 
military materiel to the region, in defiance of the American 
Congress. As Israeli Knesset member Gen. Matityahu Peled said: 
"In Central America, Israel is the 'dirty work contractor for the 
U.S. administration. Israel is acting as an accomplice and arm 
of the United States."^®
The U.S. policy of using Israeli military exports as substi­
tutes for American arms deliveries was publicly announced by 
Reagan administration officials in July 1982, when at 
Washington's request, Israel agreed to send weapons captured
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from the PLO during the 1982 war in Lebanon to Honduras for 
delivery to the anti-Sandinista Contra forces.
Initially, the Israeli government was concerned that the 
Reagan administration's emphasis on defence and its willingness 
to reinstitute military assistance to those regimes which had 
been barred from receiving arms under the Carter administration 
would reduce chances for continued expansion of Israeli military 
exports to Central America. The issue was raised during negoti­
ations for the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Co­
operation in 1981 between Israel and the United States. Propos­
als known as the Meridor Memorandum were put forward by Ya'akov 
Meridor, a minister without portfolio in the Begin cabinet. The 
Memorandum sought to outline the military sales relationships 
that Israel has developed with certain countries in Latin Ameri­
ca, Africa and Asia since the 1970s and accord them with special 
recognition by U.S. government which would exempt them from 
interference or competition on the part of the U.S. Department of 
Defense or the American arms industry. The ideas set forth in 
the Meridor Memorandum were incorporated into the official Memo­
randum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation between Israel 
and the United States which was signed on 30 November 1981.^0
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Israeli arms recipients
To accurately document the sale and export of Israeli arms to any 
region of the world is extremely difficult due to the paucity of 
reliable information. The Israeli government is far more sensi­
tive about public disclosure of its armaments exports than most 
other countries. This stems on the one hand from the use of 
military exports as a diplomatic and geo-political tool and sells 
arms to many countries which do not wish to be identified as 
doing business with Jerusalem. On the other hand, Israel sent 
much of its Cold War arms exports to countries with internation­
ally unpopular or repressive governments with which Jerusalem did 
not wish to be publicly linked.
Aaron Klieman has drawn a composite of the typical buyer of 
Israeli military materiel: "...a non-Western country with a
defense-conscious government, rightist in orientation, in which 
the military is the actual or proximate locus of power. 
Clearly, international publicity of arms deliveries to such 
clients would not be conducive to Jerusalem's efforts to reduce 
Israeli diplomatic isolation.
It should also be pointed out that it is standard Israeli 
practice to use private arms dealers —  all of whom are accredit­
ed by Jerusalem —  when organising the export of military materi­
el to clients requiring discretion or who could be embarrassing
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to Israel should the deal be made public. The private arms 
dealers function as what is known as a 'cut-out', i.e.. a figure 
who can be held up as a private entrepreneur with no ties to 
Jerusalem, should and arms sale become public.
Latin America
Since the late 1970s Israel has had a significant arms export 
relationship with the less internationally acceptable govern­
ments and organisations in Latin American, including Somoza's 
Nicaragua, Argentina and Chile while under military rule, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, the Nicaraguan Contras, and the 
Columbian cocaine mafia. Other important Latin American recipi­
ents of Israeli military exports have included Columbia and 
Ecuador.
Below is a summary of major Israeli arms transfers to Latin 
America. For more detailed information on the nature and date of 
these and other military sales to Latin America see Appendix 1.
Nicaragua - Israel's first military sales to Latin America com­
prised a series of small arms shipments to Nicaragua in the 
1 9 5 0 s . 73 The major arms sales began following a special arms show
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arranged for Anastaslo Somoza Debayle in Managua in 1974 after 
which Nicaragua placed orders for Arava transport aircraft, Dabur 
patrol boats, Sherman tanks and tactical r a d i o s . T h e  Carter 
administration's announcement in November 1978 that it was sus­
pending U.S. military and economic aid to Nicaragua led to an 
arms supply vacuum which was largely filled by Israel. By Sep­
tember 1978 open revolt against Somoza had spread to most of 
Nicaragua's cities. Military equipment sent by Israel between 
1978 and the overthrow of Somoza in July 1979 included further 
combat armed Cessna aircraft and military transport aircraft, 
helicopters, missiles, light artillery, mortars, patrol vehicles, 
and plane loads of small arms and a m m u n i t i o n . S o m e  two weeks 
before the collapse of the Somoza regime Israeli arms shipments 
were halted at the request of the United States. A number of 
ships carrying arms destined for Nicaragua were ordered back to 
Israel from mid-sea and Somoza subsequently claimed in his mem­
oirs that one ship which turned back only miles from the Nicara­
guan coast
...carried among other military items, ten- 
thousand anti-tank and anti-personnel grenade 
rifles with ammunition...That precious cargo 
could have won the war for the anti-Communist 
forces of Nicar a g u a ... Somewhere in Israel there
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is a large consignment of arms and ammunition 
which could have saved N i c a r a g u a .
The level of Israeli support for the Somoza regime is one of the 
reasons that the Sandinista government had a cool relationship 
with Israel. Israel exported no further arms to Nicaragua after 
1979 and in 1982 Managua broke diplomatic relations with Jerusa­
lem.
Argentina - Argentina, by far Israel's largest customer in Latin 
America, is probably Jerusalem's second most important market in 
the world for arms sales after South Africa. The Stockholm Inter­
national Peace Research Institute has estimated that Argentina 
took up to 30 per cent of Israel's total weapons exports during 
the 1970s.77 It is estimated that Israel sold Argentina $1 
billion worth of arms during the period of military r u l e . 7 ®
Israeli military exports to the former Argentine military 
Junta have been especially controversial due to the Israeli 
decision to continue delivering weapons during the 
Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982. This brought Israel in direct 
conflict with its patron, the United States, after Washington 
backed London in the conflict.
As with Nicaragua, Argentina became a more important custom­
er for Israeli military exports following the Carter 
adninistration's restrictions on military aid to the military
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government in Buenos Aires. However, it was during the Falk­
lands/Malvinas War that Israel proved itself as a key arms sup­
plier. Some observers argue that during the War Israel's re­
sponse to the Argentine military's critical shortage of defence 
materiel was so substantial that Israel became the first Third 
World arms manufacturer to act as the primary supplier of major 
weapons to a belligerent during a military conflict and thereby 
took a role which hitherto had been played by the major arms 
producers.79 Argentina's substantial losses of military equip­
ment, coupled with the humiliation of defeat, led to a major arms 
build-up in the years following Falklands/Malvinas War, and Is­
rael, along with France and West Germany were among the major 
suppliers.GO Since the late 1970s Israel has supplied Argentina 
with Nesher, Mirage 3, and Skyhawk fighter aircraft, a Boeing 707 
equipped with Elint (radio-wave eavesdropping) systems, Gabriel 
missiles, coastal patrol boats, fire control systems and other 
general equipment. In addition, Israel has assisted Argentina in 
setting up production of the TAM tank, licensed production for an 
armoured anti-guerrilla warfare vehicle, and reportedly partici­
pated in the development of the Pampa trainer aircraft.
Chile - The Carter administration's restriction on military 
assistance to authoritarian regimes in Latin America was also 
applied to Santiago. Chile bought a wide range of equipment from
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Israel Including Reshef patrol boats, missiles, and radar sys­
tems. In addition, the Israeli Nimda concern licensed production 
of the Israeli Shoet II armoured personnel carrier and Israel 
Aircraft Industry maintains the Chilean air force's Mirages and 
other p l a n e s . 8 2  The Chilean air force has also announced plans 
to buy 12 Kfir fighters which will reportedly be powered by ATAR 
9K50 engines, made under an Israeli-South African military pact. 
The Kfir is normally powered by a U.S. General Electric J-79 
engine and all exports are subject to U.S. approval.
El Salvador - Israeli military involvement in El Salvador began 
in 1972 when the Israeli Defense Ministry organised a youth 
development programme for the country. San Salvador provided 
Israel with its first major arms sale in Central America in 1973 
when it ordered 18 Dassault Ouragan fighters, six Fouga Magister 
trainers and 25 Arava short take off and landing aircraft. In 
light of the tensions which had led to the 1969 'Soccer War' 
between El Salvador and Honduras, the announcement of the sale 
set off something of a regional race to acquire fighter aircraft. 
The refurbished Ouragan fighters were delivered to El Salvador in 
1975 and were the first jet fighters to appear in the arsenal of 
a Central American c o u n t r y . 8 3
El Salvador was a further victim of the Carter 
administration's cut-off of military aid to countries with gov­
ernments deemed to be persistent human rights violators. Like
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Guatemala, El Salvador preempted the American move by unilateral- 
ly severing military ties with Washington. This position of 
defiance was reportedly taken because the government in San 
Salvador knew that Israel was willing to supply arms withheld by 
the United States. Between 1977 and the Reagan
administration's resumption of military aid in 1981, El Salvador 
bought an estimated 80 per cent of its arms from Israel, includ­
ing aircraft, napalm, rocket launchers, small arms and ammuni­
tion.®^ In addition, Israeli technicians began work on a comput­
er telephone monitoring system for the El Salvadoran military in 
1978.®® Israel has also supplied military advisers who have 
trained the Salvadoran military in counter-insurgency tactics to 
fight the civil war.
El Salvador provides another example of the triangular 
relationship which existed between the United States, Israel and 
various countries in Central America during the Reagan adminis­
tration through which the U.S. Congress was bypassed so as to 
supply military aid to unpopular governments and insurgency 
movements. In 1981, for example, Israel agreed to 'lend' $21 
million to the U.S. government from funds which had been already 
appropriated for use by Jerusalem. The money was transferred to 
El Salvador and Israel was "generously" repaid for the inconven­
ience during the next fiscal year,®^
El Salvador is also one of the few countries which has moved
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its embassy back to Jerusalem after having moved to Tel Aviv in 
1980 to protest the enactment of the Jerusalem Law which formally 
placed all of Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty and affirmed 
the city as Israel's capital. The move back to Jerusalem oc­
curred in April 1984 at a time when the Salvadoran government was 
seeking increased military and economic aid from Israel.
Guatemala - The Zionist relationship with Guatemala, as in the 
case of Nicaragua, precedes the creation of the state of Israel. 
Although Israel provided Guatemala with an extensive technical 
assistance programme, the first Israeli arms exports appear to 
have been in 1974. The military relationship between the two 
countries grew dramatically after the Carter administration cut 
U.S. military aid to Guatemala. The relationship continued to 
grow under the Reagan administration which found it impossible to 
whitewash Guatemala's brutal treatment of its population to 
convince the U.S. Congress to restore military aid.
Guatemala received Arava transport aircraft (an armed mili­
tary version), helicopters, armoured cars, mortars and large 
quantities of small arms. Israel also licensed Guatemalan pro­
duction of the Galil rifle and armoured vehicles.®®
As Jane Hunter points out, however, the real Israeli contri­
bution to the Guatemalan military machine has not been weapons 
but rather the technology and counter-insurgency know-how.®^ 
Israel co-operated with Guatemala's feared G-2 police intelli­
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gence service which is controlled by the army. Israel supplied 
the G-2 with two computer systems, one of which is reportedly 
used to maintain dossiers on journalists, students, politicians, 
and those suspected of having left-wing sympathies. In combina­
tion with weekly reports, the computer is reported to have been 
used to compile lists for Guatemalan death squads. A second 
computer system is used to monitor utilities use and to alert the 
military to any surges in water or electricity use which may 
indicate clandestine a c t i v i t y . T h e  Israeli Tadiran concern has 
designed and financed the Army's School of Transmissions and 
Electronics which instructs soldiers on encoding, radio jamming 
and monitoring.
Israel played a role in Guatemala's agricultural counter­
insurgency programme from 1977 and scholarships were made avail­
able for Guatemalan officials to study co-operative agricultural 
schemes in Israel. In the period from 1978-79 Israeli experts 
trained some 1,000 Guatemalans in conjunction with a rural paci­
fication plan initiated by then-president Lucas Garcia. Israel's 
Nahal programme (Fighting Pioneer Youth), which trains soldiers 
in agricultural techniques to establish and expand border settle­
ments, served as a model for counterinsurgency strategy known as 
the 'Plan of Assistance to Conflict Areas' under the Rios Montt 
regime from 1982-83.91
By the end of the 1980s, however, it appeared that the
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Israeli-Guatemalan relationship was ebbing. Guatemala began 
building relations with Egypt in 1988 and held negotiations with 
Jordan over the purchase of spare parts and equipment for its air 
force. There have been reports that Guatemala may purchase F-5 
aircraft and helicopters from Saudi Arabia and OPEC and Arab 
capital are increasingly being directed toward projects in the
country.92
Honduras - Honduras has a partially Israeli-supplied air force 
including Arava transports, Dassault Super Mystere B2 fighters, 
and a Westwind reconnaissance plane. The Super Mystere fighters, 
delivered in 1977, were refurbished with U.S. Pratt and Whitney 
engines and their transfer to Honduras without Washington's 
approval strained U.S.-Israeli relations. In addition, the 
Honduran government has bought Israeli RBY armoured cars, mortars 
and a large quantity of small arms (Galil rifles and Uzi subma­
chine guns).93 Honduran efforts to purchase the Kfir fighter 
have not come to fruition, in part due to opposition from Wash­
ington. Israel has supplied military assistance to paramilitary 
groups in Honduras similar to the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran 
civil defence patrols.9*
Honduras also served as a key 'middleman' for arms shipments 
to the Contra forces in camps on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border 
during the 1980s. The most common means of clandestine shipment 
was for weapons to be billed as destined for the Honduran armed
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forces and Israeli arms dealers reportedly shipped both Israeli 
and East European arms to the Contras in this manner. Israel's 
relationship with the Contras is examined in greater detail 
below.
Columbia - Columbia has bought Arava transports, artillery, 
tanks, and Gabriel missiles. The Columbian government awarded 
Israel Aircraft Industries a contract to refurbish its squadron 
of Mirage 5s.
In 1987 the American government approved the sale of 13 
Israeli Kfirs with U.S. engines to Bogota, partly to reward 
Israel for the cancellation of the Lavi project. As Ignacio 
Klich has noted the deal also served U.S. interests:
In as much as Bogota had previously bought 
Mirages, a Kfir deal will serve US interests 
as well, not only by depriving France of a 
customer but also by shifting Columbia away 
from French to US technology.
The Kfir deal, signed in October 1988, provides that part of the 
financing will be through Columbian coal exports to I s r a e l . ^8
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Ecuador - Israel's initial attempt to sell the Kfir fighter to 
Ecuador was rejected by the Carter administration. This veto was 
subsequently rescinded and Ecuador has since received at least 13 
Kfirs with a reported option for 11 more. In 1977 Ecuador pur­
chased 12 Super Mystere fighters in Israel's first barter arms 
for oil deal. Ecuador has also bought Arava transport aircraft, 
Barak anti-missile missiles, armoured personnel carriers, and 
various rockets, explosives and ammunition.
Contra forces - Israel's military relationship with the anti- 
Sandinista forces of the Honduran-based FDN (Nicaraguan Democrat­
ic Front) and the Costa Rican-based ARDE (Democratic Revolution­
ary Alliance) is complex matter, further complicated by the 
scandal surrounding the Iran-Contra affair in the United States. 
The beginning of Israel's relationship with the Contra forces may 
go back as far as their creation in 1979.^®®
Israel's links with the Contras reportedly stemmed from CIA 
difficulties in acquiring 'untraceable' weapons. The appearance 
of Contra forces on American television with U.S. arms caused 
considerable embarrassment in Washington during the early 1980s. 
The Reagan administration therefore requested that Israel sell 
arms to the Contras from its stock of Soviet weapons. Israeli 
shipments of Soviet arms, captured from the PLO in Lebanon, to 
the Contra forces appear to have begun in earnest in 1983 follow­
ing the visit of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon to Honduras in
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December 1982. Among the weapons sent to the Contras were Soviet 
AK-47 and SKS assault rifles and SA-7 surface to air missiles.
The break between the United States and Argentina over the 
Falklands/Malvinas War was one cause of the apparent expansion of 
Israel's role from merely supplying arms to sending military 
advisers. The Reagan administration had arranged for veterans of 
Argentina's 'dirty war' to serve as military trainers for Contra 
forces, but this arrangement was terminated when Washington sided 
with Britain during the 1982 War. By 1983 some 50 Israeli spe­
cialists in guerrilla and psychological warfare were reportedly 
stationed in El Salvador and H o n d u r a s . 1^2 The advisers were 
recruited as mercenaries, one of whom told journalists that the 
Israeli Defense Ministry was 'aware' that they were working with 
the Contras and that Israeli Defence Forces manuals and cata­
logues were used as teaching material.
In early 1984 the U.S. Congress moved to cut funds to the 
Contras. As American aid for the Contra forces ran out, Israeli 
support became crucial. Expanded military assistance from Jeru­
salem was arranged and by 1985 both Reagan administration offi­
cials and members of Congress admitted that Israel was sending 
larger shipments of small arms and more advisers to the
Contras.104
During the 1985-86 period, Israel sent at least six ship­
loads of Eastern European and Soviet weapons to the Contras
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(including the shipments which Somoza had paid for, but had 
subsequently been withheld due to pressure from the Carter admin­
istration) • In addition, some of the 400 tonnes of weapons 
supplied to the Contras by the ‘private* network established by 
Lt. Col. Oliver North of the U.S. National Security Staff, were 
bought from Israel. It was also during this period that the U.S. 
and Israeli started shipping arms to Iran via an arrangement 
between the White House and the Israeli government under which 
some of the inflated profits from the sales to Tehran went to the 
Contras in what became known as the Iran-Contra scandal.
Columbian cocaine cartel - A series of arms and military training 
deals involving Israeli Defence Forces officers with members of 
the Columbian cocaine cartel were exposed in 1989.
A documentary by the U.S. television network NBC showed 
Israelis training Columbians, purported to be drug cartel assas­
sins, in the use of automatic weapons and assault t e c h n i q u e s .
The Israeli instructors were later linked to the Hod Hahanit 
military consulting firm headed by Lt.-Col. (res.) Yair Klein and 
Lt.-Col. (res.) Amazia Shu*ali. Israeli Defence Ministry offi­
cials said that Hod Hahanit had operated in Columbia without the 
necessary permits to export military hardware and technology and 
that they knew nothing of the firm's activities. However, The 
Los Angeles Times said the Israeli Foreign Ministry had repeated­
ly informed the government on the activity of Israelis in Colum­
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bia "leaving open the possibility that the Defense Ministry was 
aware of Klein's work but did nothing about it."^®^ A subsequent 
report in The Observer said that the Israeli Defence Ministry had 
indeed issued a permit for Hod Hahanit to operate in C o l u m b i a . ^08
According to a report in the Israeli daily Hamishmar. 
Klein was not only president of the Hod Hahanit at the time the 
scandal broke, but also a senior Israeli officer in charge of the 
War Room of the Israeli Chief of Staff during a national emergen­
cy. Although Klein would have technically been in charge of maps 
and data in the War Room, he would also have determined which 
officers on duty would have been allowed to enter the War Room
during a crisis.
Columbian police reported that Klein instructed death squads 
working for major cocaine dealers and that some of Klein's 'st­
udents' were responsible for the assassination of Columbian 
presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan in 1989.^^®
Prior to Galan's assassination some 100 Uzi submachine guns 
and 400 Galil assault rifles were sent to Gonzalo Rodriguez 
Gacha, who was one of the top three leaders of Columbia's Medel­
lin drug cartel before being killed by Columbian police in Decem­
ber 1989. The weapons were shipped through Antigua by a company 
headed by Israeli Brig.-Gen. (res.) Pinchas Shacher. Thames 
television's This Week identified Shacher as a Mossad agent and 
an undercover representative of Israel Military Industries (IMI)
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who had been part of a network of Miami, Florida-based arms 
dealers supplying weapons to Latin American since 1982.^^^ One 
of the Galil rifles used in the assassination of Galan was subse­
quently traced to the shipment reportedly arranged by the
Mossad's S h a c h e r .
Israeli military exports to Africa, Asia, the Middle East 
and the West
Among the many countries that have bought military equipment from 
Israel five states stand out as particularly important clients 
for Jerusalem: South Africa, China, Iran, Taiwan and Ethiopia.
The Israeli-South African relationship was discussed in Chapter 
Five. (For more detailed information on the nature and dates of 
these and other sales to Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the 
West see Appendices 2, 3 and 4.)
China - Although Israel and China did not have diplomatic rela­
tions during the Cold War, estimates of the value of Israeli 
military and technology exports to China during the 1980s run in 
the billions of dollars. A report in The Washington Post said 
Israeli arms sales to China were worth almost $3 billion during 
the 1980s.113
369
According to Morton S. Miller, author of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency's report on world military expend­
itures and arms transfers and formerly senior arms transfer 
analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research: "The Israelis are involved in most of the weapons 
modification programs in C h i n a " . G e r a l d  Segal says that 
China's interest is in Israeli skills to assist the Chinese 
military modernisation programme and the establishment of modern 
arms production l i n e s . @  great deal of China's military 
equipment is based on 1950s Soviet technology, the Chinese mili­
tary has a particular interest in Israel's capabilities in refur­
bishing and modernising Soviet weapons systems.
Chinese representatives expressed interest in Israeli weap­
ons systems as early as 1975 when the Kfir fighter was displayed 
for the first time at the Paris Air Show. Further contacts were 
reportedly developed at a defence exhibition in Switzerland in 
1978. The Israeli military relationship with China appears
to have begun in earnest during 1979 when the Israeli arms deal­
er, Shaul Eisenberg, took a group of Israeli arms experts to 
China in his private plane.
The bulk of Israel's military sales to China have reportedly 
been components or military technology. Israeli technicians were 
sent to China in the early 1980s to assist in a modernisation 
programme for China's T-59/69 main battle tanks and heavy artil­
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lery. It is not clear if all Chinese tanks received the same 
retrofit package but it appears that in most cases they are 
fitted with new fire control systems manufactured by Israel's 
Elbit, night-sight scope systems, laser range-finders, and a 105 
mm cannon which is an Israeli version of the British L7 tank 
g u n . T h e  total number of tanks to be modernised remains 
unclear. Some sources report that in 1985 Israel concluded a 
multi-million dollar agreement with Beijing to modernise all 
9,000 of China's main battle tanks.
A further reported area of military co-operation between 
Israel and China is missile technology. In April 1988 The 
Sunday Times, citing Western intelligence sources, reported that 
Israel had agreed to supply China with Israeli-developed missile 
warheads and armour-piercing devices. The agreement was said to 
have been signed with Norinco —  China's biggest arms concern 
with over a million employees -- and Israel Military 
I n d u s t r i e s . 120 Agreement was reportedly reached on a
new concept of trajectory-corrected missiles 
of unspecified designation, laser-guided, armour- 
piercing warheads, and shells for 155mm, 152mm,
130mm and 122mm calibre heavy a r t i l l e r y .1^1
The report was subsequently denied by Israeli Defence Minister
Yitzak R a b i n . 122
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The Washington Post reported in May 1988 that Israeli ex­
perts had helped China upgrade the guidance system of CSS-2 
missile and had assisted in converting the missile to carry 
conventional rather than only nuclear w a r h e a d s . ^23 To the con­
sternation of Israel, the Chinese government subsequently sold 
the CSS-2, or East Wind as it is known, to Saudi Arabia.
In a further area of co-operation, Israel is said to be 
assisting the Chinese fighter aircraft programme and has report­
edly sold China the radar system originally designed for the now 
canceled Lavi fighter. China is said to have favoured the Lavi 
radar because it was designed to counter the threat of Soviet 
military technology, particularly surface-to-air missiles and 
allow aircraft to survive in areas protected by dense anti-air­
craft systems and electronic warfare m e a s u r e s . ^24 has also
been rumoured that teams of Israeli technicians are working at 
China's military aviation centre at Chengdu and Western military 
experts have noted similarities between photos of the prototype 
of a new Chinese fighter and the L a v i . 5
Iran - The bulk of Iran's pre-revolution arms were bought from 
the United States. Although Israel's role in Iran under the Shah 
was relatively modest, the fact that Iran's military was standar­
dised to the same American equipment which comprised Israel's 
arsenal meant the Jewish state possessed a special ability to
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meet Iran's military needs following the cessation of U.S. mili­
tary exports to T e h r a n .
The Israeli military relationship with Iran has its roots in 
the Shah's build-up of his country's armed forces and police/ 
intelligence apparatus in the 1970s. Israel sold small arms the 
Shah's Iran and reportedly played a significant role in the 
building of the Iranian intelligence forces (SAVAK). In addi­
tion, Israel was able to expand training and maintenance con­
tracts with the Iranian military. In 1978, for example, the U.S. 
Defence Department learned from satellite photographs that Irani­
an F-4s were engaged in training exercises in Israel. The most 
important joint Israeli-Iranian endeavour was a collaborative 
project to build a surface-to-surface missile tactical ballistic 
missile. Known as 'Operation Flower* this project (discussed in 
Chapter Two) was terminated in the wake of the Iranian révolu-
tion.127
Israeli diplomats fled Iran in 1979 during the revolution 
after their trade mission was occupied by the PLO. But by
October 1980, the second month of the Iran-Iraq War, the Begin 
government had already agreed to sell Tehran several hundred 
thousand dollars worth of spare tyres for F-4 fighter 
aircraft.129 Following the release of the U.S. hostages from the 
American embassy in Tehran in 1981, Israel reportedly sold Iran 
some $12 million worth of refurbished jet engines, aircraft 
tyres, spare parts for US M-48 tanks, and a m m u n i t i o n . T h u s ,
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within a hiatus of just over eighteen months, Israel had begun 
supplying arms to the revolutionary regime in Tehran and would, 
as the Financial Times said, continue to provide "the badly 
demoralised and purged Iranian armed forces with frequent injec­
tions of badly needed spare parts and m u n i t i o n s t h r o u g h  at 
least 1986-87 and the breaking of the Iran-Contra scandal.
What were Israeli interests in selling arms to a revolution­
ary Iran whose leaders repeatedly preached that the path to 
Jerusalem led through Baghdad? Three separate studies —  two of 
them by academics (Peretz Kidron and Aaron Klieman) and one by a 
journalist (Ze'ev Schiff) —  have arrived at varying answers to 
this question.
Kidron argues that in selling arms to Khomeni's Iran, Israel 
had two broad objectives in view: The direct objective - Tehran,
and he oblique objective - Washington. Under the direct objec­
tive of Tehran, Kidron lists four grounds for the sale:^^^
1) The most immediate objective of the arms sales to Iran was 
financial profit. Israel's need for hard currency, the vast 
surplus stocks of arms in Israel's arsenals, the large Israeli 
arms industry starved for local orders, and the hundreds of 
(semi-) private arms dealers insured that any customer, even 
those as vehemently anti-Israel as the Khomeni regime in Iran,
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would be welcome.
2) That Israeli interests would be best served by a limited 
Iranian victory. Shi'ite fundamentalism would gain impetus from 
such a victory but such an outcome would have been an important 
setback for a leading Arab country.
3) That Israeli military aid might ensure the safety of Iran's 
estimated 30,000 Jews.
4) That through Israeli military aid Iran could ultimately be 
steered back into the Western camp. This conception drew on the 
strategy of Israel's first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, who 
sought to build relations with the non-Arab states in the region, 
namely, Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia
Kidron says that the oblique objective of sales to Iran came to 
be enhanced Israeli influence in Washington. The turnaround in 
which Israel shifted from selling arms to Iran without 
Washington's consent to arming Iran with active U.S. collusion 
appears to have occurred at the end of the first Reagan adminis­
tration in 1984. The rationale for arms sales to Iran and the 
entire Iran-Contra operation under this 'oblique' rubric is 
somewhat more complex. Kidron argues that its multiple goals 
were:
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...extricating the American hostages from Lebanon, 
renewing US influence in Tehran, and channeling 
tens of millions of dollars to Reagan's beloved 
Contras at a time when he was frustrated by his 
inability to bypass the Congressional ban on direct 
aid....it would prove that Israel is indispensable 
to the United States....Inculcating that conviction 
in the American political establishment was Israel's 
prime purpose - far exceeding and immediate profit 
or advantage - in pursuing the Iran-Contra v e n t u r e . 1^3
Aaron Klieman views Israeli arms sales to revolutionary Iran 
from a traditional power-politics ('realist') perspective. He 
argues that from a systemic point of view one must distinguish 
between "Iran the geopolitical fact and its regime" and that
within the old Cold War global context Iran was strategically 
vital in order to prevent Soviet southward expansion and break­
through to the Gulf. From a regional perspective Iran is useful 
to Israel due to the centuries of Persian-Arab animosities and 
the split in the Islamic world which serves to deflect Arab 
attention away from Israel. Klieman argues it was far better for 
Israel to arm Iran rather than leaving Tehran to seek arms from
376
anti-Western or anti-Zionist suppliers.
Ze'ev Schiff, military commentator for the newspaper 
Ha'aretz argues that Israeli arms sales to Iran were motivated 
largely by self-serving economic interests rather than more 
complex strategic/political goals and that strategic 'interests' 
merely served as an excuse for the business. Schiff says that 
Israeli arms sale to Iran were "guided by a ravenous hunger for 
profit rather than by strategic considerations".
The level and content of Israeli arms exports to Iran during 
the 1980-87 period is difficult to judge with any precision. 
Indeed, we know more about the major sale which did not go 
through (a 'sting' operation by United States Customs officials 
based on a $2.5 billion 'sale' of arms mostly from Israel) than 
about the host of sales which actually were made. Among the 
systems reported sold during this period were TOW anti-tank 
missiles, spare parts for F-4, F-5 and F-14 aircraft. Sparrow, 
Sidewinder, and Hawk missiles, Gabriel missiles, tanks, jeeps, 
various ammunition, radar equipment, field telephones, and chemi­
cals used as charges and p r i m e r s . I n  the above-mentioned 
•sting' sale, set up by U.S. Customs officers, Iran was to re­
ceive five C-130E Hercules transport aircraft, 18 F-4 aircraft, 
46 Skyhawk fighter-bombers, 13 F-5 fighters, 50 long-range how­
itzers, and a large assortment of anti-tank and air-to-air mis­
siles. Had such a sale gone through it would have been by far 
Iran's biggest arms purchase since the fall of the Shah.^^S
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Taiwan - Relative to China and Iran, Israel's military exports 
and interests in Taiwan are better documented. Israel has been 
selling military materiel to Taiwan since the mid-1970s and has 
seen its share of the Taiwan market grow as Western countries 
have increasingly eschewed military sales to Taipei in order to 
improve relations with China. The U.S. embargoed the sale of 
sensitive military electronic equipment to Taiwan in the mid- 
1970s and later refused to sell Taipei F-4 fighter aircraft. In 
1983 the Swiss government refused to grant two Swiss companies 
permission to deliver fifty tanks and air defence systems to 
Taiwan. In that same year the Dutch government denied export 
permits for six conventional submarines ordered by Taipei.
Klieman argues that as a result, Taiwan has become a logical 
candidate for intensified military trade and co-operation with 
Israel. Taiwan has manufactured the Dvora class patrol boat 
under Israeli license since 1979 and the Gabriel missile since 
1977. Taiwan is currently in the process of testing a new
fighter aircraft for indigenous production. Although there is no 
evidence that Israel has supplied components or technology for 
the project, the Taiwanese defence ministry has indicated that 
both imported technology and weapons will be required for the 
aircraft.
One potential hindrance to Israeli-Taiwanese relations is
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Taipei's close relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis supply 
Taiwan with oil and are one of the less than two dozen countries 
still maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In 
1977, when the U.S. government gave public approval for an Israe­
li sale of Kfir fighters to Taiwan, the government in Taipei, 
with an eye to Riyadh, immediately denied it had any intention of 
buying Israeli aircraft.
Ethiopia - As part of Israel's so-called "Peripheral Strategy" to 
build relations with non-Arab and non-Muslim states and grpups in 
the Middle East, an Israeli consulate was opened in Ethiopia in 
1956. The relationship rapidly came to be based on military 
exchange —  in 1960 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion publicly said 
the Israeli Army was involved in re-organising and training the 
Ethiopian Army. Also in 1960, and on two subsequent occasions, 
the Israelis helped Emperor Haile Salassie put down military coup 
attempts. As a reward, the Israeli consulate in Addis Ababa was 
upgraded to an embassy and became a key intelligence gathering 
bureau of the Mossad.
Selassie broke relations with Israel during the 1973 Arab- 
Israeli War and the Marxist officers who overthrew him in 1974 
initially showed no interest in renewing links to Jerusalem.
Meanwhile, in 1973, Israeli religious authorities declared 
the Ethiopian Falashas to be Jews who had to be saved from assim­
ilation and in 1975 the Israeli Interior Ministry announced that
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Falashas had the right of return to Israel. Under Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin, Israel made a series of agreements under which 
arms were delivered to the government of Mengistu Haile Meriam in 
exchange for ignoring the illegal emigration of Ethiopian Jews.
Few details are known of the precise weapons systems deliv­
ered to Mengistu*s forces. In the 1980s Israel supplied cluster 
bombs, remotely piloted drones and small arms and reportedly 
trained Ethiopian pilots. Despite the fact that Israeli arms 
deliveries continued until shortly before the fall of Mengistu in 
1991, the new government in Addis Ababa appears intent on retain­
ing links to Jerusalem.142
South African Arms Exports
Armscor's overseas sales are extremely difficult to trace. This 
is partly because of overall secrecy, partly because of sales via 
intermediaries in which buyers prefer not to know the origin of 
the arms they are receiving; and, partly because much South 
African military equipment can be sold for what it is: copies
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foreign weapons systems. This means that much of what is export­
ed is never recognised as being South African.
On the severe paucity of information on South African arms 
exports Signe Landgren has written:
The field of South Africa's arms exports was 
until 1982 completely protected from insight.
No information whatsoever on weapons or customers 
was ever provided by the responsible authorities; 
nor were comprehensive figures revealed as to the 
value of military exports, except very rarely....
This is still the basic state of affairs today, 
although Armscor with its plunge into the arms 
export market in 1982 had to reveal one hitherto 
secret subject -- namely the individual weapons 
it wanted to sell on the international market.
The overall volume of South African arms exports is there­
fore impossible to measure with any accuracy. During the 1970s 
large quantities of arms were delivered to Rhodesia —  the only 
country besides South Africa to have a mandatory arms embargo 
declared against it by the United Nations. The termination of 
white minority rule in 1980 meant the end of this important 
weapons market for Armscor. Arms sales declined dramatically and
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in 1982 the head of Armscor, P.G. Marias said that annual arms 
exports had only reached $9 million.^4* Since then, few figures 
regarding total arms exports have been made public in South 
Africa. A 1988 report in Jane's Defence Weekly, citing Armscor*s 
executive general manager, J. van Vuuren, said that Armscor*s 
exported arms to 23 countries in 1987 with a total value of $927 
million.
South African arms exports: The economic rationale
South Africa actively sought to boost arms exports due to econom­
ic concerns during the 1980s. The export drive gained urgency 
following layoffs of Armscor personnel and reductions in South 
African defence spending.
In 1982, Armscor was instructed by the South African govern­
ment —  via an amendment to the country's Armaments Production 
Act —  to 'consider' and 'administer' all applications submitted 
by private sector arms manufacturers for marketing and export 
permits with regard to a r m a m e n t s . I n  plain English this meant 
Armscor was to assist private arms producers in their export 
drive.
The reasoning behind the push for increasing arms exports at
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this time is clear enough: The South African economy was stag­
nating and the South African military was less financially able 
—  or willing —  to buy the major proportion of domestically 
produced arms. Defence funds were needed for arms research and 
development and for acquisition of advanced foreign systems which 
could not be produced in South Africa.
Beginning in 1983, a series of Armscor plants were closed 
down or mothballed. The closure of the Impala trainer/light 
attack aircraft assembly line is one key example. The reason for 
this particular closure was simply that with 239 Impalas in its 
inventory, the South African Air Force did not require any fur­
ther deliveries of the aircraft and there existed no export 
market for this outdated aircraft.
Furthermore, South African military industries were not 
producing at full capacity. Armscor chairman. Marais admitted 
some factories were producing goods at only about 70 percent of 
capacity.147
The most obvious economic rationale for South African arms 
exports is that foreign orders for arms would reduce the amount 
of time that defence sector factories remain idle and also would 
contribute to an improvement in the country's balance of pay­
m e n t s .  148 Indeed, in the mid-1980s. South African economists 
argued that one way to combat the country's economic difficulties 
would be to increase arms exports by 50 percent.149
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South African arms exports: The political-security-diplomatic
rationale
South African arms exports can reasonably hope to influence 
political positions in two types of countries. First, those 
countries which are actual recipients of South African arms. 
Second, countries with an interest in the global arms trade, but 
with no interest in buying arms from South A f r i c a .
South Africa can attempt to build up a strong supplier- 
client relationship with another country and then demand improved 
political relations or less public criticism as a quid pro quo 
for intensified military co-operation or more advanced weapons 
systems. Even without overt pressure, there is a natural tenden­
cy for arms recipients to try to maintain good relations with an 
arms supplier. South Africa could also follow the Israeli exam­
ple and try develop links with the military elites in countries 
buying arms via South African military-technical experts sent to 
receiver countries as instructors for the imported weapons sys­
tems and associated tactics.^^l
South Africa can also use its arms export capacity to influ­
ence countries with global interests, such as the United States. 
Washington has particular geographic areas of interest, such as
384
Southern Africa and Latin America where South Africa has emerged 
as an arms supplier. In such regions, Pretoria could attempt to 
establish coordinated relationship with extra-regional powers by 
supplying or withholding arms from states according to the wishes 
of the extra-regional power. South Africa could thus use arms 
exports to gain diplomatic points with the U.S.^^Z
Constraints on South Africa arms exports
There are a number of circumstantial factors which hindered South 
African arms exports during the Cold War and it is useful to 
examine them in some detail. First, there is the problem of 
down-grading equipment. In some respects Armscor * over-builds• 
in order to meet the particular demands of the SADF. The trouble 
is that few Third World countries —  South Africa's only custom­
ers —  need, say, armoured cars that are mine-proof or weapons 
systems with night sights given the considerable added cost. The 
higher prices can deter customers and in many cases Armscor must 
go through the expense of down-grading equipment and then on top 
of that charge a lower price for the system.
This ties in to the second problem which is Armscor's rela­
tive inability to tailor weapon systems for the export market. 
This stems partly from the limited size of South Africa's arms 
industry infrastructure and partly from demands of the SADF for
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particular specifications on equipment produced. Competitive 
prices may be possible if Armscor merely lengthens production 
runs for systems ordered by the SADF but this is less likely to 
be possible if Armscor designs a system which has no guaranteed 
market in South Africa. For Armscor to design more for the 
export market would entail expensive plant conversions and 
reconversions. The SADF plays a key role in production decisions 
and cherefore, Armscor is unable to function like France which 
can build slightly sub-NATO standard equipment expressly for 
export.
A third difficulty faced by South African arms exports in 
the 1980s was Pretoria's relative lack of means to finance major 
arms purchases by less wealthy developing countries. The major 
industrial powers are generally able to offer more attractive 
financing terms, co-production opportunities and a variety of 
other inducements to push through a particularly difficult sale, 
but South Africa could offer few such packages. The only alter­
native to cash is countertrade, and Armscor has managed to strike 
a number of agreements based on arms for oil with Iran,^^^Iraq 
and Oman.
The fourth major difficulty for Armscor's exports in the 
1980s was that the structure of the international arms market 
worked to South Africa's disadvantage. There were simply not 
very many good potential markets for Pretoria's military exports:
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-In the Middle East most of the weapons Armscor produces are 
second-rate given the qualitative level of the region's armed 
forces. In addition there is the political problem of Arab- 
African solidarity which in some cases deters Arab states wary 
about buying from South Africa. With regard to Israel, despite 
the cordial relationship between Tel Aviv and Pretoria, Armscor 
is effectively cut out of the Israeli market for qualitative 
reasons; because Israel can and indeed often must buy from the 
United States (due to tied American military assistance); and, 
finally, because of preference given to Israel's domestic defence 
sector.
-In Latin America, much of the market is already under the con­
trol of Brazil or other regional producers. The 'outsiders' who 
are well-entrenched include the United States and Israel. South 
Africa's sales to the region are estimated at only $15-20 million 
a n n u a l l y . 154 This is despite the fact that Chile is the only 
country in the world which allows Armscor to exhibit military 
equipment at its annual international arms fair.
-In the Asian market, South Africa faces many regional competi­
tors; India, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea all have growing 
arms industries. In addition, the recent period of relative 
peace in the region has somewhat diminished the demand for arms.
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-Finally, there is the African market for arms. This ought to be 
Armscor*s best chance for military exports, but for obvious 
reasons, Armscor was mostly unable to do business in the region 
during the Cold War. In French West Africa, the former métropole 
maintained its domination of the market and in the remainder of 
the continent Black Africa had little desire to conduct business 
with South Africa.
In summary, a region-by-region breakdown would seem to 
indicate that South Africa's arms export market in the 1980s were 
bleak indeed.
A fifth reason for Armscor's export difficulties was South 
Africa's pariah status during the 1970s and 80s. Few countries 
wished to be tarred by association with Pretoria, particularly 
over something like weapons. As Armscor's sales endeavours grew, 
so did attempts to stem the export of arms from South Africa. A 
non-mandatory UN resolution (558), which called for a ban on 
arms imports from South Africa, was approved by both the General 
Assembly and the Security Council in December 1984.
A sixth reason for South African arms export difficulties is 
of a more general nature. The 1980s have witnessed considerable 
growth in the number of arms exporting countries and sales began
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taking place in what was increasingly a buyer's market.
In conclusion, it may indeed be asked: What are the real 
advantages of buying from South Africa as opposed to buying from 
other Third World arms manufacturers? The answer would seem to
be that there are few advantages other than the fact thalj some of
what Armscor sells has been tested in actual combat conditions.
These six points mitigating against South African arms
f
exports are why Pretoria's claims to having increased annual arms
exports from less than $10 million in 1982 to over $900 million
in 1987 must be treated with caution.
South African arms for export
The difficulties outlined above and the hardening of sentiment 
against Apartheid during the 1980s have no doubt increased 
Armscor's export difficulties. Nevertheless, a strong marketing 
drive continued through the end of the end of the Cold War. 
Jane's Defence Weekly described Armscor's presence at Chile's 
international arms fair (FIDA) in March 1986 as heralding a 
"massive marketing d r i v e " . it was there that Armscor unveiled 
the Alpha XHl light attack helicopter. Other new equipment 
exhibited included a small gas turbine scaled for remotely- 
piloted-vehicles and sea-skimming missiles; helicopter mountings 
for machine guns; 250 kilogram cluster bombs; the SS77 light
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machine gun; the AS 80 artillery fire-control system, and several 
new versions of the Ratel and Eland armoured v e h i c l e s .
Although information on South Africa's arms exports is 
limited, it appears that Pretoria has not had any regular large 
scale purchasers of its military equipment. Instead, South 
Africa appears to have made the bulk of its military sales 
through ââ hoc deals which do not entail post-delivery links 
between the buyer and seller.
Only three countries are documented as having bought weapons 
from Armscor on a regular large-scale basis: Rhodesia, Chile and
Iraq.
Arms exports to Rhodesia during the 1960s and 70s included 
helicopters, transport aircraft, armoured cars and small arms. 
Such sales ended with the termination of white minority rule in 
1980.
Chile has bought South Africa's Kukri air-to-air missile and 
the Crotale/Cactus surface-to-air missile. In addition, Pretoria 
provided $13 million in construction aid for Chile's naval ship­
yards. However, future sales to Chile are uncertain, given the 
new democratic government in Santiago.
Sales of the G5/G6 howitzer to Iraq (and Iran) were reported 
during the Iran-Iraq War. In December 1990, Israel and Saudi 
Arabia reportedly bought out South Africa's stock of G-5s, re­
portedly in order to prevent Baghdad from acquiring any further
390
G-5S. But Iraq Is said to have bought South Africa's entire 1990 
production run of 155mm shells for the G5. The U.S. government 
reportedly signed an agreement to buy the entire 1991 production 
of G5 shells to prevent them from reaching B a g h d a d . ^57
According to a Financial Times report. South Africa re­
exported U.S. ballistic missile technology, illegally obtained 
from the American concern International Signal Control between 
1984 and 1988 to Iraq. A U.S. official quoted in the report 
said: "Do you remember watching the anti-aircraft bursts from 
Baghdad on CNN that first night of the Allied bombing in January? 
That was some of the stuff which got to Iraq through... shipments
to South Africa."158
South Africa is reported to have sold arms to various Yugo­
slav republics during the civil war in 1991.159
A listing of all reported South African arms exports is 
included in Appendix 6.
Yugoslavian Arms and Military Exports
There is considerable disagreement regarding the overall level of 
Yugoslavia's arms exports. This stems partly from the serious 
deficit of information on the Yugoslav arms trade; even in com­
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parison with other developing arms exporting countries. As 
Brzoska and Ohlson have stressed:
Yugoslavian arms exports are difficult to assess 
as there is very little information available. 
Information from various sources is most contradictory, 
even allowing for the large margins to expected in 
the secretive business of arms supply.
In part the confusion is generated by the Yugoslavian Defence 
Ministry which consistently gives higher figures for arms exports 
in its annual reports to the Federal Parliament than are pub­
lished by the U.S. government or the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (This is the opposite extreme 
of Israel and South Africa, whose respective governments report 
only a small fraction of arms exports.)
According to official figures from Belgrade, total Yugoslav 
arms exports were $1 billion in 1981, $1.7 billion in 1982, $2.4 
billion in 1983, $2.5 billion in 1984, and $2.2 billion in
1985.161 Figures supplied by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma­
ment Agency, although they include deliveries of small arms, 
military vehicles, ammunition, light artillery, spare parts, and 
machinery for the production of armaments, state that annual 
Yugoslav arms exports have grown from some $30 million in the
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early 1970s to over $400 million in the early 1 9 8 0 s . A  SIPRI 
study found that Yugoslav arms exports during the period 1978-88 
were worth some $4.7 billion, making Belgrade the eleventh big­
gest arms exporter for this p e r i o d . 1^3
But other SIPRI statistics show Yugoslavia to be exporting 
fewer arms with total exports running at just under $50 million a 
year since the late 1 9 7 0 s . B r z o s k a  and Ohlson argue the 
official Yugoslav figures are implausible because: 1) they are 
not reconcilable with Yugoslav foreign trade statistics; 2) 
because they imply a much wider spread of Yugoslav arms than can 
actually be detected; and, 3) because the figures contradict 
other official figures about arms production in Yugoslavia. They 
further note that if the share of exports of total production 
does not exceed one-third, then total exports cannot be higher 
than a maximum of $400 million, given Yugoslav military expendi­
tures of some $2.5 billion in the early 1980s.
Brzoska and Ohlson may be correct to question official 
Yugoslav arms exports figures for the 1980s of more than $2 
billion annually. However, the SIPRI figures of around $50 
million for annual arms exports are probably a considerable 
underestimate. Why so? A number of points need to be examined. 
First, while researching this dissertation I have found that 
SIPRI appears to have underestimated arms transfers with regard 
to all three case studies. This is to be expected as SIPRI sets 
rigorous standards required to confirm any arms deal before it
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can be included in the institute's Yearbook. Furthermore, SIPRI 
utilizes only sources which are open to the public. A final point 
concerning SIPRI results is that only 'major' weapons are covered 
in the trade data. SIPRI does not attempt to account for trans­
fers of small arms, ammunition, machinery for arms production, 
military clothing etc.^^®
A second factor which may lead to underestimates of Yugoslav 
military exports is the extreme difficulty of assessing the 
export levels of military components, sub-assemblies, technology 
packages, arms manufacture components, and military services 
fi.e.. training and upgrading of aircraft and military vehicles). 
Brozoska and Ohlson touch on this point when they say that such a 
levels of Yugoslav arms export cannot be detected. Yet this is 
precisely the problem of the sorts of exports listed above. 
Yugoslav sources have stressed that in addition to arms and 
military equipment, military engineering and services are also an
important e x p o r t .
A third factor, which may also contributes to low estimates 
of Yugoslav defence exports, is the level of Yugoslav re-export 
of arms originating in other countries. Brzoska and Ohlson 
mention of this phenomenon but then go on to state that even if 
allowance is made for extensive re-export the official Yugoslav 
figures still seem inflated. It is unclear if they reject that 
Yugoslavia is involved in large-scale arms re-export business and
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remain by the SIPRI estimate of some $50 million of annual arms 
exports, or if they concede that Yugoslavia's yearly arms exports 
are actually higher. Clearcut evidence is difficult to obtain, 
but there have been numerous reports that Yugoslavia served as a 
conduit for the re-export of arms from both the East and the 
West. Iran appears to have been an important recipient of such 
re-exported arms and technology. Yugoslavia is believed to have 
provided a vital clearinghouse for supplies from Eastern Europe, 
including East German ZSU anti-aircraft guns. American
rocket guidance systems, manufactured under license in West 
Germany, were reportedly re-exported from Yugoslavia to Iran 
under a contract "worth hundreds of millions of dollars".
A final point to consider is Brzoska and Ohlson's interpre­
tation of official Yugoslav statistics. Here the authors say 
that the officially stated level of arms exports is inflated 
since it contradicts Yugoslav trade statistics and because it 
would contradict official Yugoslav figures for arms production. 
This raises a number of questions. First, are arms manufactured 
for export —  and Yugoslavia does manufacture arms which are onlv 
for export -- included in the official figures for arms
production? Second, statistics in such areas of manufacture are 
in any case often suspect; particularly from the former state 
socialist countries. To accept one set of official trade statis­
tics and then reject another requires more verification than the 
authors p r o v i d e . Furthermore, this would seem to contradict
395
the methodology which the authors set forth in Appendix 10 of 
their work where they rightly assert that ••...foreign trade 
statistics do not reveal much about the arms trade..."
Arms exports: the political-security-diplomatic rationale
The first justification that Yugoslav officials made for 
Belgrade's policy of increasing arms exports was the country's 
leading role in the Nonaligned Movement. Yugoslavia exported 
arms as a means of supporting mainly developing countries at­
tempting to follow a nonaligned policy and as a means of encour­
aging developing countries to achieve independence from superpow­
er or former colonial arms suppliers.
Most Cold War Yugoslav arms exports went to developing 
countries. More specifically, Belgrade exported to developing 
countries involved in local conflicts or arms races and to coun­
tries which had not developed the capacity to produce more so­
phisticated weapons.172 indeed, the most important buyers of 
Yugoslav arms in recent years have been Iran, Iraq, and Libya.
There appear to have been two important advantages in buying 
arms from Yugoslavia. The first was that buyers dealt with a 
fellow non-aligned country which could be expected to be a more 
reliable supplier than, say, the United States has been with its
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Arab clients. In addition, although Yugoslav arms do not have 
added diplomatic distinction of having been supplied by a major 
power, Belgrade was not in a position to apply political or 
economic pressure on most of its clients.
A second advantage —  albeit one which was of increasingly 
reduced importance during the 1980s given Yugoslavia's worsening 
economic situation —  was that Belgrade was able to offer liberal 
financing or barter agreements to foreign arms buyers. This was 
an important point which set Yugoslavia apart from other arms 
manufacturers in the developing world.
An example of the export financing system which appears to 
have prevailed through mid-1987 was that used for Yugoslavia's 
shipbuilding industry. The buyers would pay some 20 per cent of 
the price before taking delivery; 5 per cent at the contract 
signing, 5 per cent at the keel laying, 5 per cent at the launch, 
and 5 per cent on delivery. The remainder would be financed by 
commercial banks, with 80 per cent of this commercial loan fi­
nanced by Juaomes. the Yugoslav Bank for International Coopera­
tion. But Juaomes resources to support exports were increas­
ingly limited in the 1980s. Major companies such as the 3rd May 
Shipyard and Eneraooroiekt. Yugoslavia's leading consulting and 
contracting concern, lost foreign orders due to the country's 
growing inability to provide f i n a n c i n g . 1^4
Countertrade remained an important means of financing for­
eign orders. However, deals offered under countertrade cannot
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compete with companies from developed countries which offer soft 
loans mixed with commercial loans, and can even finance local 
costs.
Arms exports: the economic rationale
Yugoslavia attempted to maintain a broad-based arms industry as 
an aspect of its security policy. But as shown in Chapters Four 
and Seven, it proved impossible for Belgrade to achieve anything 
near full independence of foreign armaments. Thus, arms exports 
were seen as an important means to maintain a large arms indus­
try. Exports were viewed as a means to reduce unit costs by 
allowing longer production runs, and to generate foreign ex­
change .
Nichol points out that the Yugoslav government regarded arms 
exports in general as a means to reduce the country's balance of 
payments deficit. Article 45 of the 1979 'Law on Economic and 
Other Relationships in the Production and Transportation of 
Armaments and other Military Equipment' states that the Federal 
Executive Council "will establish...measures and mechanisms for 
regular and supplementary stimulation of exports of products for 
special services and other forms of economic r e l a t i o n s . " ^ ^ 5
A second 1979 federal law regulating Yugoslavia's arms
398
industries directly set forth that the increase of arms exports 
was the official aim of the government. Article 23 of the law 
stated that the export of arms are for defensive purposes (i.e.. 
that exports are to go to countries of the nonaligned movement). 
Article 25 set forth that foreign trade in arms may be conducted 
by 'organisations of associated labour* (i.e.. Yugoslavia's self­
managed industries), provided the Federal Secretariat of National 
Defence approves the sales.
The nature of Yugoslav arms exports
Little is known about former Yugoslavia's military exports and 
assistance. In addition to training and technical support Yugo­
slav military assistance also involved the building of arms 
industries and other military production sites. But there are 
few documented examples of such Yugoslav military e x p o r t s . I ? ?
The rugged simplicity of Yugoslav-manufactured arms is a 
reason often cited for their export success. Developing coun­
tries require simple and rugged military systems, designed at 
least partially, for partisan and mountain warfare. Artillery 
which can be easily broken down for transport and aircraft which 
require only a meadow for takeoff or landing are cheaper and 
often more useful to developing countries than more advanced 
systems.
Yugoslavia's arms export clients
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Belgrade has military cooperation agreements with Indonesia, 
Romania, Egypt, and Zaumbia. These agreements formalise military 
trade arrangements and allow to military assistance programmes 
including defence-related construction projects, training and 
technical support.
Arms sales to Indonesia began after the Bandung conference 
in 1955. In 1977 it was announced that Yugoslavia and Indonesia 
had signed a cooperation agreement under which Belgrade would 
upgrade Indonesian defence sector industries. Yugoslavia provid­
ed Indonesia with frigates, patrol boats, landing craft, and 
various aircraft.
The key element of the agreement with Romania is the joint 
Orao fighter project, discussed in Chapter Four. Other the Orao 
project, few detail are known of the nature of Yugoslav exports 
to Bucharest.
Yugoslavia provided Zambia with Galeb and Jastreb trainer 
aircraft since 1971. Little is known about the nature of the 
military agreement with Zambia other than the fact that it was 
reaffirmed in 1982 when a Yugoslav delegation visited Lusaka.
Libya bought Yugoslav Galeb aircraft, fast attack boats, 
submarines, and air-defence technology since the mid-1970s. But 
little is known about the Joint Committee for Economic and Scien­
tific Cooperation which Belgrade established with Tripoli, other
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than that it held and annual meeting.
Yugoslavia's relationship with Egypt date back to 1953 when 
Belgrade began building links with the revolutionary government 
of General Naguib and Colonel N a s s e r . Duncan Wilson notes 
that arms were a key diplomatic tool in building ties with Egypt: 
"Again it was the supply of arms which led to closer diplomatic 
links."179 A joint military-technical committee, which met annu­
ally, was established between Belgrade and Cairo. Following the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War, when the Soviet Union was slow to re­
supply Egypt with military equipment, Cairo imported several 
hundred Soviet-made tanks from Y u g o s l a v i a . the mid-1970s, 
as President Anwar Sadat attempted to break Egypt's dependence on 
Soviet arms, Egyptian military ties to Yugoslavia again became 
important. The Egyptian army suffered from an acute lack of 
spare parts for Soviet equipment and after India refused to sell 
Cairo the necessary spares for MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft, Sadat 
made a special trip to Yugoslavia, which had just begun producing 
spares for the MiG-21. However, the level of assistance Egypt 
subsequently received from Yugoslavia is not k n o w n . ^^l
In addition, various naval vessels have been sold to coun­
tries as diverse a Burma, Ethiopia, Hungary, and Vietnam. Minia­
ture submarines have been bought by Sweden and the Soviet Union. 
Howitzers and anti-aircraft guns have been sold to Cyprus and 
Zimbabwe. For a listing of reported Yugoslav arms exports see 
Appendix 8.
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Conclusion
Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia became important Third World 
arms exporters during the final two decades of the Cold War 
primarily for economic and diplomatic reasons.
Israel appears to have sold arms as a diplomatic tool to 
break out of international isolation and to build links with 
countries which had large Jewish populations. From an economic 
standpoint, Jerusalem viewed arms sales as an increasingly impor­
tant industrial export during the 1970s and 80s.
South Africa also tried to use arms sales as part of a 
diplomatic effort to escape its international pariah status 
during the Cold War; albeit with far less success than Israel. 
South Africa's economic downturn in the 1980s led to increased 
economic incentives for arms exports.
Yugoslavia sought to bolster the Nonaligned Movement through 
arms sales, but also appears to have sold increasing amounts of 
arms on purely economic grounds during the country's worsening 
economic situation in the 1980s.
Total arms export volumes from all three countries remains a 
state secret, but Israel was clearly the largest exporter with 
annual average sales in the 1980s probably around $1 billion. 
South Africa and Yugoslavia probably had average annual arms 
export sales of at least several hundred million dollars during
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this period.
The relevance of these high arms export figures for this 
dissertation is found in the paradox set forth in the introduc­
tion. Namely that all three countries became important Third 
World arms exporters during the 1970s and 80s, despite the fact 
that they were becoming militarily more dependent than ever on 
the industrialised countries for military technology and major 
'off the shelf' weapons systems.
Continued military dependency on the industrialised coun­
tries did not prevent Israel, for example, from defying the West 
with continued arms deliveries to Argentina during the 
Falklands/Malvinas War. It appears that as more countries 
become arms or military technology exporters at the close of the 
twentieth century, military dependency will become a less dan­
gerous liability for Third World countries (regardless of whether 
of not they are arms sellers themselves) than it was in the first 
three decades of the Cold War.
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Chapter Seven
Continued arms import dependency: Israeli, South African and 
Yugoslav weapons, military technology and nuclear imports in the 
1970s and 80s
The preceding chapters illustrated achievements of the case 
study countries regarding development of respective domestic arms 
manufacturing sectors and level and role of arms and military 
exports. This chapter will assess Israel, South Africa, and 
Yugoslavia's continued level of dependence on foreign weapons 
imports. I will show that despite billions of dollars invested 
in respective defence industrial sectors and a few spectacular 
weapons manufacturing achievements, the armed forces of the three 
countries remain dependent on foreign sources for the same kev 
weapons svstems which were sources of foreign dependency in the 
1950s and 60s.
The fighter aircraft of Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia 
are a classic, but by no means the only example of this point. 
In the late 1950s and early 60s Israel relied on imported French 
Mirage Ills as frontline aircraft. In the 1990s imported Ameri­
can F-15S and F-16s form the backbone of the Israeli Airforce.
South Africa also bought French Mirages as key element in of 
its air force beginning in the early 1960s. With the arms embar­
go, Pretoria was been unable to buy a new generation of fighters 
from abroad and had to make do with upgrading existing planes
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with Israeli Kfir fighter technology. Manufacturing an indige­
nous fighter remains out of South African technological and 
financial reach.
Yugoslavia began importing Soviet MiG-21s in the early 
1960s. Despite production of a variety of fighter aircraft, 
Belgrade began importing Soviet MiG-29s in 1988 as front-line 
planes for the air force.
The continued dependency of the three case study countries 
on foreign fighter aircraft is mirrored with regard to numerous 
other advanced weapon systems which will be outlined below.
Dependence on major weapons systems remains but limited independ­
ence possible
Although the case study countries remained heavily dependent on 
the industrialised powers for major weapons imports through the 
end of the Cold War, it should be pointed out that absolute 
military independence is impossible to achieve —  even for a 
superpower like the United States.
As Gerald Steinberg has noted, studies which simply dismiss 
the possibility of developing countries achieving military inde­
pendence through their defence sectors are superficial. Stein­
berg says:
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The assumption that complete independence or 
dependence are the only choices is not supported 
a careful examination....the relationships 
between arms supplies and dependence are fungible; 
they do not form a complete and inseparable "whole" 
at one pole or the other.^
What Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia achieved by 1990 
via their respective defence industry sectors was an enhanced 
short and medium-term independence with regard to non-major 
weapon systems fi.e.. not with regard to fighter aircraft, tanks 
or naval vessels) and spare parts.
Israeli defence industries may now be in a position to 
maintain supplies during a short war so as to prevent the country 
from falling into a situation as during and after the 1973 Arab- 
Israeli War in which the United States was able to exert pressure 
on Jerusalem through control of resupply of arms and spares. In 
the case of South Africa, domestic defence production has allowed 
the country to evade the UN arms embargo with regard to less 
advanced weapons. But this is a short and medium term success —  
unless sanctions are dropped, Pretoria will have to import ad­
vanced systems like submarines, fighter aircraft and helicopters
418
should South African security doctrine still require such sys­
tems. Yugoslavia's dispersal of arms and munitions factories was 
also meant as a short and medium term declaration of independence 
during the Cold War: Like Israel, Belgrade developed the means
to produce basic weapons and spares and sought to show it would 
be able to keep producing military materiel during at least the 
initial stages of a war.
The respective defence sectors thus achieved a limited 
extension of arms suddIv independence for the three case study 
countries. (Whether this limited extension has been worth the 
high cost of developing a large defence sector is another ques­
tion entirely, and beyond the realm of this dissertation.)
But such limited levels of independent arms production fall 
far short of what was envisaged by policy-makers who chose devel­
opment of costly domestic arms industries as a remedy against 
past and future arms embargoes in the case study countries over 
the past decades. I have therefore, as stressed in the introduc­
tion to this dissertation, chosen a relatively high level of 
indigenous content in arms production as a yardstick in assessing 
the success or failure of arms manufacture in Israel, South 
Africa and Yugoslavia.
The hard fact remains that all three countries were highly 
dependent on foreign sources for major weapons systems at the end 
of the Cold War. Let us now examine the continued dependency of 
Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia on imported military systems
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in greater detail, starting with the special features of the 
Israeli case.
Israeli Military Imports
Israeli military-industrial and technological dependency on the 
industrialised Western countries has been broadly examined in 
Chapter Two on Israel's defence industry.
The Israel section of this chapter, with Appendix 5, will 
document Israel's major arms imports beginning in the late 1960s 
—  the start of the major growth period for country's arms indus­
tries —  and will briefly survey Israel's acquisition of military 
technology through covert means from both Europe and the United 
States.2 I will then examine Jerusalem's special relationship 
with the United States and Israeli financial and technological 
dependency on Washington for military projects. The Israel 
section will conclude with a survey of Israeli foreign dependency 
for its civil and military nuclear programme.
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Military imports
The paradox of Israel is that at precisely the time domestic 
production of military systems radically increased —  1968-1975 
—  Jerusalem was in tandem becoming more heavily dependent than 
ever before on outside sources for major weapons systems and for 
the means to finance its armed forces. This was partly because 
in the wake of the 1967 War, Israel increasingly came to demand 
first echelon weapons systems —  particularly aircraft —  as 
part of its doctrine to counter superior Arab numbers with supe­
rior technology and tactics. It was also during this period that 
the costs of major weapons systems with advanced technology began 
their upward spiral which has continued to this day; The estimat­
ed price of well over $500 million for a single American Stealth 
B-2 bomber is only the most recent, if somewhat extreme, example.
It is ironic that in 1968, the year Israel embarked on the 
development the Kfir fighter in a bid to reduce dependency on 
foreign arms, the Johnson administration approved the sale of 
advanced F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft to the Israeli air force. 
Likewise in 1975, the year the Kfir entered service, the Ford 
administration signed a memorandum of agreement to supply Israel 
with the advanced F-16 fighter. Both of these deals are indica­
tive of the speed at which Israeli military demand began out­
stripping Israeli military manufacturing capacities even during 
the military sector's period of most heated growth.
421
This period also witnessed the beginning of Israel's major 
dependency on Washington for military and financial aid. At 
the beginning of Israel's race to develop an indigenous arms 
manufacturing sector, U.S. military aid rose to a then high of 
$85 million in 1969. In 1974, as an increasing number of Israeli 
military industries were coming on stream, U.S. military aid to 
Jerusalem reached nearly $2.5 b i l l i o n . ^
These figures are only the financial side of Israel's grow­
ing dependency during this period. As will be shown below, 
Israel's imports of key major weapons systems have remained 
largely unchanged in the past 20 years, despite the huge growth 
of the country's defence industry sector.
A series of factors combine to place contemporary Israel in 
a position of dependency on foreign sources for the supply of its 
armed forces near to that of 1967. These include:
-the rapid development in world military technology which leave 
Israel, and other developing arms producers, ever further behind;
-reliance on a military doctrine which stresses technological 
superiority to overcome potentially massive numerical enemy 
superiority;
-a weak economy with limited means to finance the country's armed
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forces in their required size, let alone costs associated with 
the research, development and production of major weapons sys­
tems;
-limited results in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict through 
diplomacy which could lead to a reduction of the Israeli Defence 
Force's requirements for military materiel to levels which could 
be sustained by truly indigenous arms production.
Israeli dependency on foreign arms has been greatly reduced 
with regard to smaller and less sophisticated systems since 1967. 
However, with regard to major systems —  apart from missiles —  
it must be conceded that little has changed between 1967 and 
1989. To cite the most obvious example for this argument: In
1967 Israel was dependent on the import of French Mirage aircraft 
to form the backbone of its air force. In 1989, with the cancel­
lation of the Lavi fighter Israel will remain dependent on Ameri­
can F-16 and F-15 aircraft to form the key element of its air 
force through the end of the century. The difference today being 
that the F-16 are fitted with some Israeli avionics and software 
upon delivery whereas the Mirages were largely bought 'off the 
shelf. As Andrew Pierre has concluded in his study The Global 
Politics of Arms Sales:
423
...Israel has found out, self-sufficiency is 
illusionary. The growth in its exports (of arms) 
has been more than matched by a growth in its 
imports of sophisticated arms. ^
The argument made by Brzoska and Ohlson that Israel's imports of 
major arms have decreased since the mid-1970s remains something 
of an overstatement,5 for as shown in Chapter Two, most of the 
'indigenous* major Israeli military systems require key foreign 
components in their manufacture.
At the end of Cold War the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies*s (IISS) Military Balance dramatically illus­
trates Israel's continued preponderant reliance on foreign-manu- 
factured manor weapon systems in the early 1990s.
Of Israel's 3,850 main battle tanks (MBT) some 1,080 are 
British Centurions, 1,300 are U.S. M-60 Al/A3s, 561 are U.S. M- 
48s, and 365 are captured Soviet T-62s and r-54/55s. The Israeli 
element of the MBT force consists of only 550 Merkava I/IIs.^
Out of a total of 523 front line fighter, ground attack and 
interceptor aircraft, 50 are U.S. F-15s, 145 are U.S. F-16s, 113 
are U.S. F-4Es, and 121 are U.S. A-4H/N Skyhawks. The Israeli 
element comprises 95 Kfir C2/C7 aircraft. As Israel does not 
manufacture helicopters the air force's 163 helicopters are all
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of U.S. or French manufacture.^
Israel's navy, long the least developed arm of the Israeli 
Defence Forces, has —  at least presently —  a higher proportion 
of indigenously manufactured craft. Out of 28 fast patrol craft 
only 3 are of foreign manufacture. However, all rely on the U.S. 
Harpoon missile as their primary anti-ship missile system. 
Israel's 3 aging submarines were manufactured by the Vickers yard 
in the United Kingdom.® Their replacements will be built in 
Germany. The Sa'ar 5 missile boat, a key component of the navy's 
upgrading programme, will be built in the United States. Thus, 
it would appear that as the Israeli navy is developed to meet the 
high standards set by the army and air force, the possibilities 
for indigenous production of its major weapons systems decline.
Despite the scale of its military sector, Israel also finds 
it necessary to import a huge variety of more basic military 
equipment the sale of which remains subject to approval of re­
spective foreign governments. These smaller items are, like 
military components and technology transfer, far more difficult 
to document. Two recent examples of such less elaborate equip­
ment will suffice here: In 1989 the British government refused
to approve a sale of gas masks to Israel on the ground that they 
could be used 'to develop an offensive capability'.^ Also in 
1989 the U.S. General Accounting Office (the investigative arm of 
the U.S. Congress) published a report saying it saw no grounds 
for withholding U.S. exports of tear gas to I s r a e l .
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It is impossible to provide a fully comprehensive listing of 
all major Israeli arms imports since the late 1960s, partly 
because of the level of secrecy surrounding such transfers and 
partly due to the sheer volume of such transfers given that 
military aid from Washington has been at levels well over $1 
billion a year since the mid-1970s. But a listing of key major 
systems is possible: For further details of such Israeli weapons 
imports from 1967 see Appendix 5.
This heavy continued dependence on American weapons meant 
Israeli-built arms systems played a negligible role in 
Jerusalem's armed conflicts from late 1960s to the early 1990s. 
Beginning with the Mirage aircraft which played a key role in the 
1967 War, on to the American F-15s and F-16s used in the 1981 
bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear plant, to the cluster bombs used 
in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and on to the Patriot missile 
systems sent by the U.S. to guard Israel from Scud missiles in 
the 1991 Gulf War, Jerusalem remained dependent on foreign weap­
ons for actual combat situations throughout the Cold War and 
beyond.
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Dependence on covertly acquired military technology
As with South Africa, an important area of endeavour for the 
Israeli diplomatic and intelligence communities is obtaining 
military technologies either covertly or overtly. Israel has 
been able to obtain most required military technology from France 
and the United States, either through military exchange agree­
ments on a state-state level or through co-operation agreements 
between Israeli defence sector concerns and those abroad. In 
other cases, however, Israel has found it necessary to obtain 
military technology through covert means. Such operations in­
volving the theft of military technology from foreign states or 
concerns have a long history in Israel. Aside from reported 
illegal imports of uranium, which will be discussed below, 
Israel * s most impressive illegal acquisition of foreign technolo­
gy was the purchase of the plans for the Mirage 5 aircraft and 
the Atar 9C jet engine from an employee of SNECMA's licensee, 
Sulzer Brothers in Switzerland. Some of the recent cases of 
Israeli industrial espionage include the reported illegal acqui­
sition of cluster bomb technology, the illegal import of 
technology for the manufacture of chrome-plating tank cannon 
barrels, nuclear weapons 'trigger technology, and missile 
guidance systems all from the United States. Dependence on 
American technology and industrial espionage in the United 
States will be discussed below.
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Domestic production facilities arms imports
An interesting point on which to conclude this section is the 
curious role domestic Israeli arms production appears to play in 
facilitating Israeli arms imports. Eitan Berglas argues that an 
aspect of domestic military production, which is no less impor­
tant than the actual manufacture of weapons, is the fact that 
once it is clear to foreign suppliers that Israel can produce 
specific advanced systems locally, foreign governments are gener­
ally more ready to export similar systems. Berglas cites air-to- 
air missiles and electronic countermeasures as two examples of 
this phenomenon.
Israel * s Special Relationship with the United States
"The magnitude of U.S. arms transfers to Israel is astonishing 
not so much in volume, which is remarkable in itself, but even 
more in the quality of arms transferred.1^
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While the previous chapters have shown that the United States 
supplies Israel with substantial military equipment, technology 
and finances, it is useful to briefly outline the historical 
development of these ties, and to document the numerous bilateral 
agreements under which they are regulated.
Although the United States under the Truman administration 
was the first country to recognise Israel in 1948, relations 
between the two countries did not assume their present form of 
heavy Israeli dependence on U.S. military supplies and financial 
assistance until the early 1970s and the strategic relationship 
was not codified until the Reagan administration. Presidents 
Truman and Eisenhower distanced the U.S. from Israel, Richard 
Nixon was the first American president to visit Israel, Jimmy 
Carter took care to avoid calling Israel and 'ally', while Ronald 
Reagan called Israel 'a major strategic asset'
Although United States military aid to Israel was minimal 
prior to 1966, American economic aid began in 1949 with a $100 
million loan from the Export-Import Bank. In 1952 Washington 
initiated a programme of economic grants to assist Israel in 
absorbing refugees and to finance commodity imports. Under the 
Food For Peace programme (PL 480) some $635 million worth of food 
was sent to Israel between 1952 and 1 9 7 3 . Despite the absence 
of direct U.S. military aid to Israel during this period, Wash­
ington still interceded indirectly on behalf of the Jewish state 
by encouraging France to supply arms to Israel following the 1955
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Czech arms deal with Egypt.
These relatively modest levels of U.S. aid were radically 
altered in the early 1970s. Combined U.S. economic and military 
aid to Israel increased from $71.1 million in 1970 to $600.8 
million in 1971. Resupply of arms and military materiel after 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War led to the 1974 aid package total of 
some $2.5 billion and in 1979, the year of the Camp David ac­
cords, the total U.S. military and economic aid reached $4.81 
billion. In the early 1980s the yearly figure was between $2.2 
and $2.5 billion and since 1987 it has been over $3 billion.
United States military and economic aid to Israel since 1948 
thus totals well over $60 billion. This means that in inflation 
adjusted dollars Israel has received more aid than was received 
by all Western Europe under the Marshall Plan. And this is 
despite the fact that Israel's population of 4.3 million is 
barely one and a half per cent that of post-War Western E u r o p e . ^0 
(It should also be noted that Israel receives $1 billion yearly 
in private donations from American Jews and a further $1 billion 
in U.S. bank credits.) The CIA reports that from this total sum 
Israel expects Washington to fund 50 per cent of its defence 
budget.  ^^
The financial and military aid relationship between Israel 
and the United States has a number of unique characteristics not 
found in Washington's other bilateral aid relationships:
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First, is the fact that since 1985 all U.S. aid has been 
given in the form of outright grants rather than repayable loans. 
Most other U.S. aid recipients receive loans.
Second, that economic grants are paid in cash for 'general 
budgetary support' instead of being of disbursed for specific
development projects which is the usual procedure. The Israeli
government may thus spend the grants in any way it chooses.
Third, military grants are paid on a 'cash flow' basis 
meaning that these funds may be committed by the Israeli govern­
ment to projects before they are appropriated by the U.S. Con­
gress. This means that Congress is obliged to appropriate the 
funds in order to meet the long-term contracts that Israel signs 
with American military suppliers.
Fourth, Israel is exempt from the 'buy American' rules which 
are customarily attached to FMS military grants. Israel is 
allowed to spend up to $300 million per year on purchases from 
its domestic arms industry and on military research and develop­
ment projects. The precedent for using FMS grants for develop­
ment of Israel's arms industries was established in 1977 when the 
U.S. granted permission for $107 million to be used for initial 
production of the Merkava tank.
Fifth, there is no resident U.S. Agency for International 
Development (U.S. AID) mission in Israel. The normal procedure 
for the disbursement of American economic assistance is for the 
U.S. AID mission to prepare and recommend an annual assistance
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programme for Washington to review. In the case of Israel the 
Israeli Ministry of Finance prepares an annual report on 'Re­
quirements for U.S. Aid', which is then presented to the adminis­
tration in Washington by the Israeli finance minister.^2
The U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative or 'Star Wars' pro­
gramme has also proven to be a lucrative source of research and 
development capital for Israel. Indeed, by 1989 Israel was the 
largest foreign participant in the Strategic Initiative programme 
with total contracts awarded to Israeli firms valued at $165
million.23
A further agreement between Washington and Jerusalem with 
major economic potential for Jerusalem is the Israeli - U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement of March 1985, Washington's first such agreement 
with a foreign country. Under the Agreement all tariffs between 
the two countries will be eliminated by 1995.
In sum, the financial aspects of Israel's relationship with 
the United States have played a vital role in allowing the eco­
nomically weak Jewish state to exist militarily well beyond its 
means. American financial support since the early 1970s allowed 
Israel to maintain its armed forces at their qualitative and 
quantitative levels and provided much of the required capital for 
Israel's defence industries. Israel's chronic and massive finan­
cial dependency on the United States is perhaps best captured in 
the title of Robert Gibson's useful investigative report in The
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Los Angeles Times: 'Israel an economic ward of the U.S.'
But financial aid is only one part of Israel's relationship 
with Washington. A second, and equally vital facet of Israel's 
import dependency on the United States is the area of military 
technology transfer. Israel has been permitted perhaps the most 
unrestricted access of any country in the world to American 
military technology. This is partly due to the great mobility of 
scientists and engineers between the U.S. and Israel, but more 
fundamentally because of Israeli acquisition of American military 
technical data packages under a series of bilateral agreements 
with Washington.
The means through which Israel obtains U.S. defence technol­
ogy vary widely. At least four broad channels which serve as 
military technology conveyor belts from the United States to 
Israel have been identified by McLaurin:
-First, the sales of advanced weapons systems to Israel. This 
often involves technology transfer, in part because Israeli 
military engineers are very sophisticated in analysing imported 
systems and partly because such sales generally involve extensive 
training of Israeli operators, logistics and maintenance person­
nel.
-Second, are military technology data transfers. The U.S.- 
Israeli accords governing such transfers are examined below.
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Because Israeli scientists are relatively advanced and are aided 
by scientific and technical consuls at all of Israel's U.S. 
diplomatic installations, they are able to monitor U.S. defence 
sector developments and are capable of ordering key components 
rather than complete systems. This sometimes helps circumvent 
military export controls.
-Third, is technical training in defence or defence applicable 
fields. McLaurin notes that military education/training ex­
changes between the U.S. and Israel are "extensive". Less well 
documented are the numbers Israelis who study defence related 
subjects in the United States —  Washington's Privacy Act prohib­
its dissemination of such information.
-Fourth, are corporate relationships, which were discussed in 
Chapter Two.^S
American foreign policy, surprisingly, appears to have been 
designed since 1967 to not only make Israel a regional military 
power, but also to build up the country's arms industry. Accord­
ing to the uncensored version of a draft report prepared by the 
U.S. General Accounting Office in 1983 entitled U.S. Assistance 
to the State of Israel ;
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Following the 1967 Six Day War, France placed 
a military embargo on Israel and it was thus 
spurred to become more military independent 
and to invest heavily into its defense industries. 
Since that time. Israel has rçç e i y e d. V, S . 
financial and technical support achieve
own arms production capability, (emphasis added)
The report goes on to note that "Israel, more than any other FMS 
(Foreign Military Sales) recipient country, has been provided 
with a higher level of military technologies having export poten­
tial" and that "This could adversely impact upon the U.S. economy 
and can affect U.S. ability to control proliferation of these 
technologies".
A series of agreements have formalised the flow of techno­
logical information with military applications from the United 
States to Israel since 1970: ^8
197 0 - The Master Defence Development Data Exchange Agreement 
established the terms and conditions for the exchange of techni­
cal data on a range of military systems. These have included: 
tank systems, rocket and missile systems, air defence systems, 
artillery systems, electronic warfare, infantry weapons, and 
defence against chemical agents.
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1971 - Agreement for Israeli production of American military 
equipment.
1973 - Weapons Systems Evaluation Group established to collect 
data on the performance of opposing Soviet and Western weapons 
systems used during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
1979 - Memorandum of Agreement on Principles Governing Co­
operation in Research and Development, Scientist and Engineer 
Exchange, and Procurement and Logistics Support of Selected 
Defence Equipment (MOA). The MOA has two annexes: Annex A seeks 
to expand the existing data exchange programme from the 1970 
Master Defence Agreement. Annex B provides a list of some 560 
military goods and services for which Israeli firms can submit 
offers to tender to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) without 
the application of * Buy American* restrictions which normally 
require the DOD to purchase American or NATO produced military 
equipment.
1981 - Defence Trade Initiative to develop and enhance Israel's 
defence production and technological base.
1981 - The Defence Trade Initiative was incorporated in the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Co-operation (MOU),
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signed on November 30. The MOU provided for American purchases 
of up to $200 million worth of Israeli military materiel annually 
to stimulate Israel's defence sector. The MOU was suspended 
after Israel annexed the Golan Heights in December 1981 but the 
spirit and most of activities of the Defence Trade Initiative 
were implemented under the 1979 MOA.
1983 - The 1981 MOU was reactivated and expanded under a further 
Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Co-operation. The 1983 
MOU established a joint American-Israeli committee to co-ordinate 
military planning, exercises, intelligence sharing, the stockpil­
ing of arms and military supplies in Israel, provided American 
funding for Israeli assistance programmes in the Developing 
countries, and offered more generous terms for U.S. economic and 
military aid to Israel.
1984 - Further revision and expansion of the 1979 Memorandum of 
Agreement on co-operation in research and development, produc­
tion, procurement, and logistic support between respective U.S. 
and Israeli defence sectors. A committee was established to 
prepare annexes, as required in the future, on any of the sub­
jects covered in the 1979 MOA.
1986 - Memorandum of Understanding to regulate Israeli and U.S. 
co-operation on the Strategic Defence Initiative.
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1986 - U.S. Congress approves the Nunn and Quayle Amendments to 
the National Defence Authorisation Act for the 1987 fiscal year 
governing co-operative military research and development with 
major non-NATO allies. The Nunn amendment allocates $40 million 
for this purpose and the Quayle amendment names Israel as quali­
fying for these funds and sets forth conditions for a joint U.S.- 
Israeli anti-tactical ballistic missile programmme.
1987 - Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Principles 
Governing Mutual Co-operation in Research and Development, Scien­
tist and Engineer Exchange, Procurement and Logistic Support of 
Defense Equipment was signed in December 1987. This MOU super­
seded and expanded the 1979 MOU and effectively granted Israel 
the same status as NATO allies in joint research and development 
projects. In addition, Israeli defence sector firms are granted 
the right to compete for a wider range of defence p r o j e c t s . 2*
1988 - On 21 April, the fortieth anniversary of Israel's inde­
pendence (by the Jewish calendar), the U.S. and Israel signed a 
new Memorandum of Agreement which "essentially institutionalized 
all the existing relationships in political, security and econom­
ic cooperation".30
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Intelligence and covert acquisition of military technology in the 
U.S.
"...it seems that even the CIA believes that apart from the odd 
questionable exercise, the Mossad, except for liaison, simply 
does operative (sic) actively in the United States itself.
Well, they're wrong."
-Victor Ostrovsky, former Mossad agent
The preceding pages have shown that Israel has a series of major 
formalised conveyor belts supplying substantial volumes of Ameri­
can military technology and U.S. government funding to Israel's 
defence sector. Nevertheless, Israel also utilises its special 
relationship with the United States gather military technology 
and other intelligence information by covert means.
Striking evidence of Israeli reliance on foreign military 
technology was revealed by a CIA report on Israeli intelligence 
priorities, released by Iranian students who occupied the U.S. 
embassy in Tehran in 1979. The top Israeli priority, according 
to the report, is intelligence on Arab military capabilities,
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second is collection of information on secret U.S. policy or 
decisions concerning Israel, and third is the "collection of 
scientific intelligence in the U.S. and other developed coun­
tries" .
The Pollard spy case which rocked U.S.-Israeli relations in 
1986 was not, as the Israeli government maintained, an unautho­
rised operation and a deviation from normal Israeli policy in the 
U.S. In most cases, it has simply not been necessary for Israel 
to mount such complex undercover operations in the United States 
given the enormous, amount of information supplied by an unoffi­
cial network of unpaid officials who are sympathetic to Israel, 
in the Pentagon, the State Department, National Security Council, 
the CIA, and in Congress. As Charles Babcock wrote in the Wash­
ington Post;
...for decades, the Israelis have targeted and 
been able to learn virtually every secret about 
US foreign policy in the Middle East, according 
to a secret 1979 CIA report on the Israeli 
intelligence services and recent interviews 
with two dozen current or former US 
intelligence officials.
One of those interviewed for Babcock's article, Robert G. Neu­
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mann, the first US ambassador to Saudi Arabia under the Reagan 
administration, reported that sensitive cables which he sent to 
Washington were sometimes leaked before the receiving assistant 
secretary could read them. Neumann is quoted as saying: "The 
government is honeycombed with people who do that. They aren't 
paid spies, but the line between that and espionage is thin."3*
Such activity on behalf of Israel appears to be tolerated by 
the United States. A 'retired senior intelligence official' 
quoted in the Washington Post report stated:
There is no question that one administration 
after another handled Israeli espionage differently 
from other countries...Political decisions were made 
to have U.S. counterintelligence officials look 
the other way.^^
In his book on the Israeli intelligence service, former 
Mossad agent Victor Ostrovsky writes that Israel operates a 
special top-secret division of the Mossad in the United States.
Called Al, Hebrew for 'on top' or 'above', its primary task 
is to gather information about the Arab world and PLO. But Al is 
also involved in military-industrial espionage.
Ostrovsky alleges that one of A l 's recent achievements was 
the theft of research material from leading U.S. aircraft manu­
facturers to help Israel secure a $25.8 million contract to
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supply the U.S. Marine Corps with unmanned Mazlat Pioneer 1 
drones. Mazlat, a subsidiary of the Tadiran concern, won the 
contract after outbidding U.S. firms in a 1985 tender
In reality, stole the research. Israel 
had been working on a drone, but was not nearly 
far enough advanced to enter this competition.
When you don't have to include research recovery 
costs in your bid it makes a substantial difference.
Israeli nuclear systems and materials: higher technology imports
A full analysis and description of the development of Israel's 
nuclear research and nuclear weapons programme lies beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Nuclear affairs comprise the most 
secret sector of Israeli defence production and hence the infor­
mation deficit is particularly pronounced. Nevertheless, some 
aspects of the Israeli nuclear programme have been pieced togeth­
er via nuclear materiel transport records, court records, inside
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sources, and a series of leaks (both real and orchestrated), the 
most spectacular of which was the Sunday Times story on Israel's 
Negev Nuclear Research Centre at Dimona, based on accounts given 
by a former employee of the centre, Mordechai Vanunu.^? This 
section will be limited to an attempt to document Israeli imports 
of nuclear technology and materials and thereby illustrate that 
Jerusalem's dependency on foreign sources in the nuclear sector 
mirror those in other areas of defence production.
Israel received its first nuclear reactor from the United 
States under the Eisenhower administration's Atoms for Peace 
programme. The Nahal Soreq research reactor, which went critical 
in 1960, was small enough that it precluded the production of 
militarily significant quantities of plutonium. The United 
States retained the right to regularly inspect the entire site 
and in 1964 this right was transferred to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA).^®
In 1957 France made a secret agreement with Israel to build 
a nuclear reactor and a chemical plant for the production of 
plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel. In addition, France's 
high commissioner for atomic energy from 1951-1970, Professor 
Francis Perrin, said (in a 1986 interview) that for two years in 
the late 1950s France and Israel worked closely together on 
developing an atomic bomb.^S According to Perrin, the level of 
French co-operation with Israel was kept secret because of agree­
ments with the United States which allowed French scientists
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connected with nuclear weapons work in Canada during the Second 
World War to return to France and apply their expertise to the 
French nuclear programme on the condition that the nuclear se­
crets be kept. A further reason for secrecy appears to have
been fear that Washington would end the limited volume of nuclear 
materiel exports to France. (Between 1 9 5 6  and 1 9 6 0  France im­
ported 3 6 . 5  tonnes of heavy water from the U.S.) Israel's
heavy water reactor at Dimona came on stream in 1 9 6 3  and the 
plutonium reprocessing plant is estimated to have begun function­
ing in 1 9 6 6 .  42
Part of the reason for French aid to Israel was that Paris 
also benefited from the co-operation. Technology developed by 
Israeli scientists to produce heavy water was given to French 
officials, and a heavy-water plant was subsequently built at 
Toulouse. But in 1 9 5 9 ,  President de Gaulle decided to end nucle­
ar cooperation with Israel. However, the contract for French 
construction of the reactor and plutonium plant at Dimona was 
honoured and Israel's reactor came into operation in 1 9 6 4 . *3
Gary Milhollin argues that Israel's collaboration with 
France gave the Jewish state three of the five ingredients it 
needed to produce nuclear weapons: a small research reactor, a
plutonium extraction plant, and nuclear weapons design informa­
tion.*4 The two ingredients which remained —  natural uranium 
and heavy water —  were acquired by Israel from foreign sources
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(although Israel has been able to obtain some uranium from in­
digenous phosphate deposits).
Sources of uranium have included Argentina, South Africa, 
Belgium, and reportedly French-controlled mines in Niger, the 
Central African Republic and G a b o n . I s r a e l  managed to evade 
export controls on uranium through illegal diversion of uranium 
shipments organised by the Mossad. In one case a shipment of 200 
metric tonnes of Belgian uranium was diverted at sea, in what 
came to be known as the 'Plumbat affair*. In other cases French 
and British lorry shipments of uranium were reportedly 
hijacked.46 Israel also reportedly acquired over 100 kilos of 
enriched uranium from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corpo­
ration (NUMEC) of the United States 47 ^nd in 1984 bought 40 
tonnes of enriched British uranium and evaded IAEA approval via 
Luxembourg.4 ®
Supplies of heavy water (a rare isotope of water that is 
needed to cool and control certain types of nuclear reactors) 
proved more difficult to obtain. Although Israel was able to 
produce small amounts of heavy water through an indigenous proc­
ess, far greater amounts were needed for the Dimona plant. In 
the early 1960s only the United States and Norway exported heavy 
water, and both restricted exports for so-called peaceful pur­
p o s e s . 49 Israel subsequently bought 21 tonnes of heavy water 
from Norway and 3.9 tonnes from the United States. ^0
Citing Pierre Péans work. Les deux bombes. Milhollin ac-
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knowledges that Israel may also have received heavy water from 
France during the 1960s which France had bought from the United 
States between 1956 and 1960 for its own nuclear programme. 
Barnaby argues that imports of heavy water may have been the 
crucial element in increasing the power output of the Dimona 
reactor which allowed Israel's nuclear weapons programme to be
speeded up. By 1970, France had imported 200 tonnes of heavy
water from the United States and was producing 26 tonnes a year 
at the Toulouse plant. "France therefore could have supplied 
Israel with the heavy water it needed to boost Dimona*s power 
from 70 up to 150 (megawatts)."^1
The Norwegian heavy water has proven politically troublesome 
for Israel since the disclosures of former Dimona technician, 
Mordechai Vanunu, in 1986 that Israel had manufactured nuclear 
weapons. Under the agreement signed with Norway in 1959, Israel 
not only pledged to use the heavy water for peaceful purposes but 
also agreed to give Norway the right to periodically inspect the 
water to guarantee its peaceful use. Norway inspected the heavy
water once in 1961. When the Norwegian government -- under
pressure from the national press and members of parliament —  
finally called for a second inspection Israel refused to grant 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors unlimited 
access to all of the heavy water on the ground that it did trust 
the IAEA to be objective. After a months of difficult negotia­
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tions between the Israeli and Norwegian governments an agreement 
was signed in the summer of 1 9 8 8  under which Norway would be able 
to inspect the nine tonnes of water which Israel claimed were all 
that remained of the shipment. However, in the spring of 1 9 8 9  
the agreement was scrapped after criticism from Norwegian parlia­
mentarians and the IAEA, which refuses to conduct inspections 
unless all nuclear facilities in a country are open for inspec­
t i o n . since heavy water reactors normally lose 0 . 5  per cent of 
their water per year Israel would have to produce some 1 8 . 5  
tonnes of water to satisfy the IAEA inspectors and then open the 
reactor's plutonium to inspection to honour the pledge for peace­
ful use.53
Heavy water, therefore, would appear to remain a particular 
area of dependency in Israel's nuclear programme.
Although no hard figures are available, the consensus is 
that Israel has produced up to 3 0 0  nuclear weapons 54 Jerusalem's 
apparent breaking of the 'peaceful use' agreements with nuclear 
materiel suppliers and refusal to sign the 1 9 6 8  nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty have disrupted the Israeli nuclear programme 
in that most countries are now cautious about the export of heavy 
water or other nuclear technology to Israel. Israeli plans to 
build a 2 5 0  megawatt heavy water reactor to generate electricity 
have run into difficulties after possible exporters of the $1-2 
billion system insisted that Israel first ratify the Non-Prolif­
eration T r e a t y . 55 More ominously for the Israeli nuclear pro-
447
gramme, the United States, which has long been lax about U.S. 
nuclear technology transfer to I s r a e l , ^6 appears to have taken a 
much harder line under the Bush administration, effectively 
changing Israel's status from that of a so-called 'threshold 
country' to being placed on the U.S. 'nuclear danger list'. 
Beginning in January 1989 the U.S. government introduced new 
restrictions on Israeli scientists visiting the American nuclear 
weapons laboratories at Los Alamos in New Mexico and Livermore in 
California which require them to go through the same security 
checks as scientists from developing countries. In some cases 
scientists from the Soviet Union and China have been allowed into 
areas of the laboratories closed to the I s r a e l i s . 5 ?
In concluding this section two additional points made by the 
former French high commissioner for nuclear energy. Professor 
Perrin, are worth noting. First, with regard to France's passing 
on American nuclear secrets to Israel Perrin asserted: "We
considered we could give the secrets to Israel provided that they 
kept it to themselves." As shown in Chapter Five on the Israeli- 
South African relationship, these were secrets that Jerusalem 
apparently was not been able to hold.
Second, with regard to the Israeli motives for developing 
nuclear weapons Perrin stated:
We thought that the Israeli bomb was aimed at
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the Americans, not to launch it against America 
but to say *if you don't help us in a critical 
situation we will require you to help us, other­
wise we will use our nuclear b o m b s ' . ^8
In other words, the Israeli nuclear arsenal was intended as a 
tool through which necessary arms imports or other concessions 
were to be obtained from the United States.59 As noted above, 
Israel's conventional arms industries also appear to have been 
partly aimed at securing imports of advanced weapons systems from 
foreign sources.
Israel's defence sector: dependent despite unique privileges
Given the overall volume of American financial transfers to 
Israel, the regular supply of U.S. military technology for 
Israel's defence sector and Washington's toleration of Israeli 
intelligence gathering activities in the U.S., it would seem 
difficult to overstate Israel's military dependency on the United 
States at the close of the Cold War. Indeed, some might argue 
that the Israeli relationship with the United States is without
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precedent in the modern history of state-state relations.
During the final two decades of the Cold War, Washington 
became the center of gravity for Jerusalem's heavy military 
dependency on the United States which covers arms, weapons tech­
nology and financial aid. The Reagan administration's killing of 
the Lavi fighter by cutting U.S. aid for the project in 1987 and 
the Bush administration's refusal in 1992 to support $10 billion 
in loan guarantees Israel unless Jerusalem stops building settle­
ments in the Occupied Territories, unequivocally demonstrate who 
controls the relationship.
If there is a major lesson to be learned from the develop­
ment of the Israeli defence sector and Jerusalem's relations with 
the United States it can only be that no Third World country will 
ever be able to develop a truly indigenous, independent and 
advanced defence sector vis-a-vis the major industrial states. 
Israel, with the advantage of a highly educated and motivated 
population, has been given all the means through which this 
should have been possible by Washington. The result at the 
beginning of the 1990s is that Israel is, and will remain, 
reliant on foreign sources for nearly all its major weapons 
systems, key technology imports and capital for the development 
of major systems.
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South African military imports
South Africa's Cold War imports of arms and technology were 
radically higher than government officials in Pretoria ever 
conceded. Admission of the country's dependency on arms imports 
would have been highly damaging in a number of ways. First, it 
would have implicated the countries violating the mandatory UN 
arms embargo by supplying weapons to Pretoria —  and few politi­
cal leaders except perhaps Chile's Pinochet and Bavaria's Franz- 
Joseph Strauss wished to be publicly associated with apartheid 
South Africa.GO
Second, such an admission would have exposed Armscor's 
claims to be leading South Africa to arms production self-suffi­
ciency as the fiction they were and are. This claim was a sig­
nificant aspect of domestic propaganda promising the survival of 
the white South African system during the 1970s and 80s. More 
fundamentally, arms production self-sufficiency has long been the 
basis of Armscor's claim for its right to exist as South Africa's 
largest state corporation.
The fiction that Armscor is producing 95 per cent of South 
Africa's defence needs has been widely accepted®^ and appears to
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have been maintained partly to protect the state arms producer 
from domestic criticism. Armscor was in an increasingly belea­
guered position due to South Africa's economic downturn during 
the 1980s. Reduced procurements by the South African military and 
the havoc wrought by an enforced rationalisation of the defence 
sector narrowed the scope of South African arms manufactures. In 
addition there were claims that Armscor has been basically mis­
managed due to the soft relationship it has with Pretoria and 
many in South Africa who wanted to see Armscor split up or priva­
tised.
Armscor does, of course, meet part of its mandate which is 
to supply the South African Defence Forces 'through whatever 
means necessary' with all arms and materiel. But this is 
achieved far more through devising means to evade the UN embargo 
and import operational weapon systems along with key components 
and technology to upgrade or manufacture new systems. Such means 
are effective —  in the short term —  but hardly as glamorous as 
the idea that Afrikaner ingenuity allowed the construction of 
indigenous helicopters, missiles and fighters to replace those 
embargoed.
Many countries sold arms, components or military technology 
to South Africa after the 1977 mandatory UN embargo. Israel has 
clearly been Pretoria's largest single supplier since 1977, 
followed probably by France. Israeli-South African military
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relations were examined in Chapter Five and French-South African 
military cooperation is discussed below. In addition, companies 
in the United States, Italy, West Germany and Taiwan continued 
military and defence technology exports to South Africa during 
the 1980s. In the area of small arms and explosives South Africa 
reportedly received supplies from eastern European countries.
Arms import avenues
There are three basic channels for the transfer of arms, compo­
nents and technology to South Africa. First are the so-called 
'gray area' sales. These involve the delivery of equipment with 
potential dual civilian / military use such as passenger or cargo 
aircraft, helicopters, communications systems, computers and so 
forth.62 Such sales are accepted by the 1977 UN arms embargo 
resolution and the interpretation has been left up to the country 
supplying the goods. In practice this has meant that 'enforce­
ment' of the embargo has been used by some countries in a carrot 
or stick approach to Pretoria.63 The United States made dual-use 
sales an element of the constructive engagement policy under the 
Reagan administration. Some $556 million worth of aircraft and 
spare parts were sold to South Africa in Fiscal Years 1980-82 
alone by companies such as Bell, Raytheon, Avco and G o o d y e a r . 6 4
Second are illegal corporate sales to South Africa. Such 
sales are carried out in outright defiance of the UN embargo and
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risk punishment if d e t e c t e d . T h e  means employed include estab­
lishing 'front* companies, the production of forged end-user 
certificates, the use of third countries and fraudulent exports 
by private dealers who merely sell their services for the highest 
profit. In addition, there are countries which have simply not 
bothered to take serious steps to enforce the embargo —  either 
through pure neglect or with the premeditated intention of allow­
ing continued arms sales to Pretoria.
This leads to the third means of transfer of embargoed 
weapons and technology to South Africa which is conducted quite 
simply by countries which choose to ignore the embargo. Obvious­
ly there are elements of such official decision in the two other 
means described above, but a substantial proportion of arms and 
technology transfers to South Africa are made in no greater 
secrecy than other more normal transfers. A striking example can 
be seen in U.S. arms sales to South Africa under the Reagan 
administration. Through disclosures obtained from the American 
State Department under the Freedom of Information Act, it can be 
documented that 29 separate export licenses were issued during 
Fiscal years 1981-83 explicitly for military goods purchased by 
South Africa worth $28.3 m i l l i o n . A  more recent case of out­
right government approval is the is the (West) German sale of 
blueprints for the Drakensberg naval supply ship which entered 
service in mid-1987, and for the U-209 submarine which according
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to some sources is under construction in South Africa. A parlia­
mentary investigation into this affair has been underway in 
Germany for several years, and it appears that high ranking 
government officials in Bonn approved this important technology 
transfer after the sale of the actual submarines from the Ho- 
waldtswerke-Deutsche Werft-AG was vetoed.
Foreign technology inputs for defence sector industries
As Signe Landgren has stressed, South Africa's arms industry 
"...owes its very existence to the access to foreign 
t e c h n o l o g y . T h e  precise foreign inputs into the various 
sectors of Pretoria's defence industries were examined detail in 
Chapter Three and are illustrated in Appendix 15 but it is useful 
here to briefly review how Western military know-how laid the 
foundations for South Africa's entire range of military indus­
tries:
-The South African aircraft industry has been built on technolo­
gy, components and aircraft from Italy, France, the UK, the USA, 
and Israel.
-The military vehicle industry has relied on know-how and designs 
from France, West Germany, Japan, the USA, and Canada.
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-The rocket and missile industry has been heavily dependent on 
technological infusions from West Germany, Israel and France.
-The nuclear industry has imported entire reactors and other 
technology from France, West Germany, the USA, and the UK.
-The naval industry has copied designs and used technology from 
Israel and West Germany.
-The small arms industry has obtained numerous licences for 
domestic production of weapons from Belgium, the UK, the USA, 
Israel, and France.
-The electronics industry has openly been supplied with technolo­
gy by numerous countries since the 1977 UN arms embargo. Major 
suppliers include the UK, the USA, France, Israel, West Germany, 
Austria, and the Netherlands.^9
From the above summary it can be seen that South Africa has 
enjoyed considerable success in evading United Nations sanctions 
on arms and military technology imports. It should be noted that 
the UN embargoes were undertaken to put political pressure on 
South Africa and that they lack any mechanism for international
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enforcement —  unlike the relatively strict COCOM military embar­
go operated by the U.S. against the former Soviet Union and 
former East Bloc.^®
Major weapons systems are imports
Despite the fact that South Africa has obtained considerable 
foreign assistance in building up defence sector industries, most 
of the South African Defence Force's major weapons systems at the 
close of the Cold War were of foreign manufacture.
The only element the SADF's triad of forces in which South 
African-manufactured weapons systems play any serious role is the 
army. The army's 250 main battle tanks are British Centurians 
which have been refitted and are now designated Olifant. The 
army's heaviest guns —  the 155mm towed G-5 and motorised G-6 —  
are manufactured in South Africa as is the Valkiri 127mm multiple 
rocket launcher. The army relies on a range of domestically 
produced armoured vehicles for transport in the bush. A total of 
4,600 Eland, Ratel, Buffel, Casspir and Wolf armoured vehicles 
have been produced in South Africa for the SADF. The army's 
surface-to-air missile, the Cactus (Crotale) are of French manu­
f a c t u r e . It must be stressed that all of the army's systems 
listed above as domestically manufactured have substantial inputs 
of foreign components and/or technology, as shown in Chapter 
Three.
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The South African air force is almost entirely foreign 
manufactured. The air forces*s 43 Mirage F-ls and 30 Mirage 3s 
are of French manufacture. The 13 Cheetah fighters are Mirages 
upgraded with Israeli Kfir technology. Pretoria's 207 aging 
Impala aircraft were domestically manufactured under Italian 
licence. The air force's 4 electronic warfare aircraft are 
U.S.-manufactured Boeing 707s and the transport aircraft are 
American C-130s, C-160s, or elderly Viscounts, C-47s and DC-4s. 
Despite recent claims of advances in the manufacture of helicop­
ters, all of the air force's 157 helicopters are French 
Aéreospatiale Alouette Ills or Pumas. Missiles deployed by the 
air force include the French R-530 and R-550 Magic, the U.S. AIM- 
9 Sidewinder, and the domestically produced Kukri V-3.?2
The South African navy is also overwhelmingly comprised of 
foreign-built systems. The force's three submarines are French 
Daphnes. The navy's nine missile patrol boats are Israeli Re- 
shefs, some of which were domestically manufactured under li­
cence. The navy's seven mine warfare ships are all of UK manu­
facture.^^ The recently unveiled Drakensberg supply ship was 
built with plans obtained from West Germany while the Tafelsberg 
armed helicopter carrier is an upgrading of a naval replenishment 
vessel.
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France: A long-term military supplier of South Africa
France has been supplying South Africa with advanced weapons and 
military technology for over 30 years. Nuclear and missile 
research cooperation began in the late 1950s. In the early 1960s 
Paris began delivering Mirage 3 fighters and Alouette helicopters 
to the South African Air Force. In the 1970s FI fighters, subma­
rines and a variety of missile systems were sold to Pretoria. In 
the 1980s French nuclear power stations came on stream in South 
Africa. Between 1981 and 1986, according to an investigative 
report in the French daily Quotidien de Paris. South Africa 
received technical assistance from Aerospatiale for its new light 
attack helicopter, the Alpha XH-1.^^
France abstained from voting on the 1963 voluntary UN arms 
embargo, but in 1964 said it would stop selling Pretoria weapons 
which could be used to put down internal unrest. Thus began what 
has become the consistent French policy of evading successive UN 
arms embargoes on South Africa. The first Mirage fighter deal in 
1961 and the growth of other French arms exports to South Africa 
during the 1960s reflected President Charles de Gaulle's determi­
nation to secure new markets for the French armaments industry.
In 1970, after direct appeal to President Georges Pompidou
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by leaders of the Organisation of African Unity (GAU), Paris 
promised to stop the sale of helicopters and armoured cars to 
South Africa. Significantly, aircraft were not included in the 
pledge and two years later it was announced that Mirage FIs would 
be built in South Africa under licence. The promised embargo on 
helicopters was liberally interpreted and France continued to 
deliver helicopters to South Africa during the early 1970s.
In 1975 President Valery Giscard d'Estaing pledged to expand 
the embargo to include equipment for South Africa's army and air 
force; but not naval equipment. French adherence to his embargo 
was re-emphasised by Giscard at the end of an official visit to 
Mali in 1977 and Paris promised French authorities would take 
special measures to prevent arms deliveries from slipping through 
the official net.^®
The promise appears to have only been partly fulfilled. The 
French government apparently canceled the 1971 agreement under 
which South Africa was to have manufactured the Mirage FI. 
Pretoria's Atlas Aircraft Industry had not advanced far enough in 
the project to be able to continue after French assistance was 
cut in 1977 and the South African Mirage project was probably 
killed by Giscard's revamped sanctions.
Nevertheless, it was reported that Pretoria accepted Paris' 
new anti-apartheid line after having received private assurances 
the French aid would continue for the South African arms indus­
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try. A report in the International Herald Tribune said:
Sources here (Paris) said that South Africa had 
been carefully prepared for Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's 
announcement. According to these informants, South 
Africa knew that every care would be taken to cushion 
the repercussion on its military capacity. That 
was South Africa's price, the sources said, for not 
retaliating by reducing it non-military imports 
from France, currently worth more than US$ 235 
million and growing.
As off-the-shelf military exports to South African became 
more difficult for Paris in the mid-1970s, a new export market 
grew in importance: nuclear technology. France sold South Africa 
two nuclear power plants in 1976. The Koeberg I reactor became 
operational in 1983 with Koeberg II following two years later.
As evidence of French policy consistency, it is interesting to 
note that the construction of the second reactor was begun two 
months after the election as president of the socialist Francois 
Mitterrand in 1981.^^
The beginning of Mitterrand's presidency was also marked by 
the sale of enriched uranium and small arms to Pretoria. The 
motivation for each of these sales seems to have been different.
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The enriched uranium was sold in a highly circuitous manner 
through Switzerland and the rationale given by an anonymous 
finance ministry spokesman in Paris was that given France's 
delicate economic situation, trade would be conducted with any 
country that was solvent.®® Whereas the sales of weapons and 
ammunition in 1981-82 appear to have been approved by the Mitter­
rand government only after Pretoria threatened to cancel a major 
civilian export order with France.
In the most recent reported French military transaction with 
South Africa, at least five senior engineers of the Aerospatiale 
helicopter division reportedly worked in South Africa on the 
development of the Alpha XHl light attack helicopter during the 
1980s. An official from the South African state arms industry, 
Armscor, acknowledged that the prototype could not have been 
built without foreign assistance.®^ However French involvement 
in the project is flatly denied by Aerospatiale. A spokesman for 
the company's helicopter division denied the report saying: "This 
is an old story and it is absolutely false." ®®
The economic rationale was a primary ground for French arms 
exports since the Second World War. In the past twenty-five 
years France has sold as much military equipment to Pretoria as 
is politically possible. The fact that France had a trade defi­
cit with South Africa for most of the 1980s (in 1984 it was Ffr 
1.6 billion) appears to have created an even greater imperative
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to push arms exports among French officials. When criticisms 
over French arms sales have grown too strong, Paris has always 
been willing to make concessions in order to preserve broader 
global interests. During the 1980s French military exports to 
South Africa were shifted away from finished weapon systems to 
technology and components, both of which are far more difficult 
to trace.
Nuclear imports : South Africa's nuclear weapons capability and 
nuclear industry
A full analysis of the South African nuclear programme lies 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. In the following pages I 
will attempt to outline two points. First, the evidence pointing 
to South African nuclear weapons development, and second, the 
extreme dependency of Pretoria's nuclear programme on foreign 
sources.
Like the country's arms industries. South Africa's nuclear 
industry is almost entirely based on foreign technology. 
The Western technology delivered to Pretoria in the past decades 
is not merely that needed for the 'peaceful' use of nuclear
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power. As Landgren has noted;
What has been delivered to South Africa from the 
West is not a nuclear bomb but definitely the capacity 
and know-how to produce such a bomb.®^
Confirmation of this fact came in 1988 when South Africa's veter­
an foreign minister, R.F. Botha, boasted that South Africa had 
the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.®^
CIA documents obtained under the U.S. Freedom of Information 
Act in September 1990 confirm that South Africa has had a dedi­
cated nuclear weapons programme since at least the mid-1970s and 
may have been able to produce nuclear weapons as early as the end 
of 1979. In a document dated December 1979, the CIA states that 
Jacobus de Viliers, the former chief of South Africa's nuclear 
energy programme, "had been directly involved in (nuclear weapons 
design work at the Pelindaba nuclear research center before his 
promotion to President of the AEB (Atomic Energy Board) in July 
1979." The same document notes that "until recently South Africa 
lacked the relevant technology and fissile material" but esti­
mates that South Africa "has by this time acquired sufficient 
fissile material for the fabrication of several nuclear 
dev i c e s ."® ®
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The first evidence of a South African nuclear weapons pro­
gramme appeared in August 1977, when a Soviet satellite photo­
graphed what appeared to be a nuclear weapons test site in South 
Africa's Kalahari Desert. Western governments were informed of 
the site by Moscow and a U.S. satellite confirmed the Soviet 
finding. Under pressure from Washington, Moscow, and other 
Western governments. South Africa halted work on the site.
More evidence of nuclear weapons testing was provided by a 
U.S. Vela satellite, which on 22 September 1979 observed a double 
flash of light normally caused by a nuclear explosion in a remote 
area of the South Atlantic. An initial study by the Carter 
administration concluded that the flash was not caused by a 
nuclear explosion but rather by "zoo events", i.e.. an unexplain­
able natural phenomenon. But the Carter administration findings 
appear to have been a whitewash. President Carter apparently 
feared a diplomatic row with Pretoria over nuclear weapons would 
scupper the negotiations over Rhodesia, and that with U.S. elec­
tions approaching he preferred to avoid a public dispute over the 
affair with Israel, which was suspected of participating in the 
test.87
A number of independent U.S. reports confirm that there was 
indeed a nuclear test in the South Atlantic on the night of 
September 22. A classified U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 
report concluded that the Vela satellite —  designed to monitor 
nuclear weapons testing —  had indeed recorded a small nuclear
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explosion, as did a study by the U.S. Navy's Research laboratory 
(NRL). American scientists operating a radio telescope in
Puerto Rico detected ripple moving through the ionosphere coming 
from the direction and at the right velocity to have been from a 
nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic. The CIA established 
that a secret South African naval exercise had been conducted at 
the same time and in the same area as the explosion.^9
On 15 December 1980 a U.S. Vela satellite detected three 
further double flashes over same area of the South Atlantic.
A 1985 U.S. Congressional report, based on 500 pages of 
previously classified NRL documents, concluded that a nuclear 
weapon had been conducted in 1979 and that a joint South African- 
Israeli nuclear programme e x i s t s . This latter finding is 
corroborated by CIA documents released in 1990 which stated:
Israelis have not only participated in certain 
South African nuclear research activities over 
the last few years, but they have also offered 
and transferred various sorts of advanced non­
nuclear weapons technology to South Africa.
While the 1979 flashes of light appear to have been con­
firmed by a variety of sources as originating from a small nucle­
ar explosion, the country responsible for the test remains open
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to question. A number of reports, including one on the American 
television network CBS, based on a book written by two Israeli 
journalists which the Israeli government suppressed, said the 
test had been carried out by Israel in cooperation with the South 
African government. A book by two Israeli security studies 
academics and a former Israeli Air Force officer suggests that 
Israel and South Africa "are managing to develop a neutron 
bomb."92 (Israeli-South African nuclear cooperation has been 
examined in Chapter Five.)
The question as to whether South Africa possesses nuclear 
weapons must therefore remain open. But as one South African 
political scientist noted in the early 1980s, it is generally 
accepted in international circles that Pretoria "has the ability 
to either manufacture nuclear weapons or rapidly to convert its 
nuclear stockpile to military purposes.
South Africa; A nuclear importer
Although South Africa is a major world producer of uranium, 
nearly all of the country's nuclear technology has been supplied 
from foreign sources.
Pretoria's first research reactor, the 20 megawatt Safari-1
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reactor, was supplied by Allis Chalmers of the United States 
under the 'Atoms for Peace' programme. Safari-1 became opera­
tional in 1965. Between 1962 and 1976, the U.S. supplied 104 kg. 
of enriched uranium needed by Safari-1. The Safari-2 research 
reactor (or Pelinduna-Zero, as it is known) began operation in 
1967. Pretoria claims Safari-2 is an indigenous reactor, but 
most sources discount that South Africa could have built an 
indigenous nuclear reactor in the 1960s. Some reports say that 
the reactor was built by West Germany's Krupp concern. Safari-1 
was shut down in order to free funds to uranium enrichment re­
search which became a South African government priority.
South Africa received its low-enriched uranium nuclear power 
reactors, Koeberg I and II, from Framatome of France. (The 
reactors were designed by the U.S. Westinghouse concern.) Koeberg 
1 began operation in March 1984 and Koeberg 2 came on stream in 
July 1985. Koeberg I and II receive uranium fuel rods from the 
Belgian-French Eurofuel concern under a contract that lasts until 
1994. It is estimated that 82 percent of the entire Koeberg 
project was financed by a consortium of French banks, headed by 
the state-owned Credit Lyonnais. Equipment for the Koeberg 
plants came from Alstrom of France, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and 
Toshiba of Japan, and Combustion Engineering and Babcock & Wilcox 
of the U S A . T h e  two Koeberg reactors could produce 400 kg 
plutonium per year, which would be the equivalent to one Naga­
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saki-size atomic bomb per week.^G
The first uranium enrichment research plant began operation 
at Valindaba in 1975. A semi-commercial plant employing station- 
ary-wall centrifuge jet nozzle system entered production in 1987. 
West Germany transferred a considerable amount of uranium enrich­
ment technology to South Africa, and the STEAG concern reportedly 
passed on much of the know-how for the Valindaba plant. A number 
of West German firms also supplied equipment for V a l i n d a b a . 9? 
Estimates of the amount of enriched uranium that the Valindaba 
plant produces annually range from 50-300 kg.
South Africa: embargo prevents dependency on single country
Although South African-produced weapons including the G-5 howitz­
er and various armoured vehicles which appear to have played a 
role in the SADF's military operations during the 1970s and 80s, 
Pretoria's exercise of air and sea power remained largely depend­
ent on foreign-built arms through the end of the Cold War. 
Indeed, lack of replacements for the air force's Mirage fighters 
seems to caused military planners to hold back these frontline 
aircraft from conflicts on repeated occasions.
South African manufactured arms proved adequate for ground- 
based army forces, counter-insurgency and policing throughout the
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Cold War. However even in meeting these more limited demands, 
Armscor's inability to produce helicopters meant the vital air 
element for military's counter-insurgency forces could only be 
supplied from foreign sources.
But in supplying strategic weapons, Armscor was unable to 
meet the needs of South Africa's army, navy and air force through
domestic production during the Cold War. In the 1980s, South
African regional military superiority was steadily eroded by 
advanced weapons imports by the frontline states and only the end 
of the Cold War prevented Pretoria from becoming caught up in a 
high-paced an arms race.
The UN arms embargo prevented South Africa from becoming 
dependent on a single arms supplier, simply because few countries 
were willing to ship weapons to South Africa on a regular basis. 
Pretoria remained dependent on a number of foreign weapons and 
military suppliers from the 1960s to the end of the 1990s includ­
ing Israel, France, (West) Germany and the United States. Thus
the center of gravity for Pretoria's foreign weapons dependency 
was more dispersed than that of Israel and Yugoslavia. South 
Africa had nothing like Israel's financial dependence on the 
United States nor Yugoslavia's preponderate dependence a single 
source of arms (Moscow).
Should it remain necessary, Pretoria will undoubtedly con­
tinue to find ways to evade UN sanctions. Nevertheless major
470
weapons systems remain an area of acute foreign dependency for 
South Africa. 'Indigenous* production of major systems has to 
date been little more than upgrading of obsolete tanks, fighters 
and ships and the assembly of a small number of major systems 
based on foreign technology and components. Despite Armcor's 
rhetoric. South Africa remains dependent on imports for tanks, 
submarines, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, heavy artillery, 
radar and communications equipment and c o m p u t e r s . ^8
This, however, is a vulnerability which will probably never 
be exploited. The expanding number of world arms producers —  in 
particular the newly industrialising countries —  along with the 
relative contraction of international demand for advanced weapons 
systems and the economic pressure on new arms producers to in­
crease exports, have created a market made for the arms buyer. 
Should the UN arms embargo remain in place despite the de Klerk 
reforms, the South African military will undoubtedly be able to 
procure weapons it needs for the 1990s from foreign sources.
Yugoslavia's Arms Imports
It is difficult to calculate what percentage of Yugoslavia's Cold 
War defence materiel requirements were met by direct imports. 
Official Yugoslav sources put the figure at an optimistically low
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5-25 percent. Some Western sources claim that Yugoslavia
maintained a long-standing rule that domestic arms production 
should always exceed arms imports by a 3:1 r a t i o . ^00 However 
Adam Roberts estimated that Yugoslav manufactures in the mid- 
1970s met perhaps 55 per cent of all military needs leaving the 
remaining 45 per cent to imports.
Yet these necessarily broad estimates tell us very little 
about the real nature and implications of Belgrade's arms imports 
through 1990. This study concludes that Yugoslavia —  like 
Israel and South Africa —  remained dependent on foreign suppli­
ers, particularly the former Soviet Union, for its most advanced 
weapon systems. The delivery of Soviet MiG-29 air defence 
fighters to the Yugoslav Air Force in the late 1980s^®^ was 
merely the most recent example of a military high-tech foreign 
dependency which began in 1945.
Two broad categories of weapons were imported by Yugoslavia. 
First, those of such advanced nature that they could not be 
manufactured in Yugoslavia. Second, are those systems which were 
required in such small numbers that they are imported to save 
research and development costs and the high costs of short pro­
duction runs.
Belgrade's main arms suppliers were the Soviet Union from 
1945-48; the United States from 1951-57; and from 1959 through 
the Yugoslav break-up in 1991, the (former) Soviet Union. The
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U.S. continued to supply spare parts worth some $500,000 a year 
after 1961 and under the Carter administration supplied a
number of off-the-shelf systems. In addition, France and the 
United Kingdom were important source of weapons, particularly as 
Belgrade attempted to diversify its suppliers.
During the 1945-48 period Yugoslavia received a variety of 
ex-Soviet equipment including Tanks, artillery systems, tank- 
repair shops, and communications equipment. The poor quality and 
high price of Soviet weapons was one of Tito * s important com­
plaints regarding Moscow in the 1945-48 p e r i o d . T h e  party 
newspaper Borba wrote scathingly of the Soviet military equipment 
in December 1950:
Besides the exorbitant price, our soldiers and officers 
have discovered that the equipment...was not new 
but reconditioned and simply given a new coat of 
paint. 106
Following the 1948 break with the Cominform countries, the 
first large-scale American and Western arms shipments reached 
Yugoslavia in 1951. 107 included were tanks, armoured personnel 
carriers, artillery, fighter and bomber aircraft, corvettes, 
minesweepers and destroyers.10®
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Arms imports from the Soviet Union and East Bloc were fully 
resumed in 1962. During the 1960s Belgrade bought fighter air­
craft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, radar systems and 
other communications equipment. In the years following 1964, the 
ground forces were extensively modernised with Soviet tanks, 
anti-tank guns, missiles, armoured personnel carriers and other 
equipment. The navy received missile and torpedo boats. During 
this period Yugoslavia continued to buy avionics, electronic 
equipment,spare parts, and other military components from France, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. American
arms sales to Yugoslavia began increasing under the Ford adminis­
tration in 1975 and increased further during the Carter adminis­
tration. Discussions concerning a more formalised supply of U.S. 
arms began in 1975 and by 1978 a series of agreements had been 
concluded for increased arms sales to Belgrade. Military sales 
agreements continued to expand under the Reagan administration 
with some $34 million approved in January and February 1982 
alone.
Most major weapons systems are imports
As is the case with Israel and South Africa, Yugoslavia's ad­
vanced weapons systems at the end of the Cold War in 1990 were
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imports or manufactured under foreign licence.
The Yugoslav army relied on Soviet tanks for conventional 
frontline defence. Some 1,150 T-54/5 and T-72/4 Soviet main 
battle tanks formed the operational Yugoslav tank force. An 
additional 700 T-34s and M-4s are were in storage. The T-72/74 
(designated M-84) was manufactured under licence in Yugoslavia 
since the since the early 1980s. Levels of production remain a 
state secret, thus the total number of T-72/74s assembled in 
Yugoslavia is not known. Anti-tank guided weapons were all 
Soviet-made and included the AT-3 Sagger, the AT-4 Spigot and the 
AT-5 Spandrel.m
Yugoslavia's relatively low-tech navy was partly comprised 
of vessels of indigenous manufacture; but as shown in Chapter 
Four, most indigenous production was based on Soviet technology. 
Submarines and ships up to the size of corvettes were produced 
domestically. Nevertheless, as is true for all three case study 
countries, the largest, most advanced systems were imports. In 
the case of the Yugoslav navy, the most powerful and advanced 
systems were Soviet Koni class frigates, two of which were im­
ported during the early 1980s. A series of other Soviet and 
French naval vessels imported over the past three decades includ­
ed French Le Fouguex class corvettes, Soviet Osa 1 class fast 
attack missile boats, Soviet Shershen class fast attack torpedo 
boats, and Soviet Vokov Klanc class minehunters.
The Yugoslav air force's most advanced fighters were 16
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Soviet MiG-29s. The air force also had 140 MiG-2Is to complement 
domestically manufactured Orao, Galeb and Jastreb fighter ground 
attack aircraft. The Yugoslavia's 70 assault helicopters were 
Soviet Mi-8s, and the 120 Gazela attack helicopters were of joint 
French-Yugoslav manufacture —  with Paris in the senior position. 
Anti-submarine helicopters were exclusively Soviet Ka-25s and 
28s. All military transport aircraft were imports including 
Soviet Anotov An-12s, An-26s, and Yak-40s, Canadian CL-215s, 
French Falcon 50s, and Learjet 25s.
Yugoslavia: Dependent on arms from Moscow
Like South Africa, Yugoslavia appears to have only succeeded in 
meeting the basic lower technology needs of its ground forces 
through domestic arms production. Belgrade's dependency on 
foreign sources for major weapons systems continued throughout 
the Cold War to the 1991 break-up of the Yugoslav federation.
Following a brief hiatus in the late 1940s and early 50s, 
Yugoslavia reverted to dependence on the former Soviet union for 
advanced weapons systems. Through licencing agreements for pro­
duction of the T-72 tank to direct sales of the MiG-29 fighter, 
Moscow was the controlling center of gravity for Yugoslav arms
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import dependency in the final two decades of the Cold War.
Unlike Israel or South Africa, Yugoslavia’s armed forces 
were never battle tested during the Cold War. Caught between the 
heavily armed East and West blocs, Yugoslav forces were highly 
deficient from a qualitative standpoint when compared to those of 
NATO or the former Warsaw Pact. The East-West conflict also 
reduced the potential efficacy of domestic Yugoslav military 
production. Whereas Israeli and South African-produced arms 
bolstered these two countries' respective regional military 
superiority to at least a limited degree, Yugoslav arms produc­
tion failed in this task, in part because of the very high stand­
ards met by armed forces of the two blocs in central Europe.
Conclusion
A dictionary definition of 'dependent': "depending on someone or
something else for aid, support etc."^^^ simply but accurately 
describes the reliance of Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia on 
foreign weapons and military technology imports throughout the 
Cold War.
The continued acquisition of advanced foreign fighter air­
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craft, or aircraft technology, at the end of the Cold War is a 
mirror image of the same weapons dependency which in the 1950s 
and 60s spurred development of respective defence industrial 
sectors. Despite the investment of billions of dollars in pres­
tige aircraft and other major projects, the three case study 
countries were unable to produce the frontline fighters or the 
range of other major systems required by respective armed forces. 
In the 1990s and beyond, all three states —  or successor states 
—  will remain dependent on foreign sources for military systems 
such as aircraft, helicopters, large naval vessels and tanks as 
well as a wide variety of other military equipment.
By the end of the Cold War Israel had become even more 
dependent on foreign (American) weapons, military technology and 
financial aid than in the 1950s and 60s. During the early period 
of statehood Jerusalem imported similar weapons but was at least 
able to pay the bill without annual multi-billion dollar grants 
from Washington.
South Africa failed in its bid to produce key weapons embar­
goed by the United Nations and remained a Cold War arms importer, 
dependent on military technology and components to upgrade exist­
ing aircraft and helicopters and on any other weapons which 
slipped through the embargo net. Major systems such as aircraft, 
naval vessels and tanks were, for the most part, too big to be 
sold to Pretoria without attracting international notice. As a
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result of the failure of domestic arms production and this limit­
ed success of the UN embargo. South Africa has had no known 
regular source for major weapons since 1977 other than Israel, as 
described in Chapter Five.
Yugoslavia briefly broke away from arms imports dependency 
on Moscow during the 1950s, but by the 1960s Belgrade was again 
dependent on the Soviet Union for imports of major weapons sys­
tems. Sales of advanced fighter aircraft and naval vessels to 
the former Yugoslav federation by the former Soviet Union in the 
late 1980s confirm Belgrade's foreign arms dependency through the 
end of the Cold War.
The continued dependency of Israel, South Africa and Yugo­
slavia on imports of "off the shelf" major weapons systems in the 
post-Cold War era dramatically illustrates the failure of respec­
tive domestic arms production sectors to provide replacements for 
the very embargoed weapons systems which triggered the creation 
of defence industries in the first place.
The relevance, for this dissertation, of arms imports for 
all three countries at the end of the 1980s is as evidence that 
despite decades of work and billions of dollars invested, none of 
the three case study countries were able to produce anything near 
the range of advanced systems required by their respective armed 
forces.
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Part Four —  Conclusion
Chapter Eight 
Conclusion
During the 1970s and 80s Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia 
built up sophisticated weapons manufacturing capabilities and 
produced everything from small arms to fighter aircraft and 
rockets. There are naturally great qualitative differences in 
the systems produced by the three: Israel is a far more sophis­
ticated arms-maker than South Africa or former Yugoslavia.
Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia initiated development of 
large-scale military industries mainly as a response to the 
uncertainty of foreign arms supplies during the Cold War. As 
shown in the case study chapters, all three countries were sub­
jected to repeated arms embargoes and the desire to reduce de­
pendency on foreign sources for weapons was a key reason for the 
creation of respective domestic defence industry sectors.
Israel experienced a series of arms embargoes beginning in 
1948 with the creation of the Jewish state. Although domestic 
arms production began in the 1950s, the French embargo imposed 
during and after the 1967 War appears to have been the watershed 
event which spurred Israel to broaden and deepen domestic mili­
tary production.
South Africa has been the world's most embargoed country in 
terms of weapons since 1945. A voluntary UN arms embargo resolu­
tion on Pretoria in 1963 was followed up with a mandatory resolu­
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tion in 1977. In 1984 the UN passed a voluntary resolution 
banning countries from importing arms from South Africa. Preto­
ria began a concerted defence industrial sector build-up in the 
1960s.
Yugoslavia was subjected to an arms embargo by the Soviet 
Union following its 1948 break with Moscow and the East Bloc. 
Domestic arms production capabilities were expanded in the 1950s 
and accelerated after the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslo­
vakia.
The military-industrial complex in the Third World
But if embargoes led to the initial decision to develop domestic 
arms industries, other combined military,economic and political 
interests —  broadly conforming with the military-industrial 
complex phenomenon —  appear to have played an important role in 
the expansion of respective defence sectors and winning commis­
sion of major defence projects in all three countries during the 
1970s and 80s.
In Israel the role of military-industrial complex interests 
in defence production decisions is especially distinct with 
regard to military and civilian aircraft projects. The Arava
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transport aircraft and Westwind jet appear to have been initiated 
as a make-work projects at the behest of the Israeli aviation 
industry. The explosive growth of the Lavi fighter project —  
prior to its 1987 cancellation —  also serves as a near textbook 
case of NIC interests influencing defence production.
In South Africa a tight web of military, economic and secu­
rity-oriented political interests consolidated their hold on 
political power during the 1970s and 80s. The rise of the power­
ful State Security Council (SSC) under the militarily well-con­
nected P.W. Botha gave the army an unprecedented role in running 
the Apartheid state. Meanwhile, the state arms producer, Arm- 
scor, was able to bring together a South African ruling class of 
business, scientific, military and government officials on its 
board of directors and came to play an important role in setting 
arms manufacturing policy. Both the SSC and Armscor conform with 
definitions of elements comprising the military-industrial com­
plex phenomenon provided in Chapter One.
Former Yugoslavia's military played a far greater political 
role than did the respective armed forces of the two other case 
study countries. Little analysis of the military-industrial 
complex is available on Yugoslavia, but the influential military 
and aviation industry lobby successfully wielded enormous pres­
sure to win approval for the $2 billion Novi Avion fighter 
project despite the country's growing economic crisis in the 
1980s.
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Military dependency perpetuated: arms production in Israel, South 
Africa and Yugoslavia
A key conclusion of this thesis is that all three case study 
countries clearly failed to achieve true military independence 
through the development of respective defence industry sectors. 
As shown in the previous chapters, Israeli, South Africa and 
Yugoslavia did not succeed in producing major weapons systems 
without reliance on foreign sources for key components like 
engines, avionics or weaponry (tank guns and missiles for air­
craft and ships).
Even in Israel, where know-how existed in the local scien­
tific community for aspects of projects such as the Lavi fighter, 
the most sophisticated components of the Lavi —  a staggering 50 
percent of the aircraft —  would have been manufactured in the 
United States or under U.S. licence. As such, the Lavi would 
have truly been a joint Israeli-U.S. production. But the Lavi's 
price was simply too high for Jerusalem and financial constraints 
forced the project's cancellation.
Almost all of South Africa's domestically-built weapons were
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based on foreign technology. The 'new* weapons systems unveiled 
during the 1980s, such as the Cheetah fighter and various heli­
copter prototypes, were merely existing South African systems 
upgraded with foreign technology and components.
Former Yugoslavia's military industries remained heavily 
dependent on foreign technology and components throughout the 
Cold War. The Orao fighter aircraft —  the most advanced plane 
produced by the Yugoslav defence sector —  required a foreign 
engine and numerous other key components. Most major Yugoslav 
weapon systems are licence-produced or merely copies of systems 
produced by the industrialised countries.
In the post-Cold War 1990s all three countries —  or succes­
sor states —  remain heavily dependent on foreign technology or 
licences for the development of new weapons systems. As a 
result of this continued dependency, Israel, South Africa and 
former Yugoslavia seem certain to continue their long history of 
begging, buying or stealing defence technology from the indus­
trialised countries.
Same reliance on weapons imports in the 1990s as in the 1960s
But reliance on military technology imports for defence indus­
tries is less than half the military dependency story for Israel, 
South Africa and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Despite decades of
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work and billions of dollars invested, none of the case study 
countries was able to produce the advanced weapons systems re­
quired by respective military forces. Fighter and transport 
aircraft, helicopters, tanks, advanced naval vessels and subma­
rines continue to be purchased from foreign suppliers. These 
weapons comprise the very same key systems which the industria­
lised countries withheld from Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia 
from the late 1940s through the 1970s, thus sparking the drive 
for domestic arms production to reduce foreign military dependen­
cy in the first place.
During the 1990s Israel will rely on deliveries of U.S. 
fighter aircraft and helicopters, American-built naval vessels, 
and German-built submarines. Despite the success of the Merkava 
tank project only a small proportion of Israel's tank forces are 
comprised of Merkavas.
South Africa continues to rely on French-built fighter air­
craft and helicopters and submarines (all of which have gone 
through a series of upgrades). Israel has been a vital conduit 
for, among other things. South African acquisitions of transport 
and reconnaissance aircraft since the 1977 UN arms embargo.
Prior to its break-up in 1991, Yugoslavia relied on Soviet 
weapons systems for all frontline defences. Key imports from the 
former Soviet Union in the late 1980s included MiG-29 fighters, 
tanks and naval vessels.
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Third World arms trade interdependency
A further important conclusion of this thesis is that despite the 
continued military dependency of Israel, South Africa and Yugo­
slavia all three countries were all able to become important 
Third World arms exporters during the last two decades of the 
Cold War. Military exports from the case study countries have 
mainly been to other developing countries, given that arms sales 
to the industrialised countries were largely precluded on quali­
tative and/or political grounds. Weapons exports from the case 
study countries played a significant role in the nascent phenome­
non of Third World military interdependence during the 1970s and 
80s.
Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia all became significant 
arms and defence technology exporters beginning in the 1970s. 
The main justifications for military exports were economic and 
diplomatic. Leaders of all three countries viewed arms exports 
as a means to recoup the heavy financial cost of domestic defence 
industries and as means to further respective diplomatic initia­
tives. Although in overall export volume these countries are no 
match for the industrialised arms exporters, they comprise an 
important part of the Third World arms exporters club which has 
steadily eroded the old post-1945 oligopoly of the industrialised
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arms sellers.
During the 1970s and 80s, Israel was able to defy the indus­
trialised arms exporters by becoming the single most important 
conduit for arms and defence technology to South Africa following 
the 1977 mandatory United Nations arms embargo. Israel supplied 
South Africa with missiles, patrol boats, helicopters, fighter 
aircraft modernisation packages and reconnaissance aircraft. 
Again in 1982 during the Falklands / Malvinas War, Israel sup­
plied Argentina with weapons in open defiance of the Western 
industrial arms producers. The Israeli phenomenon of the 1970s 
and 80s serves as a preview of the twenty-first century in which 
Third World arms producers will play a growing role in the pro­
liferation of arms, military technology and nuclear technology.
South Africa and Yugoslavia, although smaller arms exporters 
than Israel, also have emerged as significant Third World arms 
suppliers. Pretoria was the single most important supplier to 
neighboring Rhodesia in the 1970s and subsequently supplied large 
amounts of arms to pro-Western counter-revolutionary movements in 
Angola and Mozambique. During the 1980s and early 1990s South 
Africa attracted considerable international attention for its 
arms and military technology sales to Iraq.
Yugoslavia used arms exports as means to give teeth to the 
Cold War doctrine of Nonalignment and supplied large amounts of 
weapons to a number of less internationally accepted Third World 
countries, including Iran, Iraq and Libya.
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Military interdependency among developing states appears set 
to grow in the next decades as new arms producers move to fill 
the positions held by the former industrial suppliers. Markets 
for Third World arms producers come in part from other develop­
ing countries which often cannot afford or do not need state-of- 
the-art weapons systems produced by the industrialised countries. 
As a result, major Third World arms suppliers have the chance to 
play a growing role in supplying basic weaponry to fellow Third 
World countries.
Third World military interdependence may also be stimulated 
on political grounds. Attempts by industrialised powers to use 
arms sales as a diplomatic or sanctions tool aimed at the de­
veloping countries, may be thwarted by a military interdependent 
Third World in which states like Israel fill gaps created by, 
say. President Jimmy Carter's human rights arms cutoffs in Cen­
tral America or the UN arms embargo on South Africa.
The post-Cold War world: Whither Third World military industries
The military-industrial and domestic political developments in 
all three countries in the late 1980s and early 90s illustrate
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the overall misadventure of the bid to reduce dependency on 
outside sources of arms, military technology and capital via the 
high-cost development of an arms manufacturing sector. On the 
one hand, all three countries failed in their attempt to reduce 
dependency on the industrialised countries through manufacture of 
indigenous advanced weapons systems. On the other hand, the 
significant expansion of short and middle term military independ­
ence ^ —  achieved through the defence sector build-up —  count­
ed for little in resolving each country's internal crisis.
In this respect, despite some seemingly impressive achieve­
ments, Israeli, South African and Yugoslav defence production —  
an integral part of national security policy —  appears to have 
been a failure. Why so?
First, in terms of the failure or cancellation of major 
advanced weapons projects, like Israel's Lavi fighter, all three 
countries provide examples of why Third World arms producers 
remain condemned to produce, at best, second echelon indigenous 
weapon systems. All more advanced systems depend too heavily on 
imported technology, components, or capital.
Second, despite the importance accorded the defence indus­
trial sector build-up in the three case study countries, domesti­
cally produced arms have played little or no role in military 
conflict or in resolving societal crises: Israeli-built weapons
—  with the possible exception of nuclear weapons —  have not 
played a decisive role in any of the Jewish state's wars since
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1948. And Israel's nuclear-armed missiles —  arguably the most 
notable Third World arms production achievement —  are impotent 
against Palestinian unrest in Israel and the Occupied Territo­
ries.
South African arms played an ancillary role in military 
operations against neighboring states in the 1970s and 80s. But 
domestic arms production was neither been able to preserve the 
apartheid society, nor restore order in a post-apartheid society.
Indigenous Yugoslav arms production played a minor role in 
supplying weapons which would have been effective against a 
concerted attack or intervention by Warsaw Pact or NATO forces 
during the Cold War. Domestic arms production capacity did 
nothing to prevent the slide into civil war.
For the three case study countries, domestic arms production 
was viewed as a Cold War policy to reduce foreign military de­
pendence in part to pursue internationally unpopular or independ­
ent domestic and foreign policies. Although broader policy 
questions are beyond the scope of this dissertation, it should be 
noted that in achieving these ends domestic arms production 
policy proved a failure, when de-coupled from internal political 
reforms.
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Cold War arms production rationale vanishes
But more fundamentally, the heavy costs of domestic arms produc­
tion were borne as a kind of 'declaration of independence' which 
underlined the importance of Israel and South Africa as potential 
Cold War proxies of the West and Yugoslavia's Cold War policy of 
Nonalignment.
Israeli arms production guaranteed Jerusalem the right to 
serve as the Reagan administration's weapons supplier in Central 
America during the 1980s. Existence of the country's domestic 
arms sector —  along with legions of 'private' Israeli arms 
dealers —  meant Israel could independently supply the Nicaraguan 
Contra forces and right-wing governments in the region which had 
been blocked from receiving American arms by the United States 
Congress.
In a similar fashion, South Africa was able to use domesti­
cally produced arms to independently supply anti-Communist forces 
in Angola and Mozambique during the 1980s, thus allowing the 
Reagan administration to again bypass a congressional law prohib­
iting the U.S. government from supplying Angolan counter­
revolutionary forces with weapons. Domestic arms production also 
helped Pretoria maintain a facade of independence when launching 
military operations against the Angolan government and Cuban 
support forces at the behest of the West.
Arms production was a key element of Yugoslavia's attempt to
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* opt-out* of the Cold War through a policy of Nonalignment. In 
theory. Nonalignment prescribed that Belgrade should not be de­
pendent on either military bloc for weapons. The domestic manu­
facture of arms was thus the cornerstone of Belgrade's Cold War 
policy of Nonalignment.
But the end of the Cold War, eroded or erased the demand for 
proxy arms transfers and the need for Nonalignment. The ending 
of the Cold War is a major discontinuity in the calculus justify­
ing the costs of a large domestic arms manufacturing sector in 
the case study countries for the 1990s. The regional security 
situation of each of the case study states —  or successor states 
—  is a continuity on which continuation of arms production may 
be justified in the post-Cold War world.
While none of the case study countries —  or successor 
countries —  can be expected to fully dismantle their respectiye 
defence industrial sector, a series of post-Cold War factors may 
paye the way for some reductions in Third World defence produc­
tion. This is especially true for Israel, South Africa and 
former Yugoslayia, which initiated defence production for politi­
cal reasons and probably less true regarding arms producers like 
Brazil which built up defence industry sectors more for economic 
reasons. Post-Cold War considerations possibly encouraging 
reduced Third World arms production include the following:
500
1) The pointed lesson provided by the 1987 cancellation of the 
Lavi fighter as a warning to Third World arms producers on the 
limits of both technology and capital in domestic arms produc­
tion.
2) The disappearance of Cold War justifications for arms produc­
tion, including a sharp decline use of proxy arms supply, and the 
decline of the concept of Nonalignment through the elimination of 
a bipolar world.
3) The flooding of world arms markets with weapons no longer 
needed in post-Cold War Europe.
4) A reduction in ideologically-based arms racing —  as once 
fueled by Moscow and Washington —  such as which took place 
between Israel and the Arab states from the mid-1950s to the end 
of the 1980s.
5) The breaking of the old northern industrial states' arms 
supply oligopoly through Third World production, which has creat­
ed a far greater number of arms suppliers, thus reducing the 
chances of implementing a successful arms embargo.
6) An enhanced realization, particularly in light of the post- 
Cold War Communist collapse, of the equal importance of economic
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power, to classical military power, in the calculus of a state's 
international influence.
This final point may well be the key to reduced Third World arms 
production in the 1990s and beyond. Future Third World arms 
projects will be subject to far more ruthless economic —  rather 
than ideological —  scrutiny. The damning criticism of Israel's 
Lavi fighter project raised by the Israeli state comptroller will 
serve as a blunt lesson of the importance for reining in arms 
development projects run financially wild. Advanced fighter 
aircraft may still be manufactured in the Third World, but not 
under a regime which dictates reinventing the wheel to match 
available state-of-the-art technology. With the Lavi cancella­
tion in mind, aircraft and other major projects will only be 
undertaken with the assistance of major international weapons or 
aviation manufacturers, with key components imported or built 
under foreign licence.
The necessity for future international arms manufacturing 
cooperation means Third World defence production has made a 
complete circle since it first began in the 1950s. The interna­
tional technological interdependency —  required for advanced 
arms production —  has finally demolished the myth that domestic 
arms production can create true national military independence. 
Yet it was belief in this very myth of independence which prompt-
502
ed the genesis of the arms production in Israel, South Africa and 
Yugoslavia in the Cold War era.
In the 1990s and beyond. Third World arms producers will 
endeavour to intertwine their respective military industries with 
the industrial countries' defence sectors from which they so long 
struggled to achieve independence.
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Part Five —  Appendices and Bibliography
Appendices: An introduction
The following appendices document arms exports from, and imports 
to, Israel, South Africa and Yugoslavia. The appendices, which 
comprise a vital part of this dissertation, are based on an ex­
tremely wide variety of sources including arms trade yearbooks, 
weapons trade journals, newspapers and academic sources (as 
footnoted at the end of each appendix).
Arms exports and imports were treated as state secrets by 
all three countries during the Cold War; thus the information in 
the appendices cannot claim to be absolutely correct. I have 
omitted entries of export or import transactions which appear 
open to doubt and have included brief explanatory notes in the 
appendices for transactions where available documentation ap­
peared incomplete or to explain details of a particular acquisi­
tion or sale.
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APPENDIX 1 - Israeli Arms Exports to Latin America
Country
1) Argentina
2) Bolivia
3) Brazil
4) Chile
Weapons/Service Received Quantity 
Dassault Mirage-5 fighters 26
28Nesher fighters 
(designated Dagger)
Mirage-3C fighters
Year
1978
1982-
83
? 1981
(Conflicting information; 
possibly confused with 28 
Nesher fighters.)
A-4E Skyhawk fighter/ 24?
bomber
Boeing 707 equipped with 1
Elint system
Shoet MK-2 armoured personnel 10
carrier (Delivery unconfirmed; 
may be contract for licensed 
production)
Dabur patrol boats 2-4
Gabriel ship-to- 25+
ship missiles
Various bombs, rockets 
and small arms
Arava transport aircraft 6
Bell UH-ID Iroquois 8
helicopter
Reshef class fast patrol 2?
Shafrir anti-aircraft 150
missiles
Radar systems ?
Shoet 2 armoured personnel ?
carrier (licenced production 
in Chile)
1982-
83
1985
1984?
1975-
86
1976
1982
1979?
1977?
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Maintenance of Chilean air force - 
aircraft by lAI
Kfir fighters 12
(ordered in 1988)
Retrofit package for Mirage ?
fighters
5) Columbia
6) Costa Rica
7) Dominican 
Republic
8) Ecuador
Kfir-C2 fighter/bomber
Gabriel missiles
Arava transport aircraft
Rocket propelled grenades, 
small arms and ammunition
Tanks
Field artillery
Small arms and police and 
anti-terrorist training
Uzi 9mm submachine guns
12
o
200
tonnes
?
9
Kfir-C2 fighter/bomber 13
Super Mystere fighters 12
Barak anti-missile missiles ?
Arava transport aircraft 10
Armoured personnel carriers ?
Various ammunition, rockets 
and explosives
9) El Salvador Arava transport aircraft 17
Fouga Magister trainer 
aircraft
1984
1982
?
1980
1986
?
9
1983?
1977
?
1975-
76
1974-
77
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10) Guatemala
11) Haiti
12) Honduras
Dassault MD450 Ouragan 
fighters
Mystere B-2 bombers 
80mm rocket launchers 
Uzi 9mm submachine guns 
Napalm
Ammunition and spare parts 
Arava transport aircraft
Asimo helicopters
RBY MK armoured cars
Training and computers 
for G-2 police intelligence
Galil 5.56mm assault rifles
Licenced production of 
the Galil and M16 rifle 
at Israeli-built factory
Field kitchens
Uzi 9mm submachine guns
106mm guns
Dassault Super Mystere B2 
4 fighters
Fast patrol boats 
(unspecified manufacture)
Arava transport aircraft
Westwind reconnaissance 
airplane
RBY MK armoured cars 
106mm MK mortars
18
4?
200
200
?
10-17
5
10
15,000
4
600
?
18
3
1
14
9
1975
1981?
?
?
1984
1977
78
?
9
?
?
?
1977-
78
1980
1976
?
?
9
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13) Mexico
14) Nicaragua
15) Panama
16) Paraguay
17) Peru
Galil assault rifles 
and Uzi submachine guns
Westwind aircraft
(Seascan maritime patrol version)
Arava transport aircraft
Arava transport aircraft
Helicopters
Patrol boats
Anti-aircraft missiles
Surface-to-surface missiles
Uzi 9mm submachine guns
Rifles, mortars, and ammunition
Westwind airplane
(Seascan maritime patrol version)
Arava transport aircraft
Helicopters
Armoured vehicles
Patrol boats
Small arms and ammunition
Parachutes
Radio equipment
Counter-insurgency training
? ?
2 ?
10 1978
5-14 1974-
77
? before 
July 1979
? before 
July 1979
? before 
July 1979
? before 
July 1979
? before 
July 1979
? before 
July 1979
1 1975
6 1977
12 1987?
72 1987?
? 1987?
7 7
? ?
7 ?
- through
1989
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18) Venezuela Arava transport aircraft 1980
Non-State
military
organisations
Weapons/Service Received Quantity
1) FDN (Fuerza 
Democratica 
Nicaraguense/ 
Nicaraguan 
Deomocratic 
Front) Honduran 
based anti- 
Sandinista movement
2) ARDE (Alianza 
Revolucionaria 
Democratica/ 
Democratic 
Revolutionary 
Alliance) Costa 
Rican based anti- 
Sandinista movement 
led by Eden Pastora
3) Columbian Drug 
cartel
4) Peruvian drug 
producers
AK-47 rifles
artillery pieces, mortars 
mines, hand grenades, 
ammunition, and military 
advisers
AK-47 rifles 
military advisers
2000
Year
1983
1982
86
500 1983
85
Galil assault rifles 
Uzi sub-machine guns
400
100
1989
1989
Total 1987-
value 89
$15 million
Galil assault rifles, 
sniper rifles, flak 
jackets, ammunition, 
grenades, communications 
and night-vision equipment 
(Reported by Shmu'el Rosenblum, Hadashot.
3 September 1989.)
Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks, 1968-69, 1969-70, 1972, 1973, 1974,
1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985; 
Penny Lernoux, '"Who's Who of dictators" obtain arms from Is­
rael', National Catholic Reporter (USA), 25 December 1981, Vol. 
18, No. 9; Penny Lernoux, 'Israeli arms sales "imperil vital 
Latin friendships"', National Catholic Reporter. 18 December 
1981, Vol. 18, No. 8; Philip Taubman, 'Israel said to aid Latin 
American aims of US', The New York Times. 21 July 1983; Philip 
Taubman, 'Nicaragua rebels reported to have new flow of arms',
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The New York Times. 13 January 1985; Edward Cody, * Sharon to 
discuss arms sales in Honduras', The Washington Post. 7 December 
1982; Kim Willenson, Marlise Simons, Lars-Erik Nelson, Nicaragua, 
Israel helps out', Newsweek (US edition), 20 November 1978, p. 
68; Ignacio Klich, 'Israel and Columbia, planes for coal'. Middle 
East International. 5 December 1987; 'Argentina's Israeli
"AWACS*", Latin America Weekly Report. 4 October 1985; Ignacio 
Klich, 'Argentina's balancing act'. The Middle East. February 
1986; Ignacio Klich, 'Israel and Chile, Doubts on Kfir deal'. 
Middle East International. 17 February 1989; 'Israeli sale to 
Peru', Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly. 29 February- 6 March 
1988; Barbara Durr, 'Chile to buy 12 Israeli-powered Kfir fight­
ers', Financial Times. 24 October 1988; David Gardner, 'How 
Israelis act as surrogates for US in Central America', Financial 
Times. 27 November 1986; Cynthia Arnson, 'Israel and Central 
America', New Outlook. March-April 1984; Cheryl A. Rubenberg, 
'Israel and Guatemala: arms, advice and counterinsurgency', 
Middle East Report. May-June 1988; Jon Lee Anderson, 'Loose 
cannons: on the trail of Israel's gunrunners in Central America', 
New Outlook. February 1989; Jane Hunter, Israeli Foreign Policy 
(Boston: South End Press, 1987); Aaron Klieman, Israel * s Global 
Reach. (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), p. 137; Bishara Bah- 
bah, Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection (New York: 
St. Martin's, 1986); Eric Hooglund, Israel's Arms Exports (Wash­
ington, DC: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee); Andrew 
and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liaisons, p. 237; Peter Eisner and 
Knut Royce, 'Israeli link to assassination', Newsdav. 4 July 
1990; 'Israeli instructors (out of Peru)', Jerusalem Post. 3 
October 1989; Shmu'el Rosenblum, 'Peru, Bolivia said given arms', 
TAO309111389 Tel Aviv, Hadashot in Hebrew, 3 September 1989, p. 
3, in FBIS Near East and South Asia, 5 September 1989, pp. 24-5; 
David Gardner, 'How Israelis act as surrogates for US in Central 
America', Financial Times. 27 November 1986.
Plus various issues of: Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily; The 
Times, The International Herald Tribune; The Daily Telegraph; 
Israeli Foreign Affairs (USA); and. Military Technology.
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APPENDIX 2 - Israeli Arms Exports to Africa, Asia, and the Middle 
East
Country Weapons/Service Received Quantity Year
1) Benin/ 
Dahomey
2) Cameroon
3) Central 
African 
Republic
4) Chad
5) China
6) Ciskei 
(South
African 
'homeland*)
7) Egypt
8) Ethiopia
Small arms and/or military 
training
Small arms and military 
training
Small arms and/or military 
training
Small arms
Components and technicians 
for modernisation of T-59/69 
tanks
Missile technology
Lavi components and technicians 
for China's fighter programmme
Mooney 201 (M-20 J) training 
aircraft
Heavy machine gun ammunition
Since
1983
1983-
?
1986-
9
1987?
1987-
?
1984
19891 million 
rounds
(Sale was disguised by being routed 
through the UK but false papers were 
discovered by British customs 
officials.)
Small arms and military training - prior to 1977
? 1989Pioneer and Scout remotely 
piloted drones
1985-present?Arms and military training 
(It is claimed
by Eritrean People's Liberation Front that 
Israel supplied $83 million worth of arms to
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Ethiopia in 1988;that there are military 
advisers in Ethiopia and that Ethiopian pilots 
are being trained in Israel. A Sunday Times 
report said 200 Israeli soldiers and technicians 
were training soldiers and repairing military 
military equipment in Ethiopia in 1989 and that 
Jerusalem had offered Soviet weapons in exchange 
for the emigration of Ethiopian Jews. A 
1990 U.S. Congressional staff report citing 
Pentagon sources said Israel supplied Ethiopia 
with 100 cluster bombs in 1989 and that Jerusalem 
was "probably" providing sophisticated technology 
to the country's air force including surveillance 
cameras and nose cones for MiG fighters, along 
with light arms and ammunition.)
9) Gabon
10) Ghana
Small arms
Training of secret service 
by Mossad
11) Indonesia A-4E Skyhawk fighter/ground 
attack aircraft
16 1980
Small arms
12) Iran Spare parts and tyres for 
F-4 Phantom fighters
1981-
86
Refurbished jet engines, 
spare parts for M-48 tanks, 
ammunition
1981-
Advisers for Iranian 
intelligence services
before
1979
13) Ivory 
Coast
Unspecified arms and spares
Small arms and/or military 
training
1989
9
14) Kenya Gabriel 2 ship-to-ship missile 16 1981-
84
15) Lebanon
Surface-to-air missiles
Dabur gun-boats
(Sold to Bashir Gemayal's
1988
1988
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16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
Lesotho
Phalangiste.)
Military vehicles and training
Liberia Arava transport aircraft
Security and intelligence 
assistance (to the Doe regime)
Malaysia
Mauritania
Morocco
Nepal
Nigeria
Papua New 
Guinea
Gabriel ship-to-ship missiles 
Small arms and/or military 
AMX tanks
Armoured personnel carriers 
Small arms
Small arms and/or military 
training
Arava transport aircraft
Rhodesia Bell helicopters
Saudi
Arabia
Senegal
Sierra
Leone
Reserve fuel tanks for 
F-16 fighters
Small arms and/or military 
training
Small arms and/or military
Singapore Gabriel ship-to-ship missile 
M-68 howitzers
Somalia
30) South 
Korea
Small arms and/or military 
training
Small arms
Tear gas spray guns
Water cannons
6?
11
9
230
9
1989
90
1984
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
1984-
85
1978
1981
?
1977
9
1989
1989
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31) Sri Lanka
32) Taiwan
33) Tanzania
34) Thailand
Military and intelligence 
training
Dvora fast patrol boats 6
Shafrir anti-aircraft missile ?
Dvora class fast attack boats; 34?
manufactured under licence.
Taiwanese designation:
Hai Ou class
Gabriel 2 ship-to-ship missile; 72?
manufactured under licence.
Taiwanese designation:
Hsiung Feng
Small arms and/or military 
training
Arava transport aircraft 1
Gabriel 2 ship-to-ship missile 15
Artillery and small arms ?
1984
?
?
Since
1979
Since
1977
1980
1976-
77
1976-
77
35) Togo
36) Turkey
37) Swaziland
38) Uganda
Small arms and/or military 
training
Upgrading of F-4 Phantom 
fighters and artillery
(Unconfirmed to date)
Arava transport aircraft 1
Commodore 1123 and 112IB aircraft 2
Fouga Magister trainers 24
Training of secret service 
by Mossad
1979
1971
1964-
68
39) Zaire
707 cargo aircraft 
Small arms and artillery
1975
9
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Training of secret service 
by Mossad
Non-State 
military 
organisations
1) Kurdish Rebels 
in Iraq under Gen. 
Mustafa Barzani
2) Renamo / MNR 
(Mozambique 
National Resistance 
Movement)
Weapons/Service Received
Small arms and military 
training (based in Iran 
the Israelis operated in 
Iraq)
Quantity Year
1966-
75
Military instruction 1986
(limited evidence)
3) National Front 
for the
Salvation of Libya 
(led by Abdoulgassim 
Khalifa Haftar, mainly 
based in Chad)
Military training 1987
89
(limited evidence)
4) Uganda People's Military training/small arms - 1987?
Front (led by Peter (evidence limited to reports in
Otai) Ugandan newspapers)
5) FNLA and Unita 
(Angola)
Soviet Grail missiles 50 1975-
(US sent Israel Redeye missiles 76
in exchange for Israeli shipment of 
Grail missiles to the FNLA and 
Unita. All Grail missiles were reportedly 
defective.)
6) Tamil separatist 
forces
120mm shells 1000
Military training in Israel
1975-
76
Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks, 1968-69, 1969-70, 1972, 1973, 1974,
1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985; 
'Israel aided Iraqi Kurds up to '75, Begin reports'. New York 
Times. 30 September 1980; Andrew Whitley, 'Israelis strengthen
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influence in Africa', Financial Times. 28 August 1986; James 
Adams, 'Strangers and brothers, the unlikely alliance between 
Israel and South Africa', The Sunday Times. 15 April 1984; 'Bri­
tain loses "gun battle against Israel" ', The Sunday Times. 14 
October 1984; Robert Fisk, 'Israelis refit tanks for China', The 
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tanks get Israeli oyerhaul', Defense and Economy World Report. 25 
March 1985; Shlomit Teneh, '(Kibbutz) Beit Alfa will sell South 
Korea water cannons for the dispersal of demonstrators', Yedioth 
Ahronot. 3 April 1989; ' "$2 billion arms deal with Turkey" ',
(citing Jane's Defence Weekly. 9 March 1988) Jerusalem Post. 10 
March 1988; Dayid B. Ottaway, 'Israeli arms role cited in Chi- 
nese-Saudi deal', International Herald Tribune. 23 May 1988; AP, 
'South Korea plans to buy tear-gas guns from Israel', Jerusalem 
Post. 1 June 1989; Jon Swain, 'Israel in secret missile deal with 
China', The Sunday Times. 3 April 1988; Con Coughlin, 'Arms sale 
to Iran "typical Israeli policy" ', Daily Telegraph. 5 January 
1987; Marie Colyin, 'Israel sells radar to China in secret deal'. 
The Sunday Times. 10 April 1988; Andrew Whitley, 'Israel plays 
game with high stakes'. Financial Times. 27 Noyember 1986; 'Isra­
elis "aiding MNR rebels" ', Africa Analysis (London) 28 Noyember 
1986; Richard Dowden, 'Israel may be helping MNR', The Independ­
ent. 29 Noyember 1986; 'Renamo reportedly receiyes RSA, Israeli 
arms', Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese, 1730 GMT, 1 Decem­
ber 1988 cited in FBIS Africa, 2 December 1988, p. 26; 'Mozam­
bique, Israel engaged in talks on technical aid', SouthScan. 14 
December 1988; AP, 'US and Israel said training rebel Libyan 
force'. The Jerusalem Post. 6 January 1989 (citing a report in 
Africa Confidential. 5 January 1989); Dayid Horoyitz, 'British 
customs uncover secret Israeli sale of ammunition to Egyptians', 
Jerusalem Post. 12 February 1989; 'Eritrean rebel radio alleges 
military collaboration between Ethiopia and Israel', Voice of the 
Broad Masses of Eritrea in Trigrigna, 0400 GMT, 18 January 1989, 
cited in BBC Monitoring, 20 January 1989, ME/0363/ B/2; 'Point­
ers, Israel supplies Chad with arms'. Foreign Report, 13 October 
1983; AFP, '"Israel sent arms to Ugandan rebels"', Jerusalem 
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entitled In Search of Enemies, both by John Stockwell, a former 
officer in the CIA coordinator of US coyert operations in Ango­
la) ; 'Ciskei, aircraft for defence force', African Defence. June 
1984; James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet Books, 
1984); Stephen Green, Liying fey the Sword. America and Israel in
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the Middle East. 1968-1987 (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), p. 
197; SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: 
Almquist and Wiskell, 1971), p. 652; Victor Ostrovsky, By Wav of 
Deception. The Making and Unmaking af Mossad Officer (New York: 
St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 123-30, 315; Romesh Fernando, 'What the 
Israelis are doing ', Island International (Sri Lanka), 2 Novem­
ber 1988; 'Kenya pledges to help Israel in Africa', Jerusalem 
Post. 27 August 1989; Israel's Lesotho role highlighted in mys­
tery Maseru pamphlet', SouthScan. 28 June 1989, p. 187; 'Singa­
pore buys Israeli', Armies and Weapons. March/April 1977; Peter 
Godwin, 'Israel and Ethiopia in gun deal'. The Sundav Times. 10 
December 1989; 'Local arms reportedly provided to Ethiopia', 
JN1612175589 Kuwait Al-Ra'v Al-Amm in Arabic, 14 December 1989, 
pp. 1, 24, in FBIS Near East and South Asia, 19 December 1989, p. 
31; Anne Ponger, 'Israel liefert dem Iran Waffen gegen Oel ' , 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung 20 December 1989; Larry Cohler, 'House memo 
charges Israel arms Ethiopian regime', Washington Jewish Week. 12 
July 1990; Signe Landgren, Embargo Disimplemented. South Africa's 
Militarv Industrv (Oxford: CUP for SIPRI, 1989), p. 74; Andrew 
and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liaisons. The Inside Storv of the 
U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship (New York: Harpers, 1991), p. 
118, 194.
Plus various issues of: Financial Times ; Defense and Foreign 
Affairs Daily; The Times; The International Herald Tribune ; The
Daily Telegraph; Military Technology»
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APPENDIX 3 - Israeli Arms Exports to the Industrialised Countries
Country
1) Federal 
Republic 
of Germany
2) Greece
Weapons/Service Received
* Smart* shells, 155mm 
shells and other 
munitions
Uzi submachine guns, 
grenade throwers, 
ammunition, uniforms, 
tyres
Small arms
QaapMtyZ Xsar 
or value
300 mill. DM 1987
1957
65?
3) Switzerland Scout remotely piloted
vehicle system
4) USA
1989-
550Radio transmitters for 
US Army
(Initial order worth some $22 million 
is part of competition leading up to 
invitation to tender some $300 million 
to the Israeli producer Tadiran.)
Mazlat Pioneer remotely 
piloted vehicle (RPV). 
(Of the 36 drones 
delivered to the US 
Navy by July 1988, 12 
had crashed.)
72 ordered, 
$1.4 million 
per RPV
Plough/bulldozer system 300
for US Army BMY Counter 
Obstacle Vehicle supplied 
by Israeli Military Industries
Portable mine neutralisation ? 
system for US Marine Corps
Aircraft electronic system
1985
1988
1985-
88
1987-
9
1987-
9
5 ordered
control sets; supplied by 
Elta Electronics to the US 
Navy
with option 
for 114 
additional 
sets
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Tank fire control simulators; 
supplied by Elbit Electronics 
to the US Army
Kfir-Cl fighters 
(On loan under a $70 million 
maintenance contract from 
Israel Aircraft Industries to 
simulate MiG-2Is in air combat 
training.)
16
12
Overhaul of F-4 aircraft 
and spares
105mm guns and ammunition 
(for evaluation)
B-300 assault weapon 
(for US Marine Corps)
AN/VRC-12 radios
Spare parts for tanks
$1.7 mill.
$11 mill. 
$39 mill. 
$3-5 mill.
1989
9
1985
9
1979-
82
1979
82?
1982
1979
82
1979
82
Conformai tanks for F-15 
aircraft
Offset sale as part of the 
Israeli purchase of the F-16; 
General Dynamics of the US has 
agreed to buy at least $800 
million worth of military and 
civilian goods from Israel Aircraft 
Industries, Tadiran, and Elbit.
$800 mill.
1979
82
Sources: David Marsh and Andrew Whitley, *W. Germany buys 100m 
(sterling) Israeli arms'. Financial Times. 3 December 1987;
Ya'acov Friedler, 'Arms deal will alleviate Soltam's headache', 
Jerusalem Post. 3 December 1987; Yossi Melman, 'Swiss army buys 
Israeli scout MRPVs', Janes's Defence Weeklv. 30 March 1985; Judy 
Maltz and Kenneth Kaplan, 'Tadiran yet to land big US Army or­
der', Jerusalem Post. 9 June 1988; Mark Thompson, 'Contract 
bypassed US rules, probe targets deal for Israeli drones', San 
Jose (California) Mercurv News. 24 July 1988; Michael Collins 
Dunn, 'Israel: New priorities for a new era'. Defense and Foreign 
Affairs. July 1988; 'US Navy awards Elta $4.5 million contract'. 
Defense News, 30 January 1989; Judith Maltz, 'US Army order for
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Israeli defence group*, (tank simulators) Financial Times. 24 
November 1989; Andrew Whitley, 'Israelis win $20m US Army order*. 
Financial Times. 6 November 1987; Lily Gardner Feldman, The 
Special Relationship Between West Germanv and Israel (London: 
George, Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 126; Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbooks. 1980, 1981, 1982,
1983, 1984, 1985, 1986; US General Accounting Office, ÏÏS Assist­
ance to the State of Israel (uncensored draft report), p. 40.
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APPENDIX 4 - Israeli Arms Exports to South Africa
Weapons/Service Received
1) Kfir fighter modernisation 
package for Mirage 3 fighters
Quantity Year
From 1986
2) Reshef class fast patrol boats 3 1978
(Nine additional Reshefs being built under license in South
Africa)
3) Gabriel 2 ship-to-ship missile At least 108 missiles
ordered. No. delivered 
to date not known.
(The Gabriel 2 is produced under license in South Africa under 
the designation * Scorpion*.)
4) Dvora class fast patrol boats 6 ?
5) Scout and Mastiff remotely ? ?
vehicles
6) Uzi submachine gun and Galil - ?
assault rifle manufactured under
license. Galil designated R-4.
7) Small arms, night sights, ? ?
microwave detection
systems, electronic systems, electronic 
fences, barbed wire, anti-personnel mines
8) J-79 aircraft engines
9) Centurian tanks
10) M-113A1 armoured personnel carriers
11) 106mm recoilless rifle
32
400
9
1980s
1962
1980s
1980s
Sources: See footnotes for Chapter Five.
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APPENDIX 5 - Major Israeli Arms Imports Since 1967*
Supplier Weapons/Services Quantitv/value 
Received
Xear
1) USA A-4 Skyhawk fighter 100 (Ordered in 1966;
first A-5s 
delivered late 
1967 or early 
1968)
NB: The total number of A-4 aircraft that Israel has received 
from the US is difficult to calculate. The total in this table 
is 283 for the period 1967-89, while the IISS total in the Mili­
tarv Balance 1988-1989 is 121. It should be noted that Israel 
has sold some 40 A-4s to Argentina and Indonesia. It is not 
known how many A-4s have been removed from active service or 
lost.
M-48 main battle tank 
F-4 Phantom fighter
Bell 205 UH-ID/AB 205 
helicopter
Sikorsky S-65 CH-53A/D 
helicopter
M-lOl-Al 105mm towed 
howitzer
440 1968-73
93
17
33
90?
1969-71 
(ordered late 
1967; first 
F-4s delivered 
in 1969)
(beginning in 
1969)
1969-71
M-107 175mm self- 
propelled gun
M-110 203mm self- 
propelled howitzers
AGM-12B Bullpup air-to 
surface missile
AIM-7C Sparrow air-to- 
missile
200? 1968-73
60? 1968-71
760? 1969-76
2034? 1969-87
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AGM-45A Shrike air-to- 
radar missile
M-113-A1 armoured 
personnel carrier
M-60 main battle tank
Bell 212/UH-lN 
helicopter
M-60 tanks
175mm artillery systems
F-4 Phantom fighters 
A-4 Skyhawk fighters
RF-4E Phantom 
reconnaissance aircraft
Stratofreighter transport 
aircraft
AIM-9D air-to-air 
missile
AGM-65A air-to-surface 
missile
Queen Air B-80
Lockheed Hercules 
C-130E/H transport 
aircraft
Lockheed Hercules 
KC-130H inflight 
refueling aircraft
F-4 Phantom fighters
1000? 1970-78
100? 1970-71
1375? 1970-85 
40 (beginning in 
1971?)
200 (beginning in 
June 1970)
? (beginning in
June 1970)
85 1972-73
24 (beginning in
June 1970)
18 1971-78
3 1971-73
2336? 1972-73
1160? 1973-82
32? 1974-75
24? 1971-78
2 1976-77
45 1974-75
NB: The total number of F-4 Phantom fighters listed in this
table is 223. This figure and the dates of delivery are taken 
from Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the
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Third World, p. 196. It has proven difficult to determine how 
many F-4s have been withdrawn from active service or have been 
lost. The IISS in The Military Balance 1988-1089 reports that 
there are 113 F-4s at present in the Israeli Air Force.
A-4 Skyhawk fighters
TA-4H Skyhawk trainer 
aircraft
82 (beginning in
February 1972)
25 1972-73
Bell JetRanger 206A 
helicopter
LSM type landing craft/ 
minelayer
AN/PPS-15 surveillance 
radar
64 (beginning in
1972)
3 1972
20? 1973
MIN-72A landmobile 
surface-to-air-missile
288? 1973-74
A-4 Skyhawk fighters
M-730 armoured anti­
aircraft vehicle (armed 
with missiles)
BGM-71A TOW anti-tank 
missile
24 (between 1973
and 1975)
24? 1973-74
3740? 1973-82
MIM-23B Hawk landmobile 
surface-to-air-missile
400? 1973-84
J-79 jet engines for 
for use in the Kfir 
fighter (NB: same 
engine as used in F-4)
Airlift of arms during 
1973 Arab-Israeli War 
including 53 replacement 
A-4 fighter aircraft
FIM-43A Redeye portable 
surface-to-air missile
(from 1973)
$825 million 1973
500? 1975
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Grumman Mohawk OV-ID 
electronic counter­
measures aircraft
Bell 209 Huey Cobra 
AH-IG, AH-IS helicopter
40
1975
1975-85
NB: According to Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson in Arms
Transfers to the Third World, p. 196, Israel has bought a total 
of 46 Bell 209s. The figure of 40 Bell 209s in active service 
comes from the IISS in The Military Balance 1988-1989. p. 104.
Boeing 707-320C 
transport aircraft
13? 1975-83
Dabur class fast patrol 12 1975-76
(prior to licensed production in Israel)
Lance surface-to-air 110? 1976
missile system (possible local production of
warhead)
AIM-9J anti-aircraft 300? 1976-79
missile
FGM-77A Dragon anti-tank 7000 1977-81
missile
M-109-A1 155mm self 100? 1977-78
propelled howitzer
M-728 armoured 15? 1977-78
engineering vehicle
Hughes Defender 500MD 40
attack helicopter
F-15 fighters 25
(armed with Sparrow 
and Sidewinder air-to 
air missiles)
(from 1980) 
(from 1976)
Grumman Hawkeye E-2C 4 1977-78
early warning surveillance
aircraft
M-113-A1 armoured 
personnel carriers
700? 1977-79
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RGM-84A-L ship-to-ship 
missile launcher
23?
RGM-84A Harpoon ship-to- 144? 
ship missile
1979-85
1979-84
F-15 fighters
F-16 fighters
F-16 C/D fighters, 
Block 40 version
35?
75
60
(from 1980)
(from 1980)
(from December
1988)
NB; Total number of F-16 fighters in this table is 135. The 
IISS in The Militarv Balance 1988-1989 puts the total at 145.
AIM-9L anti-aircraft- 
missile
Flagstaff Mk. 2 
hydrofoil boats
Construction of 
military airfields 
in the Negev as part 
of the 1978 Egypt- 
Israeli peace treaty
Air-to-air missiles, 
surface-to-air missiles, 
tanks, armoured personnel 
carriers, and an early 
warning system for the 
southern Negev region of 
Israel
I-Hawk surface-to-air 
missile system
M-88-A1 armoured 
recovery vehicle
M-113-A2 armoured 
vehicle
M-548 armoured 
personnel carrier
800 1980-86
1977?
(from 1978; 
costs of $800- 
1 billion met 
by the USA)
(extra US aid as 
as compensation to 
Israel for signing 
peace treaty with 
Egypt from 1978)
6? 1980-84
25? 1981-82
800? 1981-82
56? 1981-82
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M-109-A1 self-propelled 
howitzers
200? 1982-83
Super King Air transport 4? 1983
aircraft (equipped for battlefield surveillance)
SA-366 helicopters 
AS-365N helicopters
Sa'ar 5 missile boat
United Kingdom Centurion tank
Submarines, T-206
BN-2A Islander 
transport aircraft
2 1985
12-20 (on order since
1986)
4 (on order since 
April 1988)
940?
3
4
1967-75
1977
1974
France
Germany
Fast patrol boats 
'Saar' class
12 1968-69
SA 321 K Super Frelon 12 1966-67
helicopter (8 or 9 of the original
shipment are reportedly 
still in service)
Submarines
Do-27 transport 
aircraft
Do-280-1 transport 
aircraft
(on order)
23? 1976
15 1974
NB: According to the memoirs of former German defence minister 
Franz-Josef Strauss, from 1957 to 1961 West Germany supplied 
Israel with transport aircraft, helicopters, artillery and anti­
tank weapons worth some $800 million.
Austria S-65A helicopters 1981
* NB: Some of the above aircraft figures for recent years are
for planes still on order.
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Sources: Mordechai Gazit, 'Israeli military procurement from the
United States', in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), Dynamics of Dependence: 
US - Israeli Relations (London; Boulder, CO: Westview Press for 
the Leonard Davis Institute, 1987), pp. 100-23; Stockholm Inter­
national Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third 
World (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971), p. 845; Andrew 
Whitley, 'Way clear for Israel to buy German submarines'. Finan­
cial Times, 7 April 1988; ' "Positive Antwort" ', Der Soieael. 17 
July 1989, No. 29; 'Israel to buy fewer, more modern F-16s', 
Aviation Week and Space Technology. 11 April 1988, p. 18; Russell 
Warren Howe, Weapons. pp. 539-46; Tirza Leibowitz, 'Sa'ar 5 
missile boat. Voyage into the future', IDF Journal. Winter 1989, 
No. 16, p. 35; Bill Gunston, Illustrated Guide to the Israeli 
Air Force (London: Salamander Books, 1982); International Insti­
tute for Strategic Studies, The Militarv Balance 1988-1989 
(London: IISS, 1988), pp. 103-4; I have drawn heavily from the 
extensive listing of Israeli arms imports from 1971-85 found in 
Appendix 1 in Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers 
to the Third World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) , 
pp.195-8; Franz-Josef Strauss, Die Erinnerunoen (Berlin: Siedler,
1989), p. 342-5.
528
APPENDIX 6 - South African Arms Exports Since 1965
Country 
1) Argentina
2) Botswana
3) Chile
4) Guatemala
5) Hong Kong
6) Iran
7) Iraq
Weapon/Service
Received
Quantity Year
1982?Exocet, Gabriel and ?
Skerpioen missiles
(Reports of South African missile shipments 
during Falklands/Malvinas War denied by 
Pretoria. A 1984 UN report said that Israeli 
arms were shipped to Argentina via South Africa 
during the War.)
military equipment ? ?
Cactus surface-to- 6 1980
air missile (reportedly sold via France)
Kukri, air-to 
air missile
Construction aid 
for Magellan 
Straight shipyards
on order
$13 million
SOR-18 telephone system ? 1980
Small arms, police ? ?
equipment?
Advisers for Indian resettlement programme
Police riot equipment ?
(Purchased for testing)
G-5 howitzer ?
and shells
Small arms and explosives shipped to 
Iran via Greek armaments producer of 
which the South African government 
bought a controlling share
1989
1980s
1984-87
G-5 howitzer 
and shells
100
Ballistic missile technology
1984-89
1984-88
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8) Israel
10) Lesotho
11) Malawi
12) Morocco
13) Oman
14) Paraguay
15) Peru
16)Portugal
17) Rhodesia
Spare parts for Mirage ? 
fighters during 1967 War
military equipment ?
Ferret armoured car 6
(ex-British)
Eland-5 and Eland 6 ?
and Ratel armoured cars
Small arms? (in counter- ? 
trade agreement 
for oil)
Armoured cars ?
Pilot training in South Africa 
arms? ?
?
1967
1972
1977-79
1979
?
?
before 1975armoured cars, j eeps 
and other equipment
(supplied during wars in Portuguese colonies 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola)
18) Somalia
DC Dakota transport 
aircraft
Bell helicopters 
(Israeli sale 
transacted via 
South Africa)
Small arms and other 
weapons
AL-60 light transport 
aircraft (ex-Italian)
Alouette-3 helicopters
Eland armoured cars
AM-3C light aircraft
Puma helicopters
Training for air
11
1972
1978
Rand 18 
million
19
4
30
7
9
1972-
74
1967 
and 1971
1967
1973
1971
1973
9
530
force personnel
Soviet arms in exchange for airbase rights for 
South Africa reported by The Observer in 1985. 
Deal denied by Somali government.
19) Sri Lanka Buffel armoured
personnel carriers
20) Swaziland Military equipment
21) Taiwan Military technology 
cooperation
22) Thailand Small arms
23) Venezuela Small arms?
?
?
1985?
?
Non-State
Militarv
Organisations Weapon/Service
received
Quantity Year
1) Uniao Nacional para a 
Indepencia Total de 
Angloa (UNITA)
2) Mozambican
Resistance
(MNR=RENAMO)
National
Small arms
Small arms
Sources; Africa Confidential. 10/4/85 and 31/7/85; SIPRI
Yearbooks. 1981-84; Latinamerica Press. 17/4/86; CARDRI News, 
June 1985; African Defence. January 1983; M. Brzoska, 'South 
Africa: Evading the Embargo', in Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms 
Production in the Third World, p. 208; Financial Times. 13/11/87. 
Signe Landgren, Embargo Disimplemented. South Africa's Militarv 
Industry, (Oxford: OUP for SIPRI, 1989), pp. 177-182; A.J. Vent­
er, 'South Africa's military industrial complex'. International 
Defense Review. December 1971, cited in Landgren, Embargo Disim­
plemented . p. 177; Figure of Rand 18 million in arms sales to 
Rhodesia from To the Point (Johannesburg), 17 September 1979, 
cited in Philip Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians (Cambridge: CUP, 
1984), p. 89; 'Hong Kong police use SA riot gear', Sundav Times. 
9 July 1989; Lee Stokes, United Press International, 'Greek 
connection in SA arms deal with Tehran', The Independent. 27 
November 1987; Anthony Robinson, 'Armscor, symbol of South 
Africa's outsider status'. Financial Times. 26 April 1989
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APPENDIX 7 - South African Arms Imports
Below is a summary of reported arms, technology and component 
transfers to South Africa since 1977 and a selection of major 
sales from before 1977;
South African militarv imports from Israel
Weapons/Services Quantity
Received
Kfir fighter and/ ?
or major components
thereof
Year
1986?
Gazelle helicopters
Boeing 707 in-flight 
refueling tankers
ELTA EL/L-8300 
computerized data 
collection analysis 
systems
Shafrir air-to- 
air missiles
50
2
4—6
1986
1986
1986
Reshef-class fast 
patrol boats (9 more 
built under license 
in SA)
Dvora-class fast 
patrol boats
Gabriel-2 ship-to- 
ship missiles
Scout and Mastiff 
remotely piloted 
vehicles(drones)
1978
At least 108 
on order. No. 
delivered to date 
unclear.
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Nuclear technology ?
Military and especially 
counter-insurgency 
training
Various electronic components, 
computer software, small arms, 
night sights, microwave protection 
and detection systems, electronic 
fences, barbed wire, anti-personnel 
mines.
South African militarv imports from France
Quantity YearWeapon/Services
Received
Mirage III and FI 114 1962-77?
Aerospatiale AM.39 
Exocet AS missile
Matra R-530 and R550 air- 
to-air missile
AS-20 and AS-30 air-to- 
surface missiles
SS-11 anti-tank missile
Milan and Entac anti-tank 
missiles (both are French- 
German co-productions)
Daphne-class
submarines
Nuclear reactors 
at Koeberg
Crotale/Cactus 
Surface-to-air 
missile
1977
600
?
?
1970-72
1974-83
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AS-12 ASM
SA-316B helicopter
Spare parts and 
modernisation 
package for Puma 
helicopters
Technology transfer for 
Armscor*s Alpha XHl 
helicopter
Small arms and ammunition
1848
2
1974-80
1983-84
1981-85
1981-86?
1981-82
Other South African arms imports
QuantityWeapons/Services
Received
Czechoslovakia Pistols
J ordan Puma helicopters
one of many 
consignments 
said to include 
2000 weapons
Year
1986-87
1986-87?
Spain
United
Kingdom
Tigercat surface-to-air 
missiles (British origin)
18 1976
batteries
(Note: A March 1987 report in the Jerusalem Post
said that Jordan has become one of the major arms 
conduits to South Africa —  shipping arms worth 
Rand 6 billion between 1972 and 1987. The report 
was published at a time when Israel was under 
intense pressure from the U.S. to reduce 
military ties with South Africa.)
7.62mm cartridges
Westland Wasp HAS Mkl 
ASW helicopter
3 shipments 1976
1973-74
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Marconi S247 radar 
modernization package
Various avionics for 
Cheetah/Kfir
Long-range aerial photo 
reconnaissance.equipment
Westland Puma helicopter 
spares (sent to France and 
rerouted to South Africa)
Spare parts for Bren and 
Vickers .303 guns
$1.2
million
1983
1984-86?
1983
1989
11982
(Note; Some Rand 50 million worth of naval 
vessels were provided by the UK to South 
Africa under the 1955 Simonstown Agreement. 
Included were four anti-submarine warfare 
frigates, five Ford class seaward defence 
vessels, 10 minesweepers, HS Avro Shackleton 
maritime reconnaissance bombers, and Canadian 
Sabre-4 jet fighters.)
UK/ West 
Germany
West Germany
Multi-sensor platforms 
for tracking high-speed 
objects (developed by 
British Aerospace and 
Messerschmitt)
U-209 submarine blueprints 
and plans/components? for 
the SAS Drakensberg
1 (with 
two more 
on order)
1988
1983-86
Netherlands
Bulgaria
Austria
ASM AMD/BA Atlantic 
Mkl maritime patrol 
and combat aircraft 
(sale unconfirmed)
Land mines, rocket launchers, 
small arms (to supply rebel 
movements in Angola and 
Mozambique)
Automatic pistols 
(confiscated en route
1985?
1978-80
500 1983
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at Copenhagen International 
Airport)
USA AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air 200 1956
missiles
Sources for South African imports:
Israeli Foreign Affairs, various issues; Jane Hunter, 'Israel and 
the Bantustans', Journal q £, Palestine Studies, no date; SIPRI, 
Southern Africa. The Escalation of a conflict (Stockholm: Almq­
vist and Wiksell International, 1976); Anthony Terry, 'French 
sell arms to Pretoria through Cairo', Sundav Times. 17 February 
1980; SIPRI Yearbooks. 1968-86; The Guardian. 6 November 1985; 
The International Herald Tribune. 8 January 1985; The Observer. 
24 April 1983; The Dailv Telegraph. 10 June 1983; Deutsche 
Presse Agentur in Die Tageszeitung. (Berlin, West) 11 November 
1987; David Pallister, 'S Africa evades arms ban'. The Guardian. 
5 July 1988; 'Sanctions busters gaoled'. The Guardian. 17 April 
1987; 'Is SA arms dump?'. Uniform. Newspaper of the South African 
Army. 5 October 1987, No. 190; 'Westland helicopter parts sent to 
SA', Business Dav. 28 July 1989; 'Jordan "top channel for SA 
arms'". The Star (International Weekly) 21 March 1987, reporting 
on a story in Jerusalem Post on Jordan's arms exports to South 
Africa; Signe Landgren, Embargo Disimplemented. South Africa's 
Military Industrv (Oxford: OUP for SIPRI, 1989), pp. 39-40, 104, 
107, 129.
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APPENDIX 8 - Yugoslavian Arms Exports
As is stressed in Chapter Seven, the information deficit 
regarding Yugoslav arms exports severe. For example, official 
Yugoslav statements say that military materiel has been delivered 
to Latin America. But these is scant evidence as to which Latin 
American states have received arms and what the nature of the 
exports has been. James Nichol speculates that since Brazil is 
listed in Yugoslav statistical yearbooks as being Belgrade's 
biggest trade partner in the region, much of the trade is 
probably with Brasilia.<Nichol in Katz (ed.) Arms Production in 
Developing Countries. p. 353.>
Because arms exports have been an important aspect of 
Yugoslav foreign policy since the 1950s, the listing below in­
cludes all reasonably documented major arms transfers since 1950.
Country
1) Algeria
Weapons/services
G-4 Super Caleb 
jet trainer
Quantity/value
9
Year
Under
negotiation
2) Bangladesh Kraljevica patrol 
craft
1975
3) Burma river gunboats
general equipment 
for one army brigade
10 1955?
barter deal 1955
4) Cyprus
108 torpedo boat 2
M55 A2 anti-aircraft ?
gun
1965
9
M-77 Oganj multiple 
rocket system
5) Egypt torpedo boat 
tanks
1956
1973-
74
spares for MiG-21 mid-
1970s
laser rangefinders 
for T-54/55 tanks
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6) El
Salvador
M-56 towed howitzer 14 1982
(based on uncertain data)
M-55 anti-aircraft gun ? ?
7) Ethiopia M-47 Patton tank
Kraljevica class 
large patrol boat
8) Honduras
9) Hungary
10) India
11) Indonesia
12) Iran
13) Iraq
14) Lebanon
torpedo boat
50 1977
(delivery unconfirmed)
1 1975
1960
CL-13 Sabre fighters 6 1980
(Canadian-built F-86 Sabre; private deal; 
seller unconfirmed)
Nestin class river 5 ?
mine sweeper
large patrol boats 
frigates
various aircraft
Kraljeca class 
Type 501 and 519 
large patrol boats
LOT landing craft
1959
1981-
84
1958
1958
1958
9East and West European ? 
weapon re-exports
including East German ZSU anti-aircraft guns
U.S. missile guidance ? ?
systems manufactured under licence in 
West Germany
training frigate
Nestin class river 
minesweeper
M55 À2 anti-aircraft 
gun
1981
9
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15) Libya
16) Malta
17) Mozambique
18) North 
Vietnam
19) Sudan
20) South 
Africa
21) Sweden
22) USSR
23) Zambia
G-2AE Caleb jet 89
Koncar class fast 4
attack boats
technical assistance ?
for air defence systems
R-2 MALA class two-man 6
submarine
Kraljvica class Type ?
501 and 519 large patrol boats
M55 A2 anti-aircraft ?
gun
Unidentified military ?
aid
small arms ?
naval and air force ?
training
Kraljevica class Types 2
501 and 519 large patrol boats
patrol boats 4
Sobet landing craft 2
1979-
90
on
order
mid-
1970s
1982
1970-
75
1962?
1962?
1969
1962
9
helicopter rotor heads ? ?
(Interavia reported in 1986 that South Africa 
was importing components for helicopter 
manufacture from Yugoslavia or Romania.)
R-2 MALA class one- ? ?
and two-man submarine
R-2 MALA class two- ? ?
man submarine
G-2 Caleb jet trainer 5
J-1 Jastreb fighter 4
1971
1971
G-4 Super Caleb (unspecified number ordered
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1984, delivery unconfirmed)
24) Zimbabwe M55 A2 anti-aircraft ? ?
gun
Non-state Weapons/service Quantity/value Year
military received
organisations
1) Rhodesia, unspecified military aid ? ?
liberation
movement
2) Angola, unspecified military aid ? ?
liberation
movement
3) Mozambique unspecified military aid ? ?
liberation
movement
4) South West Unspecified military aid ? ?
African
Peoples 
Organisation 
(SWAPO - Namibia)
5) Palestine Unspecified military aid ? ?
Liberation
Organisation
(Source for all non-state military organisations; Trond Gilberg, 
'Eastern European military assistance', in John F. Cooper and 
Daniel S. Papp (eds.). Communist Nations Militarv Assistance 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 87-8>.
Sources: Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms Transfers in the Third World,
1971-83 ; SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World; Russell 
Warren Howe, Weapons ; The Observer, 31 August 1986; Financial 
Times. 13 November 1987; SIPRI Yearbooks. 1985 and 1987; M.
Lambert, 'The second world of armaments - Chile and South Africa 
at FIDA 86', Interavia. May 1986, p. 493; Christopher F. Foss 
(ed.), J a n e 's Armour and Artillerv 1987-88 (London: Jane's,
1987), p. 750; Christopher F. Foss, Jane's Main Battle Tanks 2nd
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ed. (London: Jane's, 1986), p. 201; Jane's Armour and Artillerv 
1988-89 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's, 1988), p. 730; Jane's Fighting 
Ships 1986-87 (London: Jane's, 1986), pp. 814-7; Trond Gilberg, 
'Eastern European military assistance', in John F. Copper and 
Daniel S. Papp, Communist Nations' Militarv Assistance (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 87-8; The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, The Militarv Balance 1990-91 (London: 
IISS, 1990 ), pp. 112, 118, 146.
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Appendix 9 - Yugoslav Arms Imports
Below is a listing of major Yugoslav weapons imports which have 
been documented since 1950. This section, in conjunction with 
the earlier sections of this chapter dealing with Yugoslav arms 
manufacture and technology imports clearly illustrates the 
continued dependency of Belgrade on outside sources for its 
weaponry and military materiel.
Supplier Weapon/Service Quantity Year
Received
1) USA M-4 Sherman tank 630 1951-57
M-47 Patton tank 300 1951-57
M-3 and M-8 armoured ? 1951-57
personnel carriers
76mm M-18 Hellcat and ? 1951-57
90mm M-36 Jackson SP
guns
P-47 Thunderbolt 150 1951-57
fighter
F-84G Thunderjet 210 1953-57
f ighter-bomber
F-86 D/E Sabre jet 250 1953-57
fighter bomber
Fougueux class 1 1953?
corvette
Sirius class coastal 4 1953?
minesweepers
Ham class inshore 4 1953?
minesweepers
AGM-65B, air-to- 40 1982
surface missile (delivery not confirmed)
2) United Mk-6/-38 Mosquito 140 1951-57
Kingdom medium bombers
W-class destroyers 2 1956
542
USSR MiG-21 fighter- 
interceptors
Mi-8 helicopters
SA-2 Guideline
surface-to-surface
missiles
Barlock air search 
radars
T-54/-55 tank
Osa-1 class missile 
boats
Shershen-class 
torpedo boats
MiG-29 fighter
Ka-25 anti-submarine 
warfare helicopters
Yak-40 transport
An-12 transport
An-26 transport
SA-2 (SAM)
SA-3 (SAM)
M-1974 122mm 
howitzer
T-74 tank
AT-3 anti-tank 
missile
SA-7 portable SAM
130
70
?
1962-?
?
?
700
10
1964-?
1964-69
1964-?
(plus an additional 
10 which were built 
under license in 
Yugoslavia)
26
8
6
12
15
8
(battalions)
6
(battalions)
20
24
300
8
1988
?
?
?
?
?
1982
1983-84
1980-84
1983
543
(plus more on order)
4) Japan
5) Norway
SSC-3 ship-to- 
ship missile
Koni-class missile 
frigate
Kappa-6 rockets
Penguin-2 ship-to 
ship missile
20 1984-85
1980
mid-1960s
under negotiation
6) Canada CL-215 amphibian 1981
7) Switzerland PC-6 Porter transport
8) France Vukov Klanac class 
minehunters
9 1982
3 1957
(with fourth built in 
Yugoslavia with French 
assistance)
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance. 1988-89 ; Milan N. Vego,
'Yugoslav armed forces since 1968', RUSI Defence Yearbook 1983 ; 
James P. Nichol, 'Yugoslavia', in J.E. Katz, Arms Production in 
Developing Countries ; Pierre Maurer, 'United States - Yugoslav 
Relations, A marriage of convenience', Studia Diolomatica. Vol. 
38, No. 4, 1985; SIPRI Yearbooks. 1983, 1984,198 5,198 6,1987 ;
Jane's Fighting Ships. 1986-87 (London: Jane's, 1986), pp. 815-7; 
Christopher F. Foss, Jane's Main Battle Tanks second ed., (Lon­
don: Jane's, 1986), p. 200.
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Source: G.M. Steinberg, 'Israel: h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y  roule tt e , in
Michael B r z o s k a  and Thomas Ohlson, Arms  P r o d u c t i o n  i n  the Third  
World (London: Ta ylor and F r a ncis for the S t o c k h o l m  I n t e r a c t i o n a l  
Peace R e s e a r c h  Institute, 1986), pp. 177-8.
Production of small arms and other equipment in Israel
Type Producer
Source of 
technology Com ment
Pistols
Uzi 9-mm IMI Indigenous Derived from Uzi sub-machine-gun
Sub-machine-guns
Uzi 9-mm IMI Indigenous/
Czecho­
slovakia
In service since 1952; produced 
under licence in Belgium
Mini-Uzi 9-mm IMI Indigenous Small version for security forces
M achine-guns/rifles
Galtl 5.56- and 7.62-mm IMI Indigenous Partly derived from Soviet AK-47; 
in service since 1973; several 
versions
Smali-calibre ammunition
5.56-, 7.62-. 7.92-. 9-, 
I2.7-m m ; .30-06-, .50-in
IMI Indigenous
Large-calibre ammunition
75-mm IMI Indigenous For AMX-13 light tanks
76-mm IMI Indigenous For naval guns
90-mm IMI Indigenous For M-47/M-48 tanks
105-mm IMI Indigenous For all tanks/tank destroyers in 
Israeli Army and for export
155-mm IMI Indigenous For towed/self-propelled guns 
and howitzers
Artillery rockets
290-mm M LR  system lAl Indigenous Entered production 1984
240-mm rocket IMI Indigenous/
USSR
For captured Soviet BM-24 systems
Anti-aircraft weapons
TCM -20 lAl USA 2 X 2B-mm gun in several versions
TCM  Mk-3 lAI Indigenous/
USA
2 X 2(V25-mm gun; towed or on 
RAM-V-1 recce ACs
TCM -30 (Spider-M ) 
Anti-tank weapons
lAl Indigenous 2 X 30-mm naval CIW S
B-300 IMI Indigenous In production 1984
106-mm RCL rifle IMI (Indigenous) Recoilless rifle
Mortarsfl
52-mm IMI Indigenous
60-mm Soltam Finland Three versions
8I-m m Soltam Finland Four versions
120-mm Soltam Indigenous/
Finland
Light m ortar; latest version 
designated K-6
120-mm A-4 Soltam Indigenous/
Finland
Heavy m ortar
120-mm M-65 Soltam Indigenous/
Finland
Standard version
160-mm M-66 Soltam (Indigenous) Heavy m ortar; range: 9.6 km
continued
Type Producer
Source of 
technology Comment
Grenades
No. 5 (smoke) IMI Indigenous
No. 14 (offensive) IMI Indigenous
M26A2 (fragm entation) IMI USA
MA/AP-30 (rifle) IMI Indigenous
MA/AP-65 (rifle) IMI Indigenous Can pierce up to I3-mm arm our 
plate
MA/AT-52 HEAT (rifle) IMI Indigenous Can pierce 150-mm steel arm our
SGF-40 (smoke-rifle) IMI Indigenous
Mines
Ml A3 (trip 'flare) IMI Indigenous
No. 4 (anti-personnel) Explosive Ind. Indigenous
No. 10 (anti-personnel) IMI Indigenous
No. 12 (anti-personnel) IMI Indigenous
No. 6 (anti-tank) Explosive Ind. Indigenous
No. 25 (anti-tank) IMI Indigenous
No. 26 (anti-tank) IMI Indigenous
Other equipment
Tal-I Rafael Indigenous Cluster bomb
Tal-2 Rafael indigenous IR-homing smart bomblets
Mastiff Tadiran Indigenous Remotely piloted vehicle
Scout lAl Indigenous Remotely piloted vehicle
Lizard AAI Indigenous Light vehicle: to  be produced 
under licence in Italy-
CJ-5/CJ-6 M atmar USA Several versions incl. anti-tank 
and recce
M-325 Automotive
Ind.
Indigenous
“a u  types of m o n ar am m unition locally produced b> IMI and Soltam. 
Source: SIPRI.
Hppend 1
Source; Aaron Klieman, Israel s Global R e a c h . Arms 
Ü iplomacv (London: Pe rgamo n-B rasse y s, iyo5), p. ab.
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H O W  A R M S  P O L I C Y  IS M A D E
T he C alcu lu s  for A rm s Sales.
N E C E S S IT Y O P P O R T U N IT Y
D o m es tic  In p u ts
• E co n o m ic  s tag n a tio n
• D efense b udge t cu ts
• U n re liab le  ID F  o rd e rs
• G oal o f  full em p lo y m en t
• M ax im um  p ro d u c tiv e  cap a c ity
• In d u s tria l in fra s tru c tu re
• Sk illed  m an p o w er
• M ilita ry -in d u s tria l interest g ro u p
• P ro -a rm s  pub lic  consensus
• S u p p o rtiv e  governm ents
R eg io n a l In p u ts
• A ra b -ls ra e l co n flic t
• M idd le  E ast a rm s  race
• E nem y n u m erica l s u p e r io rity
• A rab  access to  su p p lie rs
• P rese rv ing  q u a lita tiv e  edge
• Low  A ra b  defense  m an u fac tu re
• B attlefie ld  experience
• R e p u ta tio n  o f  Israeli w eapons
S y s te m ic  In p u ts
• Israe l’s d ip lo m a tic  iso la tio n
• Few  sources o f  supp ly
• D ependence  o n  U .S .
• N o in te rn a tio n a l s a feg u a rd s
• “S ecurity  d ilem m a” o f  all s tates
• C o n v en tio n a l a rm s race
• T h ird  W orld  rearm am ent
• N o in te rn a tio n a l c onstra in ts
• Israeli com petitiveness
f ’Pi 'en J î
Source: hobert
James Everett 
(L e x i n g t o n , MA :
E . Harkavy and St ep hanie  G. Neuman, Israel . m  
Katz, Arms P ro du c tion in. D e v e loping Co un tr i 
Lexingto n Books, B.C. Heath, iy«4 ) , pp. EUh-V.
The Structure o f  Israel’s Defense Industries
Company and Subsidiaries Products Ownership
Israel Aircraft Industries, Inc.
Electronics Division 
Elta Electronics Ltd.
MBT W eapons Systems 
Tamam Precision Instruments 
Engineering Division 
Combined Technologies Division 
Golan Industries 
Mata
Precision Mechanism Ltd. (PML)
Servo Hydraulics Lod 
Ramta Structures & Systems 
Bedek Aviation Division 
Aircraft Mfg. Division
Rafael Armament Development Authority
Army Main Ordnance Factory
Koor Industries 
Electric & Electronics Co. Ltd.
Eltek Ltd.
Keren Electronics Ltd.
Koor Babcock Ltd.
Koor Systems Ltd.
Meeda Scientific Instrum ent Ltd.
Penguin Electronics Industries 
Telkoor
Telrad Telecommunications & Electronic Industries Ltd.
Koor Metals Ltd.
Agan Engineering W orks 
Gichner - Ramin Ltd.
Ham at Engineering 
Merkavim Metal W ork Ltd.
Vulcan Engineering
Israel Military Industries 
Ammunition Division 
Central Laboratory 
Chemical Division 
Forging Division 
Plant Operations 
Rockets Division 
Small Arms Division 
Tadiran Israel Electronics Industries
Israel Shipyards Ltd.
Elbit Com puters Ltd.
Soltam
M otorola, Israel Ltd.
AEL Israel Ltd.
Ormat Turbines Ltd.
Bet Shemesh Engines Ltd.
Israel Electro Optical Industry
Otiite Engineering Ltd.
Turbochrome Ltd.
I scar Blades Ltd.
Aircraft, missiles, ground equipment, 
ships. Components to whole systems of 
L a .i, Kfir, Westwind, Sea Scan, Arava, 
Gabriel SSM, Dabur and Dvora boats, 
Ramta AFV
Israeli government
Com puters, missiles, ordnance,
Shafrir AAM, David artillery 
computers, Mahat weapons control 
system
Ordnance—various
Telecommunications systems and 
equipm ent, fuses, data link systems, 
RD modules and amplifiers, military 
and airborne power systems, chemicals, 
metals, building materials
Small arms, am m unition, bombs, 
rockets, aircraft cannon, Uzi, Galil, 
tank cannon
Electronics, communications 
equipm ent, computers
Missile patrol boats, floating 
docks, ship repairs 
Com puters, simulators, 
displays
Mortars, artillery, ammunition, sights 
Communication equipm ent, C*
EW. ECM, signal, switching 
equipm ent, avionics
Turbogenerators
Jet engines and parts
Cameras, range finders, gun sights,
night-vision devices
Trucks, aircraft components
Engine turbines
Gas turbine compressors, turbine 
blades
Israeli government
Israeli government
Histadrut, but numerous subsidiaries with 
mixed ownership involving other firms, 
Israeli and foreign
Israeli government
50Ve GTE Sylvania (U .S.),
50% Koor Industries
Jointly owned by Koor and Clal
50Vg Control Data (U .S.),
50V, Elron
50V, Tampella (Fini), 50V, Koor
lOOV, M otorola (U.S.)
37V, Amer. Electronics Labs,
37V, Siemens (FRG), 26V, Tadiran
n.a. V, Turbomeca (Fr)
Israeli government
50V, Tadiran, 50V, Federmann Group
Bank Hapoalim and a U.S. Company
Chromalloy America
TRW (U.S.), V, n.a.
Israeli Discount 
Bank Investments
Appendix 1: c on t.
I'he :tructure of Israel's defense industries, continued
Astronautics CA, Ltd.
Urdan Armor Plant 
Hayes Ltd.
Eljim Ltd.
Eltek Ltd.
Automatic Coil o f  Israel Ltd. 
DECSYS Computers Ltd.
Beta Engineering & Development
Intel Israel
SDSI Scientific Data Systems, Israel 
Sci Tex Corp.
Landseas, Israel 
Laser Industries 
Mennen Electronics 
Metal W orking Laser Ltd. 
Science-Based Industries (Technion) 
Israelectra Ltd.
Pioneer Enterprises Ltd.
Arand
lltam
Teledyne Intercontinental 
Fibronics Communications 
Islambola Electronics 
Vishay Israel
Avionics, cockpit displays
Tank armor
n.a.
Computers
n.a.
Electronics, mechanical components 
Computer parts
Mine and other detection devices
Computer circuits 
n.a.
Optical systems 
Electronics, computers 
n.a. 
n.a.
Com puter welding 
n.a.
Computers, electronics 
n.a.
Computers
Computers
Electronic control systems
Computers
n.a.
n.a.
100% Astronautics Co. o f America 
Clal subsidiary
Aarhus Clefabrik (Den), % n.a.
100% Control Data (U.S.)
67% Control Data (U.S.)
Designatronics, Inc., (U .S.), % n.a.
100% Digital Equipment Corp. (U.S.)
Joint venture: 54% Gerber Scientific (U.S.), 
46% Clal
100% Intel Corp. (U.S.)
Inform ation Magnetic Corp. (U.S.), % n.a. 
Itek (U .S.) % n.a.
Landseas C orp ., (U.S.), % n.a.
Locke Technology, (U .S.), % n.a.
Mennen Greatback Electronics (U.S.), % n.a. 
Metal W orking Laser In t’l, (U.S.), % n.a. 
Microwave Assoc. (U .S.), % n.a.
Swissbanks, % n.a.
Pioneer Systems (U.S.), % n.a.
Rand Inform ation Systems (U .S.), % n.a. 
Rand Inform ation Systems (U.S.), % n.a. 
Teledyne, Inc. (U .S.), % n.a.
VALTEC (U.S.), joint venture with Elbit 
Vecco Instrum ents (U .S.), % n.a.
Vishay Intertechnology
Sources: Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, J983; Gerald Steinberg, “ The Costs and Limits o f Independence: Defense Production in Israel,”  paper 
presented at annual meeting o f  International Studies Association, 25 March 1982, Cincinnati; Esther Howard, “ Israel: The Sorcerer's Apprentice," Merip 
Reports, no. 112 (February 1983), p. 18; and Neuman data.
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source: US G e n e r a l  A c c o u n t i n g  Utlice, U Ü  Asai stmnn* to tne tate
1 s r & G i. ( u n c e n s o r e d  versi on ot the draft  report release d on 2 4  
June lydJ ) .
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iource: Sto ckholm i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Peace Re s e a r c h  Instit ute, The
Arms Trade wit h the T h i r d  World (Stockholm: A l m q v i s t  and Riksell, 
1971), pp. 043-5.
Arms supplies to Israel
Date Number Item Supplier Comment
A iraaft
•
(1930) 21 NA T-6 Harvard USA
(1930-53) 60 DH Mosquito N F. 38 France Sold for scrap. u.c. $200
overhauled in Israel
(1931) (5) Boeing PT-17 Kaydet USA
1932 4 NA P-31 Mustang Sweden Surplus
1932 40 Fokker S-11 Holland
1933 20 DH Mosquito N F  38 UK I
1933 21 NA P-31 Mustang Sweden Surplus '
1953 14 Gloster Meteor F. 8 UK 1
1953 (5) Gloster Meteor T. 7 UK !
1933 (10) Piper L-18B USA
1953 (10) Piper L-2I USA i
(1933) (5) Max Holste M.H. 1321 France
Broussard
1934 • 6 Gloster Meteor N F  .13 UK
1933 13 Dassault Ouragan France
M D430
1935 24 Dassault Mystère IVA France
1936 43 Dassault Ouragan France Lost 10 in 1936
M D430
1936 36 Dassault Mystère IVA France
1936-38 23 Sud Vautour 2-A France
1937-39 24 Sud Vautour 2-N France
(1938) 2 Sikorsky S-33 USA
(1939) 6 '  Boeing Stratofreighter USA
(1939) (5) BeU47G USA
1939 24 Dassault Super Mystère France
B .2
(1939) 2 HUler UH-I2 A USA
1960 2 Convair PBY-3 A USA
Catalina
1960 31 Sikorsky S-38 USA
1960 6 Nord 2301 Noratlas France
1960-64 100 Potez/Bedck Magister France/ Built under licence; u-c.
CM 170 Israel $200000
(1961) 3 Sud Alouette III France
1962-64 72 Dassault Mirage IIl-CJ France
1963 2 Pilatus Turbo Porter (Switzerland)
1963 6 Sud SA-321 Super Frelon France
1968 48 Douglas A-4B Skyhawk USA
1968 7 Sud SA-321 Super Frelon France
1968 23 Fouga Magister France/W. Ex-Bundeswehr; refurbished
Germany by Sud Aviation
1968-69 20 Agusta-Bell 203 Iroquois Italy
1969 23 Douglas A-4B Skyhawk USA
1969 7 - Sikorsky S-65A USA
1969-70 30 McDonneO-Douglas F-4 USA
Phantom j
Missiles I
1936 (200) Nord SS. 10 France
(1962-64)(300) Nord AS. 30 France For use with Mirage
1963 288 Raytheon MIM-23A USA 1 $23 mn contract. 10-year
“ Hawk" loan at 3.3 % interest
1963 (130) Nord Entac F ran ce- ^
(1963) (130) Nord SS. 11 France
1966 100 + Matra Model R-330 France For use with Mirage
1968 128 Raytheon MIM-23A USA
“ Hawk"
1969 2 MD-660 France
1969-70 Sparrow USA For use with Phantom
1969-70 Bullpup USA For use with Phantom
Naval vessels
(1930) 1 Coastguard cutter USA Built 1927. Displacement:
2130 t.
844
A p p C-? n d .1 X 14 , c o n t
A r m s  s u p p l i e s  to Israel, c o n t i n u e d
Date Number Item Supplier Comment
(1950) 1 Patrol vessel USA Ex-US. Displacement: 
295-450 L
1950-51 2 M otor torpedo boat France Displacement: 62 t.
1952-53 2 ~ M otor torpedo boat France Displacement: 62 t.
(1952-55) 14 Landing c n f t USA Ex-US. Displacement: 1 of 22- 
60 L 1 of 230-387 t. 2 of 
143-309 L
1954-55 2 M otor torpedo boat France Displacement: 62 L
(1955) (2) Landing c n f t UK Ex-UK. Displacement: 143- 
309 L
1955 2 Patrol vessel UK Ex-UK; built in 1943. Dis­
placement: 46-54 L
1956 2 ■ Destroyer “ 2 ’* UK Completed 1944; refitted. Dis­
placement: 1710-2 555 L
1956-57 3 M otor torpedo boat Italy Built 1956-57. o.c. S 300 000. 
Displacement: 40 t
1956-57 2 Patrol boat W. Germany Built 1956-57. Displacement: 
96-109 L
1959-60 2 Subm arine, S ' class UK Completed 1945; refitted. 
Displacement: 815 L surface. 
1000 L submerged
1967-68 3 Subm arine. 'T "  class UK Completed 2 in 1944, 1 in 1945; 
refitted. Displacement: 1535 L 
surface, 1740 L submerged
1968-69 12 G unboat, “Saar”  type 
Armoured fighting vehicles
Fnn ce Displacement: 220 t.
1950-51 (50) Sherm an. Mk. 3 USA
1950-51 (25) Cromwell UK
(1954) 100 AMX-13 France
1955 (50) M-4 Sherm an France With 105 mm guns
1956 150 Sherman France After conversioo in Israel 
designated Super Sherman
(1957-64) 200 Centurion UK
(1961-63) (30) Pan hard 245 France
1964-66 200 + M-48 Patton USA/FRG Ex-Bundeswebr
(1965-66) 100 Centurion UK
(1967) 40 Centurion UK
(1968-69) 100 Centurion UK
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Source: Alex Mintz, 'The Mi 1itary-industria1 complex, American
concepts and Israeli realities', Journal of Conflict R e s o lution. 
Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1985, p., 629.
The Defense Sector’s Share in the National Economies 
of the United States and Israel — 1982 Data
U.S. Israeli
Percentage o f  labor force employed over 5 alm ost 25
in the defense sector
Defense sector em ployees 9 45
per 1000 inhabitants
Per capita defense expenditure ($) 800 more than 1400
Defense expenditures as a percentage 6.5 about 28
o f the GNP (including 9% for 
local purchases)
Share o f  defense exports in overall 3-4 abou t 1/4 o f
exports industrial exports
SOURCES: ACDA (1984), Mintz (1985).
a. Including the IDF, military industries, and the Ministry o f Defense.
i : u u e i  l U  . 1 i.
s o II r c: e : Signe L. a ndgren , Embargo D isim p 1 emen ted , Sou, t h A f r i. c a s
h 1 1 itary Industry (Oxford: OUF-' for SIPRI , 1 9 3 9 ) «
South Africa’s major weapons industry: 
the dependence on foreign military technology
T h e  a irc ra ft industry
Type F o re ig n  m ilitary  tech n o lo g y Stage o f know -how M eth o d  o f  d is im p lc m e n ta tio n
Im pala scries 1-3 C O IN  ligh ter arm ed 
tra iner
Italy U K  (M B  326) Stage 5:
F ro m  assem bly  to  m an u fa c tu re  
P ro g ram m e co m p le ted  19K6 
4(H) un its
L icence  1965
S o ld  as u n a rm e d  tra in e r '
Bosbok tra n sp o rt lia ison Ita ly /U S A  (A M -3 C ) Stage 2:
A ssem bly  o f 40 u n its  from  im p o rted  
c o m p o n en ts  
P ro g ram m e  co m p le te d  1975
L icence  1971 
S o ld  as light plane"
C 4M K udu tran sp o rt/lia iso n Ita ly /U S A  (A M -3 C . A L -60) Stage 2;
L ocal m od ifica tion  1973 
25 un its
P ro g ram m e  co m p le te d  1976
S o ld  as light p la n e '
M irage F -IC /A  je t f igh ter F ran ce  (M irag e  F - IC /A ) Stage 2:
A ssem bly  o f 48 un its  
P ro g ram m e co m p le ted  1977
S o ld  fo r ‘e x te rn a l defence" 
L icence  1971
P la n n e d  local p ro d u c tio n  o f  KH) 
s to p p ed  by  e m b a rg o
C heetah  je t figh ter F ra n c e /Is ra e l (M ira g c -3 ) Stage S:
Local redesign  
P ro to ty p e  1986
U noffic ia l tech n ica l c o -o p e ra tio n  fo r 
m o d if ica tio n  o f  47 M irage-3  still in 
serv ice
Alpha XH -1 g u n sh ip  h e lico p ter F ran ce  (A lo u e tte -3 ) Stage S :
L ocal redesign  
P ro to ty p e  1986
U noffic ia l tech n ica l c o -o p e ra tio n
T h e  m issile  industry
Type F o re ig n  m ilita ry  tech n o lo g y S tage o f  know -how M eth o d  o f d is im p lc m e n ta tio n
C actus su rfa c e - to -a ir F ran ce  (C ro ta le ) Stage 2:
A ssem bly  o f su b -assem b lie s
L icence  1964
D e v e lo p e d  in F ran ce  w ith  S o u th  
A frican  financ ing  an d  S o u th  
A frican  spec ifica tions  
S old  fo r ‘e x te rn a l defence"
S co rp ion  sh ip -lo -sh ip Israe l (G a b rie l 2) f Stage 2: 
A ssem bly
L icence  1974, to  a rm  12 R esh e f 
p a tro l b o a ts
K ukri a ir- to -a ir F ran c e /U S A /ls ra c I  
(M ag ic , S id ew in d e r)
Stage 5:
L ocal R D T & E  fro m  1964 
P rev io u s  V3 a n d  W hip lash  can ce lled  
K ukri redesign  1980 
In  p ro d u c tio n  1984
U nofficia l tec h n ica l c o -o p e ra tio n  w ith  
Israel
E xocet sh ip -lo -sh ip F ran ce  (E x o ce t) Stage 5:
L ocal redesign  1982 
U n d e r  d ev e lo p m en t 
P ro jec t uncon firm ed
U noffic ia l te c h n ica l c o -o p e ra tio n
A T M  a n ti- ta n k F ran c e /F R G  
(E n ta c .  M ilan . S S -1 1 )
Stage 5:
L ocal redesign  1984 
U n d e r d ev e lo p m en t 
P ro jec t uncon firm ed
B eliev e d  b a se d  o n  types  in use w ith  
A rm y
A rm oured  vehicles
f it ' p e i  ‘ '
Type F oreign  m ilitary  techno logy Stage o f  know -how M eth o d  o f d is im p lem en tation
Eland series 1-7 a rm o u re d  car F rance (P a n h a rd  A M L-bO/W ) Stage 5:
From  assem bly  to  m a n u fac tu re  o f 
INK) units 1966-S4
L icence  1963
N o t defined  as C O IN ' w eapon 
C la n d e s tin e  acqu isition
Rutcl series a rm o u red  car 
AC-UK) arm oured  car 
AC-2(KI a rm oured  car
B elg ium  F R G  
(S ibm as) 
B e lg iu m T R G  
(S ibm as) 
B clg iu m /F R G  
(S ibm as)
Stage 5:
Local redesign  la te  19N)s 
INK) un its  p rod u ced  
Prog ram m e co n tin u e d  
U n d er d e v e lo p m en t in 19X6. based  
on  R atel
C o n tin u e d  use o f im p o rted  
tech n o lo g y
Olifant main battle  tank U K /ls rac l (C e n tu rio n ) Stage 5:
Local redesign  1982
U nofficia l techn ical co -o p era tio n  
M od ifica tion  o f 250 C en tu rio n s  
orig inally  im p o rted  from  UK
Valkiri multiple rocket launcher Israel Stage 5 :
Local redesign  o f Israe li copy  o f 
S talin  o rg a n ' 1980 
In p roduc tion
U nofficia l techn ical co -o p era tio n
G-5/G-6 self-prop, long-range how itzer C an ad a /U S A /B e lg iu m /S w ed en Stage 5:
Local ad ap tio n  o f  fo re ig n -d esig n ed  
concep ts  
P roduction  s ta r t 1977
D e v e lo p e d  by Space R esearch  C o rp . 
in U S A /C a n ad a  and  Belgium  
acco rd in g  to  Sou th  A frican 
specification  
C la n d es tin e  acqu isition  1976
M ilitary  tru ck s/tran sp o rte rs
•
Type F o re ig n  tech n o lo g y Stage o f know -how M eth o d  o f d is im p lem en tation
Landrover. je e p U K Stage 5:
From  assem blv  to  m an u fac tu re  
1962-1980 (? )
L icence 1961; no t defined  as “C O IN  
w eapon"
Trax, jeep F rance  U K /U S A Stage 5:
Local design  
In p ro d u c tio n  1976 (? )
L icensed  eng ines from  C hrysler, 
L ey land  and  P eu g eo t; to  rep lace  
L a n d ro v e r  U K  rad io  
c o m m u n ica tio n  system
Samil series , trucks  
O ver 70 v a rian ts  including: 
Buffel A  PC 
B ulldog A PC  
R hino  tro o p  c arrie r
F R G /ls ra e l
V
Stage 5:
F rom  assem bly  to  m an u fac tu re  
R edesign  based  on  Sam il-20 . Sam il- 
50 an d  Samil-UK)
L icence  1964 
M ag iru s-D eu tz /U n im o g  
R e p o r te d  Israe li-designed  a rm o u r 
p la te
C o n tin u e d  use o f  im p o rted  
techno logy
Magnis series , trucks F R G /Jap a n Stage 5:
In p ro d u c tio n  1984
M erg er o f M agirus/N issan  
tech n o lo g y ; to  rep lace  Sam il
Sakom series , light trucks 
Sakom-5()
F R G Stage 5 : !
R edesign  base  o n  Sam il-50  1982
C o n tin u e d  use o f im p o rted  
techno logy
C asspir series tra n s p o rte r U n k n o w n Stage 5 : 
1972
R ep o r te d ly  d e v elo p ed  in 
c o -o p e ra tio n  w ith R hodesia
H ippo /R ibbok  tra n sp o rte r U n k n o w n Stage 5 : 
1976
R ep o r te d ly  d ev elo p ed  in 
c o -o p e ra tio n  w ith  R hodesia
Hppeillix Lont
I h i  M i l l s l i i p  i i u l i i > i i y
Type Foreign  techno logy Stage of know -how M eth o d  o f d is im p lem en tation
P 1558 large pa tro l boat 
Flexible to rp ed o  recovery  ship 
De A /m  tug
De S eys and De N o o rd e tugs
Navigator tra in ing  sh ip
87-tonne rescue launchers
N am acurra-class 5 -tonne  harbour 
patrol boa t
‘M inister o f D e fen ce -c la ss  
m issile-arm ed F A C
Voorirekker-Il o cean  racing  yacht 
Shirley-T h e lico p te r c arrie r 
Tafelherg a rm ed  h e lico p ter carrier
U nknow n
UK
UK
UK
U nknow n
FR G
U nknow n
Israe l/Ita ly
U nknow n
U nknow n
D e n m ark /ls rae l/S w itzerlan d
Drakensberg fleet rep len ishm en t vessel F R G  
Subm arine T ype-209 F R G
Stage.I:
O ne unit p roduced  1974-76 
Stage 2:
O ne unit p ro d u ced  1969 
Stage.’):
O ne unit p roduced  1978 
Stage 5 :
T w o units p ro d u ced  1961 a n d  1969 
Stage 5:
O ne unit p roduced  1964 
S ta g e !:
Produced  1961 and |962  
Stage 5:
R ep o rted  as local design ; 30 un its  
p roduced  1979
Stage 2:
12 units in p rod u c tio n  from  1978
Stage 5:
P ro d u ced  1983
Stage 5:
P ro to type  1982
Stage I :
C onversion o f aged  ta n k e r  1983-84 
P u rchased  from  D en m ark  1965
Stage 5:
O n e  unit p ro d u ced  1984-86 
First unit p lan n ed  1992
A rm e d  w ith B ofors guns
B uilt by foreign  subsid iary  D orm an  
L ong  (A fric a ) ; p robab ly  licence
B uilt by foreign  subsid iary  D orm an  
L ong  (A fric a ); p robab ly  licence
B uilt by G lobe  E ng ineering  W orks 
Built bv F red  N icholls
P ro b ab ly  licence 1961
FL 9 S A R  type built by K rdgerw erft
L icence 1974
A rm ed  w ith O to  M clara guns 
In N avy service
R ep o r te d ly  p roduced  for Israel;
U n confirm ed
M odification  o f im ported  civilian 
vessel
A rm e d  w ith Sco rp ion  m issiles and  
O e rlik o n  guns
A n n o u n c ed  as the  first naval vessel 
designed  and  built in Sou th  A frica
C la n d es tin e  acqu isition  o f b luep rin ts  
1985
R ep o r te d  techn ical aid a lso from  
C hile  and  T u rk ey
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